Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Websites/Multiple Documents
Description:
Stopped October 2016. The Archive survives.
Source/publisher:
Various sources via "BurmaNet News"
Date of entry/update:
2015-03-08
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Parliament - general articles and reports, Legislation under consideration, adopted, amended or repealed
Language:
English
more
Description:
About 355,000 results (August 2017)
Source/publisher:
Various sources via Youtube
Date of entry/update:
2017-08-22
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Language:
English, Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ)
more
Source/publisher:
CIA
Date of entry/update:
2003-06-03
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
Statistics, profiles, general information etc. on Burma/Myanmar, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
English
more
Description:
''The Fiscal Federalism modules include the following:
1.Fiscal Federalism Introduction
2.Decentralization, Revenue Transfers, and Social Development
3.Fiscal Federalism and Equalization
4.Fiscal Federalism and Natural Resources
5.Public Infrastructure, Public Services, and Human Capital
6.Fiscal Federalism and Myanmar’s Peace Negotiations...''
Source/publisher:
Asia Foundation
Date of publication:
2018-11-14
Date of entry/update:
2019-01-13
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
Decentralisation (Decentralization) in Burma/Myanmar, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Educational resources and materials (Burma- and non-Burma-related)
Language:
English, Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ), Kachin, Karen, Shan
Format :
pdf pdf pdf pdf pdf
Size:
2.96 MB 4.34 MB 4.59 MB 4.74 MB 4.58 MB
more
Source/publisher:
MYLAFF
Date of entry/update:
2016-07-02
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
Plans, strategies, policy, standards and guidelines, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
English
more
Individual Documents
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from April 22 to 30, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Magway Region, Kachin State, Kayin State, Rakhine State, Chin State, and Mon State from April 22nd to 30th. Military Junta Troop committed to arresting the civilians and blackmailing the 2nd batch of Military Service in the Yangon Region, Mandalay Region, Magway Region, and Ayeyarwady Region. Military Junta arrested and used the local civilians as human shields in Magway Region, Kachin State, and Rakhine State.
Over 20 civilians died, and over 70 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 4 underaged children died, and 7 were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-05-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
275.45 KB 271.73 KB 1.84 MB
more
Description:
"MIMU’s HDP (Humanitarian, Development and Peace Focus) Nexus “Who does What Where, When and for Whom” database, or 5W, is a tool tracking the implementation of humanitarian, development and peace focused projects to support coordination, planning and efficient use of resources. MIMU has conducted this exercise regularly in Myanmar since 2008. Information is currently compiled every six months based on reports provided voluntarily by contributing agencies.
The MIMU HDP Nexus 5W shows:
➢ which organizations (WHO),
➢ are carrying out which activities (WHAT),
➢ in which locations (WHERE),
➢ project status – whether planned, ongoing or completed (WHEN)
➢ project beneficiary focus (for WHOM) – whether focused on IDPs, IDPs and host communities, other vulnerable communities or are aimed to create further resilience and development in communities.
MIMU HDP Nexus 5W Products capture information on the presence of organisations and do not indicate the volume of assistance, the number of beneficiaries, or the extent to which needs are met or unmet.
Summary
The MIMU HDP Nexus 5W Comparison report compares results from August 2020 to February 2024, looking particularly at the impact of events in early 2021 on agencies’ reported activities over time.
2021 saw a significant reduction in the number of reporting agencies and activities compared to the previous round in August 2020:
Over 30% reduction in reporting agencies (from 213 agencies in Aug’ 2020 to 159/163 agencies in May/Oct 2021), mainly INGOs and NNGOs.
33% reduction in the number of projects reported countrywide (over 200 less projects) in 2021, with reductions mainly in Shan (over 100), Yangon (over 90) and Rakhine (over 60).
A significant reduction in the number of activities reported as ongoing - 43,428 less activities in May 2021, mainly in Tanintharyi (84% reduction), Shan east (58%), Mon (57%), Shan south (55%) and Kayin (50%), and 35,930 less activities in Oct 2021, mainly in Rakhine (18%), Chin and Shan south (11% in each), Tanintharyi (10%), Kayin (9%), Shan north (8%) and Mon (7%).
Suspension of activities was significant. The highest number of suspended activities were reported in May 2021 (19 times higher than in August 2020).
2023 and 2024 has seen increase in reporting agencies and reported activities compared to 2021:
About 1,000 more village tracts/towns reported ongoing activities in 2023 and 200 more in 2024 (86%-78% of VTs/Towns around the country), mainly in Agriculture, Education, Health and Protection as compared to 2021.
Less activities reported as suspended in 2024 (2% of total reported activities) compared to 2021 (around 10%) and Feb’ 2023 (1%) – this does not indicate however whether activities have ended/completed or resumed.
Overall, despite the higher number of reporting agencies over the past 12 months:
More activities were reported as “completed/ended” – 6,476 more completed/ended activities were found in Feb’ 2024 than Feb’ 2023. This change was particularly noted within Livelihoods activities, where one agency ended a project with a large number of micro credit activities in June 2023.
A lower percentage of total activities were reported at VTs/Towns level as “ongoing” – 8% less ongoing activities reported as active (from 86% in Feb’ 2023 and 78% in Feb’ 2024)
More suspended activities focused on Other Vulnerable Groups and IDP Focus (nearly 4 times increase in each group) in Feb’ 2024 compared to Feb’ 2023..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-05-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-05-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.18 MB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"ASEAN must shift away from its military-centric engagement with Myanmar. In doing so, it must embrace a process and posture that addresses underlying structural inequities.
The 2021 Myanmar coup differs markedly from those in 1988 and 1962, facing strong domestic resistance and international condemnation. The National Unity Government (NUG), seen as legitimate, counters the military’s authority, underscoring the coup’s failure to secure control or legitimacy, rendering it more an “attempted” than a successful takeover. To maintain and enhance peace, security, and stability, and to further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region is one of the purposes of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). Presently, a pivotal concern for ASEAN leadership pertains to discerning strategies to mitigate protracted armed conflict and engender sustainable peace within Myanmar. Concurrently, they must grapple with elucidating the underlying reasons for the ineffective implementation of the 5 Points Consensus (5PC) in resolving the Myanmar issue.
The deficiency in realising the 5PC can be attributed to a myopic focus solely on the immediate conflict spurred by the attempted coup, as orchestrated by Myanmar’s military. This focus has hindered solutions addressing the key requisites for enduring peace in Myanmar. In order to adhere to a coherent course of action, ASEAN leaders are compelled to address three fundamental inquiries: Can the Myanmar military engender genuine peace within the nation? Does the Myanmar military singularly possess the requisite capacity to stabilise and uphold the integrity of Myanmar? What are the underlying catalysts precipitating Myanmar’s protracted conflicts?
Can the Myanmar military engender genuine peace within the nation?
The basic premise that the Myanmar military has the capacity to establish sustainable peace within the nation is questionable. The longstanding pattern of armed conflict in Myanmar, exacerbated by military coups and subsequent insurgencies, underscores the ineffectiveness of military rule in being genuine partners in fostering lasting peace. Since assuming power in 1958, and subsequently in 1962 and 1988, successive military regimes have failed to engage, let alone quell, armed resistance movements, leading to the proliferation of ethnic armed groups and protracted conflict over the past six decades.
Despite sporadic attempts at peacemaking initiatives, such as ceasefires and negotiations, these efforts have largely been superficial and have failed to address the root causes of the conflicts. According to Bertil Litner, a prominent expert on the Myanmar Civil War, these peacemaking endeavours have primarily served to provide armed groups with temporary respite and economic opportunities for military leaders, rather than addressing underlying political grievances.
A few weeks ago, renowned conflict scholar Johan Galtung passed away. Galtung long advocated for approaches that deepen understanding and generate creative, integrative solutions to the most complex of conflicts. For example, Galtung’s conflict triangle theory outlines the limitations of ceasefire agreements in achieving sustainable peace. Merely halting hostilities without addressing structural and cultural conflicts, this theory suggests, can only yield negative peace at best. The point here is that the Myanmar military’s historical approach to peacemaking has not fostered enduring stability and does not include peacebuilding approaches for longer-term transformative change to address the drivers of conflicts.
To attain sustainable peace and justice in Myanmar, ASEAN leaders must listen to and engage with a range of Myanmar’s leaders, and work to adopt a comprehensive approach addressing direct, structural, and cultural aspects of the conflict. By acknowledging and addressing the multifaceted nature of the crisis, ASEAN can support and foster a conducive environment for lasting peace and stability in Myanmar.
Is the Myanmar military one entity with enough strength to stabilise and preserve Myanmar?
The assertion that the Myanmar military is the sole entity possessing sufficient capability to stabilise and safeguard the nation is unfounded. That the people of Myanmar have shown their rejection and resistance to military rule is well documented. Since 1 February 2021, during attempted military seizures of power, the nation witnessed annual widespread participation in silent strikes, underscoring public aversion towards military rule and its political entrenchment. Observable trends, such as dwindling enrolment rates at military academies and reports of coerced conscription among Myanmar’s youth further affirm the peoples’ disapproval of military involvement in governance.
Recent events, notably the coordinated offensive launched in Northern Shan State on 27 October, 2024, have unveiled the true limitations of the Myanmar military’s capabilities and morale. Contrary to prior perceptions of invincibility, these events have exposed vulnerabilities within the military apparatus. Assertions propagated by the Myanmar military regarding its indispensable role in maintaining stability within the nation are now recognised as baseless bravado.
The causes of Myanmar’s armed conflicts started from the era of the Burmese kings.
The genesis of armed conflict in Myanmar can be traced back to several historical antecedents, beginning with the era of the Burmese monarchs. The entrenched autocratic system, characterised by its phenotypical brutality, instigated protracted wars between the Burmese kingdom and various ethnic groups such as the Mon, Shan, and Rakhine. These conflicts have endured across generations, perpetuating a cycle of violence and discord. The colonial period and the upheavals of the Second World War exacerbated pre-existing cultural tensions, further exacerbating interethnic hostilities, and entrenching exclusionary governance systems for inequitable recognition and power sharing.
The journey towards Independence, marred by distrust between the dominant Burman ethnic group and minority ethnic communities, laid the groundwork for post-independence conflict. Today, Myanmar’s armed revolution is rooted in entrenched social conflicts, exacerbated by structural disparities. These encompass issues such as perceptions of federalism, resource allocation, territorial delineation, and the protection of ethnic and minority rights. The protracted armed conflicts spanning over 70 years, coupled with the oppressive, divisive tactics employed by the Myanmar military, perpetuate deep cultural and structural fault lines within the nation.
Achieving sustainable peace in Myanmar necessitates addressing not only ceasefires but also the underlying structural and social conflicts. As this line of analysis suggests, giving primacy for peace leadership to the military is not going to be effectual for lasting peace. Engaging with Myanmar entails a multifaceted approach aimed at resolving chronic social tensions and fostering social cohesion across diverse ethnic and cultural divides.
ASEAN leaders and the international community can look to the notable shifts in the dynamics of the situation in Myanmar led by a range of civil society, elected leaders, and EROs (ethnic revolutionary organisations) to help end the conflict. Contemporary Myanmar society exhibits distinct signs of transformation, such as a diminished reliance on the military apparatus, and a profound aversion to the divisive tactics of Burmanisation employed by the Myanmar military. This heightened awareness among the majority Burman populace, coupled with an increasing recognition of the suffering endured by ethnic minority communities residing in border regions, has catalysed a burgeoning sense of mutual understanding and empathy among Myanmar’s diverse ethnic groups.
Notably, the ongoing Myanmar Spring Revolution underscores a positive trajectory towards social cohesion, characterised by widespread sympathy and solidarity among the populace. Leaders of armed resistance factions, including the National Unity Government, evince a nuanced understanding of Myanmar’s structural conflicts and espouse a steadfast commitment to pursuing peaceful resolutions through dialogue.
Myanmar’s protracted peace process stands firmly rooted, with concerted efforts directed towards addressing underlying structural inequities. At the forefront of the revolution’s objectives lies the imperative to dismantle the entrenched authoritarian grip of the Myanmar military, thereby paving the way for the establishment of a new federal democratic state. In this context, the responsibility falls upon ASEAN leaders and the international community to re-assess its military-centric engagement, where no durable solutions can be found, and engage meaningfully in the transformative processes for peace and justice in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Date of publication:
2024-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, Australia-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"About three years ago, Asean leaders gathered in Jakarta for an emergency summit on Myanmar at which the FivePoint Consensus (5PC) – entailing the cessation of violence in the country, constructive dialogue among parties to the conflict.....About three years ago, Asean leaders gathered in Jakarta for an emergency summit on Myanmar at which the FivePoint Consensus (5PC) – entailing the cessation of violence in the country, constructive dialogue among parties to the conflict, the appointment of a special Myanmar envoy and the provision of humanitarian assistance – was agreed upon with the State Administration Council’s (SAC) senior general Min Aung Hlaing. The 5PC has since seen very limited progress. Airstrikes by the Myanmar military and fighting among various armed actors continue, leading to the displacement of more than 2.5 million people since the 2021 coup. Inclusive platforms for political dialogue have not materialized.
While Indonesia created a new precedent of meeting with various stakeholders across Myanmar, the Asean chair’s one-year tenure remains too short for significant breakthroughs. Hitherto, observers have described Asean’s 5PC as “failed”, “toothless”, “not appropriate”, and a “dead pact” and have said Asean centrality is “in tatters”. Nonetheless, there are three useful features of the 5PC. It is deliberately capacious: its points (except naming the AHA Centre) remain broad with room for interpretation. It is not a peace plan and was crafted to avoid binding the actions of any successive chair.
Second, the 5PC is what Asean member states believe gives Asean the standing to be involved in the Myanmar crisis. Many may disagree that any agreement from Min Aung Hlaing is required for Asean engagement, but it is nonetheless significant to Asean, committed to its principle of nonintervention. Without the 5PC, there would be no basis for Asean involvement. Third, the 5PC is a measure aimed at preventing major power rivalries around the Myanmar crisis by establishing a test case for Asean centrality. Consequently, the 5PC carries high stakes for Asean’s credibility in responding to the crisis through regional initiatives. Making progress on the 5PC is crucial.
Successive Asean chairs face at least three main challenges. The first is discerning a mediumterm strategy for Asean’s engagement with Myanmar. The 5PC was designed to address the immediate aftermath of post-coup violence. But the desired “cessation of hostilities” will never come without a minimum acceptable medium-term strategy, accommodating the Myanmar people’s visions for the future. Here, half measures aimed solely at cease-fires will make no progress. Second are the limits of time and operating within the one-year Asean chair timeframe. Sensemaking and trust-building are massive undertakings, as Indonesia discovered through its painstaking efforts.
The chair needs to understand facts, histories, and perspectives on the ground, then analyse the interests of domestic and regional actors, before finally devising its policies for the year. The first two stages might already take up the best part of five months, leaving a mere two to three months to craft its approach on Myanmar for the Asean summit. The third challenge is supplementing efforts at internal convening with external rallying. It must create space to bring together Myanmar stakeholders and simultaneously muster meaningful support from the international community.
Between Myanmar, Asean and regional actors, there remains a wide gap of understanding. Many Myanmar stakeholders do not understand Asean’s processes and limitations, and many Asean member states do not fathom the complex relations and perspectives among the Myanmar groups. Asean must continue to create the space to learn from the various relevant Myanmar stakeholders and seek the support of the major frontline states, namely China and India, for its efforts. It is time to rethink the terms of the chair’s special envoy to enable Asean to deal with the aforementioned challenges. After three years, it is clear that no chair has the capacity to deal with the issue alone.
In fact, it is unfair to leave the responsibility to the chair alone. Indonesia’s proposal of a troika mechanism is a nod towards the need for a sustainable, more permanent mechanism. In this respect, the creation of an Asean office on Myanmar follows sensibly. The office should focus on three main areas of the 5PC mandate – cessation of violence, delivery of humanitarian assistance and facilitation of stakeholder dialogues – to create the spaces and conditions for a nationbuilding process.
A troika-plus mechanism (one that includes key Asean countries that have the competence, leverage and persistence to engage) could see its members share a rotating coordinator role of the office, dividing up labour by issue, stakeholders or time periods. Importantly, the office must continue engagement with all stakeholders in Myanmar, not only with the Myanmar military, as its main modus operandi. Finally, domestic engagement will have to be balanced with efforts on the external front, where the office could coordinate international envoys and rally support for Asean’s approach. A new United Nations special envoy has been appointed, and fresh coordination of envoys is needed.
While the international community has given verbal support to Asean centrality, it must also be rallied to provide support through policy options, technical assistance, resources and political leverage. With a more permanent Asean office on Myanmar, a medium-term 5PC strategy can be built. This helps to avoid short-term, individual actions, such as elections organized by the junta or through the existing Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, that might derail medium-term objectives. The Asean strategy would ideally turn into a framework that coherently guides and shapes the chair’s efforts for the year and allows each chair to make piecemeal, sustainable progress on the crisis.
This framework should outline how Asean, with the full support of the UN Security Council, can help to achieve three key objectives: (1) a humanitarian cease-fire, (2) a negotiated transition and (3) the establishment of an inclusive federal democracy in Myanmar. These objectives cover short, medium and long-term goals. New procedures for implementation and milestones to measure progress toward the objectives must be developed.
As recently as December 2023, the 17th Asean Defense Ministers’ Meeting acknowledged the “need to develop concrete, practical and measurable indicators in support of the implementation of the FivePoint Consensus”. Thankfully, the 5PC is sufficiently broadly worded to allow flexibility in activities and implementation. The establishment of a permanent office in Myanmar, initiated by the current chair Laos, could be formalized by Malaysia and effected by the Philippines. The time to start is now.
(The writers are, respectively, director of research at the Surin Pitsuwan Foundation, Thailand; head of the Department of International Relations and coordinator for the Myanmar Initiative Program at the Jakartabased Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and executive director of the Institute for Strategy and Policy, Myanmar.)..."
Source/publisher:
The Statesman
Date of publication:
2024-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Increased violence would be costly for all parties
Description:
"Recent battlefield gains by Myanmar's resistance forces indicate that the military regime which seized power in February 2021 is on the defensive.
Earlier this month, the junta lost control of Myawaddy, a trading center along the Thai border. Resistance groups also carried out drone strikes against targets in Naypyidaw, the capital, as well as the Defense Services Academy, near Mandalay.
It is an appropriate time then to assess Western support for Myanmar's resistance.
The conflict has strengthened ethnic armed groups, many of which were formed decades ago and are more ethnonationalist than democratic. How to handle these groups is a key issue for Washington, which is on the verge of implementing aid policies that risk exacerbating lethal divisions rather than promoting democracy.
The U.S. cannot bet on the collapse of the military regime, which continues to control major population centers. Yet it has held back from offering military assistance to the resistance, especially after Washington's unproductive experience in Syria's civil war. But the terms on which Washngton is offering nonlethal aid in Myanmar risk creating the outcome it has been seeking to avoid.
A $1.2 trillion funding package passed by the U.S. Congress last month raised this fiscal year's appropriation for Myanmar by 23% to $167 million. The expanded sum includes $75 million for cross-border aid and $25 million for nonlethal support to ethnic armed organizations and People's Defense Forces fighting the regime.
Washington has been here before. The language used in the appropriation was taken from a previous funding authorization relating to Syria, where nonlethal aid included body armor and intelligence about enemy troop positions. That appropriation led eventually to the covert deployment of lethal equipment.
The immediate impact of the U.S. move will be to irritate Myanmar's neighbors, who will see it as an intensification of American involvement in the conflict.
China has been hedging its bets by supporting both the military regime and several armed groups along the border. India and Thailand have also accepted military rule while allowing weapons and fighters to flow over their borders. None of them wishes to see greater U.S. entanglement.
Implementing the nonlethal aid program will cause headaches for U.S. bureaucrats too. While the U.S. is ideologically driven to support democracies overseas, it is understood now in Washington that Myanmar is more complicated than it appeared when democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi drove the international narrative.
The most powerful armed groups are organized along ethnic lines, entrenching long-standing differences about how to carve up Myanmar's territory.
Alongside them are People's Defense Force groups, formed by urban youth in response to the regime's brutal crackdown on street protests and strikes. They started with no arms or military training and have been able to wage conventional warfare only with the aid of the ethnic armies.
In the northwestern Sagaing region, where government forces recently have lost ground, every major assault on urban areas has been led by or involved significant participation by the Kachin Independence Army, the Chin National Defense Force or the All Burma Students' Democratic Front, which was formed after a 1988 uprising.
The U.S. has taken note, and in an unprecedented public acknowledgement of engagement with the resistance, State Department Counselor Derek Chollet announced on social media platform X last month that he had met with the leaders of a coalition of armed Karen, Kachin, Karenni and Chin groups and had offered congratulations on their "extraordinary efforts to pursue a federal democracy in Burma."
It is tempting for Washington to anoint the ethnic armed organizations as the new heroes of Myanmar. But the blood and soil nationalism that motivates them bears little resemblance to the Enlightenment values that are the pillars of the American republic.
Even in aiming to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar, such U.S. support is unlikely to make much difference given that Beijing is providing arms to both sides.
The armed ethnic groups vary in their allegiance to democratic norms and the level of internal democracy within their ranks. But the harsh reality is that Myanmar is moving toward ethnic cantonization.
The National Unity Government, a pro-democratic front largely operating from exile, has played a role in diplomacy and coalition building, but within Myanmar has had to rely mostly on the might of ethnic armies. Any peace settlement will have to reflect this balance of forces, which is likely to lead to the creation of ethnically based local administrations.
It is not in the interest of the U.S. or of Myanmar for Washington to increase the level of violence by bolstering armed groups engaged in combat. Nor would the U.S. benefit from trying to goad China deeper into the fighting.
While most of Southeast Asia gains from playing off China against the U.S., the most likely outcome in Myanmar would be more violence and death, creating the conditions for perpetual war. Some argue that splitting the country into many parts offers the best hope of a lasting peace, but recent violence between rival local councils in Chin state shows that division along ethnic lines is likely to lead to fresh complications.
The hard fact is that this is not a conflict susceptible to quick and easy solutions, and any U.S. attempt to determine outcomes is likely to fail. Washington should spend its increased appropriation for Myanmar on humanitarian assistance and strengthening civil society, not supporting more fighting..."
Source/publisher:
Nikkei Asian Review
Date of publication:
2024-04-29
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Mizzima Editorial
Nobody envies the current predicament of Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing.
Military positions are falling and soldiers are deserting. Generals within the ranks are grumbling. Even some of his supporters are upset at his performance and speaking out.
If that wasn’t bad enough, the potential horror of a public-relations nightmare of Myanmar’s democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi possibly dying of heatstroke in a non-airconditioned “prison box” has prompted a scramble to rehouse her and the former president Win Myint, possibly in cooler and more salubrious living quarters, though their whereabouts have not been confirmed.
There is the tut-tutting of the dragon to the north. It has not gone without notice that China’s ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, recently met with former military regime strongman Than Shwe in Naypyidaw and members of the current junta with, no doubt, messages to “cool it” and seek solutions to the worsening Myanmar crisis that is threatening Chinese investments, infrastructure, trade and friendly relations. China is no fan of democracy but is certainly pragmatic.
Min Aung Hlaing hangs out in his ivory tower in Naypyidaw, a city purportedly built with astrologers’ advice to protect the “men in green” from foreign invaders but in reality to protect them from their own irate people – Bamar and ethnic – living in the Golden Land.
It is impossible to know what Min Aung Hlaing is thinking but it may be dawning on him that he made a grave mistake in the early hours of 1 February 2021 when he pulled the rug from under the duly-elected civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party and incarcerated its leaders. Now rumours are swirling that the junta may release some jailed members of the NLD, a party removed from registration ahead of what Min Aung Hlaing claims will be a “free and fair” – though “limited” – election in the not-too-distant future.
