What's New
What's New
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-05-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-03
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from April 22 to 30, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Magway Region, Kachin State, Kayin State, Rakhine State, Chin State, and Mon State from April 22nd to 30th. Military Junta Troop committed to arresting the civilians and blackmailing the 2nd batch of Military Service in the Yangon Region, Mandalay Region, Magway Region, and Ayeyarwady Region. Military Junta arrested and used the local civilians as human shields in Magway Region, Kachin State, and Rakhine State.
Over 20 civilians died, and over 70 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 4 underaged children died, and 7 were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
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275.45 KB 271.73 KB 1.84 MB
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-03
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-03
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.84 MB
Local URL:
KM3.5.2024.pdf
KM3.5.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-05-03
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-03
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.93 MB
Local URL:
mal 3.5.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-05-03
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-03
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
23.34 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-05-03-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-05-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-02
Description:
"MIMU’s HDP (Humanitarian, Development and Peace Focus) Nexus “Who does What Where, When and for Whom” database, or 5W, is a tool tracking the implementation of humanitarian, development and peace focused projects to support coordination, planning and efficient use of resources. MIMU has conducted this exercise regularly in Myanmar since 2008. Information is currently compiled every six months based on reports provided voluntarily by contributing agencies.
The MIMU HDP Nexus 5W shows:
➢ which organizations (WHO),
➢ are carrying out which activities (WHAT),
➢ in which locations (WHERE),
➢ project status – whether planned, ongoing or completed (WHEN)
➢ project beneficiary focus (for WHOM) – whether focused on IDPs, IDPs and host communities, other vulnerable communities or are aimed to create further resilience and development in communities.
MIMU HDP Nexus 5W Products capture information on the presence of organisations and do not indicate the volume of assistance, the number of beneficiaries, or the extent to which needs are met or unmet.
Summary
The MIMU HDP Nexus 5W Comparison report compares results from August 2020 to February 2024, looking particularly at the impact of events in early 2021 on agencies’ reported activities over time.
2021 saw a significant reduction in the number of reporting agencies and activities compared to the previous round in August 2020:
Over 30% reduction in reporting agencies (from 213 agencies in Aug’ 2020 to 159/163 agencies in May/Oct 2021), mainly INGOs and NNGOs.
33% reduction in the number of projects reported countrywide (over 200 less projects) in 2021, with reductions mainly in Shan (over 100), Yangon (over 90) and Rakhine (over 60).
A significant reduction in the number of activities reported as ongoing - 43,428 less activities in May 2021, mainly in Tanintharyi (84% reduction), Shan east (58%), Mon (57%), Shan south (55%) and Kayin (50%), and 35,930 less activities in Oct 2021, mainly in Rakhine (18%), Chin and Shan south (11% in each), Tanintharyi (10%), Kayin (9%), Shan north (8%) and Mon (7%).
Suspension of activities was significant. The highest number of suspended activities were reported in May 2021 (19 times higher than in August 2020).
2023 and 2024 has seen increase in reporting agencies and reported activities compared to 2021:
About 1,000 more village tracts/towns reported ongoing activities in 2023 and 200 more in 2024 (86%-78% of VTs/Towns around the country), mainly in Agriculture, Education, Health and Protection as compared to 2021.
Less activities reported as suspended in 2024 (2% of total reported activities) compared to 2021 (around 10%) and Feb’ 2023 (1%) – this does not indicate however whether activities have ended/completed or resumed.
Overall, despite the higher number of reporting agencies over the past 12 months:
More activities were reported as “completed/ended” – 6,476 more completed/ended activities were found in Feb’ 2024 than Feb’ 2023. This change was particularly noted within Livelihoods activities, where one agency ended a project with a large number of micro credit activities in June 2023.
A lower percentage of total activities were reported at VTs/Towns level as “ongoing” – 8% less ongoing activities reported as active (from 86% in Feb’ 2023 and 78% in Feb’ 2024)
More suspended activities focused on Other Vulnerable Groups and IDP Focus (nearly 4 times increase in each group) in Feb’ 2024 compared to Feb’ 2023..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.18 MB
Local URL:
2024-05-02-MIMU_5W-Trends-en.pdf
2024-05-02-MIMU_5W-Trends-en.pdf more
Source/publisher:
UN Department of Global Communications
Date of publication:
2024-05-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-02
Description:
"(excerpt)
Myanmar
An update from Myanmar: Our team on the ground tells us they are concerned by the spreading of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech, especially in northern Rakhine State.
We fully support community leaders in Rakhine State, especially women, and youth, who are coming together and redoubling efforts to promote social cohesion amid increasing signs of tension and the risk of communal violence re-emerging in the current very volatile context.
Addressing the root causes of systemic discrimination and impunity in Rakhine State will be essential in establishing a sustainable pathway out of the current crisis facing Myanmar. The failure to do so will only fuel Myanmar’s vicious cycle of violence; that’s according to the UN team.
And we have, of course, been consistent in condemning all forms of violence against civilians in Myanmar, and we reiterate our call for the protection of civilians, including aid workers, in accordance with international humanitarian law, for the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
Format :
pdf
Size:
111.19 KB
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-02
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
7.07 MB
Local URL:
KM2.5.2024.pdf
KM2.5.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-05-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-02
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
4.19 MB
Local URL:
mal 2.5.24.pdf
mal 2.5.24.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-05-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-02
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.63 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-05-02-red.pdf
GNLM2024-05-02-red.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-01
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.81 MB
Local URL:
KM1.5.2024.pdf
KM1.5.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-05-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-01
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.89 MB
Local URL:
mal 1.5.24.pdf
mal 1.5.24.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-05-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-01
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
5.5 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-05-01-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-30
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-30
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.72 MB
Local URL:
KM30.4.2024.pdf
KM30.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-30
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-30
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.71 MB
Local URL:
mal 30.4.24.pdf
mal 30.4.24.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-30
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-30
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
5.85 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-30-red.pdf
GNLM2024-04-30-red.pdf more
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2024-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
Description:
"1. Introduction
Since the 2021 military coup[1], human rights violations are being committed against villagers by armed actors in Southeast Burma[2] with increasing intensity. Among these violations, incidents of torture of civilians have seen an alarming increase: in 2023 alone, 33 incidents involving at least 37 victims were reported to KHRG, mainly perpetrated by the Burma Army.[3] This physical and mental violence is used by the State Administration Council (SAC)[4] as a weapon of war. Villagers in locally-defined Karen State[5] are particularly vulnerable to abuse, when continuously arbitrarily arrested and detained, as the SAC punishes and intimidates them in retaliatory violence, failing to adhere to international legal norms and the rules of war. This systematic abuse is impacting the security, livelihoods and freedom of movement of villagers, and causing severe injuries, fear and trauma.
This briefing paper presents incidents of torture against villagers in Southeast Burma by the SAC and affiliated armed groups in the period between January to December 2023.[6] The paper begins with a brief overview of the context in which torture has been occurring across Southeast Burma since the 2021 coup. It then presents a factual summary of the incidents of torture in 2023, and discusses the trends identified in the reports received by KHRG, including the torture of civilians arbitrarily arrested on accusations of affiliation with armed resistance groups or to extract information about their activities; to intimidate and terrorise the population; and/or when forcing villagers to act as human shields or porters. The impact of torture on the communities is also presented. Finally, a security and legal analysis of the situation of these severe human rights violations is conducted, and policy recommendations are provided for stakeholders.
2. Contextual Overview: torture as a weapon of war in Burma
For decades, villagers have been mistreated by the Burma Army who have sought to impose their political and military will over civilian populations across Burma. Civilians have long been targeted as part of the “four cuts” strategy, which aims to destroy links between insurgents, their families, and local villagers by severing supplies of food, funds, intelligence and recruits to armed resistance groups.[7] Amid the civil war, which has been intensifying in Karen State in the past three years, human rights abuses against civilians abound, including killings, air strikes on civilian areas, indiscriminate shelling, landmine usage, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, widespread displacement, severe livelihood challenges, and barriers to education and healthcare.
The practice of arbitrary detention of civilians by the SAC is widespread in Burma, with approximately 20,240 political prisoners under detention across the country.[8] Under detention, civilians are highly vulnerable to abuse, mistreatment, or dire detention conditions, as the SAC fails to adhere to international law regarding the protection of prisoners and disallow the monitoring of conditions by lawyers or outside observers.[9] In rural Southeast Burma, villagers are frequently arrested and detained by SAC authorities in army camps, police stations, prisons, and checkpoints. In addition, villagers are often detained by soldiers in villages, on their plantations, or even their homes. Amid the ongoing conflict and the continued impunity enjoyed by armed actors, villagers are immensely vulnerable to extrajudicial killing, torture and mistreatment when detained in any of these circumstances and places.
The Burma Army has used torture for many decades, defined as the act of inflicting severe pain or suffering on someone to force them to do something or in punishment. Throughout the years, villagers have reported extreme torture including waterboarding, burning, cutting of body parts, hangings and burying underground, and torture has occurred both in detention facilities, in villages and forests, and sometimes publicly in charades of terror.[10] Some of these extreme methods are evident in the incidents documented in this briefing paper. Accusations of villagers being connected with armed resistance groups have been a common feature of torture in interrogation and punishment by the Burma Army throughout the many years of conflict. Ignoring international norms and regulations for the proper treatment of detainees, SAC soldiers inflict suffering on civilians under their captivity without recourse, to a degree which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity under customary international criminal law.
3. Factual summary: patterns of torture against villagers by the SAC and its impacts
This section presents evidence of the torture of villagers in Southeast Burma involving the SAC and SAC-affiliated groups. Since the 2021 coup, KHRG has received reports documenting 52 incidents of torture against villagers by the SAC military across our operational area.[11] In 2023 alone, KHRG received 36 reports detailing 33 of those incidents, and involving 37 victims of torture. Incidents of torture mostly occurred during arbitrary arrests; villagers were tortured as part of interrogation to extract information related to military objectives. Torture was also used against villagers in punishment for their alleged affiliation with opposition groups, either for being relatives, informants, or supporters of those groups, including suspicion of supplying them with food and materials. On other occasions, the SAC military tortured villagers in an abuse of power, to intimidate, terrorise and instil fear. Finally, villagers were also subjected to torture whilst being forced to act as human shields or porters by armed actors. Some instances of armed resistance groups operating in Southeast Burma torturing villagers have also been reported to KHRG, usually against those accused of being spies for the SAC, excluded from this analysis.[12]
a) Torture in interrogation to extract information
During the reporting period, the SAC military frequently arbitrarily arrested or detained villagers to obtain knowledge of local armed resistance groups’ activities. These arrests often occurred in the aftermath of attacks by resistance groups, as SAC soldiers sought to collect information on those involved. Torture was used to extract information or force confessions, and detention conditions were often dire. These interrogations also frequently happened publicly in villages, at checkpoints, on roads, or even in villagers’ houses. Many villagers who were arrested by the SAC were also forcibly disappeared, removed from protective measures or observation of their health or welfare by relatives or lawyers.[13] Villagers are at risk of being detained and subjected to intimidation and torture as they go about their daily lives, as the following incidents attest to.
On February 21st 2023, in search of People’s Defence Force (PDF)[14] members in the aftermath of fighting in the area, SAC soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[15] #603, led by Battalion Commander Hein San Htun, entered T’Hsee Theh Mee Lar Town, Than Tuang Way Thaw area, in Taw T’Htoo Township, Taw Oo District. The SAC soldiers arrested eight villagers who were taken to Than Taung police station, in Than Taung Town, where they were interrogated, beaten and punched. The SAC soldiers burned villagers’ houses and confiscated villagers’ belongings, including clothes and five motorcycles, which they burned altogether.
Later that day, five more villagers, three men and two women, from the same village were arrested by the SAC soldiers and questioned at the police station. All but one of the villagers were released shortly afterwards. As explained by a local person from T’Hsee Theh Mee Lar Town, a young villager was taken to an SAC army camp where he was interrogated and tortured before eventually being released a few days later. Villagers assumed that the SAC had found incriminating evidence related to other youngsters, possibly PDF members, on his phone.[16]
Villagers are arbitrarily arrested, and subsequently mistreated or tortured, in the aftermath of attacks against the SAC when soldiers search the area for those involved or who could have information on the attack. Travelling in the aftermath of attacks is therefore particularly dangerous for villagers. As explained by a victim of torture, that had taken place on January 6th 2023, in Dooplaya District: “They [the SAC] suspected me of being a spy. The fighting was happening when I returned to the village to feed my pigs. They suspected me of being a spy and arrested me. They asked many questions. They tortured me. I told them I was nothing [a civilian]. I told them I was a normal villager”. He added:
“I was afraid but could not do anything. I did not know how to be afraid. I considered myself dead.”
When the SAC interrogated him, he was kicked and stabbed by a knife several times.[17]
On another instance on March 26th 2023, at about 3 pm, Saw[18] A---, an 18-year-old villager, from Aa--- village, Aaw P’Lah village tract[19], Hsaw Htee Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, was arrested by SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #20, who are based in Nyaunglebin Town, on suspicion of participating in a recent bomb attack along with six other villagers. Saw A--- was travelling by motorcycle to buy a duck to eat when he was arrested in Ba--- village. Saw A---’s mother, B---, was informed of her son’s arrest by other villagers living in Ba--- village. After hearing of the arrest, B--- and her husband went to find him: on March 27th at LIB #20 army camp and on March 28th, at Baw Bi police station. Saw A---’s parents had to provide the SAC soldiers with food and 20,000 kyat [9.50 USD[20]] for the cost of tea to be permitted to ask for information about their son. The SAC soldiers at Baw Bi police station told the victim’s parents not to worry about their son because he would be released soon after interrogation, if found not guilty. After he was released, Saw A--- explained to his mother about the brutal torture he had to endure: he was beaten in public relentlessly by the soldiers soon after his arrest before being taken to the police station, where he was again tortured during interrogation. Others from Ba--- village, who were also arrested along with Saw A---, reported that several villagers were also subjected to torture by the SAC.[21]
On another instance on September 18th 2023, after fighting and air strikes in T’Ko Teh village tract, Waw Ray Township, Dooplaya District, a 50-year-old villager named U[22] C---, from Ca--- village, K’Leh T’Khon Teh village tract, was arrested by the SAC soldiers when he returned from a displacement site to his village to feed his livestock. After the arrest, the SAC soldiers beat and punched him. Due to the severe injuries caused, he had to undergo medical treatment.[23]
Incidents of arrest and torture are also common at checkpoints. On November 16th 2023, a villager named Ko[24] D---, from Da--- village, Sa Htain village tract, Ler K’Saw Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, was apprehended by SAC soldiers from Infantry Battalion (IB)[25] #559 and #560 at a checkpoint on the road near Ea--- village. Ko D--- had visited Ea--- village to purchase items for himself, and was detained on the road while returning home. The soldiers stopped and searched him and his motorbike, and interrogated him. During the search of his motorcycle, the SAC soldiers discovered 20 tablets of yaba[26] hidden inside the seat. When questioned about these tablets, Ko D--- informed the SAC soldiers that they were for his personal use while working. However, one of the SAC soldiers said: “You are lying. I know you bought these drugs for the PDF”. During the interrogation, the SAC soldiers beat the villager. After, one of the SAC commanders threatened Ko D--- by saying: “You can’t tell anyone about this. If you do and we see this news on social media, we will kill you”. Since this incident, Ko D--- has been afraid to travel, and cannot eat well. Ko D---’s wife informed KHRG that villagers were living with fear and concern about their security.[27]
Many local villagers who have been impacted by the arrest and torture have been left with emotional distress and trauma. The escalation of arrests and torture in Southeast Burma has heightened villagers’ worry about being apprehended which is leading to fear of commuting to work or ensuring their livelihoods.
b) Torture and physical abuse as punishment
Villagers are arbitrarily arrested and detained often with no evidence provided for suspicion of affiliation with, or support to, local armed resistance groups; villagers are simply going about their daily lives. When detained on such accusations, SAC soldiers use intimidation, physical violence and other forms of mistreatment in punishment.
Saw E---, a young villager from Fa--- village, T’Nay village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District, was detained three times in November 2023 by the SAC, and at the end tortured to death. First, he was apprehended and detained at his farm, asked for his name and any military affiliation, and then forced along with some friends to guide SAC soldiers to Wa Wee Lay Road. The second time, he was arrested while travelling on a road with two friends, Maung[28] F--- and G---, and accused of having ties with Karen armed resistance groups after they were found carrying a battery with them, which villagers insisted was for personal use to charge their phones. The SAC soldiers gave these three young villagers 240,000 kyat [114 USD] and instructed them to purchase food for the soldiers in Ga--- village, T’Nay village tract. G--- was kept behind with the soldiers. Shortly afterwards, the soldiers were attacked by Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[29] soldiers. Maung F--- and Saw E--- were too afraid to return because of the fighting. The SAC soldiers thought the three young villagers were implicated in the attack, even accusing Maung F--- of being a KNLA officer. As punishment, G---, still detained by the SAC military, was severely tortured. The SAC soldiers burned his face with fire, stabbed a knife at his back, and beat his head. The soldiers told him: “You guys are Kaw Thoo Lei[30] soldiers [KNLA]. You see! When your friends were just released, they [KNLA] tried to attack us. […] If your friends do not come back and [KNLA] attack us [again], I will bury your body in a standing position.” The village head from Fa--- village negotiated with the SAC, who asked for the money they gave Maung F--- and Saw E--- in order to release G---. G--- was released the same day and needed treatment and medicine for his injuries.
On November 24th 2023, at around 3 pm, Saw E--- was arrested one more time by this same SAC troop beside a plantation while he was going to meet his friends. He was detained alongside Saw H---, a villager from Ga--- village, T’Nay village tract, who had been arrested earlier; the two men were tied up together. Soon after he was detained, the SAC sergeant in charge gave soldiers knives and took Saw E--- to be tortured. They beat and kicked him and then cut out his eyes and cut his ears with knives. The soldier told him: “Last time [that Saw E--- was arrested], you took the money and after you left, you attacked us. And now, you come and sneak up on us again.” As they took out his eyes and cut his ears, they told him: “The eyes that snuck up on us and the ears that were eavesdropping.” During the torture of Saw E---, H--- was able to slip away and escape. He informed villagers in T’Nay area about what happened to Saw E--- and Fa--- villagers went to look for him nearby Meh Pray Hkee army camp. The SAC soldiers there told villagers that Saw E--- might had been killed during an attack by the KNLA and gave no more information.[31]
Saw H--- had been arrested on November 22nd 2023 while he was herding his cows in Ga--- area. The SAC asked him questions and also accused him of having connections with the KNLA soldiers. Saw H--- recalled:
“They [SAC soldiers] hit me with a machete and I was bleeding. They slapped me in the face. After that, they went to take a rope and tied me from the back. My hands were swelling, as the blood was not running [through]. It was so tight. I could not stand it anymore, so I asked the SAC sergeant to loosen the rope. I was a bit more comfortable when the rope was loosened.”
He was tied up together with Saw E--- on that night, after two days of arrest. When SAC soldiers questioned and tortured Saw E---, Saw H--- untied the rope by scrubbing it and escaped into the forest. After his escape, he was not able to sleep for several days due to fear. Since then, villagers are afraid of being arrested by the SAC soldiers so they dare not going to their farmlands or hill fields to secure their livelihood.[32]
On another instance, on the morning of July 9th 2023, villagers residing near the eastern part of the Pa Ra Lo river in Ler Doh Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, went to Kyauk Ta Ga Town to purchase food. SAC soldiers from LIB #264 detained them when they entered the town and apprehended 16 of the villagers, accusing them of transporting rice and other items to the PDF. Among the arrested villagers, three individuals were severely beaten by SAC soldiers, as reported by their family members. Despite being able to provide food for the detainees, the families were denied access to see them. During a subsequent meeting with village leaders on July 14th 2023, the family members expressed their desire to secure the release of the villagers but were too afraid to directly confront the SAC soldiers. In August 2023, these arrested villagers were released and many fled their villages, facing security concerns.[33]
On September 11th 2023 from 5 to 6 am, there was a fighting between PDF troops and SAC, involving over 30 soldiers from the Infantry Battalion (IB) #285 marching to Ja--- village, Pu Law area, Ler Muh Lah Township, Mergui-Tavoy District. After the fighting, the SAC indiscriminately conducted constant shelling into nearby villages and vicinities, up until 12:30 pm. This shelling resulted in the displacement of villagers. While fleeing, a 26-year-old villager named Maung K---from Ja--- village, Pu Law area, Ler Muh Lah Township, was arrested by the SAC. The soldiers tortured Maung K--- to death. They also arrested other villagers and brought them to Pu Law Town’s police station. Some villagers were released after a while.[34]
If a villager is arrested on suspicion of affiliation with an armed resistance group, it is common that their family members and close associates will also be targeted, in punishment. This creates much fear among villagers if a friend or family member is detained, regardless of any truth to the claims. In one incident in which a human rights defender was arrested, falsely accused of being PDF, and forcibly disappeared, his daughter feared being targeted herself: “After they arrested my father, I heard that SAC tried to look for the family members. They showed our pictures to people, and they asked people where we were. They also asked people about how many children my father has. They asked people whether we came back to Rb--- [the family’s hometown] or not. […] I think they wanted to arrest all my father’s family members because they wanted to make sure they could arrest every family member of my father. […] We have security concerns. We have to flee from place to place.”[35]
c) Torture as intimidation or as an abuse of power
Torture of villagers is also committed by the SAC and other affiliated armed groups with no clear military objectives discernible. These incidents can be seen as efforts to demonstrate that SAC soldiers have the power to act without fear of punishment from any legal mechanism. They can act with impunity, terrorise and intimidate villagers, and inflict pain on the civilian population, in a grave abuse of power.
For instance, in April 2023, Saw L---, a 30-year-old resident of Ka--- village in the K’Moh Thway area, Ler Doh Soh Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, was apprehended by SAC LIB #409, stationed at the Nga Pyaw Daw Wa checkpoint in Da Wei Town. Saw L--- was returning home by motorbike from escorting students to school in Da Wei Town. The SAC soldiers stationed at the checkpoint were intoxicated and called out to him, but he could not hear them due to the noise of a car engine and hence did not stop. Then, the SAC soldiers followed him by car and apprehended him in La--- village, located in the Htee Ler Klay area. Following his arrest, the SAC soldiers physically assaulted him using sticks. Saw L--- is an ordinary villager who earns a living by working on his hill field.[36]
In another incident, on August 17th 2023, Saw Ta Dah Win, an officer of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)[37] -affiliated with the SAC- tortured three villagers on a road located in Mee Kyain village tract, Hpa-an Township, Doo Tha Htoo District. The villagers were Saw M--- (49 years old), Saw N--- (23 years old) and Saw O--- (40 years old), from Na--- village, Mee Kyain village tract. These villagers work as daily labourers, selling gravel to support their livelihood. When the DKBA officer noticed a gravel pile obstructing the road during his travel to Ma--- place in Hpa-an Township, he confronted the villagers. Despite the villagers’ apologies and willingness to remove the gravel, the DKBA officer violently assaulted them. Saw M--- suffered a split lip from a wooden stick blow, and Saw N--- and Saw O--- were also repeatedly struck. This incident has left local villagers living in fear of similar mistreatment. The perpetrator, Saw Ta Dah Win, serves as an operation commander in a DKBA battalion led by Saw Bo Bee.[38]
SAC soldiers also apprehended villagers whilst they were undertaking their livelihood activities in fields and plantations. For example, on October 7th 2023 at 4:30 pm, SAC soldiers arrested and assaulted Naw[39] P---, from Oa--- village, Ma Htaw village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District. She was arrested by the SAC soldiers at her farmland located in Thwah Hkoh Law area, while she was herding buffaloes. Naw P--- was taking care of her three buffaloes because she thought it was a higher risk for her sons and son-in-law to do the herding work during this time of intensified conflict. When apprehended by SAC soldiers, they asked her random questions trying to obtain information about any armed resistance activities in the area, pointing a gun at her chest. Naw P--- was then taken to see the SAC commander at the SAC base in a forest at Wa May Kyoh place. Naw P--- does not speak Burmese, so it was challenging to communicate with the SAC soldiers, but she managed to convey that she was alone and had simply been herding buffaloes. Despite this explanation, however, she was still mistreated, tied up the entire night in the forest, leaving her wet, cold, and deprived of food. Later, the SAC soldiers offered snacks, which she hesitantly accepted, fearing potential harm. On the next day, at dawn, she was released.[40]
As has been demonstrated, villagers in Southeast Burma often face arrest and torture alongside other human rights violations by the SAC and affiliated armed groups whilst they are travelling, purchasing goods, or working. For villagers who must travel for their livelihoods, or to carry out other daily tasks, avoiding interactions with armed actors is impossible, especially since some events occur unexpectedly and there are many checkpoints on roads. Saw Q---, a 26-year-old villager from Pa--- village, A’Lu village tract, Kyeh Htoh Township, Doo Tha Htoo District, whose father was arrested whilst travelling for his livelihood as a day labourer, expressed his fears:
“Before the coup, we could travel freely. We did not hear about arbitrary arrests. After the coup, we are afraid to go to A’Lu Lay. We are afraid when we are travelling. We are concerned about the fighting that is going to happen. Before the coup, our livelihood activities were fine. Yet, after the coup, our livelihood is restricted”.[41]
d) Torture of villagers forced to act as human shields and porters
The SAC arbitrarily arrests villagers to force them to act as human shields or forced porters, accompanying troops as they travel on foot through contested territory. These acts may indeed be seen as torture in themselves, such as the hard physical labour of being forced to carry heavy loads whilst at risk of being attacked by armed groups whilst travelling. Moreover, villagers being forced to act as human shields are often mistreated and physically abused whilst under detention. They are also forcibly disappeared, isolated and cut off from communication with others. In 2023 alone, KHRG documented 13 incidents of use of human shields and forced portering, involving at least 97 villagers.[42]
In one reported incident, on March 20th 2023, 50 to 70 soldiers from SAC Light Infantry Division (LID)[43] #77 and other combined troops, entered Qa--- village and Ra--- village, Nah Tha Kway village tract, Moo Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District. The soldiers arrested 22 villagers in total, including four children aged between 6 to 17. The SAC released six villagers (including two people with disabilities) and took the rest with them as human shields. These arrested villagers were tied up and were forced to walk in front of the SAC soldiers and threatened that they would be killed if KNLA soldiers were to attack on the way. The next day, two elderly villagers were released but 14 villagers remained detained including the three children. One villager taken as a human shield in this incident, Saw R---, explained:
“After arresting us, they tied up our hands; 7-8 people in a set. They did not tell us where they were going to take us. They were so aggressive communicating with us so we dare not refuse to follow them once they arrested us. The soldiers said: ‘Don’t you dare to escape! If you do so, we will shoot you dead.’ How would we dare to escape when they are that aggressive? We dared not even move”.
The SAC soldiers confined these arrested villagers in a classroom of Ra--- village school, locking the door. For five days, these villagers endured living, eating, sleeping, and using a trash bin as a makeshift toilet in the cramped room. Once a day, the SAC soldiers would open the door, allowing the detainees to clean their hands and legs, and bathe. The SAC soldiers hung their clothes in front of the classroom where the villagers were detained so it would be targeted if attacked by KNLA soldiers. On March 24th 2023, the SAC released all of the villagers by tying them up in the forest.[44]
On July 9th 2023, SAC LIB #559 and #560, led by Commander Min Min Htun and based in the army camp in Ea--- village, Sa Htain village tract, Ler K’Saw Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, travelled to Da--- village. On their way, at around 9 am, they arrested Ko S---, a villager from Da--- village, and forced him to carry their ammunition. Ko S--- explained that he suffered from lower back pain and could not carry the bullets. Then, one of the SAC soldiers named Ko San Naing, told him: “Don’t talk nonsense. You have to carry bullets as we ask you to do so”, and continued to force him to carry their bullets. As they travelled, the SAC soldiers arrested whoever they saw on their way and took them as porters and human shields. Ko S--- reported to KHRG that the SAC arrested ten villagers in total, forcing them to carry their ammunition and walk in front of the soldiers. Among the arrested villagers were a three-year-old child and his mother. When they arrived at a plantation, owned by Ko T--- (a villager from Da--- village), they encountered Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA)[45] soldiers and fighting happened. The KTLA soldiers realised that there were also villagers with the SAC soldiers and so stopped firing guns and retreated. During the fighting, the SAC soldiers told the arrested villagers to crouch down but did not let them put down the ammunition they carried. None of the villagers were injured or hit by bullets during the fighting, nor were any of the soldiers. After the fighting, the SAC told the villagers: “You did a good job”, and released them all, leaving them to walk two hours home. Ko S--- stated: “They [SAC] would not have released us if any of their soldiers had died or had been injured.” Ko S--- and the other arrested villagers still feel afraid and panicked after being released: they worry and fear that they will be arrested again and killed.[46]
Villagers who were released or who managed to escape captivity suffer afterwards from the trauma and face recovery from injuries sustained during the torture. After being taken as human shields by the SAC in March 2023, Qa--- and Ra--- villagers, Nah Tha Kway village tract, Moo Township, expressed they were experiencing significant emotional distress. One of the victims from Ra--- village explained:
“Because of this arrest, we were afraid, and one of the children got sick [with shock]; it seems that this child was very afraid. Some elders also had to take medicine after returning to the village.”