Min Aung Hlaing – by ripping the reins from Suu Kyi’s hands – misjudged the Myanmar people, particularly Generation Z, who had got used to expanding freedoms brought in under the Thein Sein regime, and picked up by the democrats in the NLD, in the wake of the 2015 election.
There is little doubt that he expected protests and then eventually a return to teeth-grinding normality as happened during previous challenges to military regime rule – particularly in 1988 and the early 1990s, and in the wake of the 2007 Safron Revolution. But Generation Z hit back under the banner of the Spring Revolution.
Now, one by one, the military junta’s pawns are being removed from the chessboard, army positions falling, military colleagues growing doubtful, the failures adding up, leaving the power-hungry general with shrinking options, and an opposition of Spring Revolutionaries growing increasingly bold, knocking at the gates.
But Min Aung Hlaing is wily. He will no doubt be hoping that he can play a game in which when “peace” is sought by Myanmar players and the international community, he and his generals will be at the negotiating table, with a clear intent to include his military in a future federal Myanmar.
But such a stance is anathema to the Spring Revolutionaries who are seeking to tear down revered General Aung San’s hard-won creation and build a new “federal union” with the military slate swept clean..."
Source/publisher:
"Mizzima"
Date of publication:
2024-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Info Birmanie and Justice For Myanmar urge the French government to swiftly investigate and freeze any assets of Theint Win Htet in France and revoke her visa.
On April 3, 2024, the French lawyers William Bourdon and Lily Ravon, acting as counsel for Justice For Myanmar, reported Theint Win Htet to French authorities requesting that they freeze any of her assets in French territory and consider her removal from France. They also wrote to HEC Paris urging the school to notify French authorities of Theint Win Htet’s sources of funds and to consider revoking her admission.
HEC benefits from its status as a Consular Higher Education Institution (Etablissement d'Enseignement Supérieur Consulaire-EESC), and as such the CCI Paris Ile-de-France is one of its main shareholders. On April 5, 2024, Info Birmanie and Justice For Myanmar wrote to CCI Paris Ile-de-France to raise concerns about Theint Win Htet’s access to the HEC, HEC Investment Club and International Consulting Club, the implicit support that her admission may imply from the many business leaders and their institutions who sit on the board of directors, and risks related to the use of the knowledge and network in the Myanmar context.
Theint Win Htet is a member of the founding family of Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies, a Myanmar military linked crony conglomerate and, according to her LinkedIn profile, has been admitted to HEC Paris, an elite French business school.
Shwe Byain Phyu Group is a major crony conglomerate with significant links to the Myanmar military, including a partnership to import petroleum with EU-sanctioned Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and interests in the mining and timber industries, which are now dominated by EU-sanctioned state-owned enterprises that are under junta control.
As a result of the family’s business with the Myanmar military junta and its conglomerates, the USA sanctioned Theint Win Htet, her brother Win Paing Kyaw, her parents Thein Win Zaw and Tin Latt Min, and Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies on January 31, 2024. In its sanctions announcement, the USA noted the role of Theint Win Htet, her brother and mother in “various companies that are closely related to the regime.”
In 2022, Shwe Byain Phyu Group took control of Telenor Myanmar, renamed ATOM Myanmar, putting the personal data of millions of users at risk amid the junta’s attempts to ramp up surveillance as part of its campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar.
Since the military’s illegal coup attempt, Theint Win Htet has acted as a shareholder and director of One Telecom Company Limited, a company established during Shwe Byain Phyu’s acquisition of Telenor Myanmar. In 2023, Theint Win Htet did an internship at ATOM Myanmar as a financial analyst.
Theint Win Htet has also held shares in Min Shwe Myine Enterprise Limited, a Myanmar petroleum company that formed a consortium in 2022 to “to find reliable suppliers from Russia to tighten Myanmar Russia partnership.”
Theint Win Htet’s expenses are supported by her family, according to Justice For Myanmar sources.
Info Birmanie and Justice For Myanmar call on the EU to urgently impose sanctions on Shwe Byain Phyu Group and its owners and directors, including Theint Win Htet, and to increase its targeted sanctions to block the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment and jet fuel, in coordination with its allies.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says:
“The fact that Theint Win Htet is able to study in France is a further sign of the serious lack of coordination in sanctions imposed after the military’s illegal attempted coup.”
“Theint Win Htet’s presence in France undermines EU sanctions on Shwe Byain Phyu Group’s business partners and undermines US sanctions on Theint Win Htet and her family members.
“France should swiftly investigate and freeze any assets in France belonging to Theint Win Htet or her family members and bar her from France.”
“For more than three years, the people of Myanmar have courageously resisted the military’s failing attempted coup. France should stand on the side of the people and send a clear message that Myanmar cronies are not welcome in its territory.”
Info Birmanie coordinator Johanna Chardonnieras says:
"The integration of a student at HEC under American sanctions for her links with the Myanmar military junta, which is responsible for serious human rights violations, shows the laissez-faire approach to Myanmar.”
"By sharing its knowledge and network with Theint Win Htet, HEC, its management, board of directors and shareholders are showing, at best, a flagrant lack of diligence in the admissions process, and at worst, a disregard for the Myanmar people's struggle for freedom.
"It is from France that Theint Win Htet continues to exercise her ownership in the Shwe Byain Phyu Group - generating revenue for the junta and contributing to the bloody repression of her fellow citizens. It is therefore up to the French government to take appropriate measures, as a corollary of its repeated condemnations of the military junta’s international crimes and exactions, and its repeated expressions of support towards the people of Myanmar.".....Info Birmanie et Justice For Myanmar demandent urgemment au gouvernement français d’enquêter sans délai sur les avoirs de Theint Win Htet en France, de les geler et d’évaluer s’il y a lieu de remettre en question son droit de séjour en France.
Le 3 avril 2024, les avocats français William Bourdon et Lily Ravon, agissant en tant que conseils pour Justice For Myanmar, ont signalé Theint Win Htet aux autorités françaises en leur demandant de geler tous ses avoirs sur le territoire français et d’envisager le retrait de son droit de séjour en France. Ils ont également écrit à HEC Paris pour demander à l’école d’informer les autorités françaises sur les sources de financement de Theint Win Htet et d’envisager de révoquer son admission.
HEC bénéficie du statut d’Etablissement d’Enseignement Supérieur Consulaire (EESC) et, à ce titre, la CCI Paris Ile-de-France est l’un de ses principaux actionnaires. Le 5 avril 2024, Info Birmanie et Justice For Myanmar ont écrit à la CCI Paris Ile-de-France pour faire part de leurs préoccupations concernant la présence de Theint Win Htet à HEC, HEC Investment Club et International Consulting Club, du soutien implicite des nombreux chefs d’entreprise et institutions qui siègent au conseil d’administration que cette admission à HEC pourrait impliquer, et des risques liés à l’utilisation des connaissances et du réseau mis à disposition de Theint Win Htet dans le contexte birman.
Theint Win Htet est membre de la famille fondatrice du Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies, un conglomérat en relation avec l’armée birmane. D’après son profil LinkedIn, elle a été admise à HEC Paris, une école de commerce française réputée.
Le groupe Shwe Byain Phyu est un important conglomérat qui entretient des liens étroits avec l’armée birmane, notamment un partenariat pour l’importation de pétrole avec Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL), une société sanctionnée par l’Union Européenne (UE), et des intérêts dans les secteurs de l’exploitation minière et du bois, qui sont désormais dominés par des entreprises d’État sous le contrôle de la junte, sanctionnées également par l’UE.
En raison des affaires de sa famille avec la junte militaire birmane et de ces consortiums, les États-Unis ont sanctionné le 31 janvier 2024 Theint Win Htet, son frère Win Paing Kyaw, ses parents Thein Win Zaw et Tin Latt Min, ainsi que le Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies. Dans l’annonce de ces sanctions, les États-Unis ont noté le rôle de Theint Win Htet, de son frère et de sa mère dans « diverses entreprises étroitement liées au régime ».
En 2022, le groupe Shwe Byain Phyu a pris le contrôle de Telenor Myanmar, rebaptisé ATOM Myanmar, mettant en péril les données personnelles de millions d’utilisateurs, alors que la junte tente de renforcer la surveillance dans le cadre de sa campagne de terreur contre le peuple de Birmanie.
Depuis le coup d’État de l’armée, Theint Win Htet est actionnaire et gérante de One Telecom Company Limited, une société créée lors de l’acquisition de Telenor Myanmar par Shwe Byain Phyu. En 2023, Theint Win Htet a effectué un stage chez ATOM Myanmar en tant qu’analyste financière.
Theint Win Htet a également détenu des parts dans Min Shwe Myine Enterprise Limited, une société pétrolière du Myanmar qui a formé un consortium en 2022 pour « trouver des fournisseurs fiables en Russie afin de renforcer le partenariat Myanmar-Russie ».
Selon les sources de Justice For Myanmar, les dépenses de Theint Win Htet pour financer son mode de vie et ses études en France sont prises en charge par sa famille.
Info Birmanie et Justice For Myanmar appellent l’UE à imposer d’urgence des sanctions au groupe Shwe Byain Phyu et à ses propriétaires et directeurs, dont Theint Win Htet, et à renforcer ses sanctions ciblées pour bloquer l’accès de la junte aux fonds, aux armes, aux équipements et au carburant d’aviation, en coordination avec ses alliés.
Yadanar Maung, porte-parole de Justice For Myanmar, déclare :
« Le fait que Theint Win Htet puisse étudier en France est un nouveau signe du grave manque de coordination des sanctions imposées après la tentative illégale de coup d’État de l’armée. »
« La présence de Theint Win Htet en France compromet les sanctions de l’UE à l’encontre des partenaires commerciaux du groupe Shwe Byain Phyu et les sanctions des États-Unis à l’encontre de Theint Win Htet et des membres de sa famille. »
« La France devrait rapidement enquêter et geler tous les avoirs en France appartenant à Theint Win Htet ou aux membres de sa famille et lui interdire l’accès au territoire français. »
« Depuis plus de trois ans, le peuple du Myanmar résiste courageusement à la tentative de coup d’État manqué de l’armée. La France devrait se ranger du côté du peuple et envoyer un message clair selon lequel les complices de la junte birmane ne sont pas les bienvenus sur son territoire. »
Johanna Chardonnieras, coordinatrice d’Info Birmanie, déclare :
« L’intégration à HEC d’une étudiante sous sanctions américaines pour ses liens avec la junte militaire birmane, responsable de graves violations des droits humains, est symptomatique du laisser-faire en place sur le dossier birman. »
« En partageant ses connaissances et son réseau avec Theint Win Htet, HEC, sa direction, son conseil d’administration et ses actionnaires font preuve, au mieux, d’un manque flagrant de diligence dans la procédure d’admission, au pire, d’un mépris pour la lutte du peuple birman pour la liberté. »
« C’est depuis la France que Theint Win Htet continue d’exercer son actionnariat dans le groupe Shwe Byain Phyu, générant des revenus pour la junte et contribuant à la répression sanglante de ses concitoyens. Il appartient donc au gouvernement français de prendre les mesures qui s’imposent, en corollaire de ses condamnations répétées des crimes et exactions commis par la junte militaire et ses déclarations répétées de soutien au peuple birman....."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military, Sanctions
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
122.79 KB 219.39 KB 154.32 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
In the Arakha region, ongoing clashes persist between the terrorist fascist military council and the Arakha Army, notably escalating in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Ann, and Thandwe cities. The intensification of hostilities in Buthidaung Township is particularly concerning, attributed to the continued efforts to secure control over the Military Operation Command Center (MOC - 15).....
Amidst the fierce fighting and the imminent defeat of the terrorist fascist military council, they are resorting to inciting communal conflict among various communities in the Arakha region, exploiting differences in religion and nationality. Additionally, there is obvious manipulation by the terrorist fascist’s military council, evident in their deliberate training of Muslim extremists to stoke communal tensions and arming terrorist groups within the Muslim community, all aimed at furthering their agenda during the ongoing conflict......
Conversely, Muslim terrorist factions, whether acting independently or in collaboration with the military council, have initiated a series of attacks against the Arakha Army. Additionally, these groups have engaged in criminal activities such as theft and vandalism of non-Muslim public property, posing a grave threat to the lives and security of residents in the Arakha region. Incidents, including house burnings and direct threats to civilians, have become increasingly prevalent, particularly in the Buthidaung and Maungdaw areas. In response to these escalating threats, a curfew was imposed from 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM starting April 26, 2024.....
Residents of the Buthidaung and Maungdaw areas are urged to strictly adhere to the curfew from its initiation until further notice. Non-compliance will result in appropriate disciplinary measures. Residents must notify the nearest ULA administrative authorities for necessary travel and secure permission..."
Source/publisher:
United League of Arakan
Date of publication:
2024-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Rakhine (Arakanese) - cultural, political
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
124.34 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Acting President Duwa Lashi La Advocates Pragmatism and Unity in Addressing Public Issues.....Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing
Thann Reflects on Spring Revolution Victories and International Support.....National Unity Government Extends Congratulations and Solidarity to Wa State on 35th Anniversary.....Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing Thann Emphasizes Accountability and Care in Governance.....PDF Strikes Military Council’s Defense Factory.....National Unity Government Forces Intercept
and Neutralize 20 Military Council Officers.....Myanmar’s UN Ambassador Advocates for Youth Amid Military Council’s Forced
Recruitment.....Anti-Coup Committee Donates 50
Million Kyats to Aid Displaced People through National Unity Government.....People’s Defensive War Claims Lives of Nearly 30 Military Council Members.....Military Affairs Summary of Third Week of April, 2024..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
5.11 MB
more
Description:
"Weekly Update Of National Unity Government ( 17 / 2024 )..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
5.97 MB
more
Sub-title:
Appeal to the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand
Description:
"1. During the intense armed clashes between resistance forces and the junta forces at Myawaddy and its surrounding area, the junta forces have been committing various forms of targeted attacks, including artillery attacks and airstrikes, on the public buildings and properties of civilians. As a consequence of these indiscriminatory targeted attacks, thousands of civilians have been fleeing to Mae Sot, Tak Province and its surrounding area.
2. We, the National Unity Government of Myanmar, would like to express our sincere appreciation to the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, the Royal Thai Army, border guard officers, and authorities of the Tak Province for providing every necessary assistance, shelter, and other support to the people fleeing from the Myanmar border. This action portrays the Royal Thai Government as being a good neighbor for the people of Myanmar and the people of Myanmar will always remember this support and assistance.
3. As the junta has been escalating the indiscriminatory targeted attacks on civilians, we expect that the number of people fleeing from those areas might rise in the coming days.
4. Therefore, we would like to request any respective organizations and authorities to provide assistance and support the people who urgently need humanitarian assistance and shelter. We, the National Unity Government of Myanmar, together with our ethnic alliances and other affiliated groups would like to express that we are ready to cooperate with the Government of Thailand and other related organizations in every aspect to provide assistance for the people of Myanmar.....၁။ ထိုင်း-မြန်မာနယ်စပ် မြဝတီမြို့နှင့်အနီးတဝိုက်ဒေသအတွင်း တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ နှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုတို့အကြား ဖြစ်ပွားနေသော တိုက်ပွဲများတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၏ နေအိမ်အဆောက်အအုံ၊ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်တို့အား ပစ်မှတ်ထား တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သဖြင့် လွန်ခဲ့သည့်ရက်အနည်းငယ်အတွင်းမှာပင် ဒေသခံပြည်သူ ထောင်နှင့် ချီ၍ တက်ခ်ခရိုင်၊ မဲဆောက်မြို့နှင့် အခြားဒေသများသို့ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်ခဲ့ရပါသည်။
၂။ ထိုသို့တိမ်းရှောင်ထွက်ပြေးလာသည့် စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ပြည်သူများအတွက် နေရာထိုင်ခင်း စီစဉ်ကာ လိုအပ်သည့်ကယ်ဆယ်ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများ ပေးအပ်ခဲ့ပါသော ထိုင်းအစိုးရ၊ ထိုင်းတော်ဝင် တပ်မတော်၊ နယ်စပ်လုံခြုံရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် တက်ခ်ခရိုင်တာဝန်ရှိသူများအားလုံးကို မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက မြန်မာပြည်သူများကိုယ်စား အထူးပင်လှိုက်လှိုက်လှဲလှဲကျေးဇူးတင် ရှိပါသည်။ အိမ်နီးချင်းကောင်း ပီသသည့် အဆိုပါဆောင်ရွက်ချက်ကို မိမိတို့ မြန်မာပြည်သူများ အနေဖြင့် အမြဲ အမှတ်ရနေမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်အဆောက်အအုံ များကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားသည့် တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ ဆက်တိုက်ပြုလုပ်နေလျက်ရှိရာ စစ်ဘေးရှောင် ပြည်သူ ဦးရေ ဆက်လက်များပြားလာနိုင်ကြောင်း မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် မှန်းဆထားပါသည်။
၄။ ထို့ကြောင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာတာဝန်ရှိသူများအနေဖြင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှု ဆိုင်ရာ ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများ၊ နေရာထိုင်ခင်းများအား အရေးပေါ်လိုအပ်နေသည့် ပြည်သူများအတွက် ကူညီထောက်ပံ့ပေးပါရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။ မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် မဟာမိတ်တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အနေဖြင့်လည်း ထိုင်းအစိုးရ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့်အတူ မြန်မာပြည်သူများကို အကူအညီပေးနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ကဏ္ဍပေါင်းစုံ၌ ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် အသင့်ရှိနေပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2024-04-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
124.38 KB 236.58 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက လူမျိုးရေးပဋိပက္ခဖြစ်စေရန် ရည်ရွယ်၍ ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ် အတွင်း နေထိုင်ကြသည့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာများအား (တရားမဝင်အဓမ္မ) စစ်သားအဖြစ် စုဆောင်းခဲ့ပြီး စစ်သင်တန်းများ ပို့ချကာ လက်နက်များ တပ်ဆင်ပေးလျက် ရှိနေကြောင်း လေ့လာသိရှိရသည်။
၂။ အလားတူ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေသည့် အာရက္ခတပ်တော်အား ရိုဟင်ဂျာများက ဆန့်ကျင်နေကြောင်း ထင်မှတ်မှားစေသည့် ဖိအားပေးစေခိုင်းမှုများနှင့် အတူ အတုအယောင် ဆန္ဒပြပွဲများ ကျင်းပစေကာ လူမျိုးရေး ပဋိပက္ခ အရှိန်မြင့်တက်လာအောင် ယုတ်မာကောက်ကျစ်သည့် အကြံဆိုးဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်ကို တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၃။ ထို့အပြင် ဘူးသီးတောင်မြို့အတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ဦးဆောင်ကာ အရပ်သား ပြည်သူများ၏ နေအိမ်အဆောက်အအုံများ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီပေးရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ ရုံးအဆောက်အအုံများကို မီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ ဖြိုချခြင်းနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကို ပေါ်ပေါ်ထင်ထင် လုပ်ဆောင်နေကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။
၄။ ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်းမှ ပြည်သူများ၏ ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ အတူယှဉ်တွဲ နေထိုင်နေမှုကို ဖျက်လိုဖျက်ဆီး ပြုလုပ်နေကြသည့် အဖျက်အမှောင့်လုပ်ရပ်များကို ပြင်းထန်စွာ ရှုတ်ချ ကြောင်းနှင့် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်းနေ ပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လူမျိုး ရေး၊ ဘာသာရေး ပဋိပက္ခဖြစ်စေရန် ပြုလုပ်နေသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးလှည့်ကွက်များအား လူမျိုးစု အချင်းချင်းကြား ယုံကြည်မှု၊ အပြန်အလှန် လေးစားမှု၊ နားလည်သည်းခံမှုတို့ဖြင့် သတိထား ကျော်ဖြတ်ကြရန် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အထူးအလေးအနက်ထား မေတ္တာရပ်ခံ ပန်ကြားလိုပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
228.31 KB
more
Description:
"The text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the international community faces multiple crises we, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, renew our commitment to upholding the rule of law, humanitarian principles and international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and to protecting human rights and dignity for all individuals.
We reiterate the need to take collective action to preserve peace and stability and to address global challenges such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity loss, global health, education, gender inequality, poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, violent extremism and terrorism, information integrity and a digital transition that respects, protects, and promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We affirm our commitment to free societies and democratic principles, where all persons can freely exercise their rights and freedoms. Human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.
We reaffirm our commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and to re-energize efforts towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as multidimensional crises, and particularly the pandemic and ongoing major conflicts, have set back progress towards their achievement.
We will continue to work in close cooperation with our partners and with relevant multilateral fora such as the G20. Global challenges require solidarity and a cohesive international response, looking for shared solutions for peace, stability, and development, leaving no one behind.
II. FOSTERING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICA
We will continue to deepen the partnership with African countries and regional organizations, including the African union (AU). We welcome the AU participation in the G20 as a permanent member and reiterate our support for the G20 Compact with Africa. The G7-Africa partnership is guided by the objectives of the AU Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.
The consequences of the Russian aggression and its weaponization of food supplies and energy resources have affected notably many vulnerable countries, particularly in Africa. In this perspective, Russia’s war is proving not just a war against Ukraine but against the world’s poorest and most vulnerable.
We reiterate our strong partnership for just, green transitions to net zero emissions as core to sustainable development, and we are ready to inject new momentum into the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Together with the entire international community and stakeholders beyond government, we need to urgently work in partnership to accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, consistent with the unanimous commitment reaffirmed at the UN General Assembly last September.
Debt vulnerabilities are a significant challenge. We fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the “Common Framework” in a predictable, timely, orderly, and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We recognize the importance of effective and long-term solutions, promoting coordination between official bilateral and private creditors. We call upon Multilateral Development Banks and development finance institutions to continue to play a key role to foster sustainable development through increased financing, policy advice and technical assistance for the benefit of developing countries, particularly the poorer and more fragile countries across the continent. In particular central to economic development is ensuring access to sustainable and resilient food systems, health care and health security, and clean, affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.
We reiterate our commitment to supporting African governments as they address conditions leading to terrorism, violent extremism, and instability, while respecting human rights and the rule of law. Development and democracy are mutually reinforcing, and we underscore the importance of free and fair elections to meet the citizens’ needs and expectations.
We are concerned about the activities of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other emerging Russia-backed forces, which are producing a destabilizing impact, notably in North Africa, Central Africa, and the Sahel. We call for accountability of all those responsible for human rights abuses.
1. Libya
We will continue to help Libya put an end to its protracted internecine conflict, also fueled by foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries, in order to build a more peaceful and prosperous future and support its stability, independence, territorial integrity and national unity. The political stalemate leaves Libya extremely vulnerable to third state actors pursuing control over Libya’s security, politics and economy, sowing instability throughout the country and wider region.
We therefore call on all Libyan political actors to engage in meaningful dialogue in order to break the current impasse and move towards a credible roadmap to free, fair and inclusive national presidential and parliamentary elections without delay. The international community must also be united in the pursuit of these goals.
We take note with regret of the recent announcement by UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Abdoulaye Bathily, regarding his decision to resign. We thank him for his dedicated service and renew our full support to the United Nations and the key role it continues to play in Libya. We call on the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint his successor without delay.
2. Sahel
We express our grave concern for the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel, compounded by the backsliding of the principles of constitutional rule of law, democracy and good governance and regression in the regional cooperation frameworks.
Such an increasingly precarious and unpredictable political scenario requires renewed efforts by all relevant actors and stakeholders in reconfiguring international and regional responses to the challenge of growing political tension, confrontation, and instability in the Sahel.
We are also deeply concerned by the spread of terrorist threats and activities, leading to conflict and causing widespread misery and displacement of the civilian population. We are appalled by the grave human rights violations committed by multiple parties, including Russian proxies in the region.