The experience of being forced to act as a human shield is traumatic and this is compounded by the high frequency of these crimes: villagers know they may be targeted again. Some villagers who have been tortured and released need continued treatment due to their injuries. With the intensification of armed conflicts and difficulty working to get income, families are struggling to support the injured victims.
4. Analysis: Legal implications of the torture of villagers by the SAC
Villagers in Southeast Burma are individually targeted, assaulted and tortured by SAC soldiers in order to extract information about armed resistance groups, punished for alleged affiliation with such groups, intimidated and terrorised, or dehumanised when captured as human shields or forced porters. Following attacks by armed resistance groups, villagers have been common targets of retaliatory violence, as the SAC violently seeks to extract information and locate resistance soldiers in and around villages. Civilians face constant insecurity, frequently attacked while in their villages, on their plantations or farms, or on roads when travelling for essential livelihood activities. Any potential contact with SAC soldiers puts villagers at risk of ill-treatment. SAC soldiers fail to respect the basic rights, dignity and integrity of civilians, treating them as enemies and legitimate targets.
Endemic across the whole of Burma and escalating with increasing fervour, the incidents presented in this report are an aspect of the widespread and systematic arbitrary detention of civilians by the SAC, who often entangle the lines between civilians, political enemies and military targets. Under detention, whether held temporarily at checkpoints or confined in prisons, villagers are at grave risk of ill-treatment and torture. Even detention in one’s home can involve beatings, intimidation, and other torturous violence. The scale of the abuse of power by the SAC against civilians demonstrates their confidence in their own impunity.
Torture is defined under international law as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person to obtain information from them or a third party, to punish for an act committed, or suspected of having committed, to intimidate, coerce, or for any reason based on discrimination.[47] The protection against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is an absolute human right which upholds the individual’s right to the protection of his or her dignity and integrity, enshrined in Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).[48] In the incidents detailed in this briefing paper, the SAC tortured villagers to extract information about local armed resistance attacks or activities, and punish villagers accused of being affiliated with or supporting local PDFs. Other incidents also included in this briefing paper as evidence encompass violence and ill-treatment at the hands of the Burma Army.
Under international human rights law, these incidents evidence many violations of the 1948 UDHR,[49] including violations of villagers’ right to life, liberty and security, freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, and freedom of movement.[50] The prohibition is further recalled by other universal and regional conventions.[51]
Even though Burma is not a signatory to the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as one of the most universally recognised human rights, the prohibition of torture has acquired status of customary international law, thus creating an obligation erga omnes, owed to and by all states, to act against those who torture, even if a state has not ratified the relevant treaty.[52] Moreover, under international humanitarian law (IHL), the targeting of civilians violates the fundamental principle of distinction between civilian and military targets in the conduct of hostilities, as enshrined in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Articles 27 and 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians, and reaffirmed in Rule 1 of the ICRC Commentary of Customary IHL.[53] Any violation of these rights is qualified as a grave breach, allowing universal jurisdiction to bring the perpetrators to justice.[54] As further stated by Rule 90 of the ICRC Commentary, torture is prohibited in non-international armed conflicts, such as that occurring in Southeast Burma.[55] Moreover, Rule 156 of the ICRC Commentary qualifies torture as conduct that endangers protected persons and violates important values, such as by subjecting persons to humiliating treatment or forcing persons to undertake work that directly helps military operations of the enemy, as constituting war crimes.[56]
Under international criminal law, exemplified by Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,[57] torture as a war crime in a non-international armed conflict needs to meet the requirement of the 1984 Convention Against Torture: i) the instrumental purpose of the criminal act, and ii) the act of torture must be committed by, or with the involvement, of a person in a position of authority (public official, de facto organ of a state, or other non-private capacity).[58] The SAC’s acts of torture against civilians for their alleged participation in or support of armed resistance groups meet the requirements to be qualified as war crimes. Torture may also constitute a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(f) and, residually, (k) of the Rome Statute, when is committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population.[59] Notably, torture as a crime against humanity does not require an instrumental purpose, as the degree of aggression upon personal dignity and integrity is sufficient to make it a matter of international concern. Some of the incidents which occurred in the context of detention by the SAC may not have involved this purposive intent, but given their frequency and systematic nature, they may nevertheless amount to crimes against humanity.
5. Recommendations
For international stakeholders, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and regional and foreign governments:
Acknowledge the serious crimes committed by the Burma Army leaders and avoid endorsing or legitimising the State Administration Council (SAC). This includes refraining from entering into agreements with them, granting them official recognition, and inviting them to participate in international forums and functions. Support local civil society and community-based organisations (CSO/CBOs) and ethnic service providers that prioritise human rights, and work with them to strengthen support systems for victims. Support local CSOs/CBOs to expand psychological support programmes -in all ethnic regions and languages- for survivors, their families, and the communities to help them cope with trauma, uncertainty and fear. Listen to and support local and civil society organisations in their efforts to document arbitrary detention and torture in Southeast Burma, advocate for victims’ rights, and provide comprehensive support to ensure the safety and protection of witnesses who come forward to testify about arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. This support should include relocation, psychosocial support, legal aid, and financial assistance. Support efforts to hold the Burma Army leaders accountable for their vast array of crimes in impartial and independent courts, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Court of Justice (ICJ), and foreign national courts with universal jurisdiction. Broaden the scope of international investigations to include torture and arbitrary detention faced by civilians residing in Southeast Burma. Raise international awareness of the crimes of torture and arbitrary detention in rural Southeast Burma and explore actionable measures to deter and address the occurrence of these crimes.
Footnotes:
[1] On February 1st 2021, the Burma (Myanmar) military deposed the democratically elected government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD). The military transferred power to Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief of Burma’s Armed Forces. Based on unproven fraud allegations, the Burma military invalidated the landslide victory of the NLD in the November 2020 General Election and stated it would hold new elections at the end of the state of emergency. Elected President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi were detained, along with ministers, their deputies and members of Parliament.
[2] In 1989, the then-ruling military regime changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar without consultation from the people. KHRG prefers the use of Burma because it is more typically used by villagers, and since the name change to Myanmar is reflective of the military regime’s longstanding abuse of power.
[3] The terms Burma military, Burma Army, and SAC are used interchangeably throughout this report to describe Burma’s armed forces. Villagers themselves commonly use Burma Army, Burmese soldiers, or alternatively the name adopted by the Burma military regime at the time -since the 2021 coup, the State Administration Council (SAC).
[4] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma (Myanmar) and leads the Military Cabinet of Burma, the executive branch of the government.
[5] Karen State, defined locally, includes the following areas: Kayin State, Tanintharyi Region and parts of Mon State and Bago Region. Karen State, located in Southeastern Burma, is primarily inhabited by ethnic Karen people. Most of the Karen population resides in the largely rural areas of Southeast Burma, living alongside other ethnic groups, including Bamar, Shan, Mon and Pa’Oh.
[6] The present document is based on information received from February 2023 to February 2024. It was provided by community members in six out of seven districts of Karen State who have been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The code names do not correspond to the actual names or to coding used by KHRG in previous reports.
[7] KHRG, Undeniable: War crimes, crimes against humanity and 30 years of villagers’ testimonies in rural Southeast Burma, December 2022.
[8] Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP Burma), ‘Political Prisoners Post-Coup’ monitoring as of 15th March 2024, available at: aappb.org/
[9] AAPP (Burma), Political Prisoners Experience in Interrogation, Judiciary, and Incarceration Since Burma’s Illegitimate Military Coup, March 2022, pp. 6-11 available at: aappb.org/?p=20734
[10] KHRG, Undeniable, above, December 2022.
[11] KHRG operates in seven areas in Southeast Burma: Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton), Taw Oo (Toungoo), Kler Lwee Htoo (Nyaunglebin), Mergui-Tavoy, Mu Traw (Hpapun) and Dooplaya and Hpa-an. When KHRG receives information from the field, it organises data according to these seven areas. These are commonly referred to as ‘districts’ and are used by the Karen National Union (KNU), as well as many local Karen organisations, both those affiliated and unaffiliated with the KNU. KHRG’s use of the district designations in reference to our research areas does not imply political affiliation; rather, it is rooted in the fact that many rural communities commonly use these designations. For clarity, the Burmese terms for these districts are provided in brackets but do not correspond with the Burma (Myanmar) government administrative divisions.
[12] For torture incidents committed by the People’s Defence Force (PDF) and Kawthoolei Army (KTLA), for instance, see: KHRG, In the Dark: The crime of enforced disappearance and its impact on the rural communities of Southeast Burma since the 2021 coup, November 2023, pp.32-33.
[13] KHRG, In the Dark, above, November 2023.
[14] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma/Myanmar, which then formalised the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army.
[15] A Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) comprises 500 soldiers. Most Light Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw (or Burma Army) are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers, yet up-to-date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). LIBs are primarily used for offensive operations, but they are sometimes used for garrison duties.
[16] Unpublished report from Taw Oo District, received in March 2023.
[17] KHRG, In the Dark, above, p. 20
[18] ‘Saw’ is a male honorific title in S’Gaw Karen language used before a person’s name.
[19] A village tract is an administrative unit of between five and 20 villages in a local area, often centred on a large village.
[20] All conversion estimates for the kyat are based on the 18th March 2024 mid-market exchange rate of 1,000 kyat to USD 0.48 (taken from https://wise.com/gb/currency-converter/mmk-to-usd-rate).
[21] Unpublished report from Kler Lwee Htoo District, received in August 2023.
[22] ‘U is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name.
[23] Unpublished report from Dooplaya District, received in September 2023.
[24] ‘Ko’ is a Burmese title meaning older brother. It can be used for relatives as well as non-relatives.
[25] An Infantry Battalion (IB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up to date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the NCA. They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations.
[26] Yaba, which means ‘crazy medicine’ in Thai, is a tablet form of methamphetamine. Introduced to East Asia during World War II to enhance soldiers’ performance, methamphetamine has become increasingly popular in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia Vietnam, and in Burma where it is typically manufactured; see “Yaba, the ‘crazy medicine’ of East Asia” UNODC, May 2008 and KHRG, “Chapter: Drug production, use and the social impacts in Southeast Myanmar since the January 2012 ceasefire,” in Truce or Transition: Trends in human rights abuse and local response in Southeast Myanmar since the 2012 ceasefire, June 2014.
[27] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in November 2023.
[28] ‘Maung’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name.
[29] The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU).
[30] The term Kawthoolei (or Kaw Thoo Lei) refers to Karen State as demarcated by the Karen National Union (KNU), but the exact meaning and etymology is disputed; see: Jonathan Falla, True Love and Bartholomew: Rebels on the Burmese Border, Cambridge University Press: 1991.
[31] Unpublished report from Mu Traw District, received in January 2024.
[32] Unpublished report from Mu Traw District, received in January 2024.
[33] KHRG, In the Dark, above, p. 29.
[34] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in September 2023.
[35] Unpublished report from Taw Oo District, received in April 2023.
[36] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in June 2023
[37] In 1994, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) split from the KNLA over religious considerations. In 2010, the majority of DKBA troops transformed into BGFs, but one faction refused and changed its name to Democratic Karen Benevolent Army in 2012. In 2015, the DKBA Splinter Group split from this faction and reclaimed their original name, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army. It is active in Mu Traw (Hpapun) and Hpa-an districts, and it has not signed the NCA.
[38] KHRG, “Doo Tha Htoo District Incident Report: A DKBA operation commander tortured three villagers in Hpa-an Township (August 2023)”, December 2023.
[39] ‘Naw’ is a female honorific title in S’Gaw Karen language used before a person’s name.
[40] Unpublished report from Mu Traw District, received in November 2023.
[41] Unpublished report from Doo Tha Htoo District, received in July 2023.
[42] Since February 2021, KHRG has received at least 22 reports containing evidence of SAC soldiers using human shields, involving more than 564 villagers. See: KHRG, Shadow of Death: Use of civilians as human shields by the State Administration Council (SAC) in Southeast Burma since the coup, July 2023.
[43] A Light Infantry Division (LID) of the Tatmadaw is commanded by a brigadier general, and consists of ten light infantry battalions specially trained in counter-insurgency, jungle warfare, search and destroy operations against ethnic insurgents . They were first incorporated into the Tatmadaw in 1966. LIDs are organised under three Tactical Operations Commands, commanded by a colonel, three battalions each and one reserve, one field artillery battalion, one armoured squadron and other support units. Each division is directly under the command of the Chief of Staff (Army).
[44] KHRG, “Kler Lwee Htoo District Incident Report: Villagers arrested as human shields, and shelling and looting by the SAC in Moo Township, March 2023, October 2023”.
[45] The Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA) was founded on July 17th 2022 by Brigadier-General Nerdah Bo Mya. Nerdah Bo Mya, former Commander-In-Chief of the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), was dismissed by the KNU in 2022. KTLA operates in two districts in Southeast Burma, in KNU-controlled areas, namely Mergui-Tavoy and Dooplaya districts. In Dooplaya District, they operate in alliance with resistance armed groups. KTLA battalions in Mergui-Tavoy District are in conflict with both SAC and KNLA troops.
[46] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in July 2023.
[47] 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 1
[48] 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 5.
[49] 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
[50] 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3, Article 5, Article 9, Article 13.
[51] 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 7; and 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Art 14
[52] 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘Convention Against Torture’).
[53] The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, Common Article 3: ‘Conflicts not of an international character’; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 27 and Article 32; ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 1: The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants,
[54] 1949 Geneva Convention (IV), Article 146 and Article 147
[55] ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 90: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment.
[56] ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 156: Definition of War Crimes.
[57] 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7(2)(i).
[58] 1984 Convention Against Torture, Article 1
[59] 1998 Rome Statute, Article 7(1)(f) and (k)..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Reporting torture: resources, Human Rights and international relations
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Source/publisher:
Nikkei Asian Review
Date of publication:
2024-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
Sub-title:
Increased violence would be costly for all parties
Description:
"Recent battlefield gains by Myanmar's resistance forces indicate that the military regime which seized power in February 2021 is on the defensive.
Earlier this month, the junta lost control of Myawaddy, a trading center along the Thai border. Resistance groups also carried out drone strikes against targets in Naypyidaw, the capital, as well as the Defense Services Academy, near Mandalay.
It is an appropriate time then to assess Western support for Myanmar's resistance.
The conflict has strengthened ethnic armed groups, many of which were formed decades ago and are more ethnonationalist than democratic. How to handle these groups is a key issue for Washington, which is on the verge of implementing aid policies that risk exacerbating lethal divisions rather than promoting democracy.
The U.S. cannot bet on the collapse of the military regime, which continues to control major population centers. Yet it has held back from offering military assistance to the resistance, especially after Washington's unproductive experience in Syria's civil war. But the terms on which Washngton is offering nonlethal aid in Myanmar risk creating the outcome it has been seeking to avoid.
A $1.2 trillion funding package passed by the U.S. Congress last month raised this fiscal year's appropriation for Myanmar by 23% to $167 million. The expanded sum includes $75 million for cross-border aid and $25 million for nonlethal support to ethnic armed organizations and People's Defense Forces fighting the regime.
Washington has been here before. The language used in the appropriation was taken from a previous funding authorization relating to Syria, where nonlethal aid included body armor and intelligence about enemy troop positions. That appropriation led eventually to the covert deployment of lethal equipment.
The immediate impact of the U.S. move will be to irritate Myanmar's neighbors, who will see it as an intensification of American involvement in the conflict.
China has been hedging its bets by supporting both the military regime and several armed groups along the border. India and Thailand have also accepted military rule while allowing weapons and fighters to flow over their borders. None of them wishes to see greater U.S. entanglement.
Implementing the nonlethal aid program will cause headaches for U.S. bureaucrats too. While the U.S. is ideologically driven to support democracies overseas, it is understood now in Washington that Myanmar is more complicated than it appeared when democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi drove the international narrative.
The most powerful armed groups are organized along ethnic lines, entrenching long-standing differences about how to carve up Myanmar's territory.
Alongside them are People's Defense Force groups, formed by urban youth in response to the regime's brutal crackdown on street protests and strikes. They started with no arms or military training and have been able to wage conventional warfare only with the aid of the ethnic armies.
In the northwestern Sagaing region, where government forces recently have lost ground, every major assault on urban areas has been led by or involved significant participation by the Kachin Independence Army, the Chin National Defense Force or the All Burma Students' Democratic Front, which was formed after a 1988 uprising.
The U.S. has taken note, and in an unprecedented public acknowledgement of engagement with the resistance, State Department Counselor Derek Chollet announced on social media platform X last month that he had met with the leaders of a coalition of armed Karen, Kachin, Karenni and Chin groups and had offered congratulations on their "extraordinary efforts to pursue a federal democracy in Burma."
It is tempting for Washington to anoint the ethnic armed organizations as the new heroes of Myanmar. But the blood and soil nationalism that motivates them bears little resemblance to the Enlightenment values that are the pillars of the American republic.
Even in aiming to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar, such U.S. support is unlikely to make much difference given that Beijing is providing arms to both sides.
The armed ethnic groups vary in their allegiance to democratic norms and the level of internal democracy within their ranks. But the harsh reality is that Myanmar is moving toward ethnic cantonization.
The National Unity Government, a pro-democratic front largely operating from exile, has played a role in diplomacy and coalition building, but within Myanmar has had to rely mostly on the might of ethnic armies. Any peace settlement will have to reflect this balance of forces, which is likely to lead to the creation of ethnically based local administrations.
It is not in the interest of the U.S. or of Myanmar for Washington to increase the level of violence by bolstering armed groups engaged in combat. Nor would the U.S. benefit from trying to goad China deeper into the fighting.
While most of Southeast Asia gains from playing off China against the U.S., the most likely outcome in Myanmar would be more violence and death, creating the conditions for perpetual war. Some argue that splitting the country into many parts offers the best hope of a lasting peace, but recent violence between rival local councils in Chin state shows that division along ethnic lines is likely to lead to fresh complications.
The hard fact is that this is not a conflict susceptible to quick and easy solutions, and any U.S. attempt to determine outcomes is likely to fail. Washington should spend its increased appropriation for Myanmar on humanitarian assistance and strengthening civil society, not supporting more fighting..."
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Individual Documents
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Source/publisher:
The Statesman
Date of publication:
2024-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
Description:
"About three years ago, Asean leaders gathered in Jakarta for an emergency summit on Myanmar at which the FivePoint Consensus (5PC) – entailing the cessation of violence in the country, constructive dialogue among parties to the conflict.....About three years ago, Asean leaders gathered in Jakarta for an emergency summit on Myanmar at which the FivePoint Consensus (5PC) – entailing the cessation of violence in the country, constructive dialogue among parties to the conflict, the appointment of a special Myanmar envoy and the provision of humanitarian assistance – was agreed upon with the State Administration Council’s (SAC) senior general Min Aung Hlaing. The 5PC has since seen very limited progress. Airstrikes by the Myanmar military and fighting among various armed actors continue, leading to the displacement of more than 2.5 million people since the 2021 coup. Inclusive platforms for political dialogue have not materialized.
While Indonesia created a new precedent of meeting with various stakeholders across Myanmar, the Asean chair’s one-year tenure remains too short for significant breakthroughs. Hitherto, observers have described Asean’s 5PC as “failed”, “toothless”, “not appropriate”, and a “dead pact” and have said Asean centrality is “in tatters”. Nonetheless, there are three useful features of the 5PC. It is deliberately capacious: its points (except naming the AHA Centre) remain broad with room for interpretation. It is not a peace plan and was crafted to avoid binding the actions of any successive chair.
Second, the 5PC is what Asean member states believe gives Asean the standing to be involved in the Myanmar crisis. Many may disagree that any agreement from Min Aung Hlaing is required for Asean engagement, but it is nonetheless significant to Asean, committed to its principle of nonintervention. Without the 5PC, there would be no basis for Asean involvement. Third, the 5PC is a measure aimed at preventing major power rivalries around the Myanmar crisis by establishing a test case for Asean centrality. Consequently, the 5PC carries high stakes for Asean’s credibility in responding to the crisis through regional initiatives. Making progress on the 5PC is crucial.
Successive Asean chairs face at least three main challenges. The first is discerning a mediumterm strategy for Asean’s engagement with Myanmar. The 5PC was designed to address the immediate aftermath of post-coup violence. But the desired “cessation of hostilities” will never come without a minimum acceptable medium-term strategy, accommodating the Myanmar people’s visions for the future. Here, half measures aimed solely at cease-fires will make no progress. Second are the limits of time and operating within the one-year Asean chair timeframe. Sensemaking and trust-building are massive undertakings, as Indonesia discovered through its painstaking efforts.
The chair needs to understand facts, histories, and perspectives on the ground, then analyse the interests of domestic and regional actors, before finally devising its policies for the year. The first two stages might already take up the best part of five months, leaving a mere two to three months to craft its approach on Myanmar for the Asean summit. The third challenge is supplementing efforts at internal convening with external rallying. It must create space to bring together Myanmar stakeholders and simultaneously muster meaningful support from the international community.
Between Myanmar, Asean and regional actors, there remains a wide gap of understanding. Many Myanmar stakeholders do not understand Asean’s processes and limitations, and many Asean member states do not fathom the complex relations and perspectives among the Myanmar groups. Asean must continue to create the space to learn from the various relevant Myanmar stakeholders and seek the support of the major frontline states, namely China and India, for its efforts. It is time to rethink the terms of the chair’s special envoy to enable Asean to deal with the aforementioned challenges. After three years, it is clear that no chair has the capacity to deal with the issue alone.
In fact, it is unfair to leave the responsibility to the chair alone. Indonesia’s proposal of a troika mechanism is a nod towards the need for a sustainable, more permanent mechanism. In this respect, the creation of an Asean office on Myanmar follows sensibly. The office should focus on three main areas of the 5PC mandate – cessation of violence, delivery of humanitarian assistance and facilitation of stakeholder dialogues – to create the spaces and conditions for a nationbuilding process.
A troika-plus mechanism (one that includes key Asean countries that have the competence, leverage and persistence to engage) could see its members share a rotating coordinator role of the office, dividing up labour by issue, stakeholders or time periods. Importantly, the office must continue engagement with all stakeholders in Myanmar, not only with the Myanmar military, as its main modus operandi. Finally, domestic engagement will have to be balanced with efforts on the external front, where the office could coordinate international envoys and rally support for Asean’s approach. A new United Nations special envoy has been appointed, and fresh coordination of envoys is needed.
While the international community has given verbal support to Asean centrality, it must also be rallied to provide support through policy options, technical assistance, resources and political leverage. With a more permanent Asean office on Myanmar, a medium-term 5PC strategy can be built. This helps to avoid short-term, individual actions, such as elections organized by the junta or through the existing Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, that might derail medium-term objectives. The Asean strategy would ideally turn into a framework that coherently guides and shapes the chair’s efforts for the year and allows each chair to make piecemeal, sustainable progress on the crisis.
This framework should outline how Asean, with the full support of the UN Security Council, can help to achieve three key objectives: (1) a humanitarian cease-fire, (2) a negotiated transition and (3) the establishment of an inclusive federal democracy in Myanmar. These objectives cover short, medium and long-term goals. New procedures for implementation and milestones to measure progress toward the objectives must be developed.
As recently as December 2023, the 17th Asean Defense Ministers’ Meeting acknowledged the “need to develop concrete, practical and measurable indicators in support of the implementation of the FivePoint Consensus”. Thankfully, the 5PC is sufficiently broadly worded to allow flexibility in activities and implementation. The establishment of a permanent office in Myanmar, initiated by the current chair Laos, could be formalized by Malaysia and effected by the Philippines. The time to start is now.
(The writers are, respectively, director of research at the Surin Pitsuwan Foundation, Thailand; head of the Department of International Relations and coordinator for the Myanmar Initiative Program at the Jakartabased Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and executive director of the Institute for Strategy and Policy, Myanmar.)..."
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Source/publisher:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Date of publication:
2024-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
Description:
"ASEAN must shift away from its military-centric engagement with Myanmar. In doing so, it must embrace a process and posture that addresses underlying structural inequities.
The 2021 Myanmar coup differs markedly from those in 1988 and 1962, facing strong domestic resistance and international condemnation. The National Unity Government (NUG), seen as legitimate, counters the military’s authority, underscoring the coup’s failure to secure control or legitimacy, rendering it more an “attempted” than a successful takeover. To maintain and enhance peace, security, and stability, and to further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region is one of the purposes of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). Presently, a pivotal concern for ASEAN leadership pertains to discerning strategies to mitigate protracted armed conflict and engender sustainable peace within Myanmar. Concurrently, they must grapple with elucidating the underlying reasons for the ineffective implementation of the 5 Points Consensus (5PC) in resolving the Myanmar issue.
The deficiency in realising the 5PC can be attributed to a myopic focus solely on the immediate conflict spurred by the attempted coup, as orchestrated by Myanmar’s military. This focus has hindered solutions addressing the key requisites for enduring peace in Myanmar. In order to adhere to a coherent course of action, ASEAN leaders are compelled to address three fundamental inquiries: Can the Myanmar military engender genuine peace within the nation? Does the Myanmar military singularly possess the requisite capacity to stabilise and uphold the integrity of Myanmar? What are the underlying catalysts precipitating Myanmar’s protracted conflicts?
Can the Myanmar military engender genuine peace within the nation?
The basic premise that the Myanmar military has the capacity to establish sustainable peace within the nation is questionable. The longstanding pattern of armed conflict in Myanmar, exacerbated by military coups and subsequent insurgencies, underscores the ineffectiveness of military rule in being genuine partners in fostering lasting peace. Since assuming power in 1958, and subsequently in 1962 and 1988, successive military regimes have failed to engage, let alone quell, armed resistance movements, leading to the proliferation of ethnic armed groups and protracted conflict over the past six decades.
Despite sporadic attempts at peacemaking initiatives, such as ceasefires and negotiations, these efforts have largely been superficial and have failed to address the root causes of the conflicts. According to Bertil Litner, a prominent expert on the Myanmar Civil War, these peacemaking endeavours have primarily served to provide armed groups with temporary respite and economic opportunities for military leaders, rather than addressing underlying political grievances.
A few weeks ago, renowned conflict scholar Johan Galtung passed away. Galtung long advocated for approaches that deepen understanding and generate creative, integrative solutions to the most complex of conflicts. For example, Galtung’s conflict triangle theory outlines the limitations of ceasefire agreements in achieving sustainable peace. Merely halting hostilities without addressing structural and cultural conflicts, this theory suggests, can only yield negative peace at best. The point here is that the Myanmar military’s historical approach to peacemaking has not fostered enduring stability and does not include peacebuilding approaches for longer-term transformative change to address the drivers of conflicts.
To attain sustainable peace and justice in Myanmar, ASEAN leaders must listen to and engage with a range of Myanmar’s leaders, and work to adopt a comprehensive approach addressing direct, structural, and cultural aspects of the conflict. By acknowledging and addressing the multifaceted nature of the crisis, ASEAN can support and foster a conducive environment for lasting peace and stability in Myanmar.
Is the Myanmar military one entity with enough strength to stabilise and preserve Myanmar?
The assertion that the Myanmar military is the sole entity possessing sufficient capability to stabilise and safeguard the nation is unfounded. That the people of Myanmar have shown their rejection and resistance to military rule is well documented. Since 1 February 2021, during attempted military seizures of power, the nation witnessed annual widespread participation in silent strikes, underscoring public aversion towards military rule and its political entrenchment. Observable trends, such as dwindling enrolment rates at military academies and reports of coerced conscription among Myanmar’s youth further affirm the peoples’ disapproval of military involvement in governance.
Recent events, notably the coordinated offensive launched in Northern Shan State on 27 October, 2024, have unveiled the true limitations of the Myanmar military’s capabilities and morale. Contrary to prior perceptions of invincibility, these events have exposed vulnerabilities within the military apparatus. Assertions propagated by the Myanmar military regarding its indispensable role in maintaining stability within the nation are now recognised as baseless bravado.
The causes of Myanmar’s armed conflicts started from the era of the Burmese kings.
The genesis of armed conflict in Myanmar can be traced back to several historical antecedents, beginning with the era of the Burmese monarchs. The entrenched autocratic system, characterised by its phenotypical brutality, instigated protracted wars between the Burmese kingdom and various ethnic groups such as the Mon, Shan, and Rakhine. These conflicts have endured across generations, perpetuating a cycle of violence and discord. The colonial period and the upheavals of the Second World War exacerbated pre-existing cultural tensions, further exacerbating interethnic hostilities, and entrenching exclusionary governance systems for inequitable recognition and power sharing.
The journey towards Independence, marred by distrust between the dominant Burman ethnic group and minority ethnic communities, laid the groundwork for post-independence conflict. Today, Myanmar’s armed revolution is rooted in entrenched social conflicts, exacerbated by structural disparities. These encompass issues such as perceptions of federalism, resource allocation, territorial delineation, and the protection of ethnic and minority rights. The protracted armed conflicts spanning over 70 years, coupled with the oppressive, divisive tactics employed by the Myanmar military, perpetuate deep cultural and structural fault lines within the nation.
Achieving sustainable peace in Myanmar necessitates addressing not only ceasefires but also the underlying structural and social conflicts. As this line of analysis suggests, giving primacy for peace leadership to the military is not going to be effectual for lasting peace. Engaging with Myanmar entails a multifaceted approach aimed at resolving chronic social tensions and fostering social cohesion across diverse ethnic and cultural divides.
ASEAN leaders and the international community can look to the notable shifts in the dynamics of the situation in Myanmar led by a range of civil society, elected leaders, and EROs (ethnic revolutionary organisations) to help end the conflict. Contemporary Myanmar society exhibits distinct signs of transformation, such as a diminished reliance on the military apparatus, and a profound aversion to the divisive tactics of Burmanisation employed by the Myanmar military. This heightened awareness among the majority Burman populace, coupled with an increasing recognition of the suffering endured by ethnic minority communities residing in border regions, has catalysed a burgeoning sense of mutual understanding and empathy among Myanmar’s diverse ethnic groups.
Notably, the ongoing Myanmar Spring Revolution underscores a positive trajectory towards social cohesion, characterised by widespread sympathy and solidarity among the populace. Leaders of armed resistance factions, including the National Unity Government, evince a nuanced understanding of Myanmar’s structural conflicts and espouse a steadfast commitment to pursuing peaceful resolutions through dialogue.
Myanmar’s protracted peace process stands firmly rooted, with concerted efforts directed towards addressing underlying structural inequities. At the forefront of the revolution’s objectives lies the imperative to dismantle the entrenched authoritarian grip of the Myanmar military, thereby paving the way for the establishment of a new federal democratic state. In this context, the responsibility falls upon ASEAN leaders and the international community to re-assess its military-centric engagement, where no durable solutions can be found, and engage meaningfully in the transformative processes for peace and justice in Myanmar..."
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
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pdf
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7.23 MB
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KM29.4.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
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pdf
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3.54 MB
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Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.22 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-29-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
Dhaka Tribune
Date of publication:
2024-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-28
Sub-title:
Exploring the historical nexus between Cox’s Bazar and the Rohingya
Description:
"While classical literature extensively documents the historical trajectory of Cox's Bazar, contemporary discourse often overlooks its intrinsic association with the Rohingya refugees. It is pertinent to acknowledge that the annals of Cox's Bazar are inherently intertwined with the Rohingya narrative.
The incursion of Burmese forces into Arakan in 1784 precipitated a mass exodus of Rohingya and Rakhine ethnic communities towards the Ramu region (present day Cox’s Bazar), marking the inaugural instance of refugee influx into Cox's Bazar. Subsequently, in response to this humanitarian crisis, the British colonial administration dispatched Captain Hiram Cox to facilitate the settlement of displaced Rohingya and Rakhine ethnic people, in 1798.
The eponymous nomenclature "Cox's Bazar" thus derives from Captain Hiram Cox, symbolizing the historical intervention undertaken to address the exigencies of displaced refugees.
Prior to the year 1784, the geographical region presently identified as Cox's Bazar Sadar -- inclusive of its municipal boundaries -- alongside the Ukhiya and Teknaf sub-districts wherein contemporary refugee settlements are positioned, exhibited a notable absence of substantive human habitation. This area was characterized by sparse population density, with only a limited number of individuals inhabiting the territory corresponding to the current Ramu and Chakaria sub-district.
It is to be noted that the territorial expanse comprising the entirety of the Chittagong Division, encompassing Chittagong, Cox's Bazar, Rangamati, Bandarban, Khagrachhari, Feni, Lakshmipur, Comilla, Noakhali, Brahmanbaria, and Chandpur districts, along with the present-day Rakhine State, was historically under the jurisdiction of Arakan -- an autonomous domain distinct from Myanmar and Bengal.
The settlement and agricultural development of the entire Cox's Bazar district and the present-day Rakhine State of Myanmar were undertaken by the antecedents of the Rohingya populace. The vast tracts of land in these regions were previously uncultivated and sparsely inhabited. Following the Anglo-Burmese war in 1824 and with the implementation of British legislation such as the Waste Land Rules of 1839, 1941, 1863, and 1865, a substantial influx of individuals migrated to these areas with the intention of establishing residence and cultivation.
This phenomenon bears resemblance to the governmental policies of both Pakistan and Bangladesh, wherein efforts were made to settle Bengali populations in the hill tracts of Bangladesh.
It is imperative to acknowledge that the initial arrival of Rohingyas in Cox's Bazar was contemporaneous with the displacement of Rakhine ethnic groups, who were compelled to flee persecution stemming from the Burmese invasion. The vestiges of this historical displacement are discernible in the Burmese market locale within Cox's Bazar city, serving as a poignant testament to the shared heritage and collective tribulations endured by diverse communities in the region.
Prior to the year 1784, the geographical region presently identified as Cox's Bazar Sadar exhibited a notable absence of substantive human habitation
Rohingya ethnogenesis
The Rohingya populace residing in the Arakan region is discerned as a distinctive nation or ethnicity, emanating from the amalgamation of disparate cultures, races, and societal vicissitudes over an extensive historical continuum spanning millennia. The Rohingya ethnic identity is the product of a heterogeneous confluence of migratory movements and cultural amalgamations.
This amalgamation encompasses the historical influx of Arab traders and religious emissaries during the 7th to 9th centuries, Bengali migrants in the 15th century, Indian settlers during the 17th and 19th centuries, in addition to subsequent waves of Bengali, Chittagonian, and individuals from Portuguese, Moorish, Persian, Mughal, and Pathan backgrounds at various junctures in history. The Rohingya are recognized as indigenous owing to their possession of distinctive cultural mores, traditions, and values, which underpin their self-identification as a discrete socio-cultural entity. Despite their minority status within the national context, they persist as a coherent ethnic group within their domicile.
The Rohingya population is deemed indigenous based on their preservation of distinctive cultural traditions, customs, and values, which distinguishes them as a separate entity within their nation, thereby meeting the criteria for indigenous status within contemporary anthropological discourse.
People of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar
It is of scholarly interest to highlight those elderly inhabitants, specially who are aged 70 years and older, within the regions of Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong, exhibit a tendency to eschew the usage of the term "Rohingya" when referring to Rohingya refugees, preferring instead to employ the appellation "Burmaiya," signifying individuals originating from Burma/Myanmar.
One of the inclinations of this is that the senior citizens of Cox’s Bazar deemed themselves as Rohingya, ie the Rohingya citizen of Bangladesh and the refugees as the Rohingya citizen of Myanmar. It implies that the ethnicity is the same while their citizenships are different. One might argue, but there are some differences when it comes to language and culture. As we all know, language and culture evolve over a period of time. We don’t speak the same as we spoke, eg 20 years ago. Many of the terminologies have been incorporated in our culture due to cultural intermingling.
As someone rooted in rural life of Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong and exposed to various societal strata through familial and professional connections, I've observed striking parallels between the linguistic and cultural norms of marginalized communities in our villages and those of the Rohingya populace. While we've had opportunities for linguistic and cultural development, the Rohingya have faced constraints in this regard.
The linguistic discourse prevalent among marginalized communities and rural agrarians in our villages three decades prior bears remarkable resemblance to the contemporary linguistic vernacular of the Rohingya populace
The linguistic discourse prevalent among marginalized communities and rural agrarians in our villages three decades prior bears remarkable resemblance to the contemporary linguistic vernacular of the Rohingya populace, while the cultural paradigms embraced by the Rohingya community conspicuously parallel to those espoused within our societal milieu of three decades past.
While we've had the opportunity to develop our language and culture over time, through education, exposure to media like Bollywood and Hollywood, and the incorporation of new words and cultures, the Rohingya have not had the same chances. That's the fundamental difference I've noticed.
Historically, all countries in the world have borders with the same ethnic groups living on both sides of the border and Rohingya is no exception. Only difference is some Rohingya are Burmese by nationality, and some are Bangladeshi. The indigenous population of the Naga community residing within the territorial confines of India is recognized as Kachin within the borders of Myanmar, whereas the Indian Mijo ethnic group is designated as Chin within the corresponding geographical domain of Myanmar. Similarly, the autochthonous Shaan populace of Myanmar is denominated as Thai within the boundaries of Thailand.
Those individuals acknowledged as Rakhine within the Rakhine State are identified by the appellations Mogh within the regions of Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong, and alternatively referred to as Marma within the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Although the Durand Line delineates the demarcation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, it fails to segregate the Pashtun ethnicity across both nations, thereby preserving their ethnic identity notwithstanding the divergence in citizenship status. While national borders may be imposed to define the territorial sovereignty of individual states, the intrinsic ethnicity, along with its consequent ethnic affiliations and interrelations, persist beyond such delineations..."
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Source/publisher:
"Mizzima"
Date of publication:
2024-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-28
Description:
"Mizzima Editorial
Nobody envies the current predicament of Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing.
Military positions are falling and soldiers are deserting. Generals within the ranks are grumbling. Even some of his supporters are upset at his performance and speaking out.
If that wasn’t bad enough, the potential horror of a public-relations nightmare of Myanmar’s democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi possibly dying of heatstroke in a non-airconditioned “prison box” has prompted a scramble to rehouse her and the former president Win Myint, possibly in cooler and more salubrious living quarters, though their whereabouts have not been confirmed.
There is the tut-tutting of the dragon to the north. It has not gone without notice that China’s ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, recently met with former military regime strongman Than Shwe in Naypyidaw and members of the current junta with, no doubt, messages to “cool it” and seek solutions to the worsening Myanmar crisis that is threatening Chinese investments, infrastructure, trade and friendly relations. China is no fan of democracy but is certainly pragmatic.
Min Aung Hlaing hangs out in his ivory tower in Naypyidaw, a city purportedly built with astrologers’ advice to protect the “men in green” from foreign invaders but in reality to protect them from their own irate people – Bamar and ethnic – living in the Golden Land.
It is impossible to know what Min Aung Hlaing is thinking but it may be dawning on him that he made a grave mistake in the early hours of 1 February 2021 when he pulled the rug from under the duly-elected civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party and incarcerated its leaders. Now rumours are swirling that the junta may release some jailed members of the NLD, a party removed from registration ahead of what Min Aung Hlaing claims will be a “free and fair” – though “limited” – election in the not-too-distant future.
Min Aung Hlaing – by ripping the reins from Suu Kyi’s hands – misjudged the Myanmar people, particularly Generation Z, who had got used to expanding freedoms brought in under the Thein Sein regime, and picked up by the democrats in the NLD, in the wake of the 2015 election.
There is little doubt that he expected protests and then eventually a return to teeth-grinding normality as happened during previous challenges to military regime rule – particularly in 1988 and the early 1990s, and in the wake of the 2007 Safron Revolution. But Generation Z hit back under the banner of the Spring Revolution.
Now, one by one, the military junta’s pawns are being removed from the chessboard, army positions falling, military colleagues growing doubtful, the failures adding up, leaving the power-hungry general with shrinking options, and an opposition of Spring Revolutionaries growing increasingly bold, knocking at the gates.
But Min Aung Hlaing is wily. He will no doubt be hoping that he can play a game in which when “peace” is sought by Myanmar players and the international community, he and his generals will be at the negotiating table, with a clear intent to include his military in a future federal Myanmar.
But such a stance is anathema to the Spring Revolutionaries who are seeking to tear down revered General Aung San’s hard-won creation and build a new “federal union” with the military slate swept clean..."
Type:
Individual Documents
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Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-28
Sub-title:
Battlefield losses mount as the military junta has dragged the country back into poverty.
Description:
"While the Myanmar military regime’s battlefield losses throughout the country are grabbing headlines, the country’s dire economic crisis is further undercutting the junta’s capacity to wage war.
Myanmar’s military has suffered significant battlefield losses throughout the country since an ethnic rebel army alliance launched Operation 1027 nearly six months ago, raising questions whether the military is able to retake lost territories.
Fighting across eight distinct battle scapes, the military is unable to divide and conquer, and even its emphasis on first retaking the heartland of the ethnic majority Bamars, has faltered. In Sagaing, the junta has suffered significant setbacks and only recaptured one town. in southern Myanmar, two Mon resistance organizations agreed to work together as they prepare to go on the attack against the regime.
The junta offensive to recapture Myawaddy, the largest border crossing with Thailand is another case in point. Despite the city’s strategic importance, the military’s counter-offensive has stalled, with their force being reportedly ambushed and harassed.
While manpower issues have led to forced conscription, no less important is whether the regime is able to financially sustain its military operations.
Myanmar is broke, because the junta has broken the economy since its February 2021 coup.
The junta has eviscerated over a decade’s worth of economic growth. Between 2011 and 2019, Myanmar’s economy grew by an average 6% a year, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the region. Its poverty rate fell from 49% in 2005 to 25% in 2017.
While the economy has recovered from its 2021 nadir, when GDP contracted by 18%, it’s still down 12% since the coup. The World Bank’s cautious scenario for 1% growth in 2024 seems beyond reach.
Back into poverty
The military has dragged the country back into poverty through their own incompetence. Today, over 50 percent of the population of 55 million people has fallen back into poverty.
A recent United Nations Development Program report was more dire, citing field interviews that found 49.7% of respondents living on less than 76 U.S. cents a day. That number has doubled since 2017. The UNDP noted that the urban middle class has collapsed by 50% since the coup.
Inflation remains extremely high, at over 18 percent; though it reached 29% in mid-2023, according to the World Bank. Food prices have gone up threefold since the coup, with rice up from 60,000 kyat per kilogram to 180,000.
Firms, according to a World Bank survey, were operating at 56% capacity in 2023, down by 16% from 2022. That has diminished tax receipts.
Indeed, all sources of revenue, except natural gas rents, are down since the coup, according to the regime’s own data. This has been in part due to the economic conditions as well as the NUG’s active campaign of product boycotts, the establishment of alternate lotteries, and a drive to have corporations put their taxes into escrow.
Once cash cows, the two military-owned conglomerates Myanma Economic Holdings Ltd. and Myanma Economic Corporation are hemorrhaging funds. The former has since the coup failed to pay dividends to service members who are forced to invest a portion of their monthly salary.
Foreign investment, other than that from opportunistic Chinese and Thai businesses, is fleeing the country.
The once-thriving digital payments market is under intense military scrutiny, as they seek to control the flow of funds to the opposition.
Border crossings lost
The regime’s shortage of dollars has led to arbitrary currency controls, impacting importers and exporters. The kyat lost 16% of its value in the first quarter of 2024 alone, while the price of gold increased 22%.
The war has hurt the economy in another way. Myanmar-Now reports that the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta is formally known, only controls 11 border crossings, which has led to a sharp loss of customs duties.
The Kachin Independence Army has captured the Lweje crossing in Kachin State, leaving only the modest town of Kanpaiktee under junta control.
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army holds Chinshwehaw in Shan State, where the Chinese brokered an 80-20 revenue sharing agreement between them and the junta.
Although the SAC still holds Muse, the main border crossing with China, the Three Brotherhood Alliance has surrounded the town and controls the roads to Lashio and has begun collecting taxes.
The junta still controls Tachileik in southern Shan State, as well as a number of smaller crossings in Mon and Tanintharyi States.
In western Myanmar, the Arakan Army’s consolidation of power in northern Rakhine and opposition advances in Chin state mean that the junta has lost control of several of the border crossings to India and Bangladesh.
The loss of the Myawaddy, which has a population of 200,000, is an acute financial blow to the regime. With two bridges into Thailand’s Mae Sot, it was the largest border crossing in the country, accounting for $4.4 billion in trade since the February 2021 coup d’etat, roughly 23% of the country’s total trade.
Reuters noted a sharp decline in trade, especially exports, from April 2023 to March 2024. Bilateral trade fell by over 40 percent to $1.15 billion.
Hyperinflation threat
While junta officials are still manning the border gates, the Karen National Union and local border guards forces are in control of much of the city, and have pledged to “implement our plan to establish our administration one step at a time,” including customs.
The loss of border trade is so deleterious to the regime as their shortage of dollars – exacerbated by the U.S.-imposed sanctions on the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and the Myanma Investment and Commerce Bank, which handled Myanmar’s dollar transactions – has forced them to prioritize trade in local currencies.
The SAC has desperately stepped up economic cooperation with any willing partners. On April 9, the government met with a Russian-led trading bloc to discuss economic cooperation, including trade, investment, direct payments and the opening of direct flights between Moscow and Yangon. Turning to the Eurasian Economic Commission is a sign of how few choices the regime has.
What is not certain right now is the degree to which the illicit economy from areas controlled by pro-junta border guards forces is ebbing. Seeking to distance himself from Naypyitaw, Col. Saw Chit Thu recently rebranded his border forces as the Karen National Army.
There is intense fighting now outside of Shwe Kokko, one of the major scam centers along the Thai border, though opposition forces have not taken the enclave.
While the MNDAA has largely cooperated with the Chinese and helped return hundreds of Chinese fugitives, many of the scam centers along the Thai border – including KK Park I and II, as well as Family Park, Gate 25, Huanya, Xingua and Dongmei – remain open.
The regime has scapegoated a number of senior-level economic officials, including its seventh-highest official, Lt. Gen. Moe Myint Tun, and his aide. But that’s all they were, scapegoats, no different than the other corrupt and incompetent generals who remain.
Thus far, and defying predictions, the junta has not resorted to turning on the printing press at their banknote facility in Wazi. But as they become more cash strapped, they are likely to do just that.
On top of all the human death and misery the generals have caused in the conduct of a war that has largely targeted civilians, the threat of hyperinflation looms..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, Border Trade - general
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Source/publisher:
"Mizzima"
Date of publication:
2024-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-28
Description:
"The Myanmar Ambassador to United Nations Kyaw Moe Tun has called on the international community during the General Debate of the 2024 ECOSOC Financing for Development Forum in New York on 25 April to provide political and economic support for his country steeped in crisis.
The following is his statement:
Madam President,
Myanmar aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the ASEAN, the LDCs the G77, and China respectively.
Successful implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) and its seven action areas remains key to achieving the SDGs. The 2024 Financing for Sustainable Development Report highlighted fiscal constraints, debt distress and acute financing needs of many developing countries. The 4th International Conference on FFD should, therefore, strengthen international cooperation on addressing financing gaps, accelerate urgent actions to implement the 2030 Agenda and reform the international financial architecture.
As embodied by the AAAA, individual member states bear the primary responsibility of paving their own path toward realizing sustainable development while the international community provides an enabling environment and complementary support.
Unfortunately, in my country, Myanmar, the illegal military coup in February 2021 has dismantled our prospects of realizing the SDGs, even the future of our youth. The people of Myanmar are experiencing various grave sufferings due to the military junta’s atrocities. In this regard, I wish to highlight the following action areas of the AAAA in the country.
Domestic Public Resources: The deteriorating economic situation, inflation, rising food prices, worsening humanitarian situation, and mass displacement have forced the population to focus more on survival over investment and growth. UNDP reported that almost half of the population was living below the national poverty line in 2023. The middle class is disappearing, indicating growing polarization in society. Moreover, the crowding out of human capital investment threatens to undermine the future re-emergence of the middle class.
At the same time, the total breakdown of the rule of law and rampant corruption has exacerbated the illicit economy including online scams. UNODC reported that Myanmar became the world’s largest opium producer by the end of 2023. According to UNCTAD, up to $1,347 million in inward illicit financial flows have been generated from the potential exports of opiates.
Domestic and international private business and finance: The World Bank reported that financial sector reforms have also stagnated and are in danger of being reversed after the illegal military coup. Microfinance institutions were impacted by the subsequent domestic banking crisis, affecting 5 million customers including many MSMEs.
Besides, the recent unlawful forced conscription of the military junta has pushed many youth, including those working in the private sector, into hiding and fleeing the country.
In conclusion, Madam President, Myanmar is currently at the intersection of political, economic, and developmental crises. Cooperation and effective assistance from the international community should be conflict-sensitive and tailored to the aspirations of our people. It is crystal clear that ending the military dictatorship and building a federal democratic union is the only way forward to create a conducive environment to the successful implementation of the AAAA and the 2030 Agenda, above all to the peace and stability in Myanmar..."
Type:
Individual Documents
more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-28
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.32 MB
Local URL:
KM28.4.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-28
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.52 MB
Local URL:
mal 28.4.24.pdf
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Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-28
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.41 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-28-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-27
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
9.64 MB
Local URL:
KM27.4.2024.pdf
KM27.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-27
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.36 MB
Local URL:
mal 27.4.2024.pdf
mal 27.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-27
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.38 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-27-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
United League of Arakan
Date of publication:
2024-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-26
Description:
In the Arakha region, ongoing clashes persist between the terrorist fascist military council and the Arakha Army, notably escalating in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Ann, and Thandwe cities. The intensification of hostilities in Buthidaung Township is particularly concerning, attributed to the continued efforts to secure control over the Military Operation Command Center (MOC - 15).....
Amidst the fierce fighting and the imminent defeat of the terrorist fascist military council, they are resorting to inciting communal conflict among various communities in the Arakha region, exploiting differences in religion and nationality. Additionally, there is obvious manipulation by the terrorist fascist’s military council, evident in their deliberate training of Muslim extremists to stoke communal tensions and arming terrorist groups within the Muslim community, all aimed at furthering their agenda during the ongoing conflict......
Conversely, Muslim terrorist factions, whether acting independently or in collaboration with the military council, have initiated a series of attacks against the Arakha Army. Additionally, these groups have engaged in criminal activities such as theft and vandalism of non-Muslim public property, posing a grave threat to the lives and security of residents in the Arakha region. Incidents, including house burnings and direct threats to civilians, have become increasingly prevalent, particularly in the Buthidaung and Maungdaw areas. In response to these escalating threats, a curfew was imposed from 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM starting April 26, 2024.....
Residents of the Buthidaung and Maungdaw areas are urged to strictly adhere to the curfew from its initiation until further notice. Non-compliance will result in appropriate disciplinary measures. Residents must notify the nearest ULA administrative authorities for necessary travel and secure permission..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Rakhine (Arakanese) - cultural, political
Format :
pdf
Size:
124.34 KB
Local URL:
2024-04-26-UNA-Curfew-statement-en.pdf
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Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-26
Description:
"Info Birmanie and Justice For Myanmar urge the French government to swiftly investigate and freeze any assets of Theint Win Htet in France and revoke her visa.
On April 3, 2024, the French lawyers William Bourdon and Lily Ravon, acting as counsel for Justice For Myanmar, reported Theint Win Htet to French authorities requesting that they freeze any of her assets in French territory and consider her removal from France. They also wrote to HEC Paris urging the school to notify French authorities of Theint Win Htet’s sources of funds and to consider revoking her admission.
HEC benefits from its status as a Consular Higher Education Institution (Etablissement d'Enseignement Supérieur Consulaire-EESC), and as such the CCI Paris Ile-de-France is one of its main shareholders. On April 5, 2024, Info Birmanie and Justice For Myanmar wrote to CCI Paris Ile-de-France to raise concerns about Theint Win Htet’s access to the HEC, HEC Investment Club and International Consulting Club, the implicit support that her admission may imply from the many business leaders and their institutions who sit on the board of directors, and risks related to the use of the knowledge and network in the Myanmar context.
Theint Win Htet is a member of the founding family of Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies, a Myanmar military linked crony conglomerate and, according to her LinkedIn profile, has been admitted to HEC Paris, an elite French business school.
Shwe Byain Phyu Group is a major crony conglomerate with significant links to the Myanmar military, including a partnership to import petroleum with EU-sanctioned Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and interests in the mining and timber industries, which are now dominated by EU-sanctioned state-owned enterprises that are under junta control.
As a result of the family’s business with the Myanmar military junta and its conglomerates, the USA sanctioned Theint Win Htet, her brother Win Paing Kyaw, her parents Thein Win Zaw and Tin Latt Min, and Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies on January 31, 2024. In its sanctions announcement, the USA noted the role of Theint Win Htet, her brother and mother in “various companies that are closely related to the regime.”
In 2022, Shwe Byain Phyu Group took control of Telenor Myanmar, renamed ATOM Myanmar, putting the personal data of millions of users at risk amid the junta’s attempts to ramp up surveillance as part of its campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar.
Since the military’s illegal coup attempt, Theint Win Htet has acted as a shareholder and director of One Telecom Company Limited, a company established during Shwe Byain Phyu’s acquisition of Telenor Myanmar. In 2023, Theint Win Htet did an internship at ATOM Myanmar as a financial analyst.
Theint Win Htet has also held shares in Min Shwe Myine Enterprise Limited, a Myanmar petroleum company that formed a consortium in 2022 to “to find reliable suppliers from Russia to tighten Myanmar Russia partnership.”
Theint Win Htet’s expenses are supported by her family, according to Justice For Myanmar sources.
Info Birmanie and Justice For Myanmar call on the EU to urgently impose sanctions on Shwe Byain Phyu Group and its owners and directors, including Theint Win Htet, and to increase its targeted sanctions to block the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment and jet fuel, in coordination with its allies.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says:
“The fact that Theint Win Htet is able to study in France is a further sign of the serious lack of coordination in sanctions imposed after the military’s illegal attempted coup.”
“Theint Win Htet’s presence in France undermines EU sanctions on Shwe Byain Phyu Group’s business partners and undermines US sanctions on Theint Win Htet and her family members.
“France should swiftly investigate and freeze any assets in France belonging to Theint Win Htet or her family members and bar her from France.”
“For more than three years, the people of Myanmar have courageously resisted the military’s failing attempted coup. France should stand on the side of the people and send a clear message that Myanmar cronies are not welcome in its territory.”
Info Birmanie coordinator Johanna Chardonnieras says:
"The integration of a student at HEC under American sanctions for her links with the Myanmar military junta, which is responsible for serious human rights violations, shows the laissez-faire approach to Myanmar.”
"By sharing its knowledge and network with Theint Win Htet, HEC, its management, board of directors and shareholders are showing, at best, a flagrant lack of diligence in the admissions process, and at worst, a disregard for the Myanmar people's struggle for freedom.