We look forward to strengthening further our cooperation with the African Union, regional organizations and the UN in fostering stability, security, good governance and development in the Sahel, preventing a “spill-over” of insecurity towards the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa, as well as irregular migration flows towards North Africa, Europe and the Western Hemisphere.
We congratulate Mauritania on its taking over the rotating Presidency of the African Union and we commend its commitment to the rule of law, good governance, refugee inclusion and constitutional values. We stand ready to assist States of the Sahel in accelerating the pace of the transition towards the return of the constitutional order.
3. Horn of Africa
We reaffirm our strong commitment to promoting peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa. We continue to provide humanitarian support to those most affected by food insecurity, widespread poverty, armed violence, the impact of extreme weather events and displacement.
We express our concern regarding the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region of Somalia announced in January 2024. We encourage both the Ethiopian and the Federal Government of Somalia to keep all channels of dialogue open to prevent further escalation, working with regional partners, in the framework of the African Union and through bilateral contacts, in accordance with international law and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.
4. Somalia
We commend the important progress in the institutional, macroeconomic and security sector in Somalia. We encourage the Somali Authorities to continue to make meaningful progress in the fight against Al Shabaab and in the consolidation of the institutional framework, including completion of a transparent and inclusive constitutional reform process.
The process of transitioning security responsibilities to the Somali security forces needs to be closely followed, especially in view of the termination of the mandate of the African Union Transitional Mission (ATMIS) in Somalia at the end of 2024. We welcome planning underway by Somalia and the African Union for a multinational mission to follow ATMIS to help maintain stability while Somalia continues to develop its security capabilities.
5. Ethiopia
While we welcome developments in the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, we express concern for the persistent and violent tensions in many areas of the country, as well as reports of human rights violations and abuses, the severe economic crisis and widening food insecurity
We encourage further and lasting developments in the protection of human rights, protection of civilians, political dialogue to resolve tensions, reconciliation and national dialogue, transitional justice and accountability for crimes committed during the conflict.
We call for a similar commitment by those involved in conflicts in other regions of Ethiopia to pursue peace through dialogue.
We underscore the importance of delivering peace dividend quickly for conflict-affected populations through recovery and reconstruction support, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, and implementation of durable solutions for Internally Displaced People (IDPs).
6. Sudan
We strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, where the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate more than one year into the war. We especially note the impact of the crisis on women and girls, and condemn the ongoing atrocities being committed by both sides of the conflict, including using rape and other forms of gender-based violence including conflict-related sexual violence. We are concerned by the increasing numbers of displaced people.
Obstruction of humanitarian access by the Sudanese Armed Forces and rapid Support Forces is resulting in the starvation of the Sudanese people. We urge both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to agree and implement a lasting ceasefire without pre-conditions and to establish safe and stable humanitarian cross border and cross line access channels, including from multiple points of entry to the most devastated areas of Sudan. We urge all actors to return to negotiations and to engage in a national dialogue inclusive of women and the composite Sudanese civil society and aimed at re-establishing civilian and representative institutions. An active African role and the continued support of the international community remain essential to help Sudan to restore the democratic transition process.
We commend the outcomes of the Paris Conference for Sudan and the Neighbouring countries during which over 2 billion Euros have been pledged to support civilian population in Sudan and those who sought refuge in neighbouring countries in 2024.
7. Democratic Republic of the Congo
We strongly condemn the resumption of attacks by the March 23 Movement (M23) in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We are very concerned by the worsening of the humanitarian situation, and the increasing serious human rights violations and abuses the population is being subjected to. We also condemn all armed groups operating in the country. We demand the immediate cessation of hostilities and of any further advances by the M23 and its withdrawal from all occupied areas as agreed through the African Union-endorsed Luanda process. We demand all armed groups to cease hostilities, withdraw from the areas they are controlling and disarm.
We expressed deep concern at the reports of the Group of Experts on the DRC on foreign military support for M23 and direct military interventions on DRC territory. We condemn any such support provided to M23 and any other armed group operating in the DRC and demand its cessation and the immediate withdrawal of any unauthorized foreign military presence from the DRC. We also condemn support, notably provided by military forces, to certain armed groups such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), and demand the cessation of such support.
We stress that any violations of the UN arms embargo is unacceptable and urge all States to stop any support to these armed groups.
We remain committed to the Luanda and Nairobi processes to reach a negotiated diplomatic solution to the conflict. We encourage an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization programme and the meaningful participation of women and youth in all their diversity. We also stand ready to work with the nations of the Great Lakes region to address the root causes of the cycles of violence in eastern DRC in a manner that takes into account the concerns and interests of the whole region, including by promoting accountability for all actors responsible for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.
III. ADDRESSING IRREGULAR MIGRATION, FOSTERING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY
We recognize that forced displacement and irregular migration have to be addressed in an integrated, comprehensive, and balanced manner, in a spirit of joint responsibility and commitment, and in accordance with international law and in full respect of human rights.
We will support our partners in addressing the root causes of instability in Africa and other regions and countries of origin, while promoting a cycle of growth grounded in the huge potential of the Continent, particularly in view of the just and clean transition and growth in access to electricity, offering alternative solutions to irregular migration. Collectively, we will address migration drivers including through: better leveraging and coordinating our development and climate finance; supporting fragile and conflict afflicted states; and strengthening international capacity to address climate change, conflict, learning poverty and other drivers of migration. We are ready to build synergies among initiatives from all partners and institutions. We will also continue to support African countries hosting large number of displaced populations.
We acknowledge that climate change is a risk multiplier already having a strong impact on human mobility. We see the need to further strengthen disaster risk reduction, adaptation, and resilience measures to counteract the drivers of involuntary displacement in the context of climate change.
Human traffickers and people smugglers must be stopped from continuing their nefarious activities and we need to disrupt their business models. We recognize that women and girls are especially impacted by human trafficking, particularly trafficking for sexual exploitation. The UN and its Agencies have a role to play in this respect. Countries of origin, transit and destination must work together to stop migrant smuggling and human trafficking and uphold the dignity and worth of the human person – in line with the UN Charter.
We will work towards reducing irregular migration and envisioning regular, safe and orderly migration on the basis of relevant national sovereign regulations. We are committed to find ways to better address challenges posed by irregular migration, within the framework of our international obligations. We will enhance cooperation against migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In this respect, we acknowledge the “Rome Process” started in July 2023 with an International Conference on Migration and Development” with the dual objective of fighting human traffickers and smugglers and supporting economic development. We also acknowledge the “Mattei Plan for Africa” launched by Italy. We also recall the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and protection and the multilateral legal framework on migration and refugee protection. Legal migration pathways can contribute to economic growth and decent work in line with international standards in countries of origin and destination.
We need to inject consistency and coherence in our investment in areas of shared priority for Africa, including food security, nutrition, sustainable rural development, energy transition, sustainable, inclusive, resilient, and quality infrastructure development, bridging digital divides, education, training and skilling, gender equality and good governance. Based on a mutually beneficial exchange, approaching issues on an equal footing, and ensuring alignment with Africa’s needs and priorities as identified by the African Union, African Governments and their peoples, we must step up efforts to achieve concrete sustainable development outcomes, contribute to the stabilization of areas of crisis, fight fundamentalism and address the root causes of irregular migration flows.
IV. PROMOTING A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC, MANAGING ENGAGEMENT IN ASIA
The Indo-Pacific region is a key engine for global growth, with more than half of the world’s population. We reiterate commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, based on the rule of law, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, grounded on respect for international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms, and human rights. We underscore that peace and stability of the region also contributes to prosperity and development of the entire international community. Developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.
We reaffirm individual initiatives of the G7 members and welcome those of our partners, such as ASEAN, IORA, Australia, Republic of Korea, India and other South Asian as well as Pacific Island countries, to enhance their engagement in the region. We underscore our commitment to further strengthening our coordination among the G7. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of working together with all regional partners.
We reaffirm our thorough support to ASEAN centrality and unity, as well as to initiatives aimed at fostering regional cooperation in line with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
We underscore our commitment to further strengthen our partnership with the Pacific Island countries, by supporting their needs and efforts in the implementation of the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We look forward to the 4th International Conference on Small Island Developing States under the theme “Charting the course towards resilient prosperity” (St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda 27th-30th May 2024). We will broaden our support to civil society, private sector, and academia’s plans for the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
8. China
We recognize the importance of constructive and stable relations with China. We reaffirm the need to engage candidly with and express our concerns directly to China. China is a key interlocutor in addressing global challenges, and we stand ready to cooperate with China on areas of common interest.
We reaffirm our interest in a balanced and reciprocal collaboration with China aimed at promoting global economic growth, with a view to enabling sustainable and fair economic relations and strengthening the international trading system. Our policy approaches are not designed to harm China, nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development. However, we are concerned that China’s non-market policies and practices are leading to harmful overcapacity that undermines our workers, industries, and economic resilience. A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest. We are not decoupling or turning inwards.
We reiterate the importance of ensuring a level playing field and a transparent, predictable, and fair business environment. Respect for the rules-based multilateral trading system based on market principles needs to be the hallmark of our relations, to protect our workers and companies from unfair and non-market policies and practices, including forced technology transfer or illegitimate data disclosure, which distort the global economy and undermine fair competition. We will protect our workers and business communities from unfair practices, including those that lead to overcapacity, create supply chain vulnerabilities and increase exposure to economic coercion, as we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversification where necessary.
We reaffirm the need to uphold the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety. In this respect, we call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression. We express our strong concern about transfers to Russia from business in China of dual-use materials and components for weapons and equipment for military production.
We are seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We continue to oppose China’s dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea and its repeated obstruction of countries’ high seas freedom of navigation and we express serious concern about the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines vessels in this regard. There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we oppose China’s militarization, coercive and intimidation activities in the South China Sea. We re-emphasize the universal and unified character of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and reaffirm UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.
We restate the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity for the whole international community and we call for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings, as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is. There is no change in the basic position of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies.
We remain concerned about the human rights situation in China, including in Xinjiang and Tibet. We express our concerns about the deterioration of pluralism and civil and political rights in Hong Kong since the 2020 National Security Law. We reemphasize these concerns following the recent passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which will further erode autonomy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong. The new law will make it harder to live, work and do business in Hong Kong and undermine the ability of Hong Kong people to maintain free and open exchanges with the wider world. We reiterate our call on China to uphold its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which enshrine rights and freedoms and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong. Furthermore, we urge China and the Hong Kong authorities to act in accordance with their international commitments and applicable legal obligations.
We call on China not to conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions, and to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. We encourage China to uphold its commitments to act responsibly in cyber space.
9. North Korea
We reiterate our strong condemnation of North Korea’s escalatory development of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes. We further reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demand that North Korea abandon all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We urge North Korea to return to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We reiterate that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT. We urge North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests. We urge all UN member states to implement all relevant UNSCRs fully and effectively and demand Security Council members to follow through on their commitments. We urge North Korea to cease activities that generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and WMD programmes, including malicious cyber activities.
In this context, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in violation of UNSC resolutions, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles against Ukraine. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missiles-related technology to North Korea, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution to renew the mandate of the UNSCR 1718 Committee Panel of Experts makes it easier for North Korea to evade the UN sanctions that Russia had previously voted for. We urge Russia and North Korea to immediately cease all such activities and abide by relevant UNSCRs. We reiterate our commitment to counter sanctions evasion and strengthen enforcement. We will increase efforts to maintain the Panel of Experts.
We strongly condemn North Korea’s systematic human rights violations and abuses and its choice to prioritize its unlawful weapons development programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call upon North Korea to resolve the abductions issue immediately and to meaningfully engage with the UN human rights system. We take note of the progressive re-opening of North Korea’s borders and call upon North Korea to take this opportunity to re-engage with the international community including through the return of all diplomatic and humanitarian personnel to North Korea.
We are disappointed by North Korea’s continued rejection of dialogue and call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, in order to enhance regional peace and security.
10. Myanmar
We reiterate our strong condemnation of the military coup in Myanmar and reaffirm our support and solidarity with the people of Myanmar in their quest for peace, freedom, and democracy. The continuing attacks by the military destroying civilian infrastructure (including homes, schools, places of worship and hospitals), the repeated and serious violations of human rights and the alarming humanitarian situation – which particularly affect those in most vulnerable situations, including children, women and members of minority religious and ethnic groups – are unacceptable. We also condemn the recent implementation of the 2010 conscription law by the military regime. The forced recruitment of young people can only lead to further violence and trigger a massive exodus to neighboring countries.
We urge the Myanmar military to immediately cease any violence, release all prisoners arbitrarily detained – starting from the democratically elected leaders- and establish an inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders, in view of restoring the path towards a meaningful and durable democratic process. We also reiterate our call on the Myanmar military to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, to desist from any form of forced labour and to allow prompt, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all displaced persons and people in need.
We continue to support ASEAN’s efforts to promote a credible and inclusive process to achieve the swift implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We highlight the importance of a comprehensive implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) and support the UN’s further engagement in the crisis, including through the leadership of the newly appointed UN Special Envoy on Myanmar and through the designation of a Resident Coordinator in country. Accountability for serious crimes committed in Myanmar remains essential.
We reiterate our call on all States to prevent or to cease the flow of arms and other dual-use materiel, including jet fuel, into Myanmar. We stress the need to create conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of all Rohingya refugees and displaced persons and justice and accountability for atrocities committed against Rohingya and other ethnic communities.
V. ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES
11. Development Finance and Infrastructure
We reaffirm our commitment to promoting sustainable, resilient, inclusive, and quality infrastructure as a key element for achieving sustainable development by addressing the infrastructure investment gap in low- and middle-income countries. The G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and initiatives such as the EU Global Gateway offer a framework we will use to promote our vision of sustainable and economically viable infrastructure, underpinned by transparent project selection, procurement and finance.
We reaffirm our commitment to advancing high standards for quality infrastructure as a means to spur sustainable and inclusive economic development.
We intend to work together to accelerate progress towards the commitment to mobilize up to 600 billion USD by 2027 by enhancing the strategic dimension of the Partnership for the Global Infrastructure and Investment We propose to act in close cooperation with partner countries, multilateral development banks and development finance institutions, including through de-risking, co-financing initiatives and enhanced coordination mechanisms, including at country/regional level, to further promote the development of a pipeline of bankable projects in close cooperation with the private sector, as well as to reinforce project preparation.
Infrastructure development should also encompass a wide range of initiatives (i.e. on regulatory frameworks, jobs market, energy access, training and research and health systems) to support partners in order to offer opportunities to the most marginalized and vulnerable and with a view to strengthening social cohesion and inclusion.
We will promote a transformative shift towards quality investment, in key areas that drive inclusive and sustainable development and resilience, including food security, climate and clean energy, biodiversity and reducing pollution, connectivity including ICT and transport networks, global supply chain resilience, health and education, and mainstreaming gender equality. We will prioritize efforts to deepen partnerships with Africa and based on the continent’s investment needs, consistent with the goal of accelerating progress towards the SDGs, through concrete deliverables, such as ongoing work along the Lobito Corridor. Given its global mandate, G7 countries will also continue to deploy investment while bringing forward the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment global strategy in other strategic regions, such as work on the Luzon Economic Corridor.
Recognizing the insufficient progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the urgency to address the financing gaps in the context of a growing number of low-income countries and middle-income countries facing higher risk of debt distress and constrained fiscal space to invest in their own development and futures, we will work together with our partners and with international finance institutions to create the conditions to scale up long-term financing for the countries in need. In that regard, we welcome the launch of infrastructure certification schemes, such as the Blue Dot Network and the Finance to Accelerate the Sustainable Transition Infrastructure initiatives, which aim to mobilize increased private investment in emerging markets. We will strive to enhance the development finance toolkit, to mobilize additional financing from international financial institutions, bilateral partners and the private sector to more effectively reduce poverty and protect the planet.
12. Food Security and Nutrition Security
We express concern about rising food insecurity and malnutrition stemming from the combined impact of climate change, loss and degradation of ecosystems, the growing number of conflicts, inflationary pressures, and the reduced fiscal space in many developing economies. We are committed to addressing, with partners, the worsening hunger crisis affecting parts of Africa. Strengthening the resilience of agri-food systems is necessary to effectively address food insecurity and malnutrition. That makes internationally coordinated action more urgent than ever. Ensuring food and nutrition security remains a challenge for the international community and affected countries, especially in known hunger hotspots in Africa and beyond, that are vulnerable to climate and conflict-related shocks.
We reaffirm our intention to increase investments to build more resilient and sustainable food systems, to help mitigate against future food shocks and diversify food supply chains. To that end, we reaffirm our commitment to contributing to sustainable and resilient food systems transformation, in the spirit of the Roadmap for Global Food Security-Call to Action and the UN Secretary General’s Call to Action for Accelerated Food Systems Transformation, issued at the UN Food Systems Summit +2 held in July 2023 in Rome. We recall the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security, issued by G7 Leaders and invited countries. We also reaffirm our support for the G20 Matera Declaration on Food Security, Nutrition and Food Systems and the G7 Global Alliance for Food Security. We acknowledge the importance of supporting fertilizer use efficiency and value chains, including local fertilizer production. The G7 is committed to the success of the next Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2025.
We also reaffirm our commitment to work with the Rome-based agencies FAO, IFAD and WFP. We recognize the role of the Committee on World Food Security as an inclusive and multi-stakeholder platform to work together on food security and nutrition.
In continuity with the UAE Leaders Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, endorsed at the COP28 by 159 Countries, including all the G7, we will enhance our efforts to address the food security-climate change nexus in a coherent and pragmatic manner, including through initiatives like the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS).
We stress the need for better coordination of international initiatives and projects aimed at countering food insecurity and malnutrition in order to maximize the delivery and impact of already existing resources. We continue to need innovative financial solutions for food systems, especially involving responsible private investment.
13. Economic Resilience and Economic Security
Economic resilience and economic security are critical for the proper functioning of the G7 and wider global economies. We will foster cooperation in accordance with the G7 Leaders’ Statement on economic Security issued at Hiroshima last year. To this end, we remain committed to making global supply chains more resilient and reliable especially for critical products and technologies.
We will continue to co-ordinate work on de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities, actively engaging the private sector.
We emphasize the importance of honoring international norms and obligations to safeguard global economic security and resilience and reaffirm our commitment to building global economic resilience and responding to harmful practices that undermine the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. We will continue working within the G7 and with trusted partners towards resilient supply chains, built in a transparent, diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy, and reliable manner.
We reiterate our concern about increasing threats to economic security for all global economies, notably economic coercion, and comprehensive strategies that use non-market policies and practices, as well as other practices in the pursuit of market dominance that lead to harmful overcapacity and supply chain concentration, thereby creating vulnerabilities and dependencies. We remain committed to enhancing our coordination and cooperation within the G7, while at the same time engaging other interested international partners about joining our efforts. We will continue work, principally through the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to improve our assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion, in accordance with our respective legal systems and in conformity with international law.
We acknowledge the key role of semiconductors as a critical part of supply chain resilience and economic security. To that end, we welcome the establishment by the G7 Industry, Technology and Digital Ministers of a semiconductors Point of Contact (PoC) Group dedicated to facilitating information exchange and sharing best practices among G7 members.
14. Climate, Energy Security and Environment
We are facing the unprecedented triple global crises of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution that are mutually reinforcing and intrinsically linked, as well as an ongoing global energy crisis, health threats, and environmental damage, including those caused or exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
The international community needs to come together and act decisively, irrespective of geographic or political divides, taking concrete steps collectively to achieve the global target to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and achieve global net zero (CHG) emissions by 2050.
To this end, we reaffirm our commitment, and we reiterate the call on all countries to contribute to global efforts to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, sustainable and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science and to accelerate low and zero-emission technologies.
We recognize the primary need to accelerate the transition to net-zero emissions by 2050, while ensuring policies to diversify energy sources and supplies to address potential security risks to energy systems, in a manner consistent with our climate and sustainability goals.
We are determined to promote energy efficiency as the “first fuel”, and fast-track clean, safe, and sustainable energy development and deployment, while reducing our dependency on fossil fuels. Moreover, actions must be taken to increase access to electricity and clean cooking as well as to accelerate sustainable, just and inclusive clean energy transitions in emerging and developing countries and to continue efforts to swiftly implement the Just Energy Transition Partnerships.
We are determined to promote affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy in Africa. With this objective, under the Italian Presidency we look forward to continuing discussions on how the G7 can concretely advance and contribute to Africa’s industrial advancement and to its sustainable, resilient, and inclusive growth.
The connection between climate, environment and energy is critical to making progress towards our climate change and environmental goals while implementing economically sustainable, just, and rapid transitions. Seizing the opportunities presented by innovative technological solutions and the alignment of global financial flows to support the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework will be critical to ensuring prosperity and environmental sustainability, while simultaneously fostering development and poverty alleviation, especially in developing countries.
We underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements, globally by 2030, considering national circumstances, and welcome the consensus reached at CMA5 calling on all Parties to contribute to its achievement.
We need to play a key role in defining secure, sustainable, and affordable energy systems, ensuring just and inclusive clean energy transitions. We therefore commit to achieving concrete steps forward in strategic areas. Among these, we recognize the key role of renewables, including from sustainable biological origin, nuclear energy for those who opt to use it, including advanced and small modular reactors, energy efficiency, methane emissions reduction in line with the Global Methane Pledge, industrial de-carbonization, most innovative technologies such as renewable and zero-emission hydrogen, and carbon management technologies. We will pursue secure, resilient, affordable and sustainable supply chains for critical minerals and raw materials, including through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and MSP Forum, and pursue implementation of the Five Point Plan for Critical Minerals Security adopted by G7 Climate Energy and Environment Ministers. We also underline the opportunities offered by circular economy, including recycling and resource efficiency, as well as innovative technologies. Investing in innovation should also help us in addressing the key topic of reducing GHG emissions in heavy-emitting sectors and promoting the development of a circular economy.
Leveraging private sector financing as well as innovative financing mechanisms are important steps to support energy transitions in developing countries, increase resources for adaptation and resilience and enable actions for responding to loss and damage to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially SIDS and LDCs.
The transition to a net zero-emissions, sustainable, climate resilient and nature positive, pollution free and circular economy will necessarily need to involve all the members of society, to ensure just and inclusive transitions, leaving no one behind. Women, youth, and Indigenous Peoples s tend to bear the brunt of climate change-related disasters. In this context, we place particular emphasis on need to empower these societal sectors and include them in efforts to address climate change and environmental degradation. We highlight the importance of nature-based solutions in this context. Plastic pollution is a global problem that requires urgent attention. We look forward to an ambitious and effective global agreement to end plastic pollution.
Biodiversity loss is an equally serious threat. Climate, biodiversity, and human health are interrelated and interdependent. We recall our commitment to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework fully and swiftly and to achieve each of its goals and targets, which is the landmark plan to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. We also underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.
We will work to mobilise nature finance from all relevant sources and to align financial and fiscal flows, as appropriate, including international development assistance, with the GBF. We also call on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to increase and report nature finance by CBD COP16. We welcome the Global Stocktake Decision’s recognition of the importance of nature for achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through halting, and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.
Given the risk of a global water crisis and continued lack of universal access to water and sanitation, we call for stronger collaboration at multilateral level in line with the UNEA-6 Resolution on Water. We welcome the UN System-wide Strategy on Water and Sanitation and are committed to the implementation of the Water Action Agenda as a key outcome of the UN Water Conference 2023. We also call for prompt appointment of a UN Special Envoy on Water.
15. Global Health
Global health is a pre-requisite for sustainable development. Building on the lessons learned during the COVID -19 pandemic, we will continue to promote global health, knowing that health emergencies are a global challenge that need a global response.
We support a reform of the Global Health Architecture fostering a more coordinated approach, strengthening Pandemic Prevention Preparedness and Response (PPR) including sustainable financing for capacity strengthening and for health emergency response, especially through the Pandemic Fund. We recognize the importance and reiterate our commitment to reaching a successful, equitable outcome of the ongoing negotiations for a new WHO convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic PPR and targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) by May 2024. Completing the negotiations in time is critical to leverage political attention, strengthen future pandemic responses and improve equity.
We commit to redouble our efforts to advance universal health coverage, including by supporting countries to restore access to essential health services and reduce mortality rates to be better than pre-pandemic levels by 2025. We also reaffirm our commitment to invest in resilient health systems, primary health care service delivery, and a skilled health workforce – including through the WHO Academy – as essential to reclaiming lost ground due to COVID-19 and promoting Universal Health Coverage as essential elements of pandemic preparedness.
We acknowledge that climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are having a dramatic impact on global health and both noncommunicable and infectious disease threats. We are therefore addressing these challenges in a coherent and strategic manner, through the “One Health” approach that recognizes that the health of people is linked to the health of animals, plants and our shared environment.
In this framework, we reaffirm that antimicrobial resistance is a key priority, and we will work closely for a successful upcoming UN High Level Meeting on AMR in September 2024.
16. Gender Equality
We reiterate our commitment to give a new impetus to gender equality. We recall the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome documents of its review conferences and confirm our determination to deliver on the 2030 Agenda relevant Sustainable Development Goals.
We reaffirm the G7’s continued global leadership on gender equality and the promotion and protection of the rights of women and girls in all their diversity as well as LGBTQIA+ persons. We express our strong concern over the global rollback of all women’s and girls’ rights, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the disproportionate impact of conflict and crisis on them.
Gender equality and women’s empowerment is a fundamental pre-requisite to eradicate poverty, to stimulate prosperity and sustainable and inclusive growth, and to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies. We recognize that unpaid care and domestic work are major obstacles to the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and negatively impact women’s economic empowerment by impairing their ability to work full-time or in leadership positions. We reaffirm the significant value of the World Bank Invest in Childcare initiative and aim by 2035 to support 200 million more women to join the workforce by investing in efforts to close the global childcare gap.
We must pursue gender equality as a cross cutting priority to promote and protect the rights of women and girls and members of minority groups, including their ability to exercise their human rights, by ensuring freedom from all forms of discrimination and gender-based violence. We need to strengthen their economic security and empowerment by increasing and addressing barriers to their participation and building their resilience against the impacts of climate change, including by advancing their access to jobs in green and blue industries critical to our future and the future of our planet. We will promote comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR, including at the UN General Assembly and Summit of the Future.
Women and girls are disproportionately affected by conflicts and crises which can exacerbate existing gender inequalities and expose women and girls, to heightened risks of violence, exploitation, and discrimination. The involvement of women and girls in all areas related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as well as disaster risk reduction is crucial to creating and ensuring sustainable and inclusive peace and address the root causes of conflicts. In line with UNSCR 1325 and subsequent Resolutions on Women Peace and Security (WPS), we underscore the importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership in all areas of policy decision-making spaces and tangible implementation, and through women’s civil society organizations, non-government partners, and throughout the political, security and development spheres. We remain committed to protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence before, during, and after conflicts, ensuring accountability for perpetrators, and providing support and services to survivors.
17. Disaster and Risk Reduction
We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen and accelerate the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the “Early Warning for All” Initiative by scaling up international cooperation.
We acknowledge the interrelated causes and effects of disasters, particularly climate change-induced disasters, on different aspects, including peace and stability, local, regional, and international security, health, education, gender equality, and vulnerability. We renew our commitment to act ahead of disasters by working across the Humanitarian, Development Peace Nexus. Our aim is to reduce risks, anticipate and prepare for disasters, minimize the impacts of disasters on communities and infrastructure in order not to hamper development progress.
We stress the importance of the outcome of COP28 in terms of operationalizing new funding arrangements to respond to loss and damage, including the fund. We welcome the pledges to the fund that have already been made and we encourage further support, to be provided on a voluntary basis and from a wide variety of funding sources. This is part of our wider commitment to assist those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.
19. Global Governance
We reiterate the significance of maintaining and strengthening the free and open international order based on the rule of law, respecting the UN Charter, and the paramount importance of international and multilateral cooperation in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity. We share the UN Secretary General’s ambition for inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism, as outlined in the “Our Common Agenda” Report. We look forward to the UN Summit of the Future as an opportunity to accelerate these efforts, to tackle global challenges and accelerate progress on the SDGs.
To restore a sense of common purpose among UN Members States and to make international and multilateral cooperation stronger, more effective, more inclusive, more democratic, more efficient and more transparent, we commit to actively contribute to the Summit of the Future as an opportunity to foster dialogue and to find shared solutions to common problems. Human rights as one of the founding pillars of the UN system will be our common compass throughout the Pact for the Future. We welcome the latest report of the UN Secretary General on human security. We are committed to working with all UN Member States to strengthen the roles of the UNSG as well as the UNGA. We also recommit to the reform of the UNSC.
We reaffirm the need for strengthened international financial institutions and underscore the role of multilateral developments banks (MDBs) in the SDGs achievement, including in crisis affected contexts. We support the ongoing efforts for MDBs reform, including the World Bank Group (WBG) evolution roadmap, to better address global challenges. In this respect, we look forward to the WBG and International Monetary Fund annual meetings.
We stress the key role of MDBs in addressing global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and fragility and conflict, which are critical to achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development that is inclusive and resilient.
19. Conflict Prevention and Management, Support to UN Peace Operations
We renew our commitment to strengthening peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts to address increasingly complex and interconnected security challenges. We need to build resilient societies, uphold human rights, support good governance, and invest in people to achieve sustainable peace. We condemn sexual and gender-based violence, especially when related to armed conflict situations.
We highly value the role of the UN and support an integrated approach to peacebuilding and peacekeeping. We support the Peacebuilding Commission in its role as a convener of relevant stakeholders and an advisory body to other UN organs and we support the Peacebuilding Fund as a critical tool to help to ensure adequate financing for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
We reaffirm that the UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions are valuable tools to prevent escalation and the recurrence of conflicts and to protect civilians where mandated to do so.
We further reaffirm our general support for the UN Secretary General’s ‘’New Agenda for Peace’’, “Action for Peacekeeping” and “Action for Peacekeeping Plus” to reform and strengthen such operations, based on a conflict prevention approach to crises. We will enhance capabilities and work to ensure the safety and security of those deployed, for example through the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.
We underscore the importance of strengthening the global implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) and Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agendas.
20. A Global Resilient Cyberspace, Artificial Intelligence
We reiterate our commitment to an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure cyberspace. We highly value the role of the Ise-Shima Cyber Group to define common ground.
While relying on the leadership of governments and international organizations, we recognize the importance of the multistakeholder model, with the invaluable contribution of the private sector in promoting technological development and of civil society in advancing a common understanding of threats and providing solutions to improve cybersecurity.
As the international community is increasingly confronted with disruptive activities carried out through Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, we reiterate that international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace. We call for the full implementation of existing norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace, and we encourage States to deepen their understanding of how international law applies to cyberspace.
We condemn malicious cyber activity, and we will continue to work together at the national level and in multilateral fora to increase accountability in cyberspace. We will increase our cooperation against malicious cyber activities, including state-sponsored ones. We are determined to protect our democratic systems and critical infrastructures from malicious cyber threats. We express our concern for the increasing number of ransomware attacks , particularly targeting hospitals and healthcare facilities, and in this regard we recall relevant norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which emphasize states’ commitment to not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICT and to respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory aimed at the critical infrastructure of another state. We welcome significant international initiatives, such as the Counter Ransomware Initiative and the Pall Mall Process, which contribute to increase awareness and improve oversight coordination.
We urge countries to enact legislation in line with the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (Budapest Convention) and engage in accession to the treaty. We also urge countries to fully utilize the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as a tool to combat cybercrime.
We call on the international community to be guided by the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace to reduce risks to international peace and stability and make cyberspace a less contested domain. We underline the importance of confidence building measures, international cooperation, and capacity building. We affirm our support for the “Programme of action to advance responsible State behavior in the use of ICTs in the context of international security”, as the permanent and action-oriented mechanism to hold discussions on cybersecurity at the UN from 2025 onward.
We reaffirm the G7 support to Ukraine’s cyber resilience, and we welcome multilateral initiatives aimed at providing assistance, such as the Tallinn Mechanism.
We will continue to coordinate and, where possible, unite our efforts to assist countries to improve their capacity to address the multiple challenges of cybersecurity and resilience. Exchanging information on respective national projects may help identify best practices. We will be inspired by a demand driven approach and aim to fully integrate cybersecurity into digital development, as highlighted by the Accra Call for Cyber Resilient Development. To this end, we will continue to cooperate where it is relevant with International Financial Institutions, for instance the World Bank, and the private sector.
Malicious cyber activities are disrupting critical services in G7 countries – including hospitals, energy companies and water companies – and costing our economies billions of dollars in disruptions. We commit to taking concrete steps to improve our collective cyber resilience.
Considering the key and complementary role played by high-level policy makers and the National Agencies for Cybersecurity in ensuring a safe cyberspace and in fostering international collaboration at a policy and technical level, we also welcome the first meeting at G7 level, scheduled in Rome on 16-17 May, and we look forward to the outcome of their discussions. We resolve to keep analyzing the multifaceted applications of artificial intelligence and other new and emerging technologies, in such a way as to strike an effective balance between the advantageous uses for people and the need to mitigate the potential negative impacts in certain domains, including cyberspace. With this regard, we acknowledge the importance of advancing our efforts to ensure safe, secure and trustworthy AI, which is human-centric and human rights-based, including through advancing the outcomes of the Hiroshima AI Process, and foster interoperability between AI governance frameworks to support our common vision.
As new technologies are defining the future of our societies, we endorse the UN General Assembly resolution “Seizing the Opportunities for Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Systems for Sustainable Development” that was adopted by consensus and co-sponsored by 123 countries. We will also endeavor to provide contributions to the Global Digital Compact and WSIS+20 Review and the UN Pact for the Future, in order to protect an open, free, secure and inclusive Internet for future generations, governed through multi-stakeholder processes, and by protecting the ability for all to share information and communicate freely and securely, making sure the voices of younger generations, emerging economies and developing countries are properly heard.
We recognize the nexus between AI and cybersecurity, and we commit to countering the risks posed to cybersecurity by AI. We also underscore the importance of ensuring the cybersecurity of AI systems and note the publication of the Guidelines for secure AI system development.
21. Countering hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference
Malign foreign influence operations, including malicious cyber activities, and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), are a growing challenge to democratic societies around the world, threatening to undermine democratic values, human rights, governmental processes, political stability, and international partnerships. These operations aim at misleading and deceiving our citizens, interfering in our democratic processes, destabilizing our governments and democratic institutions, and undermining our shared values, creating, and exploiting cultural and societal frictions, as well as negatively affecting our ability to conduct foreign and security policy. FIMI threatens to destabilize the very fabric of our rules-based international system and is exacerbated by the exploitation of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).
We are committed to addressing the potential risk of the misuse of new technologies for purposes of disinformation, and the role of AI in FIMI, especially in the context of forthcoming elections.
AI has the potential to strengthen democracy by advancing resilience, openness, civic engagement and participation, and access to government services and information. But AI can also be used as a tool to undermine democracy, including through voter suppression, information manipulation and curtailment of civic engagement. We are concerned with the potential for authoritarian states and non-state actors to misuse current and emerging technologies to undermine democracy and confidence in elections and to erode the information environment.
FIMI negatively affects the ability of citizens to take rational, informed decisions, which lies at the very heart of our democratic institutions and aims at undermining confidence in democratic governments and societies. Disinformation can be used to polarize society; it often supports violent extremist activities and is fuelled by malicious foreign players. Online disinformation campaigns are being widely used by a range of malign actors to create or exacerbate tensions.
State and non-state actors are increasingly adopting hybrid tactics, also through their proxies. In particular, Russia, since beginning its war of aggression against Ukraine, has been augmenting military efforts on the ground with hybrid tactics, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference. We condemn the widespread use of FIMI and AI by the Russian Government and its proxies to support its war of aggression against Ukraine and fuel further tensions globally. Building our resolve to promote information resilience, we will enhance coordination to establish a common operating picture and develop coordinated responses to information manipulation. A whole-of-society and whole-of-government effort is required to combat FIMI and foster information integrity.
We are committed to protecting our information environment and democratic values against any attempt of foreign manipulation. We commit to championing free and independent media at home and around the world and promote pluralism and freedom of expression. Together we seek to strengthen public resilience to and awareness about FIMI, through education, including digital, media and information literacy initiatives and awareness-raising campaigns, also addressing gendered disinformation.
We plan to strengthen our coordinated effort to better prevent, detect, respond to, and mitigate FIMI threats, addressing the impact of hybrid threats at the earliest stage possible. As billions of citizens will cast their ballots globally in 2024, the protection of free and fair elections from foreign interference is a central focus of the G7 Agenda.
We also call on tech companies, in particular social media platforms, to intensify their efforts to prevent and counter FIMI campaigns and to reduce the potential abuse of AI technology for this purpose, also by increasing their transparency.
Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) we are strengthening our coordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies. We are determined to intensify our efforts, to protect our democratic systems and open societies from foreign information manipulation and interference, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response.
22. Digital and Transnational Repression
Advances in surveillance technology, including AI and commercial spyware, can enable foreign governments and their proxies to monitor, track, and target individuals more effectively and invasively. We are committed to countering the misuse of technology to target human rights defenders, journalists, perceived political opponents, and other civil society members.
Transnational repression (TNR), which involves reaching across state borders to intimidate, silence, attack, and/or murder dissidents, human rights activists, and others for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms, has a detrimental impact to free speech, freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms. It is one of the most harmful manifestations of authoritarian governments that aims to export repressive forms of governance extraterritorially. We strongly condemn the targeting of activists, critics and journalists in this respect.
23. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Outer Space
We remain firmly committed to uphold the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. We intend to maintain and strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation efforts for a more secure, stable, and safer world and endorse the statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group.
We are greatly concerned by Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and actions, North Korea’s and Iran’s continued advancement of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. These developments pose serious challenges for international peace and security and require our united resolve in defense of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.
Recalling the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, we reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, achieved through a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach.
In this spirit, we remain resolved to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and advance the NPT’s implementation across all three of its mutually reinforcing pillars. We reaffirm the centrality of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
We underline the urgent need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and to provide sufficient resources to ensure the continued operation and the long-term sustainability of all elements of the CTBT verification system. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all states that have not yet done so to declare new or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We deeply regret Russia’s withdrawal of its ratification of the Treaty and we are gravely concerned by Russian statements with respect to nuclear explosive testing. We urge Moscow to continue to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests.
We call for the immediate commencement of long-overdue negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) while urging all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of such material.
We adhere to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. We underscore the IAEA’s crucial role in upholding the international non-proliferation architecture, enhancing nuclear safety and security, and safeguards, and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology for the benefit of all Member States. We recall the G7 Leaders’ commitment to evaluate measures to reduce reliance on civil nuclear-related goods from Russia and to assist countries seeking to diversify their supplies. We support Japan’s safe, transparent and science-based process to responsibly manage the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System treated water and in proactively coordinating with scientists and partners as well as the IAEA.
The G7 is committed to working with all States to further identify and implement measures to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use and to strengthen arms control. We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States issued on January 3, 2022, on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, and reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement. We welcome the transparency of G7 nuclear-weapon States in providing data on their nuclear forces and the objective size of their nuclear arsenals. We call on others that have not yet done so to follow suit.
We reiterate our deep regret over Russia’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty and we call on Russia to return to its full implementation and to engage with the U.S. on reducing nuclear risks. We are also concerned about China’s ongoing and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and development of increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without transparency – including providing data and objective size of its nuclear arsenal – or good faith arms control and risk reductions measures. The G7 urges China to engage in concrete strategic risk reduction discussions with the U.S. to promote stability through greater transparency of China’s nuclear weapon policies, plans, and capabilities.
We underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, while encouraging other leaders, youth and others to also visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We recognize the important role that f conventional arms control, confidence-building measures and regional risk reduction have in reducing the risk of armed escalation or miscalculation, improving trust and transparency, and promoting strategic stability between states.
Conventional weapons continue to be used for regional coercion, raising international tensions, and in acts of military aggression that have resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties. This highlights the urgency of implementation agreements and commitments relating to conventional arms control and disarmament that take into account humanitarian factors.
Reaffirming our strong commitment to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, we underline the need for the universalization and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
We will actively seek to advance efforts in the working group on the strengthening of the BTWC to examine and develop concrete measures to enhance the implementation of the Convention.
We recognize the high priority of addressing biological threats worldwide as an utmost priority. With rapidly advancing technology and more acute biological risks, it is crucial to ensure that biological research, development, and innovation are conducted in a safe, secure, responsible, transparent, and sustainable manner. Strengthening domestic measures, engaging international organizations, academia, and the private sector remains paramount to promote and establish effective regulatory biosafety and biosecurity measures for the life sciences and global health.
We reaffirm the key importance of addressing biosecurity challenges in the African continent, strengthening preparedness, and empowering the African scientific community, involving women and youth. We recognize the important progress made through the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa (SIMBA), a flagship effort pf the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity, national frameworks, surveillance and epidemic intelligence and non-proliferation capacities in Africa.
In this overall effort, we will work together across the G7, the G7-led 31-member Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the BTWC, the WHO and other appropriate international fora to raise the bar globally on biosafety and biosecurity.
We commit to maintaining and updating export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including through multilateral export control regimes and in cooperation with all responsible international actors.
We reaffirm the key role of the G7 Global Partnership in addressing threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and CBRN materials and supporting vulnerable countries around the world in to build security capacity to better mitigate all manner of CBRN threats. We welcome the launch of the Global Partnership’s new initiative to counter WMD disinformation.
Working with partners, we e will continue to assess the risks posed by exports of rapidly advancing dual-use technologies. Where necessary and according to our respective legal frameworks, we will cooperate and promote efforts to implement export controls to address risks to international security.
We celebrate in 2024 the tenth anniversary of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which all G7 members participate. The development of realistic processes and technologies by IPNDV will help ensure future agreements contain robust verification provisions.
Space-related services, data and activities are increasingly key for the functioning of our economies and the implementation of public policies for the welfare of our citizens. However, we see globally an intensification of threats and the development of capabilities directed at disrupting the peaceful use of space.
We reiterate the importance of upholding the existing legal framework for activities in outer space, notably the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”). We remain committed to fostering international cooperation, transparency, and confidence-building measures to promote responsible behavior with the goal of improving space security for all states. In parallel, we will also remain vigilant and invest in the resilience of space-related services against potentially hostile activities.
We affirm the obligation of all States Parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.
24. Countering terrorism and transnational crime
We condemn terrorism in all its forms, and we reiterate our determination to protect freedom and security in our societies, upholding democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights – including the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy – freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.
Terrorist networks know no borders and countering terrorism requires a strong collective and internationally aligned approach that includes combating the financing of terrorism and terrorist propaganda. We need to recognize and tackle new threats emanating from malign actors’ use of emerging technologies, such as drones and artificial intelligence, while the risk of chemical, biological, and radiological attacks remain a serious threat. The potential use of technologies to counter terrorism and violent extremism must be recognized as well.
Countering terrorism needs a holistic approach, aimed also at preventing violent extremism. It is imperative that we prevent radicalization to violence online and offline, in prison as well as in societies, through work with civil society, women-led organizations, local leaders and communities. We should work to promote rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for former terrorists in order to reintegrate them back into society with a reduced risk of recidivism. We intend to step up information sharing and international cooperation, promoting capacity building domestically and with partners, including in border management. All our efforts are based on respect for human rights and the principles of the rule of law.
Organized crime is also a major threat to our societies and citizens and also knows no borders. Organized crime can take advantage of the insecurity, instability and conflicts caused by terrorism and it can also be a way that terrorist groups support their activities. Terrorism can leverage organized crime, too. Human trafficking, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, crimes that affect the environment, trafficking of cultural property, money laundering and corruption can find a fertile ground when exploiting war and conflicts. Capacity building in justice and security measures to counter the illicit economy can help to foster inclusive and peaceful societies.
We reaffirm our commitment to fight organized crime and its illegal profits, focusing on new risks such as cybercrime. Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants have become major sources of income for organized crime, together with drug trafficking. We are firmly committed to stop the criminal exploitation of vulnerable peoples, breaking the business model of organized criminal groups.
We also reaffirm our commitment to fight against the illicit production and distribution of synthetic drugs including fentanyl. Trafficking of illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs props up large, adaptable, and resilient transnational criminal organizations that operate across the globe – with the financial means and capacity to corrupt society, undermine governance, and weaken government institutions around the world. Together, we reaffirm our commitment to countering the production, distribution, and sale of illicit narcotics; to sharing threat information and engaging in joint investigations and enforcement efforts; to scheduling precursor chemicals and other drugs, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and other international entities; to collectively coordinating efforts with key international partners, especially with countries where synthetic drugs are produced; to participating in multilateral fora, such as the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, that unite countries and key institutions in fighting the scourge of deadly drugs; and to advancing public health interventions and services to those who need it. Individually and collectively, we will crack down on the global criminal networks that fuel overdose deaths, disrupt the illicit financial mechanisms that support these networks; seize deadly drugs before they enter our communities; and deliver life-saving medication and care. We are ready to work with other governments to tackle these transnational challenges and to support the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.
We welcome the valuable input of the G7 Roma-Lyon Group’s work on preventing and combating terrorism and transnational organized crime.
25. Fight against Corruption
We recognize that corruption and related illicit finance and proceeds of crime drain public resources, can often fuel organized crime and undermine democratic governance. Corruption and illicit finance also undermine progress across all the Sustainable Development Goals.
We reaffirm the fundamental role that the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and its supporting bodies play in the global fight against corruption. We will strive to further support and enhance the effectiveness of its Implementation Review Mechanism, especially with a view to its next review phase.
We also reaffirm our commitment to timely and effective implementation of the FATF standards on transparency of beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements, underscoring the importance of accountability tools that will deny corrupt actors access to our territories and our financial systems.
We also recognize the challenges faced by some developing countries in meeting international standards designed to combat corruption and illicit finance, and we encourage the international financial institutions to coordinate and increase their efforts to support countries in their efforts across their operations, particularly in fragile and conflict affected countries.
26. Threats to maritime security
We reiterate our commitment to promoting a cooperative system of international governance for the ocean and seas and to maintaining the rules-based maritime order based on international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights. In this context, we recognize the importance of the role of international courts and tribunals including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
We firmly reiterate our condemnation for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, terrorism and transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of weapons and narcotics, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other illegal maritime activities. We reaffirm the importance of national and regional ownership in pursuing the fight against illegal activities at sea.
V1. TACKLING REGIONAL ISSUES
27. Western Balkans
We reaffirm our shared commitment to the security, economic prosperity, and European perspective of the six Western Balkans countries as a crucial investment for peace and stability. We emphasize the importance of advancing the necessary internal reforms, particularly on rule of law, including tackling organized crime, illicit finance, and corruption.
We fully support further progress on regional cooperation and integration, including by implementing the Common Regional Market, and we encourage local political elites to make decisive progress on regional reconciliation. To this aim, we call on Kosovo and Serbia to implement without further delay the Agreement on the Path to Normalization and its Implementation Annex adopted in 2023. We urge both sides to engage constructively in the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue, refraining from provocations, inflammatory rhetoric, and uncoordinated actions.
We firmly reject any attempt from internal or external actors to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and multiethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support the executive mandate of the EUFOR ALTHEA operation to support the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in maintaining a safe and secure environment in the country.
We urge all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to put aside divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, to avoid any act that could destabilize the country and to focus on internal reforms that would move the country closer to realizing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
We welcome the European Council’s decision in March 2024 to open negotiations for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the European Union. We support the mandate of High Representative Christian Schmidt.