"It is from France that Theint Win Htet continues to exercise her ownership in the Shwe Byain Phyu Group - generating revenue for the junta and contributing to the bloody repression of her fellow citizens. It is therefore up to the French government to take appropriate measures, as a corollary of its repeated condemnations of the military junta’s international crimes and exactions, and its repeated expressions of support towards the people of Myanmar.".....Info Birmanie et Justice For Myanmar demandent urgemment au gouvernement français d’enquêter sans délai sur les avoirs de Theint Win Htet en France, de les geler et d’évaluer s’il y a lieu de remettre en question son droit de séjour en France.
Le 3 avril 2024, les avocats français William Bourdon et Lily Ravon, agissant en tant que conseils pour Justice For Myanmar, ont signalé Theint Win Htet aux autorités françaises en leur demandant de geler tous ses avoirs sur le territoire français et d’envisager le retrait de son droit de séjour en France. Ils ont également écrit à HEC Paris pour demander à l’école d’informer les autorités françaises sur les sources de financement de Theint Win Htet et d’envisager de révoquer son admission.
HEC bénéficie du statut d’Etablissement d’Enseignement Supérieur Consulaire (EESC) et, à ce titre, la CCI Paris Ile-de-France est l’un de ses principaux actionnaires. Le 5 avril 2024, Info Birmanie et Justice For Myanmar ont écrit à la CCI Paris Ile-de-France pour faire part de leurs préoccupations concernant la présence de Theint Win Htet à HEC, HEC Investment Club et International Consulting Club, du soutien implicite des nombreux chefs d’entreprise et institutions qui siègent au conseil d’administration que cette admission à HEC pourrait impliquer, et des risques liés à l’utilisation des connaissances et du réseau mis à disposition de Theint Win Htet dans le contexte birman.
Theint Win Htet est membre de la famille fondatrice du Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies, un conglomérat en relation avec l’armée birmane. D’après son profil LinkedIn, elle a été admise à HEC Paris, une école de commerce française réputée.
Le groupe Shwe Byain Phyu est un important conglomérat qui entretient des liens étroits avec l’armée birmane, notamment un partenariat pour l’importation de pétrole avec Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL), une société sanctionnée par l’Union Européenne (UE), et des intérêts dans les secteurs de l’exploitation minière et du bois, qui sont désormais dominés par des entreprises d’État sous le contrôle de la junte, sanctionnées également par l’UE.
En raison des affaires de sa famille avec la junte militaire birmane et de ces consortiums, les États-Unis ont sanctionné le 31 janvier 2024 Theint Win Htet, son frère Win Paing Kyaw, ses parents Thein Win Zaw et Tin Latt Min, ainsi que le Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies. Dans l’annonce de ces sanctions, les États-Unis ont noté le rôle de Theint Win Htet, de son frère et de sa mère dans « diverses entreprises étroitement liées au régime ».
En 2022, le groupe Shwe Byain Phyu a pris le contrôle de Telenor Myanmar, rebaptisé ATOM Myanmar, mettant en péril les données personnelles de millions d’utilisateurs, alors que la junte tente de renforcer la surveillance dans le cadre de sa campagne de terreur contre le peuple de Birmanie.
Depuis le coup d’État de l’armée, Theint Win Htet est actionnaire et gérante de One Telecom Company Limited, une société créée lors de l’acquisition de Telenor Myanmar par Shwe Byain Phyu. En 2023, Theint Win Htet a effectué un stage chez ATOM Myanmar en tant qu’analyste financière.
Theint Win Htet a également détenu des parts dans Min Shwe Myine Enterprise Limited, une société pétrolière du Myanmar qui a formé un consortium en 2022 pour « trouver des fournisseurs fiables en Russie afin de renforcer le partenariat Myanmar-Russie ».
Selon les sources de Justice For Myanmar, les dépenses de Theint Win Htet pour financer son mode de vie et ses études en France sont prises en charge par sa famille.
Info Birmanie et Justice For Myanmar appellent l’UE à imposer d’urgence des sanctions au groupe Shwe Byain Phyu et à ses propriétaires et directeurs, dont Theint Win Htet, et à renforcer ses sanctions ciblées pour bloquer l’accès de la junte aux fonds, aux armes, aux équipements et au carburant d’aviation, en coordination avec ses alliés.
Yadanar Maung, porte-parole de Justice For Myanmar, déclare :
« Le fait que Theint Win Htet puisse étudier en France est un nouveau signe du grave manque de coordination des sanctions imposées après la tentative illégale de coup d’État de l’armée. »
« La présence de Theint Win Htet en France compromet les sanctions de l’UE à l’encontre des partenaires commerciaux du groupe Shwe Byain Phyu et les sanctions des États-Unis à l’encontre de Theint Win Htet et des membres de sa famille. »
« La France devrait rapidement enquêter et geler tous les avoirs en France appartenant à Theint Win Htet ou aux membres de sa famille et lui interdire l’accès au territoire français. »
« Depuis plus de trois ans, le peuple du Myanmar résiste courageusement à la tentative de coup d’État manqué de l’armée. La France devrait se ranger du côté du peuple et envoyer un message clair selon lequel les complices de la junte birmane ne sont pas les bienvenus sur son territoire. »
Johanna Chardonnieras, coordinatrice d’Info Birmanie, déclare :
« L’intégration à HEC d’une étudiante sous sanctions américaines pour ses liens avec la junte militaire birmane, responsable de graves violations des droits humains, est symptomatique du laisser-faire en place sur le dossier birman. »
« En partageant ses connaissances et son réseau avec Theint Win Htet, HEC, sa direction, son conseil d’administration et ses actionnaires font preuve, au mieux, d’un manque flagrant de diligence dans la procédure d’admission, au pire, d’un mépris pour la lutte du peuple birman pour la liberté. »
« C’est depuis la France que Theint Win Htet continue d’exercer son actionnariat dans le groupe Shwe Byain Phyu, générant des revenus pour la junte et contribuant à la répression sanglante de ses concitoyens. Il appartient donc au gouvernement français de prendre les mesures qui s’imposent, en corollaire de ses condamnations répétées des crimes et exactions commis par la junte militaire et ses déclarations répétées de soutien au peuple birman....."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military, Sanctions
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
122.79 KB 219.39 KB 154.32 KB
Local URL:
2024-04-26-Info-Birmanie-and-JFM-call-on-French-authorities-to-investigate-Theint-Win-Htet-en.pdf, 2024-04-26-Info-Birmanie-and-JFM-call-on-French-authorities-to-investigate-Theint-Win-Htet-bu.pdf, 2024-04-26-Info-Birmanie-and-JFM-call-on-French-authorities-to-investigate-Theint-Win-Htet-Fr.pdf
2024-04-26-Info-Birmanie-and-JFM-call-on-French-authorities-to-investigate-Theint-Win-Htet-en.pdf, 2024-04-26-Info-Birmanie-and-JFM-call-on-French-authorities-to-investigate-Theint-Win-Htet-bu.pdf, 2024-04-26-Info-Birmanie-and-JFM-call-on-French-authorities-to-investigate-Theint-Win-Htet-Fr.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-26
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.44 MB
Local URL:
KM26.4.2024.pdf
KM26.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-26
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.09 MB
Local URL:
mal 26.4.24.pdf
mal 26.4.24.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-26
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.9 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-26-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-25
Description:
"Acting President Duwa Lashi La Advocates Pragmatism and Unity in Addressing Public Issues.....Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing
Thann Reflects on Spring Revolution Victories and International Support.....National Unity Government Extends Congratulations and Solidarity to Wa State on 35th Anniversary.....Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing Thann Emphasizes Accountability and Care in Governance.....PDF Strikes Military Council’s Defense Factory.....National Unity Government Forces Intercept
and Neutralize 20 Military Council Officers.....Myanmar’s UN Ambassador Advocates for Youth Amid Military Council’s Forced
Recruitment.....Anti-Coup Committee Donates 50
Million Kyats to Aid Displaced People through National Unity Government.....People’s Defensive War Claims Lives of Nearly 30 Military Council Members.....Military Affairs Summary of Third Week of April, 2024..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Format :
pdf
Size:
5.11 MB
more
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-04-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-25
Description:
"The MAU tracks market prices in southern Sagaing Region. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market at the end of each month. The data include prices from Monywa (main market), Myaung (village), Shwebo (main market), Ye-U (village), and Yinmarbin (village). Data and product specs are available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Prices were very stable across the region in March with fewer price changes than in past months;
Rice prices were stable or rising just 2-3%, and cooking oil prices stabilized after last month's increases;
Vegetable prices drifted slightly lower, but vegetable price trends differed somewhat by market;
Meat and fish prices fell slightly in Monywa, but meat/ fish prices were stable elsewhere;
Prices for hygiene NFIs were very stable, continuing a multi-month trend for these products;
NFI prices were generally very stable, although Monywa and Shwebo saw some price movement;
Prices were most stable in Yinmarbin, locking in February's price increases there..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Format :
pdf
Size:
1023.6 KB
more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-25
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.87 MB
Local URL:
KM25.4.2024.pdf
KM25.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-25
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.14 MB
Local URL:
mal 25.4.24.pdf
mal 25.4.24.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-25
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-25
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.27 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-25-red.pdf
GNLM2024-04-25-red.pdf more
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-24
Description:
"Weekly Update Of National Unity Government ( 17 / 2024 )..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Format :
pdf
Size:
5.97 MB
more
Source/publisher:
East Asia Forum
Date of publication:
2024-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-24
Description:
"IN BRIEF.....In Myanmar, despite the government's efforts to block Facebook, continued access to the platform has been integral to maintaining freedom of speech among the population. Nonetheless, Facebook is criticised for facilitating the spread of harmful content and misinformation. There is an urgent need for an improved, responsible design on Facebook, including more proactive verification of political accounts, revisions to content management and compensation for harm resulting from its past policies.
In Myanmar, Facebook is the window to reality. In the early days of the 2021 coup, the Ministry of Transport and Communications imposed blocking orders on Facebook and WhatsApp. Most independent media have been extinguished amid financial and physical threats. Any disruption to Facebook access, relied upon by over half of Myanmar’s population as the country’s Internet, could be fatal to their freedom of speech.
But Facebook has also attracted criticism for facilitating the spread of information that violates human rights in the country. Despite their attempts to ban Facebook, the junta weaponizes it by propagating divisive rhetoric to attract military recruits and funding. In the wake of the February 2024 forced conscription law, a user reported that ‘all the information on Facebook right now is about how to escape [the] country’. In times of crisis, people may be especially susceptible to misinformation disseminated by military supporters.
The need for reliable news is as urgent as ever. This could be achieved if Facebook was more willing to embrace the principles of responsible platform design and remediation.
In 2021, a video of the detained former Yangon region chief minister, Phyo Min Thein, accusing opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi of corruption went viral. The video has been accused of being a deepfake or being filmed under duress. In an under-resourced nation with a limited public understanding of technological manipulation, algorithms should not be optimised only for engagement. In cases where timely fact-checking may be challenging, Facebook should ensure the availability of counter-narratives to combat bias and misinformation.
Information diversity requires an understanding of how algorithms prioritise and de-prioritise content. Notwithstanding internal misinformation policies and a promise to remove ‘advocacy of violence by Myanmar security forces’, Facebook’s page-recommendation algorithm has been accused of promoting pro-military content. As articulated in the Christchurch Call, algorithms should redirect users away from extremist content or promote credible counter-narratives.
To better recognise and encourage credible content, Facebook could develop a more specific version of its universal Community Standards in the form of ethical guidelines for political content in Myanmar. This requires actively engaging the myriad stakeholders — ethnic communities, experts, youth and diaspora — to develop a nuanced understanding of what is newsworthy, credible or harmful.
With a more tailored framework to bump up desirable — albeit less engaging — news, algorithms might be able to better prioritise diverse content and provenance over pure sensationalism. This goes a long way in helping people see the platform as a mere provider of information, rather than the peddler of truth.
Facebook should step up efforts to proactively verify the accounts of political parties and affiliated entities. Despite Facebook’s takedown policy against recidivists who post harmful content, detection may not be effective because the junta has thousands of soldiers spreading misinformation via fake accounts. Facebook should invest more resources in working at a grassroots level, such as with defectors already privy to the military’s information warfare tactics, to improve its detection mechanisms.
Due process mechanisms also contribute to transparency. Content takedowns are a double-edged sword that can chill extremist speech as well as lead to the over-removal of non-harmful posts.
All users deserve the right to appeal restricted content and access mechanisms that reverse erroneous decisions. In light of the limited digital literacy rate of certain user populations and over a hundred spoken languages in Myanmar, Facebook should devote more resources to training both human and automated moderators that are sensitive to linguistic and cultural nuances.
Platforms should be held accountable when improper content management leads to grave consequences. The Rohingya conflict exposed this need in 2021 when Facebook rejected a proposal for victim remediation on the basis that ‘Facebook does not directly engage in “philanthropic activities”’. In response, Ireland’s National Contact Point for Responsible Business Conduct called for Facebook to amend its human rights policy and an Oversight Board mandate to provide rehabilitation or compensation when Facebook is found to have contributed to human rights violations.
Given the gravity of misinformation amidst an ongoing civil war, social media platforms have no reason to shirk from providing rehabilitation after the fact or even resources to educate and empower its users.
One suggestion is for Facebook to divest some profits, particularly those obtained from military-affiliated extremist content over the years, to fund urgent humanitarian efforts that provide digital services and education. Additionally, in response to complaints from victims of doxing, especially women under threat of violence, Facebook could offer heightened account security and monitor disclosures of victims’ personal information across the platform for a period of time. Beyond philanthropy, these gestures could represent Facebook taking accountability for entrenching strife and recognising its power to mitigate harms.
Despite Facebook’s missteps in Myanmar, it is an essential tool in keeping the people in touch with one another and the outside world. This only serves to underline its responsibility to protect the safety of its users..."
Type:
Individual Documents
more
Source/publisher:
"The New Humanitarian" (Geneva)
Date of publication:
2024-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-24
Sub-title:
‘I think at least the UN agencies should sit down and listen to what it is.’
Description:
"On 16 March 2023, Noeleen Heyzer, then-special envoy of the UN secretary-general on Myanmar addressed the UN General Assembly. She gave a grim but routine update on the country’s civil war, outlining rising humanitarian needs and calling for international action to prevent further bloodshed. Then Heyzer said something more unusual.
“At the request of Myanmar actors, including key ethnic armed organisations, the [exiled government] NUG and humanitarian civil society organisations, I have supported their efforts to establish and convene an Inclusive Humanitarian Forum (IHF), which aims to open up operational space to deliver humanitarian aid through all available channels,” she told the Assembly.
But over a year on from that speech, Heyzer is no longer in the job and the IHF project has ground to a halt, even as the resistance groups that invented it gain more territory – providing more aid delivery possibilities for the UN and others.
In a frank and wide-ranging interview, her first since leaving the special envoy role in June 2023, Heyzer describes how she was first approached for help with the IHF by resistance groups after they were rejected by the UN’s emergency aid coordination body, OCHA; how she tried to drive it forward; and how the project eventually fell foul of UN territorialism.
The UN Myanmar country team is “orphaned… a structure that is left without overall direction and political cover”
After being vacant for 10 months, her special envoy position was finally filled a few weeks ago, on 5 April, by Julie Bishop, a former Australian foreign minister. But according to former UN assistant secretary general for Myanmar Charles Petrie, she joins a UN Myanmar team that has been “orphaned… a structure that is left without overall direction and political cover”. There is no in-country UN resident coordinator to lead the 20 UN organisations in Myanmar with various mandates. That role is shared among other staff.
Big ideas for aid delivery to Myanmar are needed now more than ever. An estimated 2.8 million people displaced and 18.6 million overall are in need of help this year, according to UN estimates.
Existing conflicts were deepened by a February 2021 military coup that has pitted the junta – known as the State Administration Council (SAC) – against an alliance of resistance groups that have been winning substantial territory in recent months. While resistance supporters are pleased to see the junta losing ground, some experts fear an increasingly desperate regime could become even more violent, worsening the humanitarian crisis.
Helping the people caught up in the war has been riddled with complexity, as many of its victims are in areas controlled by the resistance. The big humanitarian actors – particularly the UN – work with the permission of the junta, mainly delivering aid only within the territory it controls.
Critics of this policy told The New Humanitarian the best way to help those worst affected is through the sprawling network of civil society groups and administrative wings of the ethnic armed groups controlling much of the country, across international borders – efforts the IHF aimed to support. The approach of the UN, meanwhile, has been heavily criticised by Myanmar-watchers as, at best ineffective, and at worst supine and exacerbating the suffering of those caught up in the conflict.
Championing the IHF was Heyzer’s attempt to solve that riddle.
So in an era of UN promises to put affected communities at the centre of humanitarian responses – how did the IHF go from an outsider idea, to being championed by the UN’s most senior official in Myanmar, and back again? What does its failure to be accepted say about the shortcomings of the UN in addressing one of the world’s biggest humanitarian crises? And more pressingly, given the changing dynamics of the conflict, is it time to look again at the IHF, or at least at making aid more available to all parts of Myanmar?
A controversial proposal
The IHF was proposed by the Karenni National Progressive Party, the Karen National Union, and the Chin National Front – all longstanding ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) – and by the NUG’s Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. Other EAOs and civil society groups also supported the plan in a less official capacity and did not sign associated documentation, according to Heyzer.
Read more: What was in the IHF plan?
Born out of a frustration these groups had with the approach taken by the big humanitarian actors, particularly OCHA and ASEAN – the regional bloc tasked with leading diplomatic efforts – the IHF planned to put aid directly in the hands of the EAOs, and simultaneously heighten their political clout against the junta.
Many Myanmar observers saw the IHF as an imperfect but pragmatic step towards improving the humanitarian response. “It was basically the only game in town even trying to push a new direction on access or create a forum where [the] NUG had any real role,” said a well-placed source who requested anonymity to protect their career and contacts.
“I think at least the UN agencies should sit down and listen to what it is, and to understand what the… [resistance] groups are wanting to say,” said Dr Thinn Thinn Hlaing, Myanmar country director at the Tropical Health and Education Trust, an NGO. “I don't think it has even gone on to that listening mode because they think that it's an obstructive attempt to counter AHA Centre (ASEAN’s humanitarian arm) proposals. In fact, it's not like that at all…. It is meant to be complementing.”
Some ASEAN officials felt the IHF was being positioned as a competitor to their own process under the bloc's plan for Myanmar, known as the Five Point Consensus, according to a former adviser to the IHF, who was not authorised to speak to the media. This meant the bloc did not provide the “game-changing” support it could have, they added. The fourth point of the Consensus says ASEAN “shall provide humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre”, which works with the junta.
“It was basically the only game in town even trying to push a new direction on access or create a forum where [the] NUG had any real role.”
Despite Heyzer’s high-level advocacy and claims to include civil society, the IHF could not find universal support among campaigners.
For instance, Khin Ohmar, founder of the Progressive Voice civil society group, was critical of Heyzer and called the IHF a “misguided proposal”. In written responses to The New Humanitarian in February, Ohmar said the IHF did not recognise the junta as the root cause of violence, that the junta was included in the project's set-up, and that it “left out and neglected the participation and role of Myanmar's frontline humanitarian responders” in its development.
The former adviser, however, said the perception that the IHF collaborated with the SAC was a misunderstanding stemming from clauses in some of the proposals that envisioned two tracks of aid for Myanmar: the IHF and, separately, the junta-approved UN operations.
Ohmar also said the IHF aimed “to use humanitarian assistance to induce political results”, putting lives at risk “for the sake of a potential dialogue” by calling for humanitarian pauses that could be exploited militarily by the junta. This ignored “do no harm” principles of humanitarian aid, she added.
But the former adviser said the IHF suffered from not being widely understood, and that most observers didn’t realise it was a “genuinely localised initiative, developed and proposed by EROs (ethnic resistance organisations), NUG, and CSOs (civil society organisations)”.
“Some audiences misinterpreted it as a pet project of Heyzer and assumed that local actors were being organised to cooperate from the top down,” the former adviser added, defending it as a “rare example of a local request being taken by the special envoy to the UNSC, UNGA, secretariat and powerful states in the region” – actions “really valued by local actors as no other senior diplomats have been willing to do so”.
UN opposition
But even as the communications and coordination of the IHF was said by the former adviser to have been improving, Heyzer’s perceived ownership of it was causing tension with other arms of the UN.
OCHA – an agency that has made grand promises around prioritising the wishes of affected communities – is viewed as having been particularly hostile to the plan, and four sources flagged the suspicion that the agency had pushed for her dismissal.
“No one was going to run with [the IHF] once she was gone, which was the intention of her going,” said the well-placed source above who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The UN secretary-general’s office has denied any interference from OCHA. “The appointment of the special envoy is handled by the Office of the Secretary-General. It is not an issue in which OCHA is involved,” Guterres’ spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told The New Humanitarian in response to written questions. “Furthermore, in no way did OCHA work against or try to undermine Ms. Heyzer.”
Heyzer refused to name a specific agency but did say: “People were very turf conscious – [saying], ‘if she’s not doing her mediation on the national scale and then she takes on these things… does it mean she is moving into our territory?’”
Pressed further, Heyzer said: “There was fear I was moving into an operational space. I will stop there.” But she insisted this fear was not justified. “We were so small – there was no way in which I could be operational,” she told The New Humanitarian.
‘The bigger picture’
Whatever the cause of Heyzer leaving her position, it points, for some, to larger problems surrounding the UN’s Myanmar operations.
“There’s a broader picture of an invidious position that she was in, that the mandate itself wasn’t working, and clearly it was an indication she didn't have support from the Secretary-General’s office – that's the bigger picture,” said David Mathieson, a Myanmar analyst based in Chiang Mai, northern Thailand.
That Heyzer was not allowed “a certain latitude to try to figure some things out” as special envoy was indicative of “systemic dysfunction at a high level” in Guterres’s office, Mathieson said, adding: “It’s the natural product of empire-building within the UN, which should come absolutely no surprise to anyone who’s been involved in international humanitarian and development issues over the years.”
Heyzer said she “needed the UN to be behind me”. Asked if the institution was not supporting her, she replied: “It's hard, because the UN has so many conflicts… the secretary-general’s attention, the UN’s attention, is not focused on Myanmar, especially since ASEAN is asked to take the main role. That’s why... when I was doing… other initiatives, I found was that the UN couldn’t think out of the box.”
The UN disputes this narrative. “The secretary-general did provide full support to the former special envoy. He is grateful to Ms. Heyzer for her dedicated service to the United Nations and her tireless efforts to advance a peaceful and sustainable solution for the people of Myanmar,” said Dujarric.
Looking more broadly, The New Humanitarian’s interviews with over a dozen Myanmar analysts and aid workers suggest the UN has undergone a major crisis of confidence in Myanmar. Many sources blamed a lack of attention from Guterres, who, prior to Bishop’s appointment as the new envoy, was said to have outsourced diplomacy to ASEAN.
The perception of Myanmar as a low priority for Gutterres has been heightened by the absence of a resident coordinator. “The secretary-general doesn’t want an incoming resident coordinator to present credentials to [junta capital] Naypyidaw because the optics wouldn't be good,” said one aid worker at an NGO working near the Myanmar border.
Dujarric said an official was appointed as resident coordinator in 2023 but had not been deployed to Myanmar, and country team officials were doing the job “on a rotating basis”.
But without leadership, the country team is “lost on how to engage on what is an intrinsically complicated political environment”, said Petrie. Fixing the UN’s structures in Myanmar, starting with the “essential” appointment of the resident coordinator, is critical, he added.
Dujarric said Guterres “continues to focus on the situation in Myanmar” and “draws attention to the severe humanitarian, socio-economic, and human rights crisis”. The UN has “undertaken initiatives focused on improving visibility and fundraising efforts to relieve suffering in Myanmar”, including responding to civilian protection concerns and facilitating the safe delivery of humanitarian aid, he said.
“The UN response in Myanmar is well coordinated and guided by senior level leadership,” added Dujarric. “Furthermore, the close cooperation between the UN Country Team in Myanmar and the Office of the Special Envoy helps to contextualise operational considerations in line with ground realities, geopolitical sensitivities, and regional dynamics.”
Time for another look at the IHF idea?
If the IHF itself is dead, the idea that gave it life still has much support.
As the war is turning against the junta and the NUG and EAOs control more territory, Myanmar campaigners say the UN has less reason not to engage with the resistance groups for humanitarian purposes – the reason the IHF was launched in the first place.
Aid to Myanmar requires a “completely different approach” from the international community, said Petrie. “The UN can do it under a humanitarian mandate, [which] provides the cover to engage with all groups,” he said, adding that an asserted campaign to gain more understanding of “how civil society and different actors are dealing with the challenges in SAC and non-SAC areas, and [finding] modalities to provide support to the most vulnerable in all of these areas” could go a long way to restoring the UN’s relevance in the country.
To counter the “military’s manipulation” of the relief efforts, “we have been working for the establishment of a supplementary parallel mechanism to ensure the effective delivery of humanitarian aid through safe passages”, the NUG’s top humanitarian official, Dr Win Myat Aye, told The New Humanitarian. “The approach and ideas and the concept is the same” as the IHF, he added.
In public at least, the UN doesn’t appear to disagree.
“A mixture of response approaches by humanitarian organisations is required to expand reach,” said Dujarric. “No single entity can reach every part of the country due to the different areas of control and varying access constraints, and so there is a complex mosaic of different approaches by different actors in different areas of control and access.”
The IHF is not the only controversial aid initiative being proposed for Myanmar.
In late March, Thailand began deliveries under its own ASEAN-supported humanitarian corridor scheme, sending aid from Thailand to the Myanmar Red Cross.
Critics, including Tom Andrews, the UN’s special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, say these efforts are being controlled and manipulated by the junta.
“We know that the junta takes these resources, including humanitarian, and weaponises them – uses them for their own military strategic advantage,” Andrews told AP.
Thailand’s project “smacks of desperation”, and because of its alleged associations with the junta will likely struggle to attract funding beyond ASEAN, making it “hard to sustain”, Phil Robertson, deputy director of the Asia division at Human Rights Watch, told The New Humanitarian.
If the IHF is used to rebrand these efforts, “then it’s not worth the paper it's written on,” Robertson added. “However, on the other hand, if the Forum becomes a way to support humanitarian assistance cross-border from Thailand and India via local communities and organisations who have been active on the borders for years, then the whole concept becomes more interesting and important.”
It remains to be seen what changes, if any, the newly installed Bishop intends to pursue, but observers say a major push will be needed if Heyser’s vision of broadening aid access in Myanmar to rebel held areas is to become a reality.
As Robertson put it: “Without a UN special envoy to work on this, and help sort out the differing visions, players, and plans, the Forum will remain a moribund concept.”..."
Type:
Individual Documents
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Source/publisher:
"Fortify Rights"
Date of publication:
2024-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-24
Description:
"The Infliction of Mental Harm as Genocide Against Rohingya
Read the Report
အစီရင်ခံစာ ဖတ်ရန်
The popular imagination associates genocide with mass killing. But the Genocide Convention lists four other prohibited genocidal acts, including “causing serious bodily or mental harm.” International tribunals prosecuting genocide have focused more on serious bodily harm and have found serious mental harm difficult to define precisely. This study, “My Tears Could Make a Sea”: The Infliction of Mental Harm as Genocide Against Rohingya by Fortify Rights and the Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School, draws on quantitative data, eyewitness and survivor testimonies, and tools of social science to assess how inflicting mental harm can destroy a group of people in whole or in part. More specifically, by applying the law of genocide to this account of mental harm, it addresses an urgent question: Is the Myanmar military responsible for inflicting serious mental harm on the Rohingya people as an act of genocide to destroy them as a group?