28. South Caucasus
We urge Armenia and Azerbaijan to remain fully committed to the peace process to achieve a dignified and durable peace based on the principles of non-use of force, respect for sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. We recall the Joint Statement issued by the sides on December 7th, 2023, and encourage them to uphold that spirit of cooperation in their future interactions. Further escalation would be unacceptable.
We call on Azerbaijan to fully comply with its obligations under international humanitarian law and encourage appropriate steps to ensure the safe, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons wishing to come back to their homes.
The G7 and its members are ready to facilitate further constructive contacts at all levels, notably within the established negotiating frameworks provided by the EU and the USA, whose enduring efforts we commend.
We reiterate the importance of the commitment to the Alma Ata 1991 Declaration through which Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. We encourage greater regional cooperation and the re-opening of all borders, including the border between Armenia and Türkiye.
29. Central Asian countries
We remain resolved to support the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the right of self-determination of the Central Asian countries.
We are committed to enhancing our cooperation with the Central Asian countries to tackle regional challenges, including the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the enduring impact of the situation in Afghanistan, the regional terrorist threat, as well as managing water resources and climate change and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We encourage the further strengthening of regional cooperation, especially in the field of connectivity and infrastructure, including the Middle Corridor, to improve ease of trade between the Central Asian countries, bolster global supply chains, foster trade, forge investment and energy links, provide economic diversification and enhance resilience, while upholding labor rights and environmental protection.
We will continue to support the implementation of the socio-economic and political reforms announced in the Central Asian countries. Throughout the region, we support the expansion of civic and political participation, the strengthening of the rule of law, and the safeguarding of human rights.
30. Afghanistan
We remain committed to supporting the people of Afghanistan. We condemn the continued and systemic abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Taliban, notably of the political, economic and social rights of women and girls, as well as the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities. We deeply regret that the Taliban has taken no serious step to initiate an inclusive political process with fellow Afghans regarding the future of the country. Peace and stability in Afghanistan will require the establishment of an inclusive and representative political process which allows Afghanistan to fulfill its international obligations and includes full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation of Afghan women, upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We intend to remain vigilant against the risk of Afghanistan serving as a base for hosting or exporting terrorism to other countries.
The safe and secure departure of all Afghans wishing to leave the country must be guaranteed, as well as humanitarian access and the possibility to effectively provide humanitarian aid.
We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.
We are committed to the swift appointment of a UN Special Envoy in line with the recommendations of the UN’s Independent Assessment and as mandated by Security Council Resolution 2721.
VII. COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Stronger cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean is of paramount importance as we have common values and shared interests. We commit to further partner with the Region to address global challenges, including by protecting the international system based on international cooperation and international law, tackling natural disasters and climate change, countering transnational organized crime, and promoting trade and investments aimed at improving socio-economic resilience.
31. Haiti
We express our solidarity to the Haitian population, which is suffering from unprecedented levels of gang violence. We reiterate our support to the ongoing international efforts aimed at strengthening public institutions and law enforcement, as well as combating criminal gangs, whose illegal activities have led to a marked deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation of the country.
We encourage the international community to scale up its humanitarian support to the Haitian population. We note the urgent need to protect women and children in Haiti, who are suffering disproportionately from the recent and rapid escalation in violence.
We welcome UNSCR 2699, authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Haiti, to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security in Haiti and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. We commend the Government of Kenya for its readiness to lead the mission. Every effort should be made to expeditiously provide robust financial support to the mission so that it may deploy as soon as possible. The people of Haiti cannot wait.
We also welcome UNSCR 2700, which renews the sanctions regime for Haiti for an additional year. The sanctions regime promotes accountability by extending the territorial arms embargo and ability to sanction individuals and entities who are responsible for, or complicit in, actions that threaten the peace and security in Haiti.
We commend the outcome of the CARICOM Summit held in Kingston, Jamaica, on March 11 and the commitment taken by Haitian stakeholders to implement an inclusive transitional governance arrangement.
We support the ongoing efforts of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti and call on the political actors to bridge their differences and commit in a forward-looking, transparent, and fair national dialogue, which is essential to stabilize the Country.
We reiterate the importance that the process to find lasting solutions to the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis be Haitian-led and owned.
32. Nicaragua
We call on the Nicaraguan government to end its human rights violations as well as widespread repression and related violations and abuses against civil society, Indigenous Peoples, academics, students, the independent press, and political and religious actors.
We urge authorities to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners and abide by their international obligations. We condemn the closure of CSOs and the systematic attacks on religious institutions and organizations, including the Catholic Church and its ministers, many of whom have been arrested and then sent into exile, along with hundreds of political actors and civil society members – and moved to strip them of their citizenship. We call on the Government to restore their citizenship under international conventions.
We further call on the Nicaraguan Government to hold free and fair elections, allowing the members of the opposition to exercise their rights to the freedom of assembly, and to free speech.
33. Venezuela
We are deeply concerned about the ongoing political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. We call on Venezuela to swiftly implement the Barbados Agreements of October 2023, with particular regard to electoral guarantees, and the deployment of international electoral observations missions in order to ensure free and fair elections.
We are deeply worried by the recent decisions to prevent members of the opposition from exercising their core political rights and the continued detention and harassment of opposition members. We call for the immediate release of political prisoners still detained.
We follow closely developments between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region and we demand Venezuela to refrain from destabilizing initiatives. The matter must be resolved in line with international law..."
Source/publisher:
G7 Foreign Ministers
Date of publication:
2024-04-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, International Relations
Language:
more
Description:
"We, the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are deeply concerned over the recent escalation of conflicts, including in the area of Myawaddy, Kayin State, along the border area between Myanmar and Thailand and in Rakhine State of Myanmar, which have caused displacement of civilians.
To avoid further humanitarian impacts of such escalation of all forms of conflicts, we urge all parties for an immediate cessation of violence and to exercise utmost restraint, to uphold international humanitarian law, and to take all the necessary measures to defuse tensions and to ensure the protection and safety of all civilians, including foreign nationals and citizens of ASEAN Member States..."
Source/publisher:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Date of publication:
2024-04-18
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
133.94 KB
more
Description:
"Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN), wholeheartedly appreciate the decision made by the People’s Assembly organised by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) to abolish the 1982 Myanmar citizenship law, commonly known as the Rohingya Genocide law. This landmark decision represents a significant milestone in the ongoing spring revolution journey toward fostering unity, inclusivity, and respect for all individuals within Burma.
The 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Law was formulated based on dictator Ne Win’s ideology of Burmanization, xenophobia, and racial discrimination. It has systematically discriminated against the Rohingya community, ultimately contributing to the Rohingya genocide.
Similarly, thousands of Muslims from Southern Burma have become stateless along the Thai-Burma border. Additionally, other Muslim minority groups such as Pathi, Pashu, Kaman, Myaydu, and Panthay, as well as other religious minority groups such as Hindus, Gurkha, Sikhs, Bahais, and Christians, have faced similar discriminatory experiences in expressing their identities while seeking citizenship. BHRN hopes these issues can be similarly resolved.
BHRN’s Executive Director Kyaw Win said, “Burma’s discriminatory Citizenship Law is a blight on the country’s history. By reversing this law, the People’s Assembly and the NUCC are strongly signaling they intend to separate themselves from the bigotry of the Tatmadaw. As the junta loses ground in the civil war, it is vital that planning takes place now to ensure that Burma’s next phase is one of equality and harmony for all its people. We welcome this first step and encourage further action to protect the citizenship and status of all Burma’s people.”
The 1982 citizenship law established three types of citizenship: citizen, associate citizen, and naturalized citizen. However, no clear articles or administrative processes exist for individuals to attain citizenship after holding associate or naturalized citizenship identities. Implementation of the law is rife with corruption, leading to instances where even siblings from the same household hold different identity documents.
As a result of this law and its implementation, minority communities face the risk of statelessness and limited access to education, property rights, healthcare, higher employment, and other essential services. Therefore, by undergoing the legal process to abolish this discriminatory law, the revolution in Burma reaffirms its commitment to upholding the principles of equality, justice, and human rights for all citizens.
We commend the efforts of all those involved in this decision and urge for the swift abolition of the law is crucial to continue progress towards building a more harmonious and inclusive society. Finally, a new citizenship law must be based on human rights norms and should be only one type of citizenship for everyone equally.
Organisation’s Background
BHRN is based in London and operates across Burma/Myanmar working for human rights, minority rights and religious freedom in the country. BHRN has played a crucial role in advocating for human rights and religious freedom with politicians and world leaders..."
Source/publisher:
Burma Human Rights Network
Date of publication:
2024-04-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Burma's citizenship laws and other relevant legislation (texts and commentary)
Language:
more
Description:
"Karen National Union (KNU) led resistance forces, including the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Karen National Defense Organisation (KNDO) and the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), captured Thingannyinaung Tactical Command Base under Burma/Myanmar military’s Southeastern Command on the 4th of April 2024. On the 10th of April 2024, they captured 275th Infantry Battalion stationed in Myawaddy Township. However, some troops from the 275th Infantry Battalion have retreated to the 2nd Thailand-Myanmar Friendship Bridge where they have stationed themselves and taken sheltered near the bridge.
Since capturing the bases, our allied forces are conducting military operations to intercept, block, and deter reinforcement troops sent by SAC in order not to lose Myawaddy. Some tasks still need to be carried out in order to reach a secure position in the Myawaddy area. People are urged to live and travel while taking security precautions.
Once the Myawaddy area has reached a secure position, the KNU, with the participation of the local people, will establish administrative matters, prevent illicit businesses, contraband trades and human trafficking, and implement stability, law enforcement, necessary public services, and facilitate commodity flow in the Myawaddy area from a possible position despite the challenges. We release our positions as follows:
The KNU is deeply concerned about the security of the people living on both sides of the Thailand-Burma/Myanmar border, border stability, and access to humanitarian aid, and we will do our best concerning those issues.
The KNU is committed to establishing and maintaining cross-border security and stability. We are making the necessary preparations and arrangements for the continuity of rules-based cross-border activities in line with regional best practices.
In order to establish peace and security for the people living on both sides of the Thailand-Burma/Myanmar border, the KNU is working to achieve meaningful cooperation with the Royal Thai Government, local and international partner organizations, including border-based Karen organizations and connecting with all concerned parties.
We respect and honor all our comrades who have sacrificed their lives, blood, and sweat to remove any kind of dictatorship, including the military dictatorship, and establish a new civilian-led federal democratic union that respects diversity and inclusion. The KNU will continue to fight to achieve our goal together with the Ethnic Resistance Organizations and democratic alliances, and we urge the entire people of Kawthoolei and Burma/Myanmar to keep participating and fighting persistently..."
Source/publisher:
Karen National Union
Date of publication:
2024-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Armed conflict in Karen State - general articles and reports
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
511.01 KB 810.84 KB
more
Description:
"Today, April 11th, marks the one-year anniversary of the Pazigyi Village aircraft bombing massacre. On April 11th, 2023, at approximately 7:30 A.M. in the Sagaing Division, Kantbalu Township, junta forces bombarded the opening ceremony of the Pazigyi village administration office – a donation event – with a jet plane. Those who survived were also chased and shot at by military planes, resulting in the deaths of nearly 40 children and over 170 civilians.
Despite international condemnation of this terrorist junta’s action, no meaningful action has been taken thus far, and there is still an irresponsibility in addressing the situation.
The main reason the junta can carry out daily airstrikes targeting civilians, as in the Pazigyi case, is due to the unhindered purchase of aviation fuel from the international community. Between February 2021 and December 2023, more than 1,650 airstrikes were carried out, resulting in the deaths of nearly 950 civilians, including many children.
On April 4th, 2024, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a resolution concerning Myanmar, urging member states to abstain from exporting, selling, or transferring jet fuel to the country. This marks the first time the UN has made such a call. The decision, which was delayed for more than three years, has resulted in an increase in the number of deaths and underscores the urgent need for truly effective measures and decisive action.
Singapore and Vietnam allow the use of their ports, while UN member states such as the USA, the UK, and the EU have the leverage to halt jet fuel access to the terrorist junta in Myanmar. However, they have not yet taken any effective measures, demonstrating irresponsibility. They continue to support and permit the junta to commit war crimes.
The USA, the UK, and the EU must sanction aviation fuel sales and shipment insurance. UN member states and their companies must immediately cease all exports, sales, or transfers of aviation fuel to the Myanmar junta.
As long as international governments do not take effective action to stop the junta’s access to aviation fuel, we, the Blood Money Campaign, will continue to campaign for the ban on jet fuel movement alongside local and international revolutionary organizations in solidarity..."
Source/publisher:
Blood Money Campaign
Date of publication:
2024-04-11
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
348.97 KB
more
Description:
"Chevron has finally divested from the Yadana project after two years of making empty promises to the public, following years of continuous financial support for the atrocities, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed by the military in Myanmar. The decision was prompted by pressure from civil society to halt all transactions with the brutal and illegal junta. Despite their prolonged assurances, Chevron’s actions, along with their empty promises, have contributed to the deaths of more than 4852 civilians and the destruction of over 76,923 homes in Myanmar.
After TotalEnergies’ departure from the project, Chevron’s stake in the Yadana project rose to 41.1%, and after its exit, the remaining shares have been redistributed among Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and PTTEP, a Thai majority state-owned enterprise. Although once the largest gas project in terms of production volume, the Yadana project’s output is steadily declining and is expected to conclude within a few years as per the contractual agreement. Plans to minimise negative environmental impacts in the project’s deommissioning imperative.
The Yadana project has been a significant source of revenue for the Myanmar junta and has made the investors complicit in indiscriminate airstrikes and other attacks against civilians. However, Chevron’s exit does not absolve it of its human rights responsibilities outlined in the OECD Guidelines and UN Guiding Principles. The transfer of Chevron’s shares to PTTEP and MOGE perpetuates the junta’s commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as the funds and resources remain in the hands of the terrorist junta.
Therefore, Chevron breached international laws, business and human rights principles over three years in Myanmar without taking immediate action seriously. Again, the recent divestment of Chevron must act responsibly as per all guidelines and principles. There are various actions and remedies for Myanmar people to be accountable for their support of the terrorist Min Aung Hlaing group’s atrocity crimes in Myanmar for over three years.
Meanwhile, PTTEP, as the primary investor and operator of the Yadana and Zawtika gas projects, holding a significant participating interest of 62.9630% in the Yadana project, continues to support the illegal junta. PTTEP must stop payments to the junta by withholding all funds in an escrow account. Shareholders of PTTEP also have a responsibility to engage with the company and ensure it stops its contributions to atrocities in Myanmar. Lastly, Thailand’s government also needs to take accountability to their majority state-owned enterprise, PTT and its subsidiary, PTTEP to follow all requirements of the UNGP and OECD guidelines in action as they promised in public. It will maintain their dignity, image and ethically responsible enterprise as the role model among the business entities.
The Blood Money Campaign urge the US, UK, Canada, and Australia to impose full sanctions on MOGE for directly funding the junta’s violence against Myanmar people. These governments must stop protecting MOGE and by extension, the terrorist junta..."
Source/publisher:
Blood Money Campaign
Date of publication:
2024-04-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
200.08 KB
more
Description:
"The recent events unfolding in Myanmar, particularly in the town of Myawaddy, adjacent to the Mae Sot District in Tak Province, Thailand, have raised significant concerns. Reports indicate that on April 7, 2024, the Karen National Union (KNU) and the People’s Defense Force (PDF) seized control of Myawaddy, including the capture of the Burmese Army’s tactical headquarters and the invasion of the area occupied by the 275th Battalion, the largest military base of the Burmese Army in Myawaddy town.
Furthermore, on the same day, reports emerged regarding the landing of a plane from the Burmese junta at Mae Sot International Airport. There has been speculation regarding the purpose of this flight, with some reports suggesting it may involve the transfer of weapons and military personnel from the Burmese army or the transfer of junta property from occupied territories.
In response to these developments, the Thai government held a press conference on April 8, 2024. Mr Thanawat Sirikul, Deputy Director-General of the Department of Information and Deputy Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the flight in question was for civilians, and subsequent flights have been cancelled.
Considering recent events concerning the situation in Myanmar and its implications for Thailand, Milk Tea Alliance Thailand issues the following demands to the Thai government:
Withhold the assistance provided to the Burmese Army: We call upon the Thai government to withhold all forms of assistance provided to the Burmese Army. Burmese Army is the active armed organisation in Myanmar that is conducting indiscriminate attacks on civilians and its infrastructure. Supporting the Junta in Myanmar will make Thailand complicit in their war crimes. Regarding the agreed military aid or humanitarian support, the nature and extent of such aid must be disclosed to the public.
Support for International Humanitarian Law: The Thai government must actively advocate for the Burmese military’s adherence to international humanitarian law, as outlined in the four Geneva Conventions. All parties involved in the conflict must uphold principles of humanitarian law, particularly in protecting civilians and respecting their rights.
Inclusive Peace Negotiations: We urge the Thai government to refrain from exclusively supporting peace negotiations that cater to the demands of the Burmese military. Instead, we advocate for inclusive dialogue that involves all stakeholders, including ethnic armed forces and the People’s Defense Force (PDF). These negotiations should be guided by principles of justice, accountability, and human rights, ensuring a sustainable and equitable resolution to the conflict.
Protection of Civilian Refugees: The Thai government has a moral obligation to assist civilian refugees fleeing conflict in Myanmar, according to human rights principles. Refugees must not be subjected to danger, refoulement, and exploitation, and adequate measures must be implemented to prevent any such occurrences. The Thai government must uphold its responsibility to protect vulnerable populations and provide them with the necessary support and care.
Milk Tea Alliance Thailand hopes that the Thai government will heed these demands to ensure that all civilians are treated with human rights and that the military, which is responsible for coups, genocides, and other crimes, must be held accountable and punished according to the law..."
Source/publisher:
Milk Tea Alliance Friends of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
255.59 KB 176.37 KB
more
Sub-title:
Statement on the Appointment of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations on Myanmar
Description:
"1. The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar welcomes the appointment of Ms. Julie Bishop as the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations on Myanmar.
2. We have full confidence that Ms. Bishop’s extensive experience and expertise in diplomatic acumen make her a great fit for this new position, and we would like to express our sincere hope that she will discharge her responsibilities with the utmost dedication and commitment and serve the best interests of the people of Myanmar in alignment with their desires and aspirations.
3. The National Unity Government stands to closely collaborate with the Special Envoy in our endeavor to establish a federal democratic union founded upon democratic principles and values, which is the shared goal of the Myanmar people.
4. Therefore, the National Unity Government urges the international community to provide assistance and support to the Special Envoy, enabling her to effectively fulfill her responsibilities for the betterment of the people of Myanmar.....ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်ခန့်အပ်မှုနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် Ms. Julie Bishop အား ကုလသမဂ္ဂအတွင်းရေးမှူး ချုပ်၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ် ခန့်အပ်လိုက်မှုအပေါ် ဝမ်းမြောက်စွာ ကြိုဆိုပါ သည်။
၂။ Ms. Bishop သည် ၎င်း၏ သံတမန်ရေးရာ အတွေ့အကြုံနှင့် ကျွမ်းကျင်မှုများအရ ဤရာထူး နေရာအတွက် အသင့်လျော်ဆုံး ဖြစ်မည်ဟု ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် အပြည့်အဝ ယုံကြည်ပြီး၊ မြန်မာ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက် ၎င်းတို့၏ဆန္ဒနှင့်အညီ လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များကို ထမ်းဆောင် သွားမည်ဟု မျှော်လင့်ပါသည်။
၃။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့်လည်း မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ တူညီသည့် ရည်မှန်း ချက်ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သည့် ဒီမိုကရေစီစံနှုန်းများနှင့် တန်ဘိုးများကိုအပေါ် အခြေခံသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးကို ဦးတည်ကာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်နှင့် နီးကပ်စွာ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ ထို့ကြောင့် နိုင်ငံတကာအနေဖြင့်လည်း ကုလသမဂ္ဂအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်၏ အထူးကိုယ်စား လှယ်အား ၎င်း၏လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များကို ထိရောက်အောင်မြင်စွာ ထမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် အဘက်ဘက်မှ ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီပေးကြပါရန် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက တိုက်တွန်း တောင်းဆို အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2024-04-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, National Unity Government (NUG), Human Rights and international relations
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
51.2 KB 60.46 KB
more
Description:
"Strengthen the political leadership to align with the evolutions of the revolution. To achieve policy balance, the National Unity Government (NUG) and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) will be reviewed and reformed, and a progress report will be submitted to the Third People’s Assembly.
The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC should engage with all revolutionary stakeholders as soon as possible to achieve a political pact.
In obtaining the common political pact, NUCC should initiate discussions with other political and revolutionary forces who are not yet part of NUCC.
To clearly discuss the Form of State.
To set fundamental policies for the emergance of new states including that of Bamar.
To develop directives and/or regulations to enhance communication and collaboration, check and balance between NUCC and NUG in accordance with the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC).
To strengthen accountability and improve engagement between the public and political leading institutions, such as NUCC and NUG, Town Hall Meetings, press conferences, and other public relations channels.
To avoid repeat of occurances such as violations provisions of the Federal Demoracy Charter (FDC) by the National Unity Government (NUG) by issuing the China Policy Statement, Joint Political Position Statement, and establishing the FSCC without consulting NUCC.
To ensure the National Unity Government (NUG) the political guidance and check and balance mechanism of the National Unity Consultative Council
(NUCC) by implementing the provisions stated in the Federal Democracy
Charter (FDC).
To continue the development of Rohingya Policy as soon as possible.
To lead the process of the National Apology by the National Unity Government (NUG) and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC towards the ethnic people regarding the suppressions including the Rohingya Genocide committed by past government
With the direct leadership of the President, to form a special commission on minority affairs, which will advocate for oppressed ethnic people, including Rohingya.
To take actions with a policy of zero-tolerance against sexual harassment, violence, rapes, child rape cases, and killings faced by women and LGBTIQ+ during the revolutionary period.
To bring justice for arbitrary arrests, torture, and killings against civilians during the revolutionary period.
To establish the federal human rights commission as soon as possible to seek accountability for human rights violations during the revolutionary period.
To take effective action on unlawful tax collection processes and set up a systematic process of tax collection in revolutionary force-controlled areas.
To identify the monitoring mechanism and financial supervision process on the fundraising and expenditures of the National Unity Government (NUG)
through audit and submitting the report to the people’s assembly.
To assure and protect access to education for all children and everyone during the revolutionary period without discrimination.
To protect and ensure equal access to healthcare services for all during the revolution.
To eliminate all discrimination against ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and disability with a zero-tolerance policy.
To amend or repeal laws that violate the values of human rights and women’s rights..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2024-04-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
551.45 KB
more
Description:
"In accordance with the provisions stated in the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC), the Second People’s Assembly was convened by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), lasting five days from April 4-9.
A total of (204) delegates, (104) special invitees, and (128) observers participated by representing the spring revilution forces, such as (a) elected parlimentarians including the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), (b) political parties, (c) spring reovlution forces, (d) ethnic resistance organizations, and (e) interim state/federal unit/ethnic councils. Among the participants, 64.9 percent were male, 34.3 percent were female, and the remaining 0.8 percent were others.
During the people assembly, participants and special invitees reviewed and offered recommendations on reports submitted by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), Joint Coordination Committees (JCCs), and ministries of National Unity Government (NUG).
The following three decisions were passed by the Second People’s Assembly among the recommendations and feedback provided by the representatives:-
(a) Local Governance and Rule of Law
To review and establish harmonize mechanisms among revolution forces, including the National Unity Government (NUG), to assure the responsibility and accountability of ground administration, defense, and security mechanisms (PaAhPha, PaKaPha, and PaLaPha) according to the Federal Democracy Charter.
(b) Illegitimate Conscription Law of Military Junta
To combat the illegal conscription law of military terrorist and its consequences by an effective strategic response through collaboration with people and revolutionary forces.