“My Tears Could Make a Sea” will help governments, prosecutors, investigators, scholars, human rights groups, and aid workers better understand, and act against, mental harm as genocide generally and against Rohingya people. It includes more than 35 recommendations to relevant parties, including the Myanmar military junta, the National Unity Government of Myanmar, U.N. member states, the International Criminal Court, and humanitarian organizations providing aid to Rohingya genocide survivors..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Discrimination against the Rohingya, Genocide
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
18.9 MB 17.91 MB
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-24
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
7.25 MB
Local URL:
KM24.4.2024.pdf
KM24.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-24
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.28 MB
Local URL:
mal 24.4.24.pdf
mal 24.4.24.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-24
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
7.03 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-24-red.pdf
GNLM2024-04-24-red.pdf more
Source/publisher:
Qatar Charity (Qatar) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-04-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-23
Description:
"Qatar Charity (QC) continues to implement the agricultural ‘Livelihood’ project, launched in June 2023, aiming to alleviate the plight of Rohingya refugees residing on the Bhasan Char Island of Bangladesh. The project is benefiting 200 refugees.
The project has enabled the refugees to grow various vegetables at no expense, helping them fulfill their food needs. Additionally, it also allows them to sell the surplus produce to meet their other requirements. As part of the project, Qatar Charity covers all expenses related to agricultural production. Currently, 40 refugee families benefit from this project, cultivating an area of 2.86 acres of land.
Throughout the year, refugee families are able to produce a diverse range of vegetables that they consume in their meals.
The refugees expressed their admiration for the project. Jamila Khatun, one of the farmers involved in the project, said, "Accessing fresh vegetables was challenging in our camp due to limited supply and high prices. However, we have now overcome this obstacle and can meet our family's nutritional needs, enhancing our food security."
Another beneficiary, Mohammad Rafiq, stated, "We're delighted to be able to sell our surplus produce to fellow refugees and NGO workers on the Bhasan Char Island, generating income to purchase essential items for our families."
Rahima Khatun expressed gratitude towards Qatar Charity for providing them with land, agricultural resources, and technical assistance. She hopes that its support will extend to other refugees in need.
The local authorities also expressed their appreciation for the project benefiting the refugees. Mr. Mahfuzur Rahman, a high official of the Rohingya camp in Bhasanchar, said, "It is a very good initiative of Qatar Charity. The refugees have been producing fresh vegetables which meet their food needs. The project ensures the food security of the beneficiaries."
It is worth mentioning that Qatar Charity has carried out various interventions for Rohingya refugees. Its relief interventions in Bhasan Char benefitted 550,000 individuals in the last 3 years. It provided food and non-food aid to meet their essential needs..."
Type:
Individual Documents
more
Source/publisher:
Jesuit Refugee Service (Rome)
Date of publication:
2024-04-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-23
Description:
"“Echoes of displacement” is a video series about the daily life, dreams, and hopes of school-age girls displaced in Myanmar.
In February 2021, a military Coup and the resulting conflicts plunged Myanmar into a severe humanitarian crisis. More than 2.6 million people have been internally displaced (IDPs), including 2.3 million since the Coup d’État. Intensified fighting at the end of October 2023 forced over 600,000 people to flee their homes.
Life in Myanmar has changed ever since. Human rights and basic freedoms struggle to be guaranteed.
Education is suffering. Due to the ongoing conflict, schools are being attacked and many have been closed.
Being forced to flee from one place to another in search of safety prevents children from going to school regularly. Also, focusing on studying is hard because they work to help support their families.
In these contexts, providing access to humanitarian assistance including safe, inclusive, uninterrupted, and quality education not only fosters hope but also equips children with the necessary tools to build the future they wish for.
Fleeing to hope
When she was forced to leave school, she started working to help her family.
Now that she is back in class, she wants to have fun with her friends and make as many memories as possible.
(14-year-old girl, living in an IDP camp in Myanmar)
Unbroken spirits
Before leaving school because of COVID-19 and the war, she always participated in running contests organised by her school. She always won first or second prize.
She wishes that life will return the way it was before, and encourages young people of her age to keep going, no matter how difficult it may seem.
(16-year-old girl, living in an IDP camp in Myanmar)
Hope in the shadows
At the age of 26, she wanted to work as a nurse. After the Coup d’état, her life changed. Fear disrupted the peaceful life she knew.
Now she is committed to cultivating a culture of peace by calling for education to become a priority..."
Type:
Individual Documents
more
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-04-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-23
Description:
"This Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) is a suppliment to the MAU Market Price Report in South Sagaing Region. It provides township-level data on market functionality, activity, supply, and logistics. Data were collected through observation and KIIs with retailers during Feb. 21-27, 2024. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Security was poor in Myaung and Shwebo markets in March, but it improved slightly in Yinmarbin;
Activity grew in Yinmarbin, Monywa, and Ye-U, but the rise in customers and retailers was modest;
Supply remained generally good across the region, although it was poorest by far in Yinmarbin;
Fuel, medicine, and shelter NFIs were needed most, and supply was better for foods than for NFIs;
Shipping conditions and costs were largely stable, except for some small improvements in lead times;
Security took precedence over other challenges, but retailers generally reported facing few challenges.
Regional Overview
Market Functionality - Markets operated as usual, but security remained poor in some locations. Markets monitored were open and there were no reports of new damage/closures; however, markets in Myaung and Shwebo were still described as relatively unsafe.
Market Activity - Market activity grew slightly in several markets monitored in March. Customer and retailer activity increased in the Yinmarbin market in March, and Monywa and Ye-U markets also saw small increases in traffic. Market activity was unchanged in Myaung and Shwebo, where retailers mostly served nearby villages.
Availability of Goods - Goods remained available in markets, but fuel and medicines were still needed. Supply was good in most markets, but it continued to be poorer for NFIs than for foods. Supply of fuel, medicines, and shelter items was most lacking. Supply improved at the Yinmarbin village market, although it remained worse than other markets monitored. Availability of shelter NFIs worsened somewhat in March.
Transport & Logistics - Shipping conditions and costs were largely unchanged in March. Supply lead-times improved in Yinmarbin and Ye-U, but there were few other changes. Shipping costs in the region were stable.
Retailer Challenges - Safety and security took precedence over other challenges in March. Challenges related to transportation receded somewhat in March, but retailers continued to worry about cash access and especially security conditions. Monywa retailers reported more challenges than retailers elsewhere, while Myaung retailers reported fewer challenges.
Possible Interventions - Retailer interest in recieving support increased in March. Retailers across markets showed growing interest in recieving support to increase supply, possibly because retail opportunities increased as market activity grew. Ye-U retailers continued to show the greatest interest. That said, unlikely last month when there was more interest in fuel subsidies and peace cooridoors, in March retailers scarcely favored any one mode of support over another..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations
Format :
pdf
Size:
9.37 MB
Local URL:
2024-04-23-MIMU_Snapshot-MAU-Sagaing-en.pdf
2024-04-23-MIMU_Snapshot-MAU-Sagaing-en.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-23
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.32 MB
Local URL:
KM23.4.2024.pdf
KM23.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-23
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.24 MB
Local URL:
mal 23.4.2024.pdf
mal 23.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-23
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.56 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-23-red.pdf
GNLM2024-04-23-red.pdf more
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-22
Description:
"1. We have noted that military junta has forcibly recruited Rohingyas living inside Rakhine State as soldiers, provided them with military training, and equipped them with weapons with the intention of provoking communal conflict.
2. Similarly, we have found that the military junta has carried out malicious and cunning acts by making Rohingyas organize fake demonstrations, along with forcing them to act as if they oppose the Arakan Army, who are fighting against the terrorist military to escalate ethnic conflict.
3. In addition, the terrorist military has been blatantly burning and destroying homes of civilians and office buildings of international humanitarian aid organizations, as well as perpetrating other acts of violence in Buthidaung.
4. The National Unity Government strongly condemns the subversive acts that are destroying the peaceful coexistence of the people in Rakhine State. We make a special plea to the population to be cautious and mindful of the political tricks employed by the terrorist military to create ethnic conflict. We urge the exercise of inter-ethnic trust, mutual respect, understanding and tolerance..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
Format :
pdf
Size:
730.7 KB
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Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-22
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from April 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Kayin State, Kayah State, and Shan State from April 15th to 21st. Military Junta Troop used chemical toxic bombs in Kayin State. Military Junta and police were shot in Myitkyina Prison in Kachin State and 4 people including 2 political prisoners died. Military Junta Troop also opened cases for the youths who did not want to attend the Military Service and also arrested the mother as a hostage in Paungde, Bago Region.
Almost 20 civilians died, and over 10 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 3 underaged children died, and 2 were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses. 5 civilians from Sittwe died in the land mines of the Military Junta Troop in Rakhine State..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
303.18 KB 307.5 KB 122.2 KB
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-22
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
News - Daily newspapers produced by the Government of Burma/Myanmar (archive from June 2003)
Format :
pdf
Size:
4.77 MB
Local URL:
KM22.4.2024.pdf
KM22.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-22
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.27 MB
Local URL:
mal 22.4.2024.pdf
mal 22.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-22
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.45 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-22-red.pdf
GNLM2024-04-22-red.pdf more
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-21
Description:
"၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက လူမျိုးရေးပဋိပက္ခဖြစ်စေရန် ရည်ရွယ်၍ ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ် အတွင်း နေထိုင်ကြသည့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာများအား (တရားမဝင်အဓမ္မ) စစ်သားအဖြစ် စုဆောင်းခဲ့ပြီး စစ်သင်တန်းများ ပို့ချကာ လက်နက်များ တပ်ဆင်ပေးလျက် ရှိနေကြောင်း လေ့လာသိရှိရသည်။
၂။ အလားတူ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေသည့် အာရက္ခတပ်တော်အား ရိုဟင်ဂျာများက ဆန့်ကျင်နေကြောင်း ထင်မှတ်မှားစေသည့် ဖိအားပေးစေခိုင်းမှုများနှင့် အတူ အတုအယောင် ဆန္ဒပြပွဲများ ကျင်းပစေကာ လူမျိုးရေး ပဋိပက္ခ အရှိန်မြင့်တက်လာအောင် ယုတ်မာကောက်ကျစ်သည့် အကြံဆိုးဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်ကို တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၃။ ထို့အပြင် ဘူးသီးတောင်မြို့အတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ဦးဆောင်ကာ အရပ်သား ပြည်သူများ၏ နေအိမ်အဆောက်အအုံများ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီပေးရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ ရုံးအဆောက်အအုံများကို မီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ ဖြိုချခြင်းနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကို ပေါ်ပေါ်ထင်ထင် လုပ်ဆောင်နေကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။
၄။ ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်းမှ ပြည်သူများ၏ ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ အတူယှဉ်တွဲ နေထိုင်နေမှုကို ဖျက်လိုဖျက်ဆီး ပြုလုပ်နေကြသည့် အဖျက်အမှောင့်လုပ်ရပ်များကို ပြင်းထန်စွာ ရှုတ်ချ ကြောင်းနှင့် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်းနေ ပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လူမျိုး ရေး၊ ဘာသာရေး ပဋိပက္ခဖြစ်စေရန် ပြုလုပ်နေသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးလှည့်ကွက်များအား လူမျိုးစု အချင်းချင်းကြား ယုံကြည်မှု၊ အပြန်အလှန် လေးစားမှု၊ နားလည်သည်းခံမှုတို့ဖြင့် သတိထား ကျော်ဖြတ်ကြရန် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အထူးအလေးအနက်ထား မေတ္တာရပ်ခံ ပန်ကြားလိုပါသည်။..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
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Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2024-04-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-21
Sub-title:
Appeal to the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand
Description:
"1. During the intense armed clashes between resistance forces and the junta forces at Myawaddy and its surrounding area, the junta forces have been committing various forms of targeted attacks, including artillery attacks and airstrikes, on the public buildings and properties of civilians. As a consequence of these indiscriminatory targeted attacks, thousands of civilians have been fleeing to Mae Sot, Tak Province and its surrounding area.
2. We, the National Unity Government of Myanmar, would like to express our sincere appreciation to the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, the Royal Thai Army, border guard officers, and authorities of the Tak Province for providing every necessary assistance, shelter, and other support to the people fleeing from the Myanmar border. This action portrays the Royal Thai Government as being a good neighbor for the people of Myanmar and the people of Myanmar will always remember this support and assistance.
3. As the junta has been escalating the indiscriminatory targeted attacks on civilians, we expect that the number of people fleeing from those areas might rise in the coming days.
4. Therefore, we would like to request any respective organizations and authorities to provide assistance and support the people who urgently need humanitarian assistance and shelter. We, the National Unity Government of Myanmar, together with our ethnic alliances and other affiliated groups would like to express that we are ready to cooperate with the Government of Thailand and other related organizations in every aspect to provide assistance for the people of Myanmar.....၁။ ထိုင်း-မြန်မာနယ်စပ် မြဝတီမြို့နှင့်အနီးတဝိုက်ဒေသအတွင်း တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ နှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုတို့အကြား ဖြစ်ပွားနေသော တိုက်ပွဲများတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၏ နေအိမ်အဆောက်အအုံ၊ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်တို့အား ပစ်မှတ်ထား တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သဖြင့် လွန်ခဲ့သည့်ရက်အနည်းငယ်အတွင်းမှာပင် ဒေသခံပြည်သူ ထောင်နှင့် ချီ၍ တက်ခ်ခရိုင်၊ မဲဆောက်မြို့နှင့် အခြားဒေသများသို့ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်ခဲ့ရပါသည်။
၂။ ထိုသို့တိမ်းရှောင်ထွက်ပြေးလာသည့် စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ပြည်သူများအတွက် နေရာထိုင်ခင်း စီစဉ်ကာ လိုအပ်သည့်ကယ်ဆယ်ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများ ပေးအပ်ခဲ့ပါသော ထိုင်းအစိုးရ၊ ထိုင်းတော်ဝင် တပ်မတော်၊ နယ်စပ်လုံခြုံရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် တက်ခ်ခရိုင်တာဝန်ရှိသူများအားလုံးကို မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက မြန်မာပြည်သူများကိုယ်စား အထူးပင်လှိုက်လှိုက်လှဲလှဲကျေးဇူးတင် ရှိပါသည်။ အိမ်နီးချင်းကောင်း ပီသသည့် အဆိုပါဆောင်ရွက်ချက်ကို မိမိတို့ မြန်မာပြည်သူများ အနေဖြင့် အမြဲ အမှတ်ရနေမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်အဆောက်အအုံ များကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားသည့် တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ ဆက်တိုက်ပြုလုပ်နေလျက်ရှိရာ စစ်ဘေးရှောင် ပြည်သူ ဦးရေ ဆက်လက်များပြားလာနိုင်ကြောင်း မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် မှန်းဆထားပါသည်။
၄။ ထို့ကြောင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာတာဝန်ရှိသူများအနေဖြင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှု ဆိုင်ရာ ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများ၊ နေရာထိုင်ခင်းများအား အရေးပေါ်လိုအပ်နေသည့် ပြည်သူများအတွက် ကူညီထောက်ပံ့ပေးပါရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။ မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် မဟာမိတ်တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အနေဖြင့်လည်း ထိုင်းအစိုးရ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့်အတူ မြန်မာပြည်သူများကို အကူအညီပေးနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ကဏ္ဍပေါင်းစုံ၌ ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် အသင့်ရှိနေပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-21
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
5.78 MB
Local URL:
KM21.4.2024.pdf
KM21.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-21
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.04 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-21-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-20
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-20
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.08 MB
Local URL:
KM20.4.2024.pdf
KM20.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-20
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-20
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.3 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-20-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
G7 Foreign Ministers
Date of publication:
2024-04-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-19
Description:
"The text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the international community faces multiple crises we, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, renew our commitment to upholding the rule of law, humanitarian principles and international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and to protecting human rights and dignity for all individuals.
We reiterate the need to take collective action to preserve peace and stability and to address global challenges such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity loss, global health, education, gender inequality, poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, violent extremism and terrorism, information integrity and a digital transition that respects, protects, and promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We affirm our commitment to free societies and democratic principles, where all persons can freely exercise their rights and freedoms. Human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.
We reaffirm our commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and to re-energize efforts towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as multidimensional crises, and particularly the pandemic and ongoing major conflicts, have set back progress towards their achievement.
We will continue to work in close cooperation with our partners and with relevant multilateral fora such as the G20. Global challenges require solidarity and a cohesive international response, looking for shared solutions for peace, stability, and development, leaving no one behind.
II. FOSTERING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICA
We will continue to deepen the partnership with African countries and regional organizations, including the African union (AU). We welcome the AU participation in the G20 as a permanent member and reiterate our support for the G20 Compact with Africa. The G7-Africa partnership is guided by the objectives of the AU Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.
The consequences of the Russian aggression and its weaponization of food supplies and energy resources have affected notably many vulnerable countries, particularly in Africa. In this perspective, Russia’s war is proving not just a war against Ukraine but against the world’s poorest and most vulnerable.
We reiterate our strong partnership for just, green transitions to net zero emissions as core to sustainable development, and we are ready to inject new momentum into the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Together with the entire international community and stakeholders beyond government, we need to urgently work in partnership to accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, consistent with the unanimous commitment reaffirmed at the UN General Assembly last September.
Debt vulnerabilities are a significant challenge. We fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the “Common Framework” in a predictable, timely, orderly, and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We recognize the importance of effective and long-term solutions, promoting coordination between official bilateral and private creditors. We call upon Multilateral Development Banks and development finance institutions to continue to play a key role to foster sustainable development through increased financing, policy advice and technical assistance for the benefit of developing countries, particularly the poorer and more fragile countries across the continent. In particular central to economic development is ensuring access to sustainable and resilient food systems, health care and health security, and clean, affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.
We reiterate our commitment to supporting African governments as they address conditions leading to terrorism, violent extremism, and instability, while respecting human rights and the rule of law. Development and democracy are mutually reinforcing, and we underscore the importance of free and fair elections to meet the citizens’ needs and expectations.
We are concerned about the activities of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other emerging Russia-backed forces, which are producing a destabilizing impact, notably in North Africa, Central Africa, and the Sahel. We call for accountability of all those responsible for human rights abuses.
1. Libya
We will continue to help Libya put an end to its protracted internecine conflict, also fueled by foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries, in order to build a more peaceful and prosperous future and support its stability, independence, territorial integrity and national unity. The political stalemate leaves Libya extremely vulnerable to third state actors pursuing control over Libya’s security, politics and economy, sowing instability throughout the country and wider region.
We therefore call on all Libyan political actors to engage in meaningful dialogue in order to break the current impasse and move towards a credible roadmap to free, fair and inclusive national presidential and parliamentary elections without delay. The international community must also be united in the pursuit of these goals.
We take note with regret of the recent announcement by UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Abdoulaye Bathily, regarding his decision to resign. We thank him for his dedicated service and renew our full support to the United Nations and the key role it continues to play in Libya. We call on the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint his successor without delay.
2. Sahel
We express our grave concern for the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel, compounded by the backsliding of the principles of constitutional rule of law, democracy and good governance and regression in the regional cooperation frameworks.
Such an increasingly precarious and unpredictable political scenario requires renewed efforts by all relevant actors and stakeholders in reconfiguring international and regional responses to the challenge of growing political tension, confrontation, and instability in the Sahel.
We are also deeply concerned by the spread of terrorist threats and activities, leading to conflict and causing widespread misery and displacement of the civilian population. We are appalled by the grave human rights violations committed by multiple parties, including Russian proxies in the region.
We look forward to strengthening further our cooperation with the African Union, regional organizations and the UN in fostering stability, security, good governance and development in the Sahel, preventing a “spill-over” of insecurity towards the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa, as well as irregular migration flows towards North Africa, Europe and the Western Hemisphere.
We congratulate Mauritania on its taking over the rotating Presidency of the African Union and we commend its commitment to the rule of law, good governance, refugee inclusion and constitutional values. We stand ready to assist States of the Sahel in accelerating the pace of the transition towards the return of the constitutional order.
3. Horn of Africa
We reaffirm our strong commitment to promoting peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa. We continue to provide humanitarian support to those most affected by food insecurity, widespread poverty, armed violence, the impact of extreme weather events and displacement.
We express our concern regarding the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region of Somalia announced in January 2024. We encourage both the Ethiopian and the Federal Government of Somalia to keep all channels of dialogue open to prevent further escalation, working with regional partners, in the framework of the African Union and through bilateral contacts, in accordance with international law and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.
4. Somalia
We commend the important progress in the institutional, macroeconomic and security sector in Somalia. We encourage the Somali Authorities to continue to make meaningful progress in the fight against Al Shabaab and in the consolidation of the institutional framework, including completion of a transparent and inclusive constitutional reform process.
The process of transitioning security responsibilities to the Somali security forces needs to be closely followed, especially in view of the termination of the mandate of the African Union Transitional Mission (ATMIS) in Somalia at the end of 2024. We welcome planning underway by Somalia and the African Union for a multinational mission to follow ATMIS to help maintain stability while Somalia continues to develop its security capabilities.
5. Ethiopia
While we welcome developments in the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, we express concern for the persistent and violent tensions in many areas of the country, as well as reports of human rights violations and abuses, the severe economic crisis and widening food insecurity
We encourage further and lasting developments in the protection of human rights, protection of civilians, political dialogue to resolve tensions, reconciliation and national dialogue, transitional justice and accountability for crimes committed during the conflict.
We call for a similar commitment by those involved in conflicts in other regions of Ethiopia to pursue peace through dialogue.
We underscore the importance of delivering peace dividend quickly for conflict-affected populations through recovery and reconstruction support, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, and implementation of durable solutions for Internally Displaced People (IDPs).
6. Sudan
We strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, where the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate more than one year into the war. We especially note the impact of the crisis on women and girls, and condemn the ongoing atrocities being committed by both sides of the conflict, including using rape and other forms of gender-based violence including conflict-related sexual violence. We are concerned by the increasing numbers of displaced people.
Obstruction of humanitarian access by the Sudanese Armed Forces and rapid Support Forces is resulting in the starvation of the Sudanese people. We urge both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to agree and implement a lasting ceasefire without pre-conditions and to establish safe and stable humanitarian cross border and cross line access channels, including from multiple points of entry to the most devastated areas of Sudan. We urge all actors to return to negotiations and to engage in a national dialogue inclusive of women and the composite Sudanese civil society and aimed at re-establishing civilian and representative institutions. An active African role and the continued support of the international community remain essential to help Sudan to restore the democratic transition process.
We commend the outcomes of the Paris Conference for Sudan and the Neighbouring countries during which over 2 billion Euros have been pledged to support civilian population in Sudan and those who sought refuge in neighbouring countries in 2024.
7. Democratic Republic of the Congo
We strongly condemn the resumption of attacks by the March 23 Movement (M23) in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We are very concerned by the worsening of the humanitarian situation, and the increasing serious human rights violations and abuses the population is being subjected to. We also condemn all armed groups operating in the country. We demand the immediate cessation of hostilities and of any further advances by the M23 and its withdrawal from all occupied areas as agreed through the African Union-endorsed Luanda process. We demand all armed groups to cease hostilities, withdraw from the areas they are controlling and disarm.
We expressed deep concern at the reports of the Group of Experts on the DRC on foreign military support for M23 and direct military interventions on DRC territory. We condemn any such support provided to M23 and any other armed group operating in the DRC and demand its cessation and the immediate withdrawal of any unauthorized foreign military presence from the DRC. We also condemn support, notably provided by military forces, to certain armed groups such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), and demand the cessation of such support.
We stress that any violations of the UN arms embargo is unacceptable and urge all States to stop any support to these armed groups.
We remain committed to the Luanda and Nairobi processes to reach a negotiated diplomatic solution to the conflict. We encourage an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization programme and the meaningful participation of women and youth in all their diversity. We also stand ready to work with the nations of the Great Lakes region to address the root causes of the cycles of violence in eastern DRC in a manner that takes into account the concerns and interests of the whole region, including by promoting accountability for all actors responsible for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.
III. ADDRESSING IRREGULAR MIGRATION, FOSTERING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY
We recognize that forced displacement and irregular migration have to be addressed in an integrated, comprehensive, and balanced manner, in a spirit of joint responsibility and commitment, and in accordance with international law and in full respect of human rights.
We will support our partners in addressing the root causes of instability in Africa and other regions and countries of origin, while promoting a cycle of growth grounded in the huge potential of the Continent, particularly in view of the just and clean transition and growth in access to electricity, offering alternative solutions to irregular migration. Collectively, we will address migration drivers including through: better leveraging and coordinating our development and climate finance; supporting fragile and conflict afflicted states; and strengthening international capacity to address climate change, conflict, learning poverty and other drivers of migration. We are ready to build synergies among initiatives from all partners and institutions. We will also continue to support African countries hosting large number of displaced populations.
We acknowledge that climate change is a risk multiplier already having a strong impact on human mobility. We see the need to further strengthen disaster risk reduction, adaptation, and resilience measures to counteract the drivers of involuntary displacement in the context of climate change.
Human traffickers and people smugglers must be stopped from continuing their nefarious activities and we need to disrupt their business models. We recognize that women and girls are especially impacted by human trafficking, particularly trafficking for sexual exploitation. The UN and its Agencies have a role to play in this respect. Countries of origin, transit and destination must work together to stop migrant smuggling and human trafficking and uphold the dignity and worth of the human person – in line with the UN Charter.
We will work towards reducing irregular migration and envisioning regular, safe and orderly migration on the basis of relevant national sovereign regulations. We are committed to find ways to better address challenges posed by irregular migration, within the framework of our international obligations. We will enhance cooperation against migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In this respect, we acknowledge the “Rome Process” started in July 2023 with an International Conference on Migration and Development” with the dual objective of fighting human traffickers and smugglers and supporting economic development. We also acknowledge the “Mattei Plan for Africa” launched by Italy. We also recall the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and protection and the multilateral legal framework on migration and refugee protection. Legal migration pathways can contribute to economic growth and decent work in line with international standards in countries of origin and destination.
We need to inject consistency and coherence in our investment in areas of shared priority for Africa, including food security, nutrition, sustainable rural development, energy transition, sustainable, inclusive, resilient, and quality infrastructure development, bridging digital divides, education, training and skilling, gender equality and good governance. Based on a mutually beneficial exchange, approaching issues on an equal footing, and ensuring alignment with Africa’s needs and priorities as identified by the African Union, African Governments and their peoples, we must step up efforts to achieve concrete sustainable development outcomes, contribute to the stabilization of areas of crisis, fight fundamentalism and address the root causes of irregular migration flows.
IV. PROMOTING A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC, MANAGING ENGAGEMENT IN ASIA
The Indo-Pacific region is a key engine for global growth, with more than half of the world’s population. We reiterate commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, based on the rule of law, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, grounded on respect for international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms, and human rights. We underscore that peace and stability of the region also contributes to prosperity and development of the entire international community. Developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.
We reaffirm individual initiatives of the G7 members and welcome those of our partners, such as ASEAN, IORA, Australia, Republic of Korea, India and other South Asian as well as Pacific Island countries, to enhance their engagement in the region. We underscore our commitment to further strengthening our coordination among the G7. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of working together with all regional partners.
We reaffirm our thorough support to ASEAN centrality and unity, as well as to initiatives aimed at fostering regional cooperation in line with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
We underscore our commitment to further strengthen our partnership with the Pacific Island countries, by supporting their needs and efforts in the implementation of the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We look forward to the 4th International Conference on Small Island Developing States under the theme “Charting the course towards resilient prosperity” (St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda 27th-30th May 2024). We will broaden our support to civil society, private sector, and academia’s plans for the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
8. China
We recognize the importance of constructive and stable relations with China. We reaffirm the need to engage candidly with and express our concerns directly to China. China is a key interlocutor in addressing global challenges, and we stand ready to cooperate with China on areas of common interest.
We reaffirm our interest in a balanced and reciprocal collaboration with China aimed at promoting global economic growth, with a view to enabling sustainable and fair economic relations and strengthening the international trading system. Our policy approaches are not designed to harm China, nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development. However, we are concerned that China’s non-market policies and practices are leading to harmful overcapacity that undermines our workers, industries, and economic resilience. A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest. We are not decoupling or turning inwards.
We reiterate the importance of ensuring a level playing field and a transparent, predictable, and fair business environment. Respect for the rules-based multilateral trading system based on market principles needs to be the hallmark of our relations, to protect our workers and companies from unfair and non-market policies and practices, including forced technology transfer or illegitimate data disclosure, which distort the global economy and undermine fair competition. We will protect our workers and business communities from unfair practices, including those that lead to overcapacity, create supply chain vulnerabilities and increase exposure to economic coercion, as we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversification where necessary.