(c ) The issue of Myanmar Citizenship Law (1982)
The Second People’s Assembly determined that the Myanmar Citizenship Law (1982) would be abolished. It shall be implemented in accordancw tih Chapter (5) “Interim Legislature” provisions of the Federal Democracy Charter.
The remaining proposals are put on record for further discussion by respective political leading forces in accordance with the Federal Democracy Charter.
All the discussion points, feedback and recommendations of attended representatives were being documented in the Assembly, and respective political leading organizations will continue coordination in accordance with the Federal Democracy Charter.
The assembly agreed to hold the People’s Assembly every six months..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2024-04-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, National Unity Government (NUG)
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
608.83 KB 841.27 KB
more
Description:
"The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), Athan, RW Welfare Society, and Progressive Voice welcome the UN Human Rights Council’s resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar. While the adoption of the resolution by consensus represents an important step in further cementing the Myanmar military’s lack of legitimacy, the resolution falls short in key areas in addressing the ongoing atrocities and ensuring justice and accountability in Myanmar.
The resolution, adopted by consensus at the end of the 55th regular session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) on 4 April 2024, unequivocally condemns the military junta’s escalating violence against civilians and its increasing violations of international law, committed with blanket impunity. The HRC’s adoption of a new resolution on Myanmar deals a resounding blow to the illegal Myanmar military junta, putting on full display the world’s condemnation of its terror campaign against the people of Myanmar.
It leaves no doubt that the military junta has absolutely no international legitimacy and is the root cause of Myanmar’s intensifying human rights and humanitarian crisis.
The resolution maintains the ongoing crisis in Myanmar high on the Council’s agenda. It ensures that the Council is regularly informed of the developments in the country by the High Commissioner and the Special Rapporteur. In particular, its request that the High Commissioner report on “pathways to fulfil the people of Myanmar’s aspirations for human rights protection, accountability, democracy and a civilian government” is a welcome step. This presents a crucial opportunity for the UN system as a whole to truly demonstrate its respect for the wishes and efforts of Myanmar people to establish federal democracy, and ensure the protection of human rights, and justice and accountability.
Shortcomings in the Resolution
The resolution, however, falls dangerously short yet again in several key areas.
Transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment: While the resolution rightly recognizes the serious human rights and humanitarian implications of the junta’s atrocity crimes, in particular the increasing airstrikes facilitated by “sale, diversion and unregulated or illicit transfers of arms and jet fuel,” it fails to recognize the need for a comprehensive global arms embargo or sanctions on aviation fuel.
It merely calls on states to “cease the illicit transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment […] as well as to refrain from […] the export, sale or transfer of jet fuel, surveillance goods and technologies and less-lethal weapons.”
The failure to explicitly call for a comprehensive embargo on arms and sanctions on aviation fuel to Myanmar represents a failure by the Council to fully respect the overwhelming demands of Myanmar’s peoples to the international community, which is to neutralize the junta by ending its capacity to bomb civilian communities across the country.
The reality is that any transfer, sale, or diversion of arms, munitions, and other military equipment to the military junta likely amounts to aiding and abetting its commission of war crimes and other crimes under international law. This means that all sales, transfers, and diversions of arms, munitions and other military equipment to the Myanmar military are illicit, and therefore must stop immediately.
ASEAN: Of additional concern is the resolution’s expression of “full support for the central role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations” (ASEAN). ASEAN’s efforts over the past three years—including its so-called Five-Point Consensus (5PC) and attempts at “inclusive dialogue”—have been consistently ineffective and misguided. It has continually failed to recognize and address the Myanmar military as the root cause of the crisis, while neglecting the will, aspirations, efforts, and sacrifices of the Myanmar people to establish an inclusive, peaceful federal democratic Myanmar. Still today, ASEAN’s approach to addressing the crisis lacks the Myanmar people’s consent.
The people of Myanmar cannot afford to wait indefinitely for ASEAN to implement the 5PC. As primary stakeholders in the future of their own country, the people of Myanmar have a right to know about ASEAN’s plans. ASEAN and the UN are accountable to the people of Myanmar regarding matters of their own country.
Continuing to rely exclusively on ASEAN, despite the indisputable failure of its efforts over the past three years, will only prolong the junta’s escalating atrocities. This obliges the UN and the international community as a whole to end its ineffective reliance on ASEAN and to assume collective responsibility and leadership in addressing Myanmar’s crisis.
Calls to Action
Three years since the military’s attempted coup, the will of the Myanmar people remains strong, as their steadfast democratic resistance movement continues its tireless efforts to dismantle the military junta and build an inclusive federal democracy and sustainable peace from the ground up.
The Council must mobilize Member States to heed the unwavering calls of the people of Myanmar to fully ban the military junta’s access to arms and aviation fuel once and for all, and actualize justice and accountability through all possible avenues. There cannot be a true end to the human rights and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar unless and until the military is held accountable under international law. We call on the Council to urge UN Member States—particularly those of the Security Council—to refer the situation in Myanmar as a whole to the International Criminal Court under Article 14 of the Rome Statute..."
Source/publisher:
FORUM-ASIA, Athan, RW Welfare Society and Progressive Voice
Date of publication:
2024-04-08
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
129.32 KB
more
Sub-title:
ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ ၅၅ ကြိမ်မြောက် ညီလာခံ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီက ချမှတ်လိုက်သည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအခြေအနေဆိုင်ရာ သဘောတူဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် အပေါ် တုန့်ပြန်ချက်
Description:
"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, welcomes the Human Rights Council’s adoption by consensus of the resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar on 4 April 2024. Myanmar extends its deep appreciation to the European Union as penholder and to all cosponsors.
Myanmar also welcomes the resolution’s extension of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, and its call for a more active UN role in Myanmar including greater coherence and efficiency on the ground and continued action to hold the military accountable for its crimes.
Myanmar looks forward to contributing to the OHCHR report mandated by the Council. The High Commissioner has been asked to prepare a comprehensive report on ‘pathways to fulfil the aspirations of the people of Myanmar for human rights protection, accountability, democracy and a civilian government’. Myanmar remains firmly committed to securing accountability through international courts and national jurisdictions and to exploring fresh ways to deliver justice and reparations, including through the creation of a special tribunal.
Ministry of Human Rights
National Unity Government
ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ
၅၅ ကြိမ်မြောက် ညီလာခံ
လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီက ချမှတ်လိုက်သည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအခြေအနေဆိုင်ရာ သဘောတူဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် အပေါ် တုန့်ပြန်ချက်
===============================
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ
(၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၈ ရက်)
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက ကိုယ်စားပြုထားသည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတ မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံတော်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး အခြေအနေနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ လူ့အခွင့် အရေးကောင်စီက ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ ၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် တညီတညွတ်တည်း အတည်ပြု လိုက်သည့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အား ကြိုဆိုဂုဏ်ပြုပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတ မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံသည် ယခုဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို ဦးဆောင်ရေးဆွဲခဲ့သည့် ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂနှင့် ထောက်ခံ တင်သွင်းခဲ့ကြသောနိုင်ငံများကို လေးလေးနက်နက် ကျေးဇူးတင်ကြောင်း ပြောကြားလို ပါသည်။
ဤဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တွင် ယခင်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များထက် ပိုမိုခိုင်မာသည့် အချက်သစ်များ ပါဝင်ကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရသည်။ ၎င်းဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် အသစ်များထဲတွင် အရပ်သား ပြည်သူများ အပေါ် လေကြောင်း တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ ပိုမိုပြင်းထန်စွာ လုပ်ဆောင်နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စုထံ လေယာဉ်ဆီ တင်ပို့ခြင်း၊ ရောင်းချခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် လွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းတို့ကို ရှောင်ကြဉ်ရန် နိုင်ငံများအား တောင်းဆိုမှုပါဝင်ပါသည်။
ဤဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်သစ်တွင် ရိုဟင်ဂျာများ အပါအဝင် လူမျိုးစုနှင့် ဘာသာရေးလူနည်းစုများ အပေါ် ဆိုးရွားစွာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်နေခြင်း၊ မိုခါဆိုင်ကလုန်းမုန်တိုင်းအပြီး ရခိုင် ပြည်နယ်သို့ ပေးပို့ရမည့် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများအား ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ တားမြစ်ခြင်း၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ အမျိုးသားအမျိုးသမီး၊ လူငယ်များကို အတင်အဓမ္မ စစ်မှု ထမ်းရန် အပြင်းအထန် စီစဥ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်ပရောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများ အပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထား နှောင့်ယှက်နေခြင်း များကိုလည်း ရှုတ်ချထားပါသည်။
လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီက လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာမဟာမင်းကြီးအား “မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ပြည်သူများ၏ ရည်မှန်းချက်များ ဖြစ်သည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကို ကာကွယ်ပေးခြင်း၊ တာဝန်ခံမှု ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်း၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် အရပ်သားအစိုးရတရပ် ပေါ်ထွန်းရေး အတွက် လုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်း စသည့်နည်းလမ်းများကို ပြည်ပြည့်စုံစုံ အစီရင်ခံစာရေးဆွဲ တင်သွင်းရန်” တာဝန်အပ်နှင်းခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ မဟာမင်းကြီးရုံးအား ကောင်စီက တာဝန်ပေးအပ်ခဲ့သည့် ထိုအစီရင်ခံစာအတွက် ပူးပေါင်း လက်တွဲလုပ်ဆောင်ရန် အဆင်သင့်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ တရားရုံးများနှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်အဆင့် တရားစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်များ မှတစ်ဆင့် တာဝန်ခံမှု ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် အထူးခုံရုံးများ ဖွဲ့စည်းခြင်းအပါအဝင် တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် နစ်နာမှုများအားကုစားပေးခြင်းဆိုင်ရာ နည်းလမ်းသစ်များကို ရှာဖွေ ဖော်ထုတ်လုပ်ဆောင်သွားရန် ခိုင်မာစွာ ကတိပြုပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2024-04-08
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
166.96 KB 1007.23 KB
more
Description:
"ခိုင်မာစေလိုက်သည့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို အဖွဲ့၀င်နိုင်ငံများအနေနှင့် တိကျခိုင်မာသော ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်ဖြင့် မလွဲမသွေ ဆက်လက်ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည်။
မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်အား အောက်တွင်ဖတ်ရှုနိုင်ပါသည်။
5 April 2024: The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) welcomes the adoption of a strengthened United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. It is imperative that UN member States now respond to the gravity of the escalating crisis in Myanmar by taking concrete steps to end Myanmar military violence and hold military leaders accountable for their crimes.
The resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, which was adopted by consensus in Geneva on Thursday, 4 April 2024, calls for steps to be taken towards advancing accountability and cutting the Myanmar military’s supply of arms and jet fuel that enable it to perpetrate atrocities against civilians.
The resolution calls on all States to “to cease the illicit sale, transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment to Myanmar” and to “refrain […] from the export, sale or transfer of jet fuel.” The inclusion of jet fuel, as called for by Myanmar civil society and international non-governmental organisations, is a critical step towards cutting the military’s capacity to commit human rights atrocities through its use of devastating airstrikes.
Ending the supply of jet fuel is urgent, as the military escalates its indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilian targets in response to mounting losses on the ground to allied resistance forces. According to data compiled by Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica, the military carried out 750 airstrikes between 1 September and 31 December 2023, an average of at least six per day.
Furthermore, SAC-M emphasises that any transfer of arms, munitions and military equipment to the Myanmar military likely constitutes an act of aiding and abetting war crimes, which is a crime under international law. Therefore, all sale, transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment to the Myanmar military is illicit and, under the resolution, should cease.
The Myanmar military has ignored previous Human Rights Council resolutions on Myanmar by continuing to block the population’s access to vital humanitarian assistance. According to UN figures, 2.8 million people are internally displaced and 18.6 million people are in need of aid.
SAC-M calls on the international community to not fall into the ‘humanitarian trap’ of trying to secure a path forward towards a political solution through a notional humanitarian corridor, reducing the response to the whole Myanmar crisis into a purely humanitarian format. Instead, member States, donors and UN agencies must expand delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need through direct coordination with resistance authorities, including the National Unity Government and Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations, and broader civil society.
The new resolution also requests the UN Secretary-General to “call the continued attention of the Security Council to the situation in Myanmar”, which has failed to enforce its resolution 2669 on Myanmar since it was adopted in December 2022. The Secretary-General should advise the UN Security Council to impose a total embargo on the sale, transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment to the Myanmar military and to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.
The Security Council held an open briefing on the situation in Myanmar in New York on Thursday, hours after the Human Rights Council resolution was adopted. However, Myanmar’s permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, was prevented from speaking at the briefing. SAC-M considers this to set a dangerous precedent for the denial of speaking rights to a permanent representative of a concerned country.
Additionally, the Human Rights Council resolution calls on the High Commissioner for Human Rights to report to the Council “on pathways to fulfil the aspirations of the people of Myanmar for human rights protection, accountability, democracy and a civilian government.”
SAC-M urges the High Commissioner to use the report to consider ways in which the extensive evidence collected by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar can be put to use and the process of prosecuting the leaders of the military for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes can finally commence.
၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၅ ရက်။
ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအခြေအနေဆိုင်ရာနှင့် ပတ်သက်သည့်ပိုမိုခိုင်မာစေသော ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် တစ်ရပ် ချမှတ်ခြင်းအား SAC-M မှ လက်ခံကြိုဆိုလိုက်သည်။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ရဲ့ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအား ရပ်တန့်ရန် တိကျခိုင်မာသော ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများလုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်းနှင့်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများအတွက် တာဝန်ရှိကြောင်း သေချာစေခြင်းအားဖြင့်မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ပြင်းထန်နေသော အကျပ်အတည်း၏ ပမာဏထုထည်မှုကို ကုလအဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများမှ ယခုချက်ချင်း ကိုင်တွယ်ဖြေရှင်းတုံ့ပြန်ရန် မဖြစ်မနေအရေးကြီးသည်။
၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၄ ရက် ကြာသပတေးနေ့က ဂျီနီဗာတွင် အားလုံးသဘောတူညီမှုဖြင့် ချမှတ်ခဲ့သော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး အခြေအနေနှင့် ပတ်သက်သည့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်သည် တာဝန်ခံမှု မြှင့်တင်ရန် နှင့် အရပ်သားများအပေါ် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများ ကျူးလွန်ရန် အထောက်အကူပြုသည့် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ လက်နက်နှင့် လေယာဉ်လောင်စာများအား ဖြတ်တောက်ရန် လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များအား တောင်းဆိုထားသည်။
ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တွင် “မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့ လက်နက်၊ ခဲယမ်းမီးကျောက်များနှင့် စစ်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ တရားမ၀င် ရောင်းချခြင်း၊ လွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းနှင့် လွှဲအပ်ခြင်းတို့ကို ရပ်တန့်ရန်” အပြင် “လေယာဉ်ဆီ တင်ပို့ခြင်း၊ ရောင်းချခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် လွှဲအပ်ခြင်းမှ […] ရှောင်ကြဉ်ရန်” ဟူ၍ အဖွဲ့၀င်နိုင်ငံအားလုံးကို တောင်းဆိုထားသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အရပ်ဘက်လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အစိုးရမဟုတ်သော နိုင်ငံတကာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများက တောင်းဆိုထားသည့် လေယာဉ်ဆီ လောင်စာကိစ္စရပ်အား ထည့်သွင်းခြင်းသည် အပျက်အစီးပြင်းထန်သော လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများမှတဆင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိသည့် စစ်တပ်၏ အစွမ်းအစကို ဖြတ်တောက်စေရန်အတွက် အဓိကကျသော ခြေလှမ်းတစ်ခု ဖြစ်သည်။
မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် အရပ်သားပစ်မှတ်များကို ခွဲခြားခြင်းမရှိ ဝေဟင်မှ ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက်မှုကို တိုးမြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်နေပြီး ယင်းသည် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ မဟာမိတ်တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များထံ မြေပြင်တွင် တိုးပွားလာသော ရှုံးနိမ့်မှုများအတွက် ပြန်လည်တုံ့ပြန်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် လေယာဉ်ဆီ ထောက်ပံ့မှု ရပ်ဆိုင်းရေးသည် အရေးပေါ် ပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ဉာဏ်လင်းသစ် Analytica (Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica) မှ ပြုစုသော အချက်အလက်များအရ စစ်တပ်သည် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် စက်တင်ဘာ ၁ ရက်မှ ဒီဇင်ဘာ ၃၁ ရက်အတွင်း လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှု ၇၅၀ ကြိမ် ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပြီး တစ်ရက်လျှင် ပျမ်းမျှ အနည်းဆုံး ခြောက်ကြိမ်တိုက်ခိုက်သည်။
ထို့အပြင် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်အား လက်နက်၊ ခဲယမ်းမီးကျောက်များနှင့် စစ်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ လွှဲပြောင်းမှုမှန်သမျှသည် စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများကို အားပေးကူညီခြင်းဟူသော ကျူးလွန်မှုတစ်ခုဖြစ်ပြီး ယင်းသည်နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေအရ ရာဇ၀တ်မှုဟု သတ်မှတ်ထားသည်ဟု SAC-M မှ အလေးပေးထောက်ပြလိုသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် မြန်မာစစ်တပ် ထံ လက်နက်၊ ခဲယမ်းနှင့် အခြားစစ်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ ရောင်းချခြင်း၊ လွှဲပြောင်းခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် လွှဲအပ်ခြင်း မှန်သမျှသည် တရားမ၀င်ဖြစ်ပြီး ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်နှင့်အညီ ရပ်တန့်ရမည်။
မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏ ယခင်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များကို လျစ်လျူရှုထားပြီး မြန်မာလူထုအတွက် အရေးပါသော လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများ ရရှိခွင့်ကို ဆက်လက်ပိတ်ဆို့ထားသည်။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ၏ ကိန်းဂဏန်းများ အရ ၂.၈ သန်းသော ပြည်သူများသည် ပြည်တွင်းနေရပ်စွန့်ခွာတိမ်းရှောင်သူများ ဖြစ်ကြရ ပြီး ၁၈.၆ သန်းမှာ အကူအညီများ လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိသည်။
SAC-M မှ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းကို တောင်းဆိုလိုသည်မှာ စိတ်ကူးဆန်သော လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုစင်္ကြံမှတဆင့် နိုင်ငံရေးအဖြေတစ်ခုဆီသို့ ဦးတည်သွားမည့်လမ်းကြောင်းတစ်ခုကို အရယူရန် ကြိုးပမ်းမည် ဟူသည့် ‘လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုထောင်ချောက်’ ထဲသို့မကျရောက်ရန် ပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ယင်းထောင်ချောက်သည် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ ပုံစံအဆင့်သို့သာ ဖြစ်သွားစေပြီး မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံအကျပ်အတည်းတစ်ခုလုံးအပေါ် နိုင်ငံတကာ၏တုံ့ပြန်မှု လျော့ကျသွားစေမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ သို့ပါ၍ အဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများ၊ အလှူရှင်များနှင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအေဂျင်စီများသည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ NUG နှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား တော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ စသည့် တော်လှန်ရေး အာဏာပိုင်များ အပြင် အရပ်ဘက် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများစွာတို့နှင့် တိုက်ရိုက် ညှိနှိုင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် လိုအပ်သူများထံ လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများ ပေးအပ်ခြင်းကို တိုးချဲ့လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် လိုအပ်သည်။
ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အသစ်အရ “မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အခြေအနေအပေါ် လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ၏ ဆက်လက်အာရုံစိုက်စေရန် တောင်းဆိုခြင်း”ဟူသည့်အချက်အား ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အထွေထွေအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်ထံ ထပ်လောင်းတောင်းဆိုထားပြီး လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီသည် ယင်း၏မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် ၂၆၆၉ ကို ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ဒီဇင်ဘာလတွင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့ပြီးကတည်းက ယင်းအား လက်တွေ့သက်ရောက်မှုရှိစေရန် ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့သည်။ အထွေထွေအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်သည် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ထံ လက်နက်ရောင်းချမှု၊ လွှဲပြောင်းမှု၊ လမ်းကြောင်းလွှဲမှုအပေါ် လုံးဝပိတ်ဆို့အရေးယူမှုချမှတ်ရန် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီကို အကြံပြုသင့်ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအခြေအနေကို နိုင်ငံတကာ ရာဇ၀တ်မှုတရားရုံး (ICC) သို့ လွှဲပြောင်းပေးရန်လည်း ၎င်းက အကြံပြုသင့်သည်။
လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို အတည်ပြုပြီးနောက် နာရီပိုင်းအကြာတွင် လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအခြေအနေနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ကြာသပတေးနေ့တွင် နယူးယောက်၌ အဖွင့်ရှင်းလင်းပွဲ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ သို့သော်လည်း အစည်းအ၀ေးတွင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂဆိုင်ရာ မြန်မာအမြဲတမ်းကိုယ်စားလှယ် သံအမတ်ကြီးဦးကျော်မိုးထွန်း အား မပြောဆိုရန် တားမြစ်ခဲ့သည်။ သက်ဆိုင်ရာနိုင်ငံတစ်ခု၏ အမြဲတမ်းနေကိုယ်စားလှယ်တစ်ဦးမှ ပြောဆိုပိုင်ခွင့် ကို ပိတ်ပင်ခြင်းသည် အန္တရာယ်ရှိသော သာဓကတစ်ခုအဖြစ် SAC-M မှယူဆသည်။
ထို့အပြင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အရ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ မဟာမင်းကြီးရုံးအား ကောင်စီသို့ “လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကာကွယ်မှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှု၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် အရပ်သားအစိုးရတစ်ရပ် နှင့်စပ်လျဥ်းသည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ပြည်သူများ၏ ဆန္ဒများကို ဖြည့်ဆည်းပေးရေး လမ်းစဥ်”အပေါ် အစီရင်ခံရန် တောင်းဆိုထားသည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လွတ်လပ်သော စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှု ယန္တရား (IIMM) မှ စုဆောင်းရရှိထားသည့် ကျယ်ပြောများပြားလှသော သက်သေ အထောက်အထားများကိုအသုံးပြု၍ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများနှင့် စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများအတွက် စစ်ဘက်ခေါင်းဆောင်များကို တရားစွဲဆိုသည့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ကို စတင်ရန် နည်းလမ်းများထည့်သွင်းစဥ်းစားရေးအလို့ငှာ အစီရင်ခံစာကို အသုံးချရန် SAC-M မှ မဟာမင်းကြီးအား တိုက်တွန်းလိုပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-04-05
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Mar 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Shan State, Kayin State, Kachin State, Rakhine State, and Chin State from March 15th to 21st. The head of the Prison who works under the Military threatened and tortured the political prisoners at Daik-U Prison from the Bago Region, Insein Prison from Yangon Region, Gangaw Police Station from Magway Region, and Magway Prison. Military Junta and village administrators are forcing civilians of the full age to get Military Service, blackmailing, and arresting by using various ways.
Over 60 civilians died, and over 60 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 3 underaged children died, and 6 were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses. The military Junta forced Rohingyas to protest the Arakan Army-AA..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-03-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
377.42 KB 365.75 KB 2.58 MB
more
Description:
"ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ အနေဖြင့် တာဝန်ခံမှုအရှိန်မြှင့်ပြီး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ထူထောင်ရေးအတွက် မြန်မာလူထု၏
ကြိုးပမ်းမှုများကို ထောက်ခံအားပေးပါ။
မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်အား အောက်တွင်ဖတ်ရှုနိုင်ပါသည်။
15 March 2024: The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council must respond to the gravity of the escalating crisis in Myanmar. It must urgently provide effective support for the Myanmar people’s efforts to establish federal democracy, including by holding the military accountable, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
SAC-M team members Isabel Todd and Connor Macdonald travelled to Geneva this month to meet with UN officials, diplomats and members of Myanmar’s National Unity Government during the 55th Regular Session of the UN Human Rights Council. The Council is due to adopt a resolution on Myanmar at the end of the Session.