We reaffirm the need to uphold the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety. In this respect, we call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression. We express our strong concern about transfers to Russia from business in China of dual-use materials and components for weapons and equipment for military production.
We are seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We continue to oppose China’s dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea and its repeated obstruction of countries’ high seas freedom of navigation and we express serious concern about the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines vessels in this regard. There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we oppose China’s militarization, coercive and intimidation activities in the South China Sea. We re-emphasize the universal and unified character of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and reaffirm UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.
We restate the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity for the whole international community and we call for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings, as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is. There is no change in the basic position of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies.
We remain concerned about the human rights situation in China, including in Xinjiang and Tibet. We express our concerns about the deterioration of pluralism and civil and political rights in Hong Kong since the 2020 National Security Law. We reemphasize these concerns following the recent passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which will further erode autonomy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong. The new law will make it harder to live, work and do business in Hong Kong and undermine the ability of Hong Kong people to maintain free and open exchanges with the wider world. We reiterate our call on China to uphold its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which enshrine rights and freedoms and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong. Furthermore, we urge China and the Hong Kong authorities to act in accordance with their international commitments and applicable legal obligations.
We call on China not to conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions, and to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. We encourage China to uphold its commitments to act responsibly in cyber space.
9. North Korea
We reiterate our strong condemnation of North Korea’s escalatory development of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes. We further reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demand that North Korea abandon all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We urge North Korea to return to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We reiterate that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT. We urge North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests. We urge all UN member states to implement all relevant UNSCRs fully and effectively and demand Security Council members to follow through on their commitments. We urge North Korea to cease activities that generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and WMD programmes, including malicious cyber activities.
In this context, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in violation of UNSC resolutions, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles against Ukraine. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missiles-related technology to North Korea, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution to renew the mandate of the UNSCR 1718 Committee Panel of Experts makes it easier for North Korea to evade the UN sanctions that Russia had previously voted for. We urge Russia and North Korea to immediately cease all such activities and abide by relevant UNSCRs. We reiterate our commitment to counter sanctions evasion and strengthen enforcement. We will increase efforts to maintain the Panel of Experts.
We strongly condemn North Korea’s systematic human rights violations and abuses and its choice to prioritize its unlawful weapons development programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call upon North Korea to resolve the abductions issue immediately and to meaningfully engage with the UN human rights system. We take note of the progressive re-opening of North Korea’s borders and call upon North Korea to take this opportunity to re-engage with the international community including through the return of all diplomatic and humanitarian personnel to North Korea.
We are disappointed by North Korea’s continued rejection of dialogue and call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, in order to enhance regional peace and security.
10. Myanmar
We reiterate our strong condemnation of the military coup in Myanmar and reaffirm our support and solidarity with the people of Myanmar in their quest for peace, freedom, and democracy. The continuing attacks by the military destroying civilian infrastructure (including homes, schools, places of worship and hospitals), the repeated and serious violations of human rights and the alarming humanitarian situation – which particularly affect those in most vulnerable situations, including children, women and members of minority religious and ethnic groups – are unacceptable. We also condemn the recent implementation of the 2010 conscription law by the military regime. The forced recruitment of young people can only lead to further violence and trigger a massive exodus to neighboring countries.
We urge the Myanmar military to immediately cease any violence, release all prisoners arbitrarily detained – starting from the democratically elected leaders- and establish an inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders, in view of restoring the path towards a meaningful and durable democratic process. We also reiterate our call on the Myanmar military to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, to desist from any form of forced labour and to allow prompt, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all displaced persons and people in need.
We continue to support ASEAN’s efforts to promote a credible and inclusive process to achieve the swift implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We highlight the importance of a comprehensive implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) and support the UN’s further engagement in the crisis, including through the leadership of the newly appointed UN Special Envoy on Myanmar and through the designation of a Resident Coordinator in country. Accountability for serious crimes committed in Myanmar remains essential.
We reiterate our call on all States to prevent or to cease the flow of arms and other dual-use materiel, including jet fuel, into Myanmar. We stress the need to create conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of all Rohingya refugees and displaced persons and justice and accountability for atrocities committed against Rohingya and other ethnic communities.
V. ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES
11. Development Finance and Infrastructure
We reaffirm our commitment to promoting sustainable, resilient, inclusive, and quality infrastructure as a key element for achieving sustainable development by addressing the infrastructure investment gap in low- and middle-income countries. The G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and initiatives such as the EU Global Gateway offer a framework we will use to promote our vision of sustainable and economically viable infrastructure, underpinned by transparent project selection, procurement and finance.
We reaffirm our commitment to advancing high standards for quality infrastructure as a means to spur sustainable and inclusive economic development.
We intend to work together to accelerate progress towards the commitment to mobilize up to 600 billion USD by 2027 by enhancing the strategic dimension of the Partnership for the Global Infrastructure and Investment We propose to act in close cooperation with partner countries, multilateral development banks and development finance institutions, including through de-risking, co-financing initiatives and enhanced coordination mechanisms, including at country/regional level, to further promote the development of a pipeline of bankable projects in close cooperation with the private sector, as well as to reinforce project preparation.
Infrastructure development should also encompass a wide range of initiatives (i.e. on regulatory frameworks, jobs market, energy access, training and research and health systems) to support partners in order to offer opportunities to the most marginalized and vulnerable and with a view to strengthening social cohesion and inclusion.
We will promote a transformative shift towards quality investment, in key areas that drive inclusive and sustainable development and resilience, including food security, climate and clean energy, biodiversity and reducing pollution, connectivity including ICT and transport networks, global supply chain resilience, health and education, and mainstreaming gender equality. We will prioritize efforts to deepen partnerships with Africa and based on the continent’s investment needs, consistent with the goal of accelerating progress towards the SDGs, through concrete deliverables, such as ongoing work along the Lobito Corridor. Given its global mandate, G7 countries will also continue to deploy investment while bringing forward the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment global strategy in other strategic regions, such as work on the Luzon Economic Corridor.
Recognizing the insufficient progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the urgency to address the financing gaps in the context of a growing number of low-income countries and middle-income countries facing higher risk of debt distress and constrained fiscal space to invest in their own development and futures, we will work together with our partners and with international finance institutions to create the conditions to scale up long-term financing for the countries in need. In that regard, we welcome the launch of infrastructure certification schemes, such as the Blue Dot Network and the Finance to Accelerate the Sustainable Transition Infrastructure initiatives, which aim to mobilize increased private investment in emerging markets. We will strive to enhance the development finance toolkit, to mobilize additional financing from international financial institutions, bilateral partners and the private sector to more effectively reduce poverty and protect the planet.
12. Food Security and Nutrition Security
We express concern about rising food insecurity and malnutrition stemming from the combined impact of climate change, loss and degradation of ecosystems, the growing number of conflicts, inflationary pressures, and the reduced fiscal space in many developing economies. We are committed to addressing, with partners, the worsening hunger crisis affecting parts of Africa. Strengthening the resilience of agri-food systems is necessary to effectively address food insecurity and malnutrition. That makes internationally coordinated action more urgent than ever. Ensuring food and nutrition security remains a challenge for the international community and affected countries, especially in known hunger hotspots in Africa and beyond, that are vulnerable to climate and conflict-related shocks.
We reaffirm our intention to increase investments to build more resilient and sustainable food systems, to help mitigate against future food shocks and diversify food supply chains. To that end, we reaffirm our commitment to contributing to sustainable and resilient food systems transformation, in the spirit of the Roadmap for Global Food Security-Call to Action and the UN Secretary General’s Call to Action for Accelerated Food Systems Transformation, issued at the UN Food Systems Summit +2 held in July 2023 in Rome. We recall the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security, issued by G7 Leaders and invited countries. We also reaffirm our support for the G20 Matera Declaration on Food Security, Nutrition and Food Systems and the G7 Global Alliance for Food Security. We acknowledge the importance of supporting fertilizer use efficiency and value chains, including local fertilizer production. The G7 is committed to the success of the next Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2025.
We also reaffirm our commitment to work with the Rome-based agencies FAO, IFAD and WFP. We recognize the role of the Committee on World Food Security as an inclusive and multi-stakeholder platform to work together on food security and nutrition.
In continuity with the UAE Leaders Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, endorsed at the COP28 by 159 Countries, including all the G7, we will enhance our efforts to address the food security-climate change nexus in a coherent and pragmatic manner, including through initiatives like the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS).
We stress the need for better coordination of international initiatives and projects aimed at countering food insecurity and malnutrition in order to maximize the delivery and impact of already existing resources. We continue to need innovative financial solutions for food systems, especially involving responsible private investment.
13. Economic Resilience and Economic Security
Economic resilience and economic security are critical for the proper functioning of the G7 and wider global economies. We will foster cooperation in accordance with the G7 Leaders’ Statement on economic Security issued at Hiroshima last year. To this end, we remain committed to making global supply chains more resilient and reliable especially for critical products and technologies.
We will continue to co-ordinate work on de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities, actively engaging the private sector.
We emphasize the importance of honoring international norms and obligations to safeguard global economic security and resilience and reaffirm our commitment to building global economic resilience and responding to harmful practices that undermine the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. We will continue working within the G7 and with trusted partners towards resilient supply chains, built in a transparent, diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy, and reliable manner.
We reiterate our concern about increasing threats to economic security for all global economies, notably economic coercion, and comprehensive strategies that use non-market policies and practices, as well as other practices in the pursuit of market dominance that lead to harmful overcapacity and supply chain concentration, thereby creating vulnerabilities and dependencies. We remain committed to enhancing our coordination and cooperation within the G7, while at the same time engaging other interested international partners about joining our efforts. We will continue work, principally through the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to improve our assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion, in accordance with our respective legal systems and in conformity with international law.
We acknowledge the key role of semiconductors as a critical part of supply chain resilience and economic security. To that end, we welcome the establishment by the G7 Industry, Technology and Digital Ministers of a semiconductors Point of Contact (PoC) Group dedicated to facilitating information exchange and sharing best practices among G7 members.
14. Climate, Energy Security and Environment
We are facing the unprecedented triple global crises of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution that are mutually reinforcing and intrinsically linked, as well as an ongoing global energy crisis, health threats, and environmental damage, including those caused or exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
The international community needs to come together and act decisively, irrespective of geographic or political divides, taking concrete steps collectively to achieve the global target to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and achieve global net zero (CHG) emissions by 2050.
To this end, we reaffirm our commitment, and we reiterate the call on all countries to contribute to global efforts to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, sustainable and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science and to accelerate low and zero-emission technologies.
We recognize the primary need to accelerate the transition to net-zero emissions by 2050, while ensuring policies to diversify energy sources and supplies to address potential security risks to energy systems, in a manner consistent with our climate and sustainability goals.
We are determined to promote energy efficiency as the “first fuel”, and fast-track clean, safe, and sustainable energy development and deployment, while reducing our dependency on fossil fuels. Moreover, actions must be taken to increase access to electricity and clean cooking as well as to accelerate sustainable, just and inclusive clean energy transitions in emerging and developing countries and to continue efforts to swiftly implement the Just Energy Transition Partnerships.
We are determined to promote affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy in Africa. With this objective, under the Italian Presidency we look forward to continuing discussions on how the G7 can concretely advance and contribute to Africa’s industrial advancement and to its sustainable, resilient, and inclusive growth.
The connection between climate, environment and energy is critical to making progress towards our climate change and environmental goals while implementing economically sustainable, just, and rapid transitions. Seizing the opportunities presented by innovative technological solutions and the alignment of global financial flows to support the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework will be critical to ensuring prosperity and environmental sustainability, while simultaneously fostering development and poverty alleviation, especially in developing countries.
We underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements, globally by 2030, considering national circumstances, and welcome the consensus reached at CMA5 calling on all Parties to contribute to its achievement.
We need to play a key role in defining secure, sustainable, and affordable energy systems, ensuring just and inclusive clean energy transitions. We therefore commit to achieving concrete steps forward in strategic areas. Among these, we recognize the key role of renewables, including from sustainable biological origin, nuclear energy for those who opt to use it, including advanced and small modular reactors, energy efficiency, methane emissions reduction in line with the Global Methane Pledge, industrial de-carbonization, most innovative technologies such as renewable and zero-emission hydrogen, and carbon management technologies. We will pursue secure, resilient, affordable and sustainable supply chains for critical minerals and raw materials, including through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and MSP Forum, and pursue implementation of the Five Point Plan for Critical Minerals Security adopted by G7 Climate Energy and Environment Ministers. We also underline the opportunities offered by circular economy, including recycling and resource efficiency, as well as innovative technologies. Investing in innovation should also help us in addressing the key topic of reducing GHG emissions in heavy-emitting sectors and promoting the development of a circular economy.
Leveraging private sector financing as well as innovative financing mechanisms are important steps to support energy transitions in developing countries, increase resources for adaptation and resilience and enable actions for responding to loss and damage to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially SIDS and LDCs.
The transition to a net zero-emissions, sustainable, climate resilient and nature positive, pollution free and circular economy will necessarily need to involve all the members of society, to ensure just and inclusive transitions, leaving no one behind. Women, youth, and Indigenous Peoples s tend to bear the brunt of climate change-related disasters. In this context, we place particular emphasis on need to empower these societal sectors and include them in efforts to address climate change and environmental degradation. We highlight the importance of nature-based solutions in this context. Plastic pollution is a global problem that requires urgent attention. We look forward to an ambitious and effective global agreement to end plastic pollution.
Biodiversity loss is an equally serious threat. Climate, biodiversity, and human health are interrelated and interdependent. We recall our commitment to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework fully and swiftly and to achieve each of its goals and targets, which is the landmark plan to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. We also underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.
We will work to mobilise nature finance from all relevant sources and to align financial and fiscal flows, as appropriate, including international development assistance, with the GBF. We also call on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to increase and report nature finance by CBD COP16. We welcome the Global Stocktake Decision’s recognition of the importance of nature for achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through halting, and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.
Given the risk of a global water crisis and continued lack of universal access to water and sanitation, we call for stronger collaboration at multilateral level in line with the UNEA-6 Resolution on Water. We welcome the UN System-wide Strategy on Water and Sanitation and are committed to the implementation of the Water Action Agenda as a key outcome of the UN Water Conference 2023. We also call for prompt appointment of a UN Special Envoy on Water.
15. Global Health
Global health is a pre-requisite for sustainable development. Building on the lessons learned during the COVID -19 pandemic, we will continue to promote global health, knowing that health emergencies are a global challenge that need a global response.
We support a reform of the Global Health Architecture fostering a more coordinated approach, strengthening Pandemic Prevention Preparedness and Response (PPR) including sustainable financing for capacity strengthening and for health emergency response, especially through the Pandemic Fund. We recognize the importance and reiterate our commitment to reaching a successful, equitable outcome of the ongoing negotiations for a new WHO convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic PPR and targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) by May 2024. Completing the negotiations in time is critical to leverage political attention, strengthen future pandemic responses and improve equity.
We commit to redouble our efforts to advance universal health coverage, including by supporting countries to restore access to essential health services and reduce mortality rates to be better than pre-pandemic levels by 2025. We also reaffirm our commitment to invest in resilient health systems, primary health care service delivery, and a skilled health workforce – including through the WHO Academy – as essential to reclaiming lost ground due to COVID-19 and promoting Universal Health Coverage as essential elements of pandemic preparedness.
We acknowledge that climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are having a dramatic impact on global health and both noncommunicable and infectious disease threats. We are therefore addressing these challenges in a coherent and strategic manner, through the “One Health” approach that recognizes that the health of people is linked to the health of animals, plants and our shared environment.
In this framework, we reaffirm that antimicrobial resistance is a key priority, and we will work closely for a successful upcoming UN High Level Meeting on AMR in September 2024.
16. Gender Equality
We reiterate our commitment to give a new impetus to gender equality. We recall the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome documents of its review conferences and confirm our determination to deliver on the 2030 Agenda relevant Sustainable Development Goals.
We reaffirm the G7’s continued global leadership on gender equality and the promotion and protection of the rights of women and girls in all their diversity as well as LGBTQIA+ persons. We express our strong concern over the global rollback of all women’s and girls’ rights, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the disproportionate impact of conflict and crisis on them.
Gender equality and women’s empowerment is a fundamental pre-requisite to eradicate poverty, to stimulate prosperity and sustainable and inclusive growth, and to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies. We recognize that unpaid care and domestic work are major obstacles to the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and negatively impact women’s economic empowerment by impairing their ability to work full-time or in leadership positions. We reaffirm the significant value of the World Bank Invest in Childcare initiative and aim by 2035 to support 200 million more women to join the workforce by investing in efforts to close the global childcare gap.
We must pursue gender equality as a cross cutting priority to promote and protect the rights of women and girls and members of minority groups, including their ability to exercise their human rights, by ensuring freedom from all forms of discrimination and gender-based violence. We need to strengthen their economic security and empowerment by increasing and addressing barriers to their participation and building their resilience against the impacts of climate change, including by advancing their access to jobs in green and blue industries critical to our future and the future of our planet. We will promote comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR, including at the UN General Assembly and Summit of the Future.
Women and girls are disproportionately affected by conflicts and crises which can exacerbate existing gender inequalities and expose women and girls, to heightened risks of violence, exploitation, and discrimination. The involvement of women and girls in all areas related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as well as disaster risk reduction is crucial to creating and ensuring sustainable and inclusive peace and address the root causes of conflicts. In line with UNSCR 1325 and subsequent Resolutions on Women Peace and Security (WPS), we underscore the importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership in all areas of policy decision-making spaces and tangible implementation, and through women’s civil society organizations, non-government partners, and throughout the political, security and development spheres. We remain committed to protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence before, during, and after conflicts, ensuring accountability for perpetrators, and providing support and services to survivors.
17. Disaster and Risk Reduction
We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen and accelerate the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the “Early Warning for All” Initiative by scaling up international cooperation.
We acknowledge the interrelated causes and effects of disasters, particularly climate change-induced disasters, on different aspects, including peace and stability, local, regional, and international security, health, education, gender equality, and vulnerability. We renew our commitment to act ahead of disasters by working across the Humanitarian, Development Peace Nexus. Our aim is to reduce risks, anticipate and prepare for disasters, minimize the impacts of disasters on communities and infrastructure in order not to hamper development progress.
We stress the importance of the outcome of COP28 in terms of operationalizing new funding arrangements to respond to loss and damage, including the fund. We welcome the pledges to the fund that have already been made and we encourage further support, to be provided on a voluntary basis and from a wide variety of funding sources. This is part of our wider commitment to assist those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.
19. Global Governance
We reiterate the significance of maintaining and strengthening the free and open international order based on the rule of law, respecting the UN Charter, and the paramount importance of international and multilateral cooperation in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity. We share the UN Secretary General’s ambition for inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism, as outlined in the “Our Common Agenda” Report. We look forward to the UN Summit of the Future as an opportunity to accelerate these efforts, to tackle global challenges and accelerate progress on the SDGs.
To restore a sense of common purpose among UN Members States and to make international and multilateral cooperation stronger, more effective, more inclusive, more democratic, more efficient and more transparent, we commit to actively contribute to the Summit of the Future as an opportunity to foster dialogue and to find shared solutions to common problems. Human rights as one of the founding pillars of the UN system will be our common compass throughout the Pact for the Future. We welcome the latest report of the UN Secretary General on human security. We are committed to working with all UN Member States to strengthen the roles of the UNSG as well as the UNGA. We also recommit to the reform of the UNSC.
We reaffirm the need for strengthened international financial institutions and underscore the role of multilateral developments banks (MDBs) in the SDGs achievement, including in crisis affected contexts. We support the ongoing efforts for MDBs reform, including the World Bank Group (WBG) evolution roadmap, to better address global challenges. In this respect, we look forward to the WBG and International Monetary Fund annual meetings.
We stress the key role of MDBs in addressing global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and fragility and conflict, which are critical to achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development that is inclusive and resilient.
19. Conflict Prevention and Management, Support to UN Peace Operations
We renew our commitment to strengthening peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts to address increasingly complex and interconnected security challenges. We need to build resilient societies, uphold human rights, support good governance, and invest in people to achieve sustainable peace. We condemn sexual and gender-based violence, especially when related to armed conflict situations.
We highly value the role of the UN and support an integrated approach to peacebuilding and peacekeeping. We support the Peacebuilding Commission in its role as a convener of relevant stakeholders and an advisory body to other UN organs and we support the Peacebuilding Fund as a critical tool to help to ensure adequate financing for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
We reaffirm that the UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions are valuable tools to prevent escalation and the recurrence of conflicts and to protect civilians where mandated to do so.
We further reaffirm our general support for the UN Secretary General’s ‘’New Agenda for Peace’’, “Action for Peacekeeping” and “Action for Peacekeeping Plus” to reform and strengthen such operations, based on a conflict prevention approach to crises. We will enhance capabilities and work to ensure the safety and security of those deployed, for example through the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.
We underscore the importance of strengthening the global implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) and Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agendas.
20. A Global Resilient Cyberspace, Artificial Intelligence
We reiterate our commitment to an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure cyberspace. We highly value the role of the Ise-Shima Cyber Group to define common ground.
While relying on the leadership of governments and international organizations, we recognize the importance of the multistakeholder model, with the invaluable contribution of the private sector in promoting technological development and of civil society in advancing a common understanding of threats and providing solutions to improve cybersecurity.
As the international community is increasingly confronted with disruptive activities carried out through Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, we reiterate that international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace. We call for the full implementation of existing norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace, and we encourage States to deepen their understanding of how international law applies to cyberspace.
We condemn malicious cyber activity, and we will continue to work together at the national level and in multilateral fora to increase accountability in cyberspace. We will increase our cooperation against malicious cyber activities, including state-sponsored ones. We are determined to protect our democratic systems and critical infrastructures from malicious cyber threats. We express our concern for the increasing number of ransomware attacks , particularly targeting hospitals and healthcare facilities, and in this regard we recall relevant norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which emphasize states’ commitment to not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICT and to respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory aimed at the critical infrastructure of another state. We welcome significant international initiatives, such as the Counter Ransomware Initiative and the Pall Mall Process, which contribute to increase awareness and improve oversight coordination.
We urge countries to enact legislation in line with the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (Budapest Convention) and engage in accession to the treaty. We also urge countries to fully utilize the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as a tool to combat cybercrime.
We call on the international community to be guided by the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace to reduce risks to international peace and stability and make cyberspace a less contested domain. We underline the importance of confidence building measures, international cooperation, and capacity building. We affirm our support for the “Programme of action to advance responsible State behavior in the use of ICTs in the context of international security”, as the permanent and action-oriented mechanism to hold discussions on cybersecurity at the UN from 2025 onward.
We reaffirm the G7 support to Ukraine’s cyber resilience, and we welcome multilateral initiatives aimed at providing assistance, such as the Tallinn Mechanism.
We will continue to coordinate and, where possible, unite our efforts to assist countries to improve their capacity to address the multiple challenges of cybersecurity and resilience. Exchanging information on respective national projects may help identify best practices. We will be inspired by a demand driven approach and aim to fully integrate cybersecurity into digital development, as highlighted by the Accra Call for Cyber Resilient Development. To this end, we will continue to cooperate where it is relevant with International Financial Institutions, for instance the World Bank, and the private sector.
Malicious cyber activities are disrupting critical services in G7 countries – including hospitals, energy companies and water companies – and costing our economies billions of dollars in disruptions. We commit to taking concrete steps to improve our collective cyber resilience.
Considering the key and complementary role played by high-level policy makers and the National Agencies for Cybersecurity in ensuring a safe cyberspace and in fostering international collaboration at a policy and technical level, we also welcome the first meeting at G7 level, scheduled in Rome on 16-17 May, and we look forward to the outcome of their discussions. We resolve to keep analyzing the multifaceted applications of artificial intelligence and other new and emerging technologies, in such a way as to strike an effective balance between the advantageous uses for people and the need to mitigate the potential negative impacts in certain domains, including cyberspace. With this regard, we acknowledge the importance of advancing our efforts to ensure safe, secure and trustworthy AI, which is human-centric and human rights-based, including through advancing the outcomes of the Hiroshima AI Process, and foster interoperability between AI governance frameworks to support our common vision.
As new technologies are defining the future of our societies, we endorse the UN General Assembly resolution “Seizing the Opportunities for Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Systems for Sustainable Development” that was adopted by consensus and co-sponsored by 123 countries. We will also endeavor to provide contributions to the Global Digital Compact and WSIS+20 Review and the UN Pact for the Future, in order to protect an open, free, secure and inclusive Internet for future generations, governed through multi-stakeholder processes, and by protecting the ability for all to share information and communicate freely and securely, making sure the voices of younger generations, emerging economies and developing countries are properly heard.
We recognize the nexus between AI and cybersecurity, and we commit to countering the risks posed to cybersecurity by AI. We also underscore the importance of ensuring the cybersecurity of AI systems and note the publication of the Guidelines for secure AI system development.
21. Countering hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference
Malign foreign influence operations, including malicious cyber activities, and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), are a growing challenge to democratic societies around the world, threatening to undermine democratic values, human rights, governmental processes, political stability, and international partnerships. These operations aim at misleading and deceiving our citizens, interfering in our democratic processes, destabilizing our governments and democratic institutions, and undermining our shared values, creating, and exploiting cultural and societal frictions, as well as negatively affecting our ability to conduct foreign and security policy. FIMI threatens to destabilize the very fabric of our rules-based international system and is exacerbated by the exploitation of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).
We are committed to addressing the potential risk of the misuse of new technologies for purposes of disinformation, and the role of AI in FIMI, especially in the context of forthcoming elections.
AI has the potential to strengthen democracy by advancing resilience, openness, civic engagement and participation, and access to government services and information. But AI can also be used as a tool to undermine democracy, including through voter suppression, information manipulation and curtailment of civic engagement. We are concerned with the potential for authoritarian states and non-state actors to misuse current and emerging technologies to undermine democracy and confidence in elections and to erode the information environment.
FIMI negatively affects the ability of citizens to take rational, informed decisions, which lies at the very heart of our democratic institutions and aims at undermining confidence in democratic governments and societies. Disinformation can be used to polarize society; it often supports violent extremist activities and is fuelled by malicious foreign players. Online disinformation campaigns are being widely used by a range of malign actors to create or exacerbate tensions.
State and non-state actors are increasingly adopting hybrid tactics, also through their proxies. In particular, Russia, since beginning its war of aggression against Ukraine, has been augmenting military efforts on the ground with hybrid tactics, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference. We condemn the widespread use of FIMI and AI by the Russian Government and its proxies to support its war of aggression against Ukraine and fuel further tensions globally. Building our resolve to promote information resilience, we will enhance coordination to establish a common operating picture and develop coordinated responses to information manipulation. A whole-of-society and whole-of-government effort is required to combat FIMI and foster information integrity.
We are committed to protecting our information environment and democratic values against any attempt of foreign manipulation. We commit to championing free and independent media at home and around the world and promote pluralism and freedom of expression. Together we seek to strengthen public resilience to and awareness about FIMI, through education, including digital, media and information literacy initiatives and awareness-raising campaigns, also addressing gendered disinformation.
We plan to strengthen our coordinated effort to better prevent, detect, respond to, and mitigate FIMI threats, addressing the impact of hybrid threats at the earliest stage possible. As billions of citizens will cast their ballots globally in 2024, the protection of free and fair elections from foreign interference is a central focus of the G7 Agenda.
We also call on tech companies, in particular social media platforms, to intensify their efforts to prevent and counter FIMI campaigns and to reduce the potential abuse of AI technology for this purpose, also by increasing their transparency.
Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) we are strengthening our coordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies. We are determined to intensify our efforts, to protect our democratic systems and open societies from foreign information manipulation and interference, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response.
22. Digital and Transnational Repression
Advances in surveillance technology, including AI and commercial spyware, can enable foreign governments and their proxies to monitor, track, and target individuals more effectively and invasively. We are committed to countering the misuse of technology to target human rights defenders, journalists, perceived political opponents, and other civil society members.
Transnational repression (TNR), which involves reaching across state borders to intimidate, silence, attack, and/or murder dissidents, human rights activists, and others for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms, has a detrimental impact to free speech, freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms. It is one of the most harmful manifestations of authoritarian governments that aims to export repressive forms of governance extraterritorially. We strongly condemn the targeting of activists, critics and journalists in this respect.
23. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Outer Space
We remain firmly committed to uphold the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. We intend to maintain and strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation efforts for a more secure, stable, and safer world and endorse the statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group.
We are greatly concerned by Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and actions, North Korea’s and Iran’s continued advancement of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. These developments pose serious challenges for international peace and security and require our united resolve in defense of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.
Recalling the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, we reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, achieved through a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach.
In this spirit, we remain resolved to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and advance the NPT’s implementation across all three of its mutually reinforcing pillars. We reaffirm the centrality of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
We underline the urgent need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and to provide sufficient resources to ensure the continued operation and the long-term sustainability of all elements of the CTBT verification system. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all states that have not yet done so to declare new or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We deeply regret Russia’s withdrawal of its ratification of the Treaty and we are gravely concerned by Russian statements with respect to nuclear explosive testing. We urge Moscow to continue to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests.
We call for the immediate commencement of long-overdue negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) while urging all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of such material.
We adhere to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. We underscore the IAEA’s crucial role in upholding the international non-proliferation architecture, enhancing nuclear safety and security, and safeguards, and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology for the benefit of all Member States. We recall the G7 Leaders’ commitment to evaluate measures to reduce reliance on civil nuclear-related goods from Russia and to assist countries seeking to diversify their supplies. We support Japan’s safe, transparent and science-based process to responsibly manage the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System treated water and in proactively coordinating with scientists and partners as well as the IAEA.
The G7 is committed to working with all States to further identify and implement measures to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use and to strengthen arms control. We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States issued on January 3, 2022, on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, and reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement. We welcome the transparency of G7 nuclear-weapon States in providing data on their nuclear forces and the objective size of their nuclear arsenals. We call on others that have not yet done so to follow suit.
We reiterate our deep regret over Russia’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty and we call on Russia to return to its full implementation and to engage with the U.S. on reducing nuclear risks. We are also concerned about China’s ongoing and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and development of increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without transparency – including providing data and objective size of its nuclear arsenal – or good faith arms control and risk reductions measures. The G7 urges China to engage in concrete strategic risk reduction discussions with the U.S. to promote stability through greater transparency of China’s nuclear weapon policies, plans, and capabilities.
We underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, while encouraging other leaders, youth and others to also visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We recognize the important role that f conventional arms control, confidence-building measures and regional risk reduction have in reducing the risk of armed escalation or miscalculation, improving trust and transparency, and promoting strategic stability between states.
Conventional weapons continue to be used for regional coercion, raising international tensions, and in acts of military aggression that have resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties. This highlights the urgency of implementation agreements and commitments relating to conventional arms control and disarmament that take into account humanitarian factors.
Reaffirming our strong commitment to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, we underline the need for the universalization and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
We will actively seek to advance efforts in the working group on the strengthening of the BTWC to examine and develop concrete measures to enhance the implementation of the Convention.
We recognize the high priority of addressing biological threats worldwide as an utmost priority. With rapidly advancing technology and more acute biological risks, it is crucial to ensure that biological research, development, and innovation are conducted in a safe, secure, responsible, transparent, and sustainable manner. Strengthening domestic measures, engaging international organizations, academia, and the private sector remains paramount to promote and establish effective regulatory biosafety and biosecurity measures for the life sciences and global health.
We reaffirm the key importance of addressing biosecurity challenges in the African continent, strengthening preparedness, and empowering the African scientific community, involving women and youth. We recognize the important progress made through the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa (SIMBA), a flagship effort pf the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity, national frameworks, surveillance and epidemic intelligence and non-proliferation capacities in Africa.
In this overall effort, we will work together across the G7, the G7-led 31-member Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the BTWC, the WHO and other appropriate international fora to raise the bar globally on biosafety and biosecurity.
We commit to maintaining and updating export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including through multilateral export control regimes and in cooperation with all responsible international actors.
We reaffirm the key role of the G7 Global Partnership in addressing threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and CBRN materials and supporting vulnerable countries around the world in to build security capacity to better mitigate all manner of CBRN threats. We welcome the launch of the Global Partnership’s new initiative to counter WMD disinformation.
Working with partners, we e will continue to assess the risks posed by exports of rapidly advancing dual-use technologies. Where necessary and according to our respective legal frameworks, we will cooperate and promote efforts to implement export controls to address risks to international security.
We celebrate in 2024 the tenth anniversary of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which all G7 members participate. The development of realistic processes and technologies by IPNDV will help ensure future agreements contain robust verification provisions.
Space-related services, data and activities are increasingly key for the functioning of our economies and the implementation of public policies for the welfare of our citizens. However, we see globally an intensification of threats and the development of capabilities directed at disrupting the peaceful use of space.
We reiterate the importance of upholding the existing legal framework for activities in outer space, notably the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”). We remain committed to fostering international cooperation, transparency, and confidence-building measures to promote responsible behavior with the goal of improving space security for all states. In parallel, we will also remain vigilant and invest in the resilience of space-related services against potentially hostile activities.
We affirm the obligation of all States Parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.
24. Countering terrorism and transnational crime
We condemn terrorism in all its forms, and we reiterate our determination to protect freedom and security in our societies, upholding democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights – including the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy – freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.
Terrorist networks know no borders and countering terrorism requires a strong collective and internationally aligned approach that includes combating the financing of terrorism and terrorist propaganda. We need to recognize and tackle new threats emanating from malign actors’ use of emerging technologies, such as drones and artificial intelligence, while the risk of chemical, biological, and radiological attacks remain a serious threat. The potential use of technologies to counter terrorism and violent extremism must be recognized as well.
Countering terrorism needs a holistic approach, aimed also at preventing violent extremism. It is imperative that we prevent radicalization to violence online and offline, in prison as well as in societies, through work with civil society, women-led organizations, local leaders and communities. We should work to promote rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for former terrorists in order to reintegrate them back into society with a reduced risk of recidivism. We intend to step up information sharing and international cooperation, promoting capacity building domestically and with partners, including in border management. All our efforts are based on respect for human rights and the principles of the rule of law.
Organized crime is also a major threat to our societies and citizens and also knows no borders. Organized crime can take advantage of the insecurity, instability and conflicts caused by terrorism and it can also be a way that terrorist groups support their activities. Terrorism can leverage organized crime, too. Human trafficking, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, crimes that affect the environment, trafficking of cultural property, money laundering and corruption can find a fertile ground when exploiting war and conflicts. Capacity building in justice and security measures to counter the illicit economy can help to foster inclusive and peaceful societies.
We reaffirm our commitment to fight organized crime and its illegal profits, focusing on new risks such as cybercrime. Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants have become major sources of income for organized crime, together with drug trafficking. We are firmly committed to stop the criminal exploitation of vulnerable peoples, breaking the business model of organized criminal groups.
We also reaffirm our commitment to fight against the illicit production and distribution of synthetic drugs including fentanyl. Trafficking of illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs props up large, adaptable, and resilient transnational criminal organizations that operate across the globe – with the financial means and capacity to corrupt society, undermine governance, and weaken government institutions around the world. Together, we reaffirm our commitment to countering the production, distribution, and sale of illicit narcotics; to sharing threat information and engaging in joint investigations and enforcement efforts; to scheduling precursor chemicals and other drugs, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and other international entities; to collectively coordinating efforts with key international partners, especially with countries where synthetic drugs are produced; to participating in multilateral fora, such as the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, that unite countries and key institutions in fighting the scourge of deadly drugs; and to advancing public health interventions and services to those who need it. Individually and collectively, we will crack down on the global criminal networks that fuel overdose deaths, disrupt the illicit financial mechanisms that support these networks; seize deadly drugs before they enter our communities; and deliver life-saving medication and care. We are ready to work with other governments to tackle these transnational challenges and to support the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.
We welcome the valuable input of the G7 Roma-Lyon Group’s work on preventing and combating terrorism and transnational organized crime.
25. Fight against Corruption
We recognize that corruption and related illicit finance and proceeds of crime drain public resources, can often fuel organized crime and undermine democratic governance. Corruption and illicit finance also undermine progress across all the Sustainable Development Goals.
We reaffirm the fundamental role that the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and its supporting bodies play in the global fight against corruption. We will strive to further support and enhance the effectiveness of its Implementation Review Mechanism, especially with a view to its next review phase.
We also reaffirm our commitment to timely and effective implementation of the FATF standards on transparency of beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements, underscoring the importance of accountability tools that will deny corrupt actors access to our territories and our financial systems.
We also recognize the challenges faced by some developing countries in meeting international standards designed to combat corruption and illicit finance, and we encourage the international financial institutions to coordinate and increase their efforts to support countries in their efforts across their operations, particularly in fragile and conflict affected countries.
26. Threats to maritime security
We reiterate our commitment to promoting a cooperative system of international governance for the ocean and seas and to maintaining the rules-based maritime order based on international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights. In this context, we recognize the importance of the role of international courts and tribunals including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
We firmly reiterate our condemnation for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, terrorism and transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of weapons and narcotics, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other illegal maritime activities. We reaffirm the importance of national and regional ownership in pursuing the fight against illegal activities at sea.
V1. TACKLING REGIONAL ISSUES
27. Western Balkans
We reaffirm our shared commitment to the security, economic prosperity, and European perspective of the six Western Balkans countries as a crucial investment for peace and stability. We emphasize the importance of advancing the necessary internal reforms, particularly on rule of law, including tackling organized crime, illicit finance, and corruption.
We fully support further progress on regional cooperation and integration, including by implementing the Common Regional Market, and we encourage local political elites to make decisive progress on regional reconciliation. To this aim, we call on Kosovo and Serbia to implement without further delay the Agreement on the Path to Normalization and its Implementation Annex adopted in 2023. We urge both sides to engage constructively in the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue, refraining from provocations, inflammatory rhetoric, and uncoordinated actions.
We firmly reject any attempt from internal or external actors to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and multiethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support the executive mandate of the EUFOR ALTHEA operation to support the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in maintaining a safe and secure environment in the country.
We urge all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to put aside divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, to avoid any act that could destabilize the country and to focus on internal reforms that would move the country closer to realizing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
We welcome the European Council’s decision in March 2024 to open negotiations for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the European Union. We support the mandate of High Representative Christian Schmidt.
28. South Caucasus
We urge Armenia and Azerbaijan to remain fully committed to the peace process to achieve a dignified and durable peace based on the principles of non-use of force, respect for sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. We recall the Joint Statement issued by the sides on December 7th, 2023, and encourage them to uphold that spirit of cooperation in their future interactions. Further escalation would be unacceptable.
We call on Azerbaijan to fully comply with its obligations under international humanitarian law and encourage appropriate steps to ensure the safe, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons wishing to come back to their homes.
The G7 and its members are ready to facilitate further constructive contacts at all levels, notably within the established negotiating frameworks provided by the EU and the USA, whose enduring efforts we commend.
We reiterate the importance of the commitment to the Alma Ata 1991 Declaration through which Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. We encourage greater regional cooperation and the re-opening of all borders, including the border between Armenia and Türkiye.
29. Central Asian countries
We remain resolved to support the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the right of self-determination of the Central Asian countries.
We are committed to enhancing our cooperation with the Central Asian countries to tackle regional challenges, including the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the enduring impact of the situation in Afghanistan, the regional terrorist threat, as well as managing water resources and climate change and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We encourage the further strengthening of regional cooperation, especially in the field of connectivity and infrastructure, including the Middle Corridor, to improve ease of trade between the Central Asian countries, bolster global supply chains, foster trade, forge investment and energy links, provide economic diversification and enhance resilience, while upholding labor rights and environmental protection.
We will continue to support the implementation of the socio-economic and political reforms announced in the Central Asian countries. Throughout the region, we support the expansion of civic and political participation, the strengthening of the rule of law, and the safeguarding of human rights.
30. Afghanistan
We remain committed to supporting the people of Afghanistan. We condemn the continued and systemic abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Taliban, notably of the political, economic and social rights of women and girls, as well as the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities. We deeply regret that the Taliban has taken no serious step to initiate an inclusive political process with fellow Afghans regarding the future of the country. Peace and stability in Afghanistan will require the establishment of an inclusive and representative political process which allows Afghanistan to fulfill its international obligations and includes full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation of Afghan women, upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We intend to remain vigilant against the risk of Afghanistan serving as a base for hosting or exporting terrorism to other countries.
The safe and secure departure of all Afghans wishing to leave the country must be guaranteed, as well as humanitarian access and the possibility to effectively provide humanitarian aid.
We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.
We are committed to the swift appointment of a UN Special Envoy in line with the recommendations of the UN’s Independent Assessment and as mandated by Security Council Resolution 2721.
VII. COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Stronger cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean is of paramount importance as we have common values and shared interests. We commit to further partner with the Region to address global challenges, including by protecting the international system based on international cooperation and international law, tackling natural disasters and climate change, countering transnational organized crime, and promoting trade and investments aimed at improving socio-economic resilience.
31. Haiti
We express our solidarity to the Haitian population, which is suffering from unprecedented levels of gang violence. We reiterate our support to the ongoing international efforts aimed at strengthening public institutions and law enforcement, as well as combating criminal gangs, whose illegal activities have led to a marked deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation of the country.
We encourage the international community to scale up its humanitarian support to the Haitian population. We note the urgent need to protect women and children in Haiti, who are suffering disproportionately from the recent and rapid escalation in violence.
We welcome UNSCR 2699, authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Haiti, to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security in Haiti and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. We commend the Government of Kenya for its readiness to lead the mission. Every effort should be made to expeditiously provide robust financial support to the mission so that it may deploy as soon as possible. The people of Haiti cannot wait.
We also welcome UNSCR 2700, which renews the sanctions regime for Haiti for an additional year. The sanctions regime promotes accountability by extending the territorial arms embargo and ability to sanction individuals and entities who are responsible for, or complicit in, actions that threaten the peace and security in Haiti.
We commend the outcome of the CARICOM Summit held in Kingston, Jamaica, on March 11 and the commitment taken by Haitian stakeholders to implement an inclusive transitional governance arrangement.
We support the ongoing efforts of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti and call on the political actors to bridge their differences and commit in a forward-looking, transparent, and fair national dialogue, which is essential to stabilize the Country.
We reiterate the importance that the process to find lasting solutions to the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis be Haitian-led and owned.
32. Nicaragua
We call on the Nicaraguan government to end its human rights violations as well as widespread repression and related violations and abuses against civil society, Indigenous Peoples, academics, students, the independent press, and political and religious actors.
We urge authorities to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners and abide by their international obligations. We condemn the closure of CSOs and the systematic attacks on religious institutions and organizations, including the Catholic Church and its ministers, many of whom have been arrested and then sent into exile, along with hundreds of political actors and civil society members – and moved to strip them of their citizenship. We call on the Government to restore their citizenship under international conventions.
We further call on the Nicaraguan Government to hold free and fair elections, allowing the members of the opposition to exercise their rights to the freedom of assembly, and to free speech.
33. Venezuela
We are deeply concerned about the ongoing political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. We call on Venezuela to swiftly implement the Barbados Agreements of October 2023, with particular regard to electoral guarantees, and the deployment of international electoral observations missions in order to ensure free and fair elections.
We are deeply worried by the recent decisions to prevent members of the opposition from exercising their core political rights and the continued detention and harassment of opposition members. We call for the immediate release of political prisoners still detained.
We follow closely developments between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region and we demand Venezuela to refrain from destabilizing initiatives. The matter must be resolved in line with international law..."
Type:
Individual Documents
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Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-04-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-19
Description:
"GENEVA (19 April 2024) – UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk today warned that intensified fighting in Rakhine State between the military and the Arakan Army, alongside tensions being fuelled between the Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine communities, pose a grave threat to the civilian population. He warned of a grave risk that past atrocities will be repeated.
Since the year-long informal ceasefire between the two sides broke down last November, 15 of Rakhine’s 17 townships have been affected by fighting, resulting in hundreds of deaths and injuries, and taking the number of displaced to well over 300,000.
“Rakhine State has once again become a battleground involving multiple actors, and civilians are paying a heavy price, with Rohingya at particular risk,” the High Commissioner said. “What is particularly disturbing is that whereas in 2017, the Rohingya were targeted by one group, they are now trapped between two armed factions who have a track record of killing them. We must not allow the Rohingya to be targeted again.”
The military has been fast losing ground to the Arakan Army (AA) throughout northern and central Rakhine. This has led to intensified fighting in the townships of Buthidaung and Maungdaw, ahead of an expected battle for the Rakhine State capital, Sittwe. The two townships are home to large Rohingya populations, putting them at grave risk.
“Facing defeat, the military has outrageously started to forcibly conscript, bribe and coerce Rohingya into joining their ranks. It is unconscionable that they should be targeted in this way, given the appalling events of six years ago, and the ongoing extreme discrimination against the Rohingya including the denial of citizenship,” Türk said.
Some reports say the military is forcing the Rohingya recruits or villagers to burn ethnic Rakhine homes, buildings or villages. Ethnic Rakhine villagers have allegedly responded in kind by burning Rohingya villages. The UN Human Rights Office is trying to verify all reports received, a task complicated by a communications blackout throughout the State.
Türk said disinformation and propaganda are also rife, pointing to claims that “Islamic terrorists” have taken Hindus and Buddhists hostage. “This was the same kind of hateful narrative that fuelled communal violence in 2012 and the horrendous attacks against the Rohingya in 2017,” he said.
Since the start of the year, the AA has positioned itself in and around Rohingya villages effectively inviting military attacks on Rohingya civilians.
On 15 April, the Médecins Sans Frontières office and pharmacy were torched in Buthidaung, along with some 200 homes. Hundreds have fled and are reported to be taking refuge in a high school, the grounds of the former hospital, and along roads in Buthidaung town. With both the Maungdaw and Buthidaung hospitals having been shut by the military in March and with the conflict intensifying, there is effectively no medical treatment in northern Rakhine.
“The alarm bells are ringing, and we must not allow there to be a repeat of the past,” Türk said. “Countries with influence on the Myanmar military and armed groups involved must act now to protect all civilians in Rakhine State and prevent another episode of horrendous persecution of the Rohingya.”..."
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-19
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.11 MB
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KM19.4.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-19
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.52 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-19-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Date of publication:
2024-04-18
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-18
Description:
"We, the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are deeply concerned over the recent escalation of conflicts, including in the area of Myawaddy, Kayin State, along the border area between Myanmar and Thailand and in Rakhine State of Myanmar, which have caused displacement of civilians.
To avoid further humanitarian impacts of such escalation of all forms of conflicts, we urge all parties for an immediate cessation of violence and to exercise utmost restraint, to uphold international humanitarian law, and to take all the necessary measures to defuse tensions and to ensure the protection and safety of all civilians, including foreign nationals and citizens of ASEAN Member States..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Format :
pdf
Size:
133.94 KB
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-18
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-18
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
8.18 MB
Local URL:
KM18.4.2024.pdf
KM18.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-18
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-18
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.68 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-18-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
Médecins Sans Frontières
Date of publication:
2024-04-17
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-17
Description:
"The intensification of conflict in Myanmar since October 2023 has led to a lack of humanitarian access to areas where people need urgent assistance, as well as a decimation of the health care system and increasing fears of military conscription or forced recruitment by other armed groups.
The normalization of the prohibition of humanitarian access is alarming. Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) teams in Myanmar have witnessed a near-total absence of humanitarian assistance for communities who rely on it, including the Rohingya people, a persecuted minority trapped by movement restrictions and lack of legal status, which is particularly affected by the conflict.
Since November 2023, all organizations delivering health care in Rakhine state have been denied authorization to operate, while movement across the entire country is heavily restricted and unsafe. In northern Rakhine state, two township hospitals have been forced to close, and there is now virtually no secondary health care available for vulnerable communities.
MSF has been forced to suspend or reduce regular activities, including running 25 mobile clinics in Rakhine state where staff typically provide 1,500 patient consultations per week. During March 2024, MSF provided only 81 consultations. This severe disruption to the emergency referral process has caused numerous fatalities, particularly among pregnant mothers and babies.
Nimrat Kaur began working as a project coordinator for MSF in Maungdaw, Myanmar in mid-April 2023, just before Cyclone Mocha hit last year. She has seen firsthand the challenges faced by people living there. Upon leaving Myanmar, Nimrat shared her experience and that of her colleagues, reflecting on the events she witnessed and the impact the project has had on people’s lives.
What did you witness in northern Rakhine state?
Since November 13, 2023, we have seen an escalation of conflict in Rakhine state and the townships of Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung have been cut off from the rest of the state. People were locked out and blocked in. Communities were not able to move across the state, and supplies could not [pass]. I don’t just mean health care supplies, but basic life-supporting supplies like food, fuel, and water. These kinds of things have been restricted, which led to whatever supplies were available becoming inflated in price. There were some fearful days, and we had to move the team to the safe room almost three or four times one day.
"I am fortunate I had the opportunity to leave the violence, but there are many who don’t have the opportunity to even move. I really feel for that. That thought really consumes me."
How has MSF been supporting communities in this area?
Usually, in northern Rakhine, we provide [care through] mobile clinics. This is where a mobile team of doctors, nurses, and other staff go to rural areas far off from the main town. Since the conflict started, we haven’t been able to run these clinics. This is because of the increased insecurity and because we did not receive authorization. People in the areas we usually visit already have very limited access to health care. We’re extremely concerned about the impact of having no access to essential health care for people who usually rely on our mobile clinics for medical services.
How has the conscription law affected people in northern Rakhine?
Three months into the latest eruption of conflict, the conscription law was announced in the country. The law states citizens are expected to serve in the armed forces for anything from two to five years. I’ve seen how this has affected everyone. Rakhine communities have been trying to leave the state and go to Sittwe or Yangon and find refuge somewhere. Unfortunately, my Rohingya colleagues and the wider Rohingya community do not have the paperwork to move outside of their own village, so I really wonder what is going to happen to them and I am really worried about their safety. I could see the change in the staff’s understanding of what is happening in the country—that the conflict is now at another level.
Why is the Rohingya community particularly vulnerable?
In Rakhine state, it’s a mix of ethnicities. There are Rakhine, Rohingya, and Hindis. Arakanese are citizens of Rakhine, but the Rohingya were stripped of their citizenship in 1982.
Generations of Rohingya people have really struggled for what they have now. You cannot understand how challenging and limited life is for them.
In our team, we have Rohingya staff, some of whom have been able to get a citizenship card, but this is an exception and not the case for most. Other Rohingya staff [from the] same team, same age group, and same village, do not even have a national identification card or a basic yellow card, which is needed to move even just within their own village.
For Rohingya staff working in Maungdaw, it takes months to be authorized to travel from Maungdaw to Sittwe, where the other MSF project is based. It is even longer for the authorization to travel to Yangon because of the paperwork required. For Rohingya staff to travel they need to receive a village administration verification, ward administration verification, police administration verification, and then often other authorizations from other authorities. And then of course, on top of this, you must pay fees, and these fees are not the standard fees people with citizenship cards pay.
Many Rohingya staff in Maungdaw have not seen the other township that they’re working for. The whole time they have been in Maungdaw because they are not permitted to travel. This gave me a sense that these circumstances are very different compared to the circumstances in other states we work in.
What are the current health care options for communities in northern Rakhine?
We haven’t been able to run mobile clinics since the conflict started, and already these communities were vulnerable because of the lack of access to safe health care. We tried to provide a few months' worth of medications to our patients who are taking diabetes or hypertension drugs. We have also supported [them] with teleconsultations, which we have tried to maintain for people who need mental health care. But this also unfortunately could not last for more than a few weeks because since January 10, Buthidaung and Maungdaw have not had any electricity, and with no electricity, there hasn’t been any cell coverage.
The latest blow for people has been the closing of Maungdaw and Buthidaung township hospitals. We’re unsure why Maungdaw [closed], but admitted patients had to leave with no alternative option to go to. Buthidaung closed because it ran out of human resources and supplies. These two township hospitals were our only health care stakeholder left with whom we could work and refer emergency patients to. This has a huge impact on communities here. If the township hospitals are closed, where do people go?
With hospitals shut down, people reach out to MSF and other health care organizations on the ground to support them, but we have had limited capacity in terms of resources. We usually stock up for a minimum of four to five months, but those stocks have not lasted very long. We still don’t have any way to bring in our supplies. Staff have not felt safe working in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, or Rathedaung.
"The latest blow for people has been the closing of Maungdaw and Buthidaung township hospitals. This has a huge impact on communities here. If the township hospitals are closed, where do people go?"
Day-to-day activities are becoming more difficult. We need fuel to run an office so we can have internet and be connected to the rest of our team. It has really affected us to not be able to serve the community we are there for.
I am fortunate I’ve had the opportunity to leave the violence, but there are many who don’t have the opportunity to even move. I really feel for that. That thought really consumes me..."
Type:
Individual Documents
more
Source/publisher:
MA-UK Myanmar via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-04-17
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-17
Description:
"Nearly half country below poverty line In the past six years the est. percentage of population living below the national poverty line, set at 1,590 MMK/Day (approx. 0.75 USD/Day), almost doubled, from the 24.8% of 2017 to the 49.7% of 2023, nearly half of Myanmar’s population (UNDP, 2024). In the same period, reduced labor productivity, lack of labor demand and high inflation, caused workers' earnings to decline by 15 percent in real terms (World Bank Myanmar Economic Monitor). As result of the combination of these factors, the estimated national median income per capita in 2023 was only 75,000 MMK per month (approx. 35 USD), which in rural areas is further reduced of an average 24%..."
Type:
Individual Documents
more
Source/publisher:
Médecins Sans Frontières
Date of publication:
2024-04-17
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-17
Description:
"MSF’s outgoing project coordinator outlines the dire needs of the Rohingya in Rakhine state amid escalating violence.
The intensification of conflict in Myanmar since October 2023 has led to a lack of humanitarian access to areas where people need urgent assistance, as well as a decimation of the health care system and increasing fears of military conscription or forced recruitment by other armed groups.
The normalization of the prohibition of humanitarian access is alarming. Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) teams in Myanmar have witnessed a near-total absence of humanitarian assistance for communities who rely on it, including the Rohingya people, a persecuted minority trapped by movement restrictions and lack of legal status, which is particularly affected by the conflict.
Since November 2023, all organizations delivering health care in Rakhine state have been denied authorization to operate, while movement across the entire country is heavily restricted and unsafe. In northern Rakhine state, two township hospitals have been forced to close, and there is now virtually no secondary health care available for vulnerable communities.
MSF has been forced to suspend or reduce regular activities, including running 25 mobile clinics in Rakhine state where staff typically provide 1,500 patient consultations per week. During March 2024, MSF provided only 81 consultations. This severe disruption to the emergency referral process has caused numerous fatalities, particularly among pregnant mothers and babies.
Nimrat Kaur began working as a project coordinator for MSF in Maungdaw, Myanmar in mid-April 2023, just before Cyclone Mocha hit last year. She has seen firsthand the challenges faced by people living there. Upon leaving Myanmar, Nimrat shared her experience and that of her colleagues, reflecting on the events she witnessed and the impact the project has had on people's lives.
What did you witness in northern Rakhine state?
Since November 13, 2023, we have seen an escalation of conflict in Rakhine state and the townships of Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung have been cut off from the rest of the state. People were locked out and blocked in. Communities were not able to move across the state, and supplies could not [pass]. I don't just mean health care supplies, but basic life-supporting supplies like food, fuel, and water. These kinds of things have been restricted, which led to whatever supplies were available becoming inflated in price. There were some fearful days, and we had to move the team to the safe room almost three or four times one day.
How has MSF been supporting communities in this area?
Usually, in northern Rakhine, we provide [care through] mobile clinics. This is where a mobile team of doctors, nurses, and other staff go to rural areas far off from the main town. Since the conflict started, we haven't been able to run these clinics. This is because of the increased insecurity and because we did not receive authorization. People in the areas we usually visit already have very limited access to health care. We're extremely concerned about the impact of having no access to essential health care for people who usually rely on our mobile clinics for medical services.