More than three years ago, in response to the military’s attempted coup, the Myanmar people launched a nationwide grassroots revolution to transition the country into a federal democracy. They are strengthening local revolutionary administrations and interim governance structures across the country. But the military continues to obstruct the Myanmar people’s democratic aspirations through the commission of gross human rights atrocities that amount to the most serious crimes under international law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Independent on-the-ground verification of reports of conflict-related fatalities is extremely challenging in the current Myanmar context. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), which aggregates conflict data from open-source material, at least 50,000 people have been killed in Myanmar since the launch of the military’s attempted coup in 2021, including at least 8,000 civilians. ACLED says these figures are conservative estimates. According to the UN, there are at least 2.7 million people displaced inside the country and 18.6 million people in need of aid, due to the military’s blockades on humanitarian assistance.
The military has escalated its use of violence against the population in recent weeks and months, signalling its determination to continue committing atrocities so long as it has the means to do so. The UN Human Rights Council has so far failed to respond in a manner proportionate to the gravity of the crisis. It has not acted to end the impunity that makes the atrocities possible, as many UN human rights mechanisms have stated.
SAC-M is calling on the members of the Human Rights Council to protect human rights in Myanmar far more effectively through the upcoming resolution. The Council should address accountability by identifying ways to utilise the extensive evidence collected by the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, including through the establishment of a special tribunal for Myanmar. It must call on UN member States to cease all transfers of arms and aviation fuel to the Myanmar military. It must demand that the Security Council impose compulsory arms and fuel embargoes and refer the entire Myanmar situation to the International Criminal Court for prosecutions.
Furthermore, the Human Rights Council should support the Myanmar people’s clearly expressed democratic will and aspirations by calling for strengthened international recognition of, and engagement with, the National Unity Government, National Unity Consultative Council, Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations and civil society, including on urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance.
The UN has failed the people of Myanmar to date. The Human Rights Council must lead the way in remedying that failure by taking concrete steps to end the military’s human rights violations and contribute to laying the foundations for a peaceful and just future for Myanmar.
၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ ၁၅ ရက်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် တစ်နေ့တစ်ခြား ဆိုးရွားပြင်းထန်လာနေသော ပဋိပက္ခ၏ အခြေအနေကို ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီက တုံ့ပြန်အရေးယူရမည်ဖြ်ပါသည်။ စစ်တပ်အား ၎င်းတို့ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သော ပြစ်မှု များကို တာဝန်ခံစေမှုအပါအဝင် ဖယ်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ် ထူထောင်ရန် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှုများကို ထိရောက်သော ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုများ စောလျင်စွာ ပေးအပ်ရမည်ဟု မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူး အကြံပေးကောင်စီ (SAC-M) မှ ပြောကြားလိုက်ပါသည်။
SAC-M အဖွဲ့မှ အဖွဲ့ဝင် Isabel Todd နှင့် Connor Macdonald တို့က လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏၅၅ ကြိမ်မြောက်၊ ပုံမှန်အစည်းအဝေးတွင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂမှ တာဝန်ရှိသူများ၊ သံတမန်များ၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရအဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံရန် ယခုလအတွင်း ဂျီနီဗာသို့ သွားရောက်ခဲ့သည်။ ကောင်စီသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တစ်ရပ်ကို အစည်းအဝေးအပြီးတွင် ချမှတ်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သည့် သုံးနှစ်ကျော်ကာလအတွင်း စစ်တပ်၏ အာဏာသိမ်းရန် ကြိုးပမ်းမှုကို တုံ့ပြန်သည့်အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူ များက တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးအနှံ့ အောက်ခြေလူထုတော်လှန်ရေးမှသည် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသို့ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းလိုသည့် တော်လှန်ရေးကို ဆင်နွှဲခဲ့ကြသည်။ ၎င်းတို့သည် နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းရှိ ခုံတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များ၏ ဒေသန္တရအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးနှင့် ကြားဖြတ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဖွဲ့စည်းပုံများကို အားကောင်းလာအောင် လုပ်ဆောင်နေကြသည်။ သို့ရာတွင် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ အပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေအရ အဆိုးရွားဆုံးသော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများဖြစ်သည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာမှု အဖုံဖုံကို စစ်တပ်က ကျူးလွန်နေပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီ မျှော်မှန်းချက်များကို ဆက်လက်တားဆီး ပိတ်ပင်နေဆဲပင်ဖြစ်သည်။
ပဋိပက္ခနှင့်ဆက်နွယ်သော ထိခိုက်သေဆုံးမှုအစီရင်ခံစာများကို ပကတိ အခြေအနေမှန်အတိုင်း စိစစ်အတည်ပြုခြင်းသည် လက်ရှိမြန်မာနိုင်ငံအခင်းအကျင်းတွင် လွန်စွာခက်ခဲသော စိန်ခေါ်မှုဖြစ်နေဆဲပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ အများပြည်သူလက်လှမ်းမီနိုင်သော သတင်းအချက်အလက်များမှ ပဋိပက္ခဆိုင်ရာ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို စုစည်းနေသော ACLED အဖွဲ့ ၏ မှတ်တမ်းများအရ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် စစ်တပ်မှ အာဏာသိမ်းမှု ကြိုးစားချိန်မှ စတင်၍ အရပ်သား ၈၀၀၀ အပါအဝင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အနည်းဆုံး လူ ၅၀,၀၀၀ ထက်မနည်း သေဆုံးခဲ့သည်။ ACLED က ယင်းအချက်အလက်များက အနိမ့်ဆုံး ခန့်မှန်းထားသော
အချက်အလက်များဖြစ်သည်ဟု ပြောဆိုထားပါသည်။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ၏ အချက်အလက်အရ နိုင်ငံအတွင်း အနည်းဆုံး လူဦးရေ ၂.၇ သန်းခန့်သည် အိုးမဲ့အိမ်မဲ့ဖြစ်နေပြီး လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီပေးရေးတွင် စစ်တပ်၏ ပိတ်ဆို့ကန့်သတ်ချက်များကြောင့် အကူအညီလိုအပ်နေသူ ၁၈.၆ သန်းခန့်ရှိနေသည်။
စစ်တပ်သည် မကြာသေးမီ ရက်သတ္တပတ်များနှင့် လများအတွင်း လူထုအပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုကို ပိုမိုကျူးလွန်လာခဲ့ပြီး ၎င်းတို့အခွင့်အရေးရသမျှကာလပတ်လုံး ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာမှုများကို ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်ရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ချထားကြောင်း သိသာထင်ရှားနေပါသည်။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီသည် ပဋိပက္ခ၏ အခြေအနေကို သင့်လျော်သလို တုံ့ပြန်ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် ပျက်ကွက် နေဆဲပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီသည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးယန္တရားအများအပြားက ဖော်ပြထားပြီးသည့်အတိုင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း ဆိုးရွားစွာအကြမ်းဖတ်မှုများကို ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေသည့်အချက်ဖြစ်သည့် စစ်တပ်အပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူခံရခြင်းမှ ကင်းလွတ်နေမှုကို ရပ်တန့်စေရန်လည်း မဆောင်ရွက်ပေးသေးချေ။
ယခုချမှတ်မည့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးများကို ပိုမိုထိရောက်စွာကာကွယ် ပေးနိုင်ရန်အတွက် SAC-M က လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များအား တောင်းဆိုသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးခုံရုံးတည်ထောင်ခြင်း အပါအဝင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လွတ်လပ်သော စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုယန္တရားမှ စုဆောင်းရရှိထားသော အထောက်အထားများအားလုံးကို အသုံးချမည့် နည်းလမ်းများကို သတ်မှတ်ဖော်ထုတ်ခြင်းဖြင့် တာဝန်ခံစေမှုရှိစေရန် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီက ကိုင်တွယ်ဖြေရှင်းရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ထံသို့ လက်နက်နှင့် လေယာဉ်ဆီတင်ပို့မှုများအားလုံးကို ရပ်ဆိုင်းရန် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများအား တောင်းဆိုရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ လက်နက်များနှင့် လောင်စာဆီတင်သွင်းမှုကို မဖြစ်မနေ တရားဝင် ပိတ်ပင်တားဆီးကန့်သတ်ရန်နှင့် တရားစွဲဆိုရန်အတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီသည် လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီအား နိုင်ငံတကာရာဇဝတ်ခုံရုံးသို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အခြေအနေအရပ်ရပ်အား လွှဲပြောင်းပေးအပ်ရန် တောင်းဆိုရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ထို့အပြင် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုအကူအညီအား အရေးပေါ်ပေးအပ်ခြင်းအပါအဝင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား နိုင်ငံတကာမှ အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှုနှင့် စေ့စပ်ညှိနှိုင်းဆွေးနွေးမှုများ ခိုင်မာအားကောင်းစေရန် တောင်းဆိုခြင်းဖြင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီက မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ရှင်းလင်းပြတ်သားနေသည့် ဒီမိုကရေစီလိုလားတောင့်တမှုနှင့် ပြင်းပြသော ဆန္ဒသဘောထား တို့အား ပံ့ပိုးကူညီသင့်ပါသည်။
ကုလသမဂ္ဂအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများအတွက် ကူညီပံ့ပိုးရန် ယနေ့အထိ တိုင်အောင် ပျက်ကွက်နေဆဲပင် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါ ပျက်ကွက်မှုများကို ကုစားပေးဖို့ အတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် စစ်တပ်၏ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို အဆုံးသတ်ကာ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းပြီး တရားမျှတသော အနာဂတ် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဖြစ်လာစေရန် အခြေခံအုတ်မြစ်ကောင်းများချမှတ်ရာတွင် အားပေးကူညီသည့်အနေဖြင့် တိကျသောခြေလှမ်းများကို လျှောက်လှမ်းပြခြင်းဖြင့် ဦးဆောင်ဦးရွက်ပြုပေးသင့်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-03-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"A deadly stampede outside a passport office that took two lives and unending lines outside embassies - these are just some examples of what has been happening in Myanmar since the announcement of mandatory conscription into the military.
Myanmar's military government is facing increasingly effective opposition to its rule and has lost large areas of the country to armed resistance groups.
On 1 February 2021, the military seized power in a coup, jailing elected leaders and plunging much of the country into a bloody civil war that continues today.
Thousands have been killed and the UN estimates that around 2.6 million people been displaced.
Young Burmese, many of whom have played a leading role protesting and resisting the junta, are now told they will have to fight for the regime.
Many believe that this is a result of the setbacks suffered by the military in recent months, with anti-government groups uniting to defeat them in some key areas.
"It is nonsense to have to serve in the military at this time, because we are not fighting foreign invaders. We are fighting each other. If we serve in the military, we will be contributing to their atrocities," Robert, a 24-year-old activist, told the BBC.
Many of them are seeking to leave the country instead.
"I arrived at 03:30 [20:30 GMT] and there were already about 40 people queuing for the tokens to apply for their visa," recalled a teenage girl who was part of a massive crowd outside the Thai embassy in Yangon earlier in February. Within an hour, the crowd in front of the embassy expanded to more than 300 people, she claims.
"I was scared that if I waited any longer, the embassy would suspend the processing of visas amid the chaos," she told the BBC, adding that some people had to wait for three days before even getting a queue number.
In Mandalay, where the two deaths occurred outside the passport office, the BBC was told that there were also serious injuries - one person broke their leg after falling into a drain while another broke their teeth. Six others reported breathing difficulties.
Justine Chambers, a Myanmar researcher at the Danish Institute of International Studies, says mandatory conscription is a way of removing young civilians leading the revolution.
"We can analyse how the conscription law is a sign of the Myanmar military's weakness, but it is ultimately aimed at destroying lives... Some will manage to escape, but many will become human shields against their compatriots," she said.
Myanmar's conscription law was first introduced in 2010 but had not been enforced until on 10 February the junta said it would mandate at least two years of military service for all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27.
Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun, the spokesperson for the military government, said in a statement that about a quarter of the country's 56 million population were eligible for military service under the law.
The regime later said it did not plan to include women in the conscript pool "at present" but did not specify what that meant.
The government spokesperson told BBC Burmese that call-ups would start after the Thingyan festival marking the Burmese New Year in mid-April, with an initial batch of 5,000 recruits.
The regime's announcement has dealt yet another blow to Myanmar's young people.
Many had their education disrupted by the coup, which came on top of school closures at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic.
In 2021, the junta suspended 145,000 teachers and university staff over their support for the opposition, according to the Myanmar Teachers' Federation, and some schools in opposition-held areas have been destroyed by the fighting or by air strikes.
Then there are those who have fled across borders seeking refuge, among them young people looking for jobs to support their families.
Young Burmese confront dashed dreams in exile
Why India wants to fence its troubled Myanmar border
In response to the conscription law, some have said on social media that they would enter the monkhood or get married early to dodge military service.
The junta says permanent exemptions will be given to members of religious orders, married women, people with disabilities, those assessed to be unfit for military service and "those who are exempted by the conscription board". For everyone else, evading conscription is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine.
But Robert doubts the regime will honour these exemptions. "The junta can arrest and abduct anyone they want. There is no rule of law and they do not have to be accountable to anyone," he said.
Wealthier families are considering moving their families abroad - Thailand and Singapore being popular options, but some are even looking as far afield as Iceland - with the hope that their children would get permanent residency or citizenship there by the time they are of conscription age.
Others have instead joined the resistance forces, said Aung Sett, from the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, which has a long history of fighting military rule.
"When I heard the news that I would have to serve in the military, I felt really disappointed and at the same time devastated for the people, especially for those who are young like me. Many young people have now registered themselves to fight against the junta," the 23-year-old told the BBC from exile.
Some observers say the enforcement of the law now reveals the junta's diminishing grip on the country.
Last October, the regime suffered its most serious setback since the coup. An alliance of ethnic insurgents overran dozens of military outposts along the border with India and China. It has also lost large areas of territory to insurgents along the Bangladesh and Indian borders.
According to the National Unity Government, which calls itself Myanmar's government in exile, more than 60% of Myanmar's territory is now under the control of resistance forces.
"By initiating forced conscription following a series of devastating and humiliating defeats to ethnic armed organisations, the military is publicly demonstrating just how desperate it has become," said Jason Tower, country director for the Burma programme at the United States' Institute of Peace.
A turning point in Myanmar as army suffers big losses
Who are the rulers who executed Myanmar activists?
Mr Tower expects the move to fail because of growing resentment against the junta.
"Many youth dodging conscription will have no choice but to escape into neighbouring countries, intensifying regional humanitarian and refugee crises. This could result in frustration growing in Thailand, India, China and Bangladesh, all of which could tilt away from what remains of their support for the junta," he said.
Even if the military does manage to increase troop numbers by force, this will do little to address collapsing morale in the ranks. It will also take months to train up the new troops, he said.
The junta had a long history of "forced recruitment" even before the law was enacted, said Ye Myo Hein, a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
"So the law may merely serve as a facade for forcibly conscripting new recruits into the military. With a severe shortage of manpower, there is no time to wait for the lengthy and gradual process of recruiting new soldiers, prompting [officials] to exploit the law to swiftly coerce people into service," he said.
Even for those who will manage to escape, many will carry injuries and emotional pain for the rest of their lives.
"It has been really difficult for young people in Myanmar, both physically and mentally. We've lost our dreams, our hopes and our youth. It just can't be the same like before," said Aung Sett, the student leader.
"These three years have gone away like nothing. We've lost our friends and colleagues during the fight against the junta and many families have lost their loved ones. It has been a nightmare for this country. We are witnessing the atrocities committed by the junta on a daily basis. I just can't express it in words."..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of publication:
2024-02-27
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Other laws impacting on civil and political rights
Language:
more
Sub-title:
In Part 2 of a 2-part series, Bobby Anderson considers the strengths and weaknesses of Myanmar’s military and its chances of collapse.
Description:
"The Resistance
Let’s start with the difference between an Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) and a People’s Defense Force (PDF). Put simply and broadly, a PDF does not seek autonomy within the State, while autonomy within a federal state (but no longer succession) is a key demand of most EAOs.[1] PDFs were created in response to the 2021 coup, while EAOs uniformly pre-dated it. Some but not all PDFs are connected to the NUG, although the term PDF also includes Local Defense Forces (LDFs), which are autonomous.
Taking PDFs and EAOs as a whole, Andrew Selth estimates ‘up to 250 loosely organised local defence groups, urban resistance cells and EAOs… there could be about 25,000 active members of the various militias and resistance groups, and a further 30,000-35,000 in the relevant EAOs.’ This and other claims arrive with the caveat that no one has an accurate macro-level tally: local organizations are the only ones likely to have accurate estimates, but those too would be limited and area-specific data, which is constantly shifting. Therefore, any tally is out-of-date soon after it occurs.
Ethnic Armed Organizations
Regarding EAOs, in 2018, I wrote about the failure of the deposed civilian government’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, and that relates to Selth’s key use of the word relevant. His count of 30,000-35,000 EAO troops discounts EAOs not currently at war with the junta, most through ceasefires – a situation that predates the current junta’s seizure of power. Let’s briefly consider EAO numbers as a whole, because those with ceasefires still represent potential combatants. The sit-tat’s aforementioned manner of signing and breaking ceasefires is a deadly game, and EAO’s with current ceasefires know that they are not durable. Estimates of pre- and post-coup EAO numbers (i.e. not PDFs) are represented in the table below:
* includes reserves.
** indicates no known or significant change from pre-coup numbers
Since the coup, we can only note that EAO numbers have increased. If Ye Myo Hein’s estimates are correct, there is at least a parity between EAO numbers overall and the sit-tat’s human resource capacity. Prior to the October 27 offensive, the disorganization of the resistance was what in part held back faster territorial acquisition and greater sit-tat attrition. The sit-tat, in many ways inept, at least acknowledges the stark fact that it can’t fight the strongest EAOs, and so it continued to play the aforementioned game of musical chair ceasefires. The momentum building against the sit-tat makes this option less attractive for EAOs.
Back to Selth’s ‘relevant,’ select EAOs falling under the China-backed Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee (FPNCC), deserve particular mention. The FPNCC is a negotiating block created and led by the United Wa State Party (UWSP), which formed out of the remnants of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989. The UWSP for its part has been built by China into the largest, best armed, and most cohesive EAO in the country, and perhaps after the now-defunct Wagner Group and the thoroughly desiccated Islamic State, is now the largest non-state armed group on the Asian continent.
The Three Brotherhood’s AA, MNDAA, and TNLA are under the FPNCC umbrella, as are the National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla), and the Shan State Army North (linked to the Shan State Progress Party). Unlike many an EAO alliance, the FPNCC proved more durable, and at present it contains the absolute majority of EAO fighters countrywide.
The Chin National Front’s (CNF) armed forces are allied with several newly formed Chinland Defense Forces – which are PDF groups based in Chin State. Their exponential post-coup growth is noteworthy and harken back to the CNF’s bloody and unexpected arrival on the resistance scene in the mid-1990s after they were trained and armed by the KIA.
An outlier in the EAO continuum is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Other Rohingya groups, such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, and other EAOs, regard it as a terrorist organization, with links to other Jihadist groups worldwide, although ARSA denies this. ARSA have also been implicated in massacres in Rakhine. They are mostly involved in intra-Rohingya political struggles in the refugee camps in Bangladesh and are more actively engaged in killing Rohingya alternates to their authority there, and occasional Bangladeshi security officials, than killing sit-tat in Rakhine. Rohingya people, as far as the author is aware, have no representation in PDFs, nor are they part of any resistance not wholly concerned with their own specific ethno-religious-territorial concerns. This is despite some outreach on the part of NUG to build bridges with Rohingya, firstly by actually using the word ‘Rohingya’, in contrast to Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, who only referred to them as Bengalis in order to cement the claim that they were recent migrants from Bangladesh. NUG has since acknowledged the violence they were subjected to by the sit-tat, but has hardly acknowledged the structural violence adhered to by the NLD against them. And so NUG’s claims – that it would provide justice, repatriation, and reparation for Rohingya – are yet to be tested.
People’s Defense Forces
The most recent PDFs in Myanmar began forming and arming immediately after the 2021 Military coup. However, they have a long and potted history in Myanmar, explained by Jasnea Sarma at the University of Zurich as follows:
In the past too there used to be such groups. They went by different names like Swan Ar Shin စွမ်းအားရှင်, ပြည်သူ့တဝန် or civilian task force, ရွာတာဝန်ပြည်သူ့စွမ်းအားရှင် or village task force etc) . These groups were driven by self-defence and formed often as a response to circumstance, namely local protection from threats. The post-coup PDFs, often referred to as ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် or ပြည်သူ့တပ်မတော်, are a direct response to the coup, all fighting the sit tat, but they do mimic the workings of these older groups. This explains in-part why it’s difficult to clearly understand which PDF is aligned with which group. They are not necessarily always linked to previously elected representatives, although many are. Not all PDFs are tied to NUG. Many are now allied with EAOs, some are standalone, with occasional alliances of convenience. There are many composed mainly of armed university students assisted by EAOs. Some also have church affiliations. What’s important is that they have arms and can maintain a defensive posture and have been extremely important and effective after the 2021 coup. History tells us that if anything, they will keep forming in (and around) Burma, adapting to the needs.
Jasnea Sarma
PDFs have been able to mount effective resistance across Bamar areas and have been able to recruit a significant number of fighters, including former soldiers and police officers; as mentioned, many Bamar youth in Sagaing and Magwe who might have joined the sit-tat are in PDFs instead. They have also received weapons from abroad, although most of their firearms originate from actions against the sit-tat or from select EAOs. Local manufacture of firearms also occurs, but the artisanal nature of these operations not only limits their impact, but poses danger to both manufacturer and shooter. Civilian drone conversion is another factor. Regarding numbers, NUG claims 50-100,000 fighters in 259 trained PDF battalions and 401 LDFs. The formal size of a PDF battalion is 200 personnel, but some are up to 500. Hein estimates that PDF personnel numbered 40,000 as of February 2022, with no less than 30,000 LDF personnel. These PDFs are concentrated in the Anyar theatre of Sagaing, Magwe, and Mandalay, where there are at least 15,000 PDF and 20,000 LDF combatants.
As of November 2022, independent observers speaking with Ye Myo Hein estimated that 30 percent of PDFs/LDFs fell under the command of NUG, 40 percent had some links to NUG, while 30 percent were wholly independent. At the local level, it’s likely that all PDFs have more authority than local NUG representation. They’re armed, after all. However, some PDFs are under the control of NUG (which raised $44 million for its defense ministry alone in its first 14 months), with a clearer integration between the two, rather than the diffuse and grassroots nature of many other PDFs which resemble the franchise nature of many an insurgency.
However, the PDFs face deep challenges, including a lack of coordinated leadership, limited support from the international community, and even the populations of some areas they control, due to the predatory behavior of select groups. Limited resources are worth highlighting: Min Zaw Oo from the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security estimated to Deutsche Welle that at the beginning of 2022, only 10 percent of PDFs had automatic weapons, although they are now generally better armed. Despite this, we have evidence of local support, of retention in numbers, of the capacity of fighters, all found in the sit-tat body count the PDFs are responsible for.
Overall, the balance of personnel favors the armed resistance.
Credibility Issues
The support EAOs might give to PDFs in particular and the NUG in general is constrained by the lack of credibility the deposed civilian government had with some EAOs. AA chief General Twan Mrat Naing summarized it well: “the NLD government after 1988 promised federalism and they pledged this to the ethnic people, but after they came to power, they didn’t keep the promise. So we have learned the lesson and we are not naive anymore.” The past relationships of many EAOs with the deposed civilian government surely shapes EAO relations with the NUG and PDFs and this issue will come to the forefront in any NUG-EAO victory. Promises of federalism will not be taken at face value.