How has the conscription law affected people in northern Rakhine?
Three months into the latest eruption of conflict, the conscription law was announced in the country. The law states citizens are expected to serve in the armed forces for anything from two to five years. I've seen how this has affected everyone. Rakhine communities have been trying to leave the state and go to Sittwe or Yangon and find refuge somewhere. Unfortunately, my Rohingya colleagues and the wider Rohingya community do not have the paperwork to move outside of their own village, so I really wonder what is going to happen to them and I am really worried about their safety. I could see the change in the staff's understanding of what is happening in the country---that the conflict is now at another level.
Why is the Rohingya community particularly vulnerable?
In Rakhine state, it's a mix of ethnicities. There are Rakhine, Rohingya, and Hindis. Arakanese are citizens of Rakhine, but the Rohingya were stripped of their citizenship in 1982.
Generations of Rohingya people have really struggled for what they have now. You cannot understand how challenging and limited life is for them.
In our team, we have Rohingya staff, some of whom have been able to get a citizenship card, but this is an exception and not the case for most. Other Rohingya staff [from the] same team, same age group, and same village, do not even have a national identification card or a basic yellow card, which is needed to move even just within their own village.
For Rohingya staff working in Maungdaw, it takes months to be authorized to travel from Maungdaw to Sittwe, where the other MSF project is based. It is even longer for the authorization to travel to Yangon because of the paperwork required. For Rohingya staff to travel they need to receive a village administration verification, ward administration verification, police administration verification, and then often other authorizations from other authorities. And then of course, on top of this, you must pay fees, and these fees are not the standard fees people with citizenship cards pay.
Many Rohingya staff in Maungdaw have not seen the other township that they're working for. The whole time they have been in Maungdaw because they are not permitted to travel. This gave me a sense that these circumstances are very different compared to the circumstances in other states we work in.
What are the current health care options for communities in northern Rakhine?
We haven't been able to run mobile clinics since the conflict started, and already these communities were vulnerable because of the lack of access to safe health care. We tried to provide a few months' worth of medications to our patients who are taking diabetes or hypertension drugs. We have also supported [them] with teleconsultations, which we have tried to maintain for people who need mental health care. But this also unfortunately could not last for more than a few weeks because since January 10, Buthidaung and Maungdaw have not had any electricity, and with no electricity, there hasn't been any cell coverage.
The latest blow for people has been the closing of Maungdaw and Buthidaung township hospitals. We're unsure why Maungdaw [closed], but admitted patients had to leave with no alternative option to go to. Buthidaung closed because it ran out of human resources and supplies. These two township hospitals were our only health care stakeholder left with whom we could work and refer emergency patients to. This has a huge impact on communities here. If the township hospitals are closed, where do people go?
With hospitals shut down, people reach out to MSF and other health care organizations on the ground to support them, but we have had limited capacity in terms of resources. We usually stock up for a minimum of four to five months, but those stocks have not lasted very long. We still don't have any way to bring in our supplies. Staff have not felt safe working in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, or Rathedaung.
Day-to-day activities are becoming more difficult. We need fuel to run an office so we can have internet and be connected to the rest of our team. It has really affected us to not be able to serve the community we are there for.
I am fortunate I've had the opportunity to leave the violence, but there are many who don't have the opportunity to even move. I really feel for that. That thought really consumes me..."
Type:
Individual Documents
more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-17
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-17
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
8.11 MB
Local URL:
KM17.4.2024.pdf
KM17.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-17
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-17
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.08 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-17-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
Médecins Sans Frontières
Date of publication:
2024-04-16
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-16
Sub-title:
The loss of the facility is another blow to a decimated health care system.
Description:
"The office and pharmacy of Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Rakhine state, Myanmar was destroyed in a fire on April 15, along with all of its medical stock and office equipment. We urge all parties to the conflict to respect health care facilities as per their obligations under international humanitarian law.
BUTHIDAUNG, April 16, 2024—MSF is deeply alarmed that our office and pharmacy in Buthidaung, Rakhine state, Myanmar, burnt down on April 15. The burning down of MSF’s office and pharmacy is just the latest blow to what is a decimation of available health care options for people in Rakhine state and their continued denial of access to humanitarian assistance.
No staff were injured, but all medical stock and office equipment were destroyed. This includes lifesaving drugs such as antibiotics, instrumental in the treatment of diseases like pneumonia, primarily affecting children under five years old.
The destruction of the MSF office comes amid increasing violence witnessed in Buthidaung since last Friday. We hear reports of more than 200 homes burned down and witness thousands of people who are displaced by the violence seeking refuge in an area directly across from where our office was located.
We are urging parties to the conflict to respect the protection of health care facilities as is per their obligation under international humanitarian law. We urge relevant authorities to consider the urgent need to expedite approvals for the movement of medical supplies, facilitate our ability to restock the destroyed supplies at our Buthidaung office, and restore humanitarian access, now impeded in the state since November 2023..."
Type:
Individual Documents
more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-16
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-16
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
4.54 MB
Local URL:
mal 16.4.2024.pdf
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Source/publisher:
Burma Human Rights Network
Date of publication:
2024-04-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-15
Description:
"Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN), wholeheartedly appreciate the decision made by the People’s Assembly organised by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) to abolish the 1982 Myanmar citizenship law, commonly known as the Rohingya Genocide law. This landmark decision represents a significant milestone in the ongoing spring revolution journey toward fostering unity, inclusivity, and respect for all individuals within Burma.
The 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Law was formulated based on dictator Ne Win’s ideology of Burmanization, xenophobia, and racial discrimination. It has systematically discriminated against the Rohingya community, ultimately contributing to the Rohingya genocide.
Similarly, thousands of Muslims from Southern Burma have become stateless along the Thai-Burma border. Additionally, other Muslim minority groups such as Pathi, Pashu, Kaman, Myaydu, and Panthay, as well as other religious minority groups such as Hindus, Gurkha, Sikhs, Bahais, and Christians, have faced similar discriminatory experiences in expressing their identities while seeking citizenship. BHRN hopes these issues can be similarly resolved.
BHRN’s Executive Director Kyaw Win said, “Burma’s discriminatory Citizenship Law is a blight on the country’s history. By reversing this law, the People’s Assembly and the NUCC are strongly signaling they intend to separate themselves from the bigotry of the Tatmadaw. As the junta loses ground in the civil war, it is vital that planning takes place now to ensure that Burma’s next phase is one of equality and harmony for all its people. We welcome this first step and encourage further action to protect the citizenship and status of all Burma’s people.”
The 1982 citizenship law established three types of citizenship: citizen, associate citizen, and naturalized citizen. However, no clear articles or administrative processes exist for individuals to attain citizenship after holding associate or naturalized citizenship identities. Implementation of the law is rife with corruption, leading to instances where even siblings from the same household hold different identity documents.
As a result of this law and its implementation, minority communities face the risk of statelessness and limited access to education, property rights, healthcare, higher employment, and other essential services. Therefore, by undergoing the legal process to abolish this discriminatory law, the revolution in Burma reaffirms its commitment to upholding the principles of equality, justice, and human rights for all citizens.
We commend the efforts of all those involved in this decision and urge for the swift abolition of the law is crucial to continue progress towards building a more harmonious and inclusive society. Finally, a new citizenship law must be based on human rights norms and should be only one type of citizenship for everyone equally.
Organisation’s Background
BHRN is based in London and operates across Burma/Myanmar working for human rights, minority rights and religious freedom in the country. BHRN has played a crucial role in advocating for human rights and religious freedom with politicians and world leaders..."
Type:
Individual Documents
more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-15
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
4.88 MB
Local URL:
mal 15.4.2024.pdf
mal 15.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-14
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-14
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.74 MB
Local URL:
mal 14.4.24.pdf
mal 14.4.24.pdf more
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-13
Description:
"The MAU tracks market prices in in Southeast Myanmar. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. The data include prices from Demoso (village), Hpapun (Kamamaung), Hsihseng (main), Kawkareik (main), Loikaw (main), Pekon (main), and Taungoo (Nat Htet). Data are available online at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Rice prices rose 11-14% in March, although other essential food prices were mostly stable;
Vegetable prices were unusually stable, particularly in Taungoo and Hpapun (Kamarmaung) where supply was good and prices remained flat;
Meat/fish prices were stable or rising 3-5% in March, reversing the fairly modest price reductions observed in February;
Prices for hygiene products were stable in March, except in Taungoo where prices retreated;
NFI prices fluctuated in Demoso and Pinlaung, but NFI prices were otherwise mostly stable across markets in March;
Prices for monsoon-related NFIs are likely to rise in the months ahead, including items like mosquito nets and plastic tarps.
Product-Level Price Changes
Essential Foods – Rice prices rose 11-14% in March, while other essential food prices were mostly stable. Rice prices were stable in Demoso and Taungoo, but they rose in other markets monitored. Prices for pulses and cooking oil were stable, except in Demoso where they fell 7-11%.
Vegetables – Vegetable prices were unusually stable in March as supply was steady. Garlic prices fell 17-40% in some markets, while long bean and watercress prices rose 14-50% in some markets but otherwise held steady. Taungoo and Hpapun saw particularly stable vegetable prices in March.
Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices were stable or 3-5% higher in March. Prices for fresh fish, dried fish, and chicken drifted 3-5% higher in March. Pork, fish paste, and shrimp prices were mostly stable notwithstanding several instances of rising or falling prices.
Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products were stable or falling in March. Prices for hygiene products fell 20-33% in Taungoo in March, while other markets saw price stability or the occasional rising price. Detergent prices fell 8% or more in three of five markets monitored in March.
Other NFIs – NFI prices were stable in March, although Demoso and Pinlaung saw more price fluctuation. Prices for plastic tarps rose 5% across markets as the monsoon season approached, and charcoal prices spiked in Pekon and Pinlaung. NFI prices otherwise did not shift much in March. At a township-level, NFI prices were falling in Pinlaung, but they were generally stable elsewhere. NFI prices were most stable in Taungoo and Hpapun, while Demoso saw a few rising and falling prices..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.07 MB
more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-13
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
3.03 MB
Local URL:
mal 13.4.2024.pdf
mal 13.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
Karen National Union
Date of publication:
2024-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-12
Description:
"Karen National Union (KNU) led resistance forces, including the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Karen National Defense Organisation (KNDO) and the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), captured Thingannyinaung Tactical Command Base under Burma/Myanmar military’s Southeastern Command on the 4th of April 2024. On the 10th of April 2024, they captured 275th Infantry Battalion stationed in Myawaddy Township. However, some troops from the 275th Infantry Battalion have retreated to the 2nd Thailand-Myanmar Friendship Bridge where they have stationed themselves and taken sheltered near the bridge.
Since capturing the bases, our allied forces are conducting military operations to intercept, block, and deter reinforcement troops sent by SAC in order not to lose Myawaddy. Some tasks still need to be carried out in order to reach a secure position in the Myawaddy area. People are urged to live and travel while taking security precautions.
Once the Myawaddy area has reached a secure position, the KNU, with the participation of the local people, will establish administrative matters, prevent illicit businesses, contraband trades and human trafficking, and implement stability, law enforcement, necessary public services, and facilitate commodity flow in the Myawaddy area from a possible position despite the challenges. We release our positions as follows:
The KNU is deeply concerned about the security of the people living on both sides of the Thailand-Burma/Myanmar border, border stability, and access to humanitarian aid, and we will do our best concerning those issues.
The KNU is committed to establishing and maintaining cross-border security and stability. We are making the necessary preparations and arrangements for the continuity of rules-based cross-border activities in line with regional best practices.
In order to establish peace and security for the people living on both sides of the Thailand-Burma/Myanmar border, the KNU is working to achieve meaningful cooperation with the Royal Thai Government, local and international partner organizations, including border-based Karen organizations and connecting with all concerned parties.
We respect and honor all our comrades who have sacrificed their lives, blood, and sweat to remove any kind of dictatorship, including the military dictatorship, and establish a new civilian-led federal democratic union that respects diversity and inclusion. The KNU will continue to fight to achieve our goal together with the Ethnic Resistance Organizations and democratic alliances, and we urge the entire people of Kawthoolei and Burma/Myanmar to keep participating and fighting persistently..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Armed conflict in Karen State - general articles and reports
Format :
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Size:
511.01 KB 810.84 KB
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Source/publisher:
UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-12
Description:
"Highlights
• Internal displacement continues to rise with more than 2.8 million people displaced country-wide, who are in need of humanitarian assistance amid access challenges.
• The heightened conflict in Rakhine is driving displacement, raising protection concerns and exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities.
• Over the past month, UNICEF and its partners provided 39,815 people with primary health care services.
• UNICEF also supported 67,661 internally displaced children (including 34,451 girls) with access to formal and non-formal education, including early learning.
• At the end of Q1 of 2024, UNICEF’s HAC is only 11 per cent funded, limiting UNICEF’s ability to scale up and address the lifesaving needs of the most vulnerable people.
Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs
Armed conflict has been spreading in many parts of the country especially in Rakhine state, the northwest, Kachin and the southeast. Displacement continues to increase, and more than 2.8 million people have been internally displaced.
About 18.6 million people across Myanmar will need humanitarian assistance in 20242 and rising inflation affects people’s ability to meet their basic needs, further exacerbating vulnerabilities. People, especially children, are struggling to survive because of threats to their security and protection. Enforcement of conscription across the country and forced recruitment by different armed groups are increasing people’s anxiety and insecurity. The ongoing clashes and the restrictions imposed by all parties still pose the main obstacles in accessing affected people and in providing lifesaving support and social services.
The conflict in northern Shan State has been stable since the ceasefire was agreed in January, despite continuing tensions between the Myanmar Armed Forces and armed groups in Kayukme and Hsipaw. United Nations staff, who had been temporarily relocated from Lashio, returned as the security situation improved. Most of the internally displaced population have returned to their places of origin, with only approximately 20,000 people still temporarily displaced.
However, landmine incidents have significantly increased in northern Shan, and travel restrictions remain in place for civilians. Transportation costs have also significantly risen due to road accessibility issues and checkpoints set up by both parties.
In southern Shan, the armed conflict has escalated in Hopong, Loilen (Mongpawn), Hsihseng, Mawkmai, Pinlaung,
Pekon, Ywarngan and near Taunggyi. More than 10,000 people flee from 17 villages in Pinlaung Township since early March. Approximately 80 per cent of Hsihseng town has been destroyed by airstrikes, bombings, and heavy artillery fire. This has caused the number of internally displaced persons to rise in conflict-affected areas and neighbouring townships. In Kayah state, armed conflict escalated mainly in Hpasaung and Loikaw and the number of internally displaced is increasing due to the conflicts, and because of the relocation of people from southern Shan.
In Kachin state, intense gunfire, artillery shelling and aerial attacks have been reported in Bhamo, Mansi, Sumprabum townships since 3 March. Consequently, 27 civilians, including 6 children, were allegedly killed and 7 people including a child, were injured. 3 More than 18,000 people have been displaced in 10 townships since the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) launched a new offensive on 7 March4 . Roads from Myitkyina-Bhamo and Myitkyina-Sumprabum remain blocked and hindering access to the displaced people for humanitarian aid. Electricity was cut off in Bhamo, Mansi and Sumprabum townships due to the destruction of power lines during the fighting. Mobile communication and internet services remain severely limited in Mansi and Sumprabum townships. Roadblocks and restrictions on telecommunications hamper the further assessment of emerging needs to inform humanitarian responses.
In Rakhine State, fighting intensified in March with artillery fire and deadly aerial bombardment, particularly in Kyaukpyu, Maungdaw, Ponnagyun, Ramree and Rathedaung townships, 15 townships have been affected out of 17 townships.
Artillery shelling incidents impacted civilian areas in Sittwe, killing a total of at least 29 civilians and injuring 42 others, while also damaging buildings, including a school5 . Waterways and road closures are causing shortages of food and other commodities, as well as a rise in the prices of essential goods. Refusal of travel authorisations have impeded accessing to affected communities for the provision of humanitarian assistance and poor internet and telephone network connectivity also hampers the gathering of information on the needs of the displaced population. More than 157,000 people are estimated to have been displaced in Rakhine and Paletwa in Chin since the ceasefire failed and most townships have travel restrictions. Most health services facilities are badly affected with very limited numbers of health workers and health supplies are running out. The displacements and restrictions are also affecting learning facilities.
Landmines are a major issue across Rakhine state with communities, including children, being injured by landmines with regular incidents. In the northwest, clashes in Kale township resulted in civilian casualties, the destruction of houses and people’s displacement. Approximately 28,000 people from Kale town fled to safer locations6 , about 25,000 people from Monywa and more than 6,400 people have been displaced in Katha district. Reportedly, there are civilian casualties in, or surrounding, Kale town due to continuous clashes. As fighting intensified there, all major roads in and out of the town were blocked, as well as the road to Chin state, with the price of goods rising by between three to five times. Reportedly, landmines have been planted; some close to civilian areas. Those people remaining in Kale are in serious danger from shelling and airstrikes, as well as landmines. Some 7,000 people were reported as newly displaced as of 19 March and this number is expected to increase. In Sagaing, intensifying clashes in Kani Township have displaced more than 12,000 people since 1 March. The conflict reportedly killed more than 30 civilians, injured many more, and damaged or destroyed more than 500 houses in Chin, Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay between 7 and 17 March..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Public Health, Human Rights and international relations, UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund)
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438.44 KB
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-12
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
5.91 MB
Local URL:
KM12.4.2024.pdf
KM12.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-12
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.33 MB
Local URL:
mal 12.4.2024.pdf
mal 12.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-12
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.1 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-12-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
Blood Money Campaign
Date of publication:
2024-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-11
Description:
"Today, April 11th, marks the one-year anniversary of the Pazigyi Village aircraft bombing massacre. On April 11th, 2023, at approximately 7:30 A.M. in the Sagaing Division, Kantbalu Township, junta forces bombarded the opening ceremony of the Pazigyi village administration office – a donation event – with a jet plane. Those who survived were also chased and shot at by military planes, resulting in the deaths of nearly 40 children and over 170 civilians.
Despite international condemnation of this terrorist junta’s action, no meaningful action has been taken thus far, and there is still an irresponsibility in addressing the situation.
The main reason the junta can carry out daily airstrikes targeting civilians, as in the Pazigyi case, is due to the unhindered purchase of aviation fuel from the international community. Between February 2021 and December 2023, more than 1,650 airstrikes were carried out, resulting in the deaths of nearly 950 civilians, including many children.
On April 4th, 2024, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a resolution concerning Myanmar, urging member states to abstain from exporting, selling, or transferring jet fuel to the country. This marks the first time the UN has made such a call. The decision, which was delayed for more than three years, has resulted in an increase in the number of deaths and underscores the urgent need for truly effective measures and decisive action.
Singapore and Vietnam allow the use of their ports, while UN member states such as the USA, the UK, and the EU have the leverage to halt jet fuel access to the terrorist junta in Myanmar. However, they have not yet taken any effective measures, demonstrating irresponsibility. They continue to support and permit the junta to commit war crimes.
The USA, the UK, and the EU must sanction aviation fuel sales and shipment insurance. UN member states and their companies must immediately cease all exports, sales, or transfers of aviation fuel to the Myanmar junta.
As long as international governments do not take effective action to stop the junta’s access to aviation fuel, we, the Blood Money Campaign, will continue to campaign for the ban on jet fuel movement alongside local and international revolutionary organizations in solidarity..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
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348.97 KB
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Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-11
Sub-title:
Decision Not to Deport 19 Children Should be Expanded to All Refugees
Description:
"(Bangkok) – The Thai government’s decision not to forcibly return 19 children to Myanmar should be expanded to include all refugees from Myanmar, Human Rights Watch said today.
On March 12, 2024, officials from Thai immigration and the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security took 19 Myanmar children, ages 5 to 17, from Wat Sawang Arom School in Lopburi province in central Thailand and brought them without their parents to the border in Chiang Rai province prior to repatriating them to Myanmar. Thai members of parliament, human rights groups, and the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand strongly criticized the planned return. On March 26, Social Development and Human Security Minister Varawut Silpa-archa said in a media interview that his agency would not return the 19 children to Myanmar, and that they could remain in Thailand.
“Thai authorities showed sympathy and support by allowing 19 children from Myanmar to remain in Thailand,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The government’s next step should be to assure all those fleeing Myanmar that they can seek protection in Thailand.”
Prior to Varawut’s announcement, Thai officials had said that the 19 children were “undocumented” and were irregularly living in Thailand. The previous government in July 2023 had used a similar argument to justify sending back 126 “undocumented” Myanmar children from a school in Ang Thong province, despite concerns raised by the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand and human rights groups.
Varawut’s assurances that these 19 children could remain in Thailand should become Thai government policy for all Myanmar refugees, as long as the human rights situation in Myanmar remains dire, Human Rights Watch said. Fighting since early April around the Myanmar border town of Myawaddy, opposite Mae Sot in Thailand’s Tak province, has raised concerns about future influxes of refugees.
Thai Foreign Minister Parnpree Bahiddha-Nukara said on April 9 that the government has prepared to receive up to 100,000 refugees temporarily.
Not everyone fleeing conflict and rights abuses in Myanmar has been able to seek protection in Thailand. In late October, the Thai military forcibly returned thousands of refugees who had been sheltering in border areas next to Myanmar’s Karenni State.
Any forced returns to Myanmar may violate Thailand’s obligations as a party to the Convention Against Torture and the customary international law principle prohibiting refoulement, the forcible return of anyone to a place where they would face a genuine risk of persecution, torture or other ill-treatment, or a threat to their life.
Since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military junta has carried out a nationwide campaign of mass killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate attacks that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. More than two million people have been internally displaced and more than 109,000 refugees have fled to neighboring countries.
The Thai government should promptly fulfill its pledge at the Global Refugee Forum in December 2023 to withdraw its reservation to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 22 guarantees the rights of refugee children, but Thailand’s reservation calls for refugee children to be treated “subject to the national laws, regulations and prevailing practices in Thailand.” The convention also contains protections for children from being forcibly separated from their parents.
Thailand should also provide protection and support to all refugees, including by permitting the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, to undertake refugee status determinations.
“The deteriorating human rights situation in Myanmar could mean that Thailand receives many more refugees in the near future,” Pearson said. “While the Thai government should be assuring refugees that they will not be returned into harm’s way, concerned governments should be prepared to support Thailand to provide protection.”..."
Type:
Individual Documents
more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-11
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
8.31 MB
Local URL:
KM11.4.2024.pdf
KM11.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-11
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.9 MB
Local URL:
mal 11.4.24.pdf
mal 11.4.24.pdf more
Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-11
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.34 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-11-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-10
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-10
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Mirror" ("Kyemon") 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.02 MB
Local URL:
KM10.4.2024.pdf
KM10.4.2024.pdf more
Source/publisher:
News and Periodicals Enterprise, Ministry of Information, Union of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-10
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-10
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"Myanmar Alin" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.61 MB
Local URL:
mal 10.4.24.pdf
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Source/publisher:
The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2024
Date of publication:
2024-04-10
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-10
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
"The Global New Light of Myanmar" 2024
Format :
pdf
Size:
5.23 MB
Local URL:
GNLM2024-04-10-red.pdf
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Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2024-04-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
Sub-title:
Statement on the Appointment of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations on Myanmar
Description:
"1. The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar welcomes the appointment of Ms. Julie Bishop as the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations on Myanmar.
2. We have full confidence that Ms. Bishop’s extensive experience and expertise in diplomatic acumen make her a great fit for this new position, and we would like to express our sincere hope that she will discharge her responsibilities with the utmost dedication and commitment and serve the best interests of the people of Myanmar in alignment with their desires and aspirations.
3. The National Unity Government stands to closely collaborate with the Special Envoy in our endeavor to establish a federal democratic union founded upon democratic principles and values, which is the shared goal of the Myanmar people.
4. Therefore, the National Unity Government urges the international community to provide assistance and support to the Special Envoy, enabling her to effectively fulfill her responsibilities for the betterment of the people of Myanmar.....ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်ခန့်အပ်မှုနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် Ms. Julie Bishop အား ကုလသမဂ္ဂအတွင်းရေးမှူး ချုပ်၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ် ခန့်အပ်လိုက်မှုအပေါ် ဝမ်းမြောက်စွာ ကြိုဆိုပါ သည်။
၂။ Ms. Bishop သည် ၎င်း၏ သံတမန်ရေးရာ အတွေ့အကြုံနှင့် ကျွမ်းကျင်မှုများအရ ဤရာထူး နေရာအတွက် အသင့်လျော်ဆုံး ဖြစ်မည်ဟု ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် အပြည့်အဝ ယုံကြည်ပြီး၊ မြန်မာ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက် ၎င်းတို့၏ဆန္ဒနှင့်အညီ လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များကို ထမ်းဆောင် သွားမည်ဟု မျှော်လင့်ပါသည်။
၃။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့်လည်း မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ တူညီသည့် ရည်မှန်း ချက်ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သည့် ဒီမိုကရေစီစံနှုန်းများနှင့် တန်ဘိုးများကိုအပေါ် အခြေခံသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးကို ဦးတည်ကာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်နှင့် နီးကပ်စွာ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ ထို့ကြောင့် နိုင်ငံတကာအနေဖြင့်လည်း ကုလသမဂ္ဂအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်၏ အထူးကိုယ်စား လှယ်အား ၎င်း၏လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များကို ထိရောက်အောင်မြင်စွာ ထမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် အဘက်ဘက်မှ ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီပေးကြပါရန် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက တိုက်တွန်း တောင်းဆို အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, National Unity Government (NUG), Human Rights and international relations
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Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2024-04-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
Description:
"Strengthen the political leadership to align with the evolutions of the revolution. To achieve policy balance, the National Unity Government (NUG) and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) will be reviewed and reformed, and a progress report will be submitted to the Third People’s Assembly.
The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC should engage with all revolutionary stakeholders as soon as possible to achieve a political pact.
In obtaining the common political pact, NUCC should initiate discussions with other political and revolutionary forces who are not yet part of NUCC.
To clearly discuss the Form of State.
To set fundamental policies for the emergance of new states including that of Bamar.
To develop directives and/or regulations to enhance communication and collaboration, check and balance between NUCC and NUG in accordance with the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC).
To strengthen accountability and improve engagement between the public and political leading institutions, such as NUCC and NUG, Town Hall Meetings, press conferences, and other public relations channels.
To avoid repeat of occurances such as violations provisions of the Federal Demoracy Charter (FDC) by the National Unity Government (NUG) by issuing the China Policy Statement, Joint Political Position Statement, and establishing the FSCC without consulting NUCC.
To ensure the National Unity Government (NUG) the political guidance and check and balance mechanism of the National Unity Consultative Council
(NUCC) by implementing the provisions stated in the Federal Democracy
Charter (FDC).
To continue the development of Rohingya Policy as soon as possible.
To lead the process of the National Apology by the National Unity Government (NUG) and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC towards the ethnic people regarding the suppressions including the Rohingya Genocide committed by past government
With the direct leadership of the President, to form a special commission on minority affairs, which will advocate for oppressed ethnic people, including Rohingya.
To take actions with a policy of zero-tolerance against sexual harassment, violence, rapes, child rape cases, and killings faced by women and LGBTIQ+ during the revolutionary period.
To bring justice for arbitrary arrests, torture, and killings against civilians during the revolutionary period.
To establish the federal human rights commission as soon as possible to seek accountability for human rights violations during the revolutionary period.
To take effective action on unlawful tax collection processes and set up a systematic process of tax collection in revolutionary force-controlled areas.
To identify the monitoring mechanism and financial supervision process on the fundraising and expenditures of the National Unity Government (NUG)
through audit and submitting the report to the people’s assembly.
To assure and protect access to education for all children and everyone during the revolutionary period without discrimination.
To protect and ensure equal access to healthcare services for all during the revolution.
To eliminate all discrimination against ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and disability with a zero-tolerance policy.
To amend or repeal laws that violate the values of human rights and women’s rights..."
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
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pdf
Size:
551.45 KB
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