International Support for the Sit-tat
Since the coup, elements of the “international community” have imposed sanctions on the sit-tat and affiliated individuals. The countries and institutions most in support of NUG are peripheral in comparison to the countries which maintain pragmatic relations with the sit-tat. Who cares about Switzerland when you’ve got China? While, as mentioned, sanctions may bite because of the predominance of the US dollar, this is not an insurmountable issue for either the junta or allies who seek alternates to said dollar.
China and Russia protect the sit-tat from United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) resolutions, and both can offer the veil of legitimacy to any staged elections. India and other Myanmar neighbors must keep their options open with a state they must trade with and absorb refugees from.
China
In 2004 the sit-tat began reaching out to “the west”, which was seen as a hedge against China’s hegemony in the region. The situation is now an inverse of the one which led to the removal of Khin Nyunt and his China clique two decades ago. China’s support is crucial to the sit-tat’s survival. However, China’s nuanced approach to the Three Brotherhood Alliance reflects both a loss of patience and a hedging of bets.
Since the February 2021 coup, China has justified engagement with the sit-tat to both support stability and ensure bilateral relations, although a recent USIP report showed how, with regard to stability, the opposite is occurring, with negative implications for China. China also cites principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Implicitly, Myanmar is firmly within China’s sphere of influence. The notion of a ‘sphere of influence’ was once imagined to be terminally ill by liberal internationalists, but it is both healthy and real, and extends to China’s drug control policy as well as its vaunted Belt and Road Initiative, which binds Myanmar and her eastern neighbors to China, economically and infrastructurally. The bond already exists culturally, in Yunnan in particular.
China is Myanmar’s predominant economic partner, much to India’s consternation (see below), and has invested heavily in Myanmar’s energy sector, infrastructure development, and natural resource extraction, providing a much-needed source of economic support for the country, both under the civilian government and the latest junta. Myanmar, however, has a considerable amount of authority in the relationship. Key Chinese investments include the Kyaukphyu deep sea port, power plant, and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which will connect Kyaukphyu and Yunnan via pipeline and reduce China’s reliance on fuel shipments through the Straits of Malacca; the Mee Lin Gyaing natural gas power plant in Ayeyarwady; and numerous others. This is imperial thinking of a scale not comprehensible to many a government, especially ones who only see foreign relations through the prism of their own domestic elections, and still others who automatically discount the effectiveness of state-controlled enterprises in favor of the sacraments of a ‘free market’.
This relationship has not always been so smooth. Myanmar and China cooperated in the subjugation of Chinese Nationalist Guomindang (GMD) forces which had fled Yunnan and established themselves in Shan in the late 1940s, with a delusion that they would one day re-invade with the support of the CIA. Those wash-outs were a theoretical threat to the China’s ruling communists, entirely overblown. The dregs of the GMD in Shan, unlike the sit-tat, was an institution entirely hollowed out by corruption, and was generally only interested in making money. China-Myanmar cooperation was, at the time, an aberration. During the Cold War, Myanmar considered China both rival and threat. After the dictator Ne Win’s expulsion of large numbers of ethnic Chinese in the late 1960s, China increased support to Communist Party of Buma (CPB) forces in Bago Yoma, just north of Yangon, while Red Guard ‘volunteers’ supporting the CPB invaded Northern Shan in 1968. Reconciliation began after the death of Mao and Deng Xiaoping’s emergence as China’s paramount leader in the late 1970s. The CPB’s vocal support for the ’Gang of Four’, a faction of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials whom Deng had purged, led Deng’s support to the CPB to decline. The removal of the sit-tat’s ‘China clique’ in 2004 did not end Chinese overtures and investments, although the derailing of the Myitsone dam project in 2011 was a further hiccup in the relationship. Since the coup, China has not only blocked efforts to impose sanctions on Myanmar but has increased its own investments.
Even before the recent offensive, China hedged its bets vis a vis the sit-tat, and the civilian government they deposed, with EAOs, though the FPNCC; a coalition of EAOs that were by and large excluded from peace process before the coup. China’s facilitation with these EAOs led to ceasefires which allowed the overextended sit-tat to reallocate overextended forces elsewhere. China also froze out the western powers that sought to engage FPNCC, leaving those westerners – “conflict” and “peacebuilding” experts and the like – to content themselves with NCA signatories, the KNU and NMSP especially. China’s relations with FPNCC members continued after the latest offensive; indeed, it is likely that the Three Brotherhood Alliance alerted China of its intentions in advance. China’s continued subtle approach toward both the sit-tat and the alliance reflects their stated policy of non-interference, but it also likely reflects a loss of patience in the sit-tat’s sheltering of the operations of ethnic Chinese criminal gangs in Shan and elsewhere. The October 27 Offensive has resulted in the capture and extradition of numerous of these criminals to China, and China has also mediated temporary ceasefires between the warring parties which will likely peter out soon due to the sit-tat’s incorrigible belief in its own battlefield genius, despite all evidence to the contrary.
China also extends the occasional fig leaf to NUG, while explicitly stating their displeasure at the NUG’s continued relations with Western powers. This seems mostly for show. NUG, for its part, has issued a policy paper on China which includes support for the ‘One China’ policy. If NUG were to emerge victorious in the struggle against the sit-tat, China would find itself temporarily sidelined, because despite its insistence on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, its dealings with the current sit-tat is implicitly a bet on its success. However, this sidelining would be temporary. China simply has too much authority—economic, political, and otherwise.
Russia
The sit-tat hedges its China bets with Russia. During the Cold War, Myanmar was closely aligned with the Soviet Union—the USSR even built the Inya Lake Hotel following Nikita Khrushchev’s 1958 visit—and Russia retains much of that goodwill. This remains, however, a relationship of convenience: the sit-tat needs arms, and Russia needs cash. Russia is currently the sit-tat’s largest arms supplier, and this includes artillery and fighter jets. This cooperation extends to tourism, trade, and nuclear energy. Russia also blocks UNSC attempts to sanction the sit-tat. Russia’s support to development of nuclear energy in Myanmar is of particular note: the sit-tat claims that such development is peaceful. However, surely Min Aung Hlaing is following the example of Kim Jong Un and the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK), just as Kim learned from what happened to Moammar Qaddafi in Libya. Weapons of mass destruction are protective amulets westerners also believe in.
India
India’s position toward the sit-tat and the February 2021 coup has been aptly described as ‘fractured between words and deeds’ – sweet diplomatic words about upkeeping democracy, and deeds reflecting an extremely short-sighted military, political, and economic support for the junta, as well as a reluctance to understand the important role of other resistance actors. India tries to maintain a positive relationship with whoever happens to be running Myanmar, and the reason is a) China, and b) security in Northeastern India, including counterinsurgency along the long and porous border with Myanmar. This border security also involves China, which regards Northeastern India’s Arunachal Pradesh as part of Tibet. India’s current policy dates back to at least 1988. Like China, India justifies this engagement with the principle of non-interference and the need for stability. During the brief democratic transition, it maintained a balance in its relations with the sit-tat and the civilian government, with the aim of promoting its strategic interests in the region, including security, energy, and connectivity. India has reverted to its pre-democratic stance, maintaining positive relations with the current junta to the extent that the Modi government has downplayed junta bombs erroneously falling into Indian territory and return soldiers safely back to Myanmar who escape to safe Indian army/paramilitary controlled areas. Myanmar is an important partner for India’s ‘Act East’ policy, which aims to deepen India’s ties with Southeast Asia and strengthen its position as a regional power. It is seen as key to India’s energy security, with several major projects underway, including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project which connects Sittwe and NE India, and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway; India’s answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The sit-tat’s attitude toward India is more transactional. They look the other way while Indian Naga, Meitei, Mizo and other insurgents to use Myanmar as a base. The sit-tat likely see the presence of these foreign insurgents as useful bargaining chips in any negotations with Indian authorities. The insurgents pay for the privilege in the form of protection fees, and they purchase weapons and supplies from local sit-tat as well.[15]
Other neighbors are less, but still, important: Thailand has maintained a pragmatic relationship with the powers that be in Myanmar since the departure of the Raj. Bangladesh, despite the burden of the expelled Rohingya, and delays to their repatriation, does likewise. Near neighbors have had to be more serious than the utopian foreign policies of distant states.
Short-term predictions
Who’d have known? That three years on this fight would continue. That the Bamars would lead it. That some EAOs would finally, meaningfully, join forces, not only with one another, but with PDFs. That the sit-tat would shrink in the face of it.
What we’ve learned firstly is that the sit-tat is an ineffective and inefficient war-making enterprise. They draw from the same limited toolbox across juntas and acronyms; they don’t seem to have any new ideas, other than conscription. And so, while they won’t likely collapse anytime soon, they will continue to weaken and bleed. We will see more defections, more forced conscription, and ever less enthusiasm for the fight. We may even see foreign support for the sit-tat in the form of foreign fighters, namely Russian military, although the parameters of this limit the extent of it: firstly, sit-tat ego needs to be overcome; second, China needs to approve. Such foreigners would be labelled ‘advisors’, and the resistance would have no small fun in killing them.
The sit-tat’s brutality will increase within an ever-shrinking space. We can anticipate a further revamping of the sit-tat’s ‘Four Cuts’ (လေးဖြတ် ဗျူဟာမှာ/ ဖြတ်လေးဖြတ်) counterinsurgency strategy, first used in the 1960s in the Bago Yoma – an area that remains depopulated to the present day. Four Cuts aims to deny food, funds, intelligence and recruits to enemies of the state, and involves large-scale detentions, population transfers, and the inevitable killings. This is already happening, especially in order to secure transport routes, and we can anticipate more systematic actions in the Bamar heartlands of Sagaing and Magwe in particular, where the sit-tat will attempt to depopulate inconvenient areas whose populations they cannot adequately control.
Given attrition rates and growing emphasis on less reliable militias, in addition to growing financial shortfalls, we can anticipate the sit-tat’s further loss of territory, with the junta essentially surrendering remaining tracts of Chin, Kayah, Northern Shan, and Rakhine in particular. The same will happen in Bamar areas in which Four Cuts cannot be effectively implemented; they will fall back to flatlands distinguished by all-weather roads, and EAO and to a lesser extent PDF territories will expand in response. Personnel attrition will lead to a further reliance on air power, which in turn leads to more reliance on Russia for planes, parts, and training. Areas of the country controlled by the Three Brotherhood Alliance and other members of the FPNCC which have ceasefires with the junta will continue to expand and assert sovereignty. So will independent-minded BGFs and criminal gangs. The oft-claimed fiction that Myanmar is a state will become ever more untenable.
Ultimately, we will witness a desiccated sit-tat ruling a desiccated Bamar space, surrounded by enemies. This will also prove untenable: the international community has no stomach for any new states, and this includes China and Russia. The future Myanmar will be federal by fiat.
It’s worth returning to the dream of impending collapse: a remote possibility that still cannot be discounted. The degrading of such an institution as the sit-tat occurs at what looks to be a slow pace which suddenly accelerates. If enough officers believe it is going to happen, their own individual decisions will combine to make it happen. What happened to Romania in December of 1989 illustrates such a process. Political wits once said of Romanians that they were like corn mush in that they could be boil forever yet never explode, but they had the strength to boo the dictator in Timisoara, on live television. The regime, at that moment, ended, because it ended in the minds of its enforcers, who shot Ceausescu and his wife and then turned on one another in a brief killing frenzy while re-labelling themselves a democratic opposition. The sit-tat’s implosion would be far bloodier, and that sour-faced major general I ran into in Paletwa in 2019 will be either in front of the firing squad or behind the rifle stock.
The one thing we can bank on is that the people of Myanmar will continue to suffer..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2024-02-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
They were returning home after the junta enacted a military conscription law.
Description:
"More than 100 ethnic Rakhine youths detained by Myanmar’s junta as they returned by bus to Rakhine state from the commercial capital Yangon last week remained incommunicado on Monday, with relatives expressing concern that they were forcibly recruited to join the military amid a rollout of the country’s conscription law.
Junta troops arrested the youths on Feb. 20 at a checkpoint in Shwe Pyi Thar township, according to a monk who was a fellow passenger on one of the buses and who lobbied to authorities on their behalf.
“Of the three buses that were stopped, the two that I tried to intercede for carried between 90 and 100 passengers [in total],” said the monk who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke to RFA Burmese on condition of anonymity due to security concerns.
“The last thing I knew, they were arrested,” he said. “The reason I know this is because they entered the military checkpoint and never came out.”
The youths, aged between 18 and 30, had been working in garment, shoe and other factories in Yangon, the monk said. They were returning to their homes in the Rakhine townships of Myepon, Minbya, Mrauk-U, and Kyauktaw because their wards in Yangon would no longer register them as guests and they feared arrest after the junta enacted the military conscription law earlier this month.
They departed the Aung Mingalar Bus Yard in two buses operated by the Aung Si Khaing bus service and a third operated by the Pwint Phyu bus service, the monk said. The buses typically carry up to 50 passengers.
The youths are currently being held at the junta troop unit in Yangon region’s Hlaing Tharyar township, he said, adding that he had been unable to contact them as of Monday.
No contact since arrest
The military has suffered heavy losses on the battlefield in recent months – most notably in western Rakhine state, where the ethnic Arakan Army, or AA, ended a ceasefire in November and has since gone on to capture six townships.
On Feb. 10, the junta enacted the People’s Military Service Law, sending draft-eligible civilians fleeing from Myanmar’s cities. They say they would rather leave the country or join anti-junta forces in remote border areas than fight for the military, which seized power in a 2021 coup d’etat.
RFA Burmese has since received reports of recruitment roundups and arrests of young people, despite pledges from authorities that the law will not be enforced until April.
A relative of one of the detained youths told RFA that 14 of them are from his home village of Ywa Thar Yar, in Myebon township’s Yaw Chaung district.
“Four are male and 10 are female,” he said. “We haven’t had any contact with them since their arrest. They were working in factories in Yangon.”
The relative urged the junta to “release them as soon as possible,” as they had committed no crimes and were supporting their families with their income.
Aid workers confirmed to RFA that more than 100 Rakhine youths were arrested at the checkpoint on Feb. 20, but were unable to provide the details of those in custody, such as their names, ages or hometowns.
Nowhere is safe
Residents said that in the past two weeks, authorities in Yangon and Mandalay have been strictly enforcing the Guest List Law, which mandates either seven days’ imprisonment or a fine of 10,000 kyats (about US$5) for those who fail to register.
And last week, junta troops arrested around 600 civilians after their flights from Yangon landed at two airports in Rakhine state, according to family members and sources with knowledge of the situation, who said the military is holding them on suspicion of attempting to join the armed resistance.
A young Rakhine man working in Yangon told RFA that the junta is arresting people from his state who are living in the city “even if they are registered on guest lists,” but said returning home isn’t safe either.
“Now, if you go back to Rakhine, you will be arrested at Sittwe Airport … [or] at Kyaukpyu Airport. But if you stay [in Yangon], there are difficulties with the military service law,” he said. “I fled here to avoid the fighting in Rakhine, but it’s not safe here either. That’s just the current situation."
Rakhine military commentators told RFA they believe that the junta is likely targeting youths returning to Rakhine state because they “fear they will join the AA.”
Attempts by RFA to contact junta spokesperson Maj. General Zaw Min Tun for comment on the detention of young people in Shwe Pyi Thar township went unanswered Monday.
On Feb. 20, the AA said in a statement that the junta is “unlawfully arresting Rakhine people” in cities such as Yangon and Mandalay to use as soldiers, in addition to subjecting them to daily discrimination, torture, extortion, and execution. The group called on Rakhines fleeing fighting in the state to move to territory under its control, instead of relocating to the cities..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-02-26
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Other laws impacting on civil and political rights
Language:
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Feb 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Rakhine State, Kachin State, Shan State, Kayah State, Kayin State, and Mon State from February 15th to 21st. Over 100 civilians died by the arrest and killing of Military Troops and 4 women including an aged girl were raped and killed. Military Junta arrested and blackmailed the civilians by using the Conscription Law in many places around the country.
About 20 civilians died and over 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 6 underaged children died when the Military Junta committed abuses. A civilian also died by the landmine of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-02-23
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.4 MB
more
Sub-title:
In Part 1 of a 2-part series, Bobby Anderson considers the strengths and weaknesses of Myanmar’s military and its chances of collapse.
Description:
"Starting in 2017, the insurgent Arakan Army (AA) waged war against the Union of Myanmar across the complex topography of Paletwa township in southern Chin State. In January 2024, Paletwa fell to them.
I had worked in Paletwa with the deposed civilian government’s Department of Rural Development (DRD) before the February 2021 coup. From 2017 onward, in response to the AA’s guerilla actions, the civilian government had constricted my movement across the township; by 2019 I was limited to Paletwa town and the expanse of the Kaladan River stretching south. I still heard small arms fire at night. Back then the river was my only way in or out of town, and it wasn’t safe either: boats transporting soldiers were strafed.
In what is now a memory steeped in irony, back in 2019 the Myanmar military or Tatmadaw, of late referred to as စစ်တပ် / sit-tat, hosted a ceremony in Paletwa town to commemorate their “re-taking” of the township from AA. They hadn’t re-taken any territory at all, but no matter: the sit-tat has never let reality get in the way of self-adulation. That afternoon I sat obliviously on the side of the road which ran down to the jetty, eating ဝက်သားဟင်း tamin hin (pork curry). I paid and I happened to step outside just as a major general and his entourage passed on foot. He stopped and looked at me, open mouthed, and I did the same to him. My first thought was that he looked like a cut rate scoutmaster: U Baden-Powell. Then I wished I’d paid more attention before I stepped out. None of the soldiers lining the street were there when I’d entered the mess an hour before. I smiled dumbly, hoping for reciprocity. Instead, I got a look of hatred that felt white-hot; an expression that spread across the soldiery. Civilian officials later told me that the major general was vexed that I was in Paletwa. And he was especially vexed because I had permission to be there from the civilian government. I’d passed security checkpoints on the Kaladan with the requisite paperwork and had checked in with the town’s police and immigration officials—in the Union, immigration officials control the internal movement of both foreigners and Myanmar citizens.
That sour look stayed with me. For a commander, who would have had total control over the township prior to the quasi-democratization that began a decade earlier, back in Paletwa for a victory lap, it must have been a rude shock to be blindsided by a useless, grinning, pale guy. I flatter myself in hindsight by imagining that in some miniscule way I was, to that commander, representative of everything abhorrent about civilian rule.
This essay considers the possibility for a return to civilian rule in the face of both sit-tat intransigence and stunning recent losses at the hands of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance – comprised of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – launched a coordinated offensive against the sit-tat on October 27, 2023, and have since seized much of northern Shan state, while People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and other Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) launch new operations countrywide. This has all served to put down the myth of the sit-tat’s dominance. I consider alternating claims of sit-tat resiliency and fragility, with particular attention to the demographics of both the sit-tat and the resistance; as well as sit-tat coherence, mindset, funding, territorial control, and international relations. I conclude with a few predictions.
Myanmar’s military
Myanmar’s military has dominated the country’s political and social landscape since independence. It ruled Myanmar as a dictatorship from 1958 to 1960, then from 1962 until 2011, when a series of political and economic reforms initiated by the sit-tat through their affiliated Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) under Thein Sein led to a transition to a semi-democratic system which ultimately saw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) win elections in 2015.
However, prior to this ‘loss’, the sit-tat, learning from the Indonesian military’s post-1998 mis-steps in that country’s abrupt and disorganized transition to civilian rule, had enshrined their dominance through a constitution they drafted. The 2008 Constitution gave the sit-tat undisputed control of key ministries including Home Affairs and Defense, and allocated them 25 percent of seats in the parliament or Hluttaw, making reforms of the aforementioned constitution impossible. The sit-tat’s constitution also provided a legal basis for any future coup d’état. The NLD’s expert on constitutional law, U Ko Ni, believed in a democratic future and noted that what could not be amended could be replaced. In 2017, he received a bullet to the head by way of reply. The sit-tat would remain in control, and any future civilian government would be, for all intents and purposes, window dressing.
On February 1, 2021, the sit-tat deposed the civilians anyway. Sit-tat head, Min Aung Hlaing, justified his coup by alleging widespread ballot fraud in the November 2020 elections which had seen the NLD accrue a majority of votes. The coup was widely condemned by the international community, bar the sit-tat’s most powerful friends: the People’s Republic of China, which referred to the coup as a ‘cabinet reshuffle,’[1] and Russia.
The civilian government reconstituted itself as best it could in non-sit-tat-controlled territories and abroad, forming the National Unity Government (NUG) together with its allies from EAOs, activist groups, and political parties in April 2021. While the coup was historically predictable, as was resistance in non-Bamar, ethnic minority areas, the violent ferocity of the resistance in Bamar areas that came perhaps as a shock to the military. Some civilians began to band together in People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). Some PDFs sheltered in territories controlled by the country’s myriad EAOs, receiving training from them. Some PDFs also aligned themselves with the NUG. And soon, PDFs began killing soldiers in droves. The sit-tat, for their part, responded to resistance predictably, and with increasing sadism, moving from the first days of jailing NLD figures and dispersing protesters to levelling entire communities from the air, recently with the deadliest airstrike thus far in the conflict. The 168 civilians dead in Pa Zi Gyi in April 2023 join untold thousands in graves, while many survivors join two million displaced.
Many Myanmar-focused academics and journalists have staked positions on the sit-tat’s resiliency or fragility. In 2021, the Center for Strategic and International Studies claimed hopefully that the sit-tat was on their last legs, while in 2023, The Irrawaddy more subtly and intelligently noted that the sit-tat’s implosion is not impossible.
Numbers
Before the coup, general estimates of sit-tat personnel ranged from 300,000 to 400,000. These were overblown.
In the past three years, more sober estimates have emerged. On the low end, in May 2023 Ye Myo Hein estimated 150,000 personnel, of which 70,000 are in combat roles. However, the line between combatant and non-combatant in that structure has essentially been erased due to understaffing and losses, and this attrition in numbers was obvious even before the October offensives. As for police, who serve as auxiliaries to the sit-tat, Andrew Selth suggests 80,000, while Ye Myo Hein estimates 70,000. Police would be less reliable regime enforcers: they are not indoctrinated in the manner of soldiers (see below) and they reside in civilian communities. Border Guard Forces (BGF) and Pyu Saw Htee – newly-created and armed militias[2] – may also be counted, but they are peripheral. BGF loyalties are local and diffuse; as a rule they once fought the state but then switched sides, generally betraying previous ideologies, and so their loyalties can be fluid. They are essentially rural gangs running small fiefdoms with state protection. As for militias in general, their numbers are growing due to an inability for the sit-tat to recruit fast enough to replace their own losses. Such militias- staffed with retirees, criminals and EAO turncoats- are a cheap and collateral interim.
Losses
Even before the October 2023 offensive in northern Shan State, Ye Myo Hein estimated 13,000 sit-tat casualties since the start of the coup, along with 8,000 defections and desertions. He estimated 7,000 police losses, although this police figure is not disaggregated by casualty, or desertion/defection. Nikkei noted that unnamed Yangon diplomats believed that the sit-tat was losing an average of 15 soldiers per day, or roughly 5,500 per year. The NUG claimed nearly 5,000 dead soldiers in the first 10 months following the coup, and prior to the October 27, the 2023 Offensive claimed that the sit-tat had lost half of its combat forces in the last two years, or 30,000 troops. These claims, however, cannot be confirmed, nor can the vast number of changing estimates following the recent offensives, and so sticking with conservative estimates is prudent.
If we accept Ye Myo Hein’s estimates as accurate – and this author does – then losses estimated by Nikkei of 5,500 per year constituted 3.7 percent of the overall. That is a considerable bleed. To this we need to add desertions and defections: Hein estimated an additional 8,000, while the NUG claimed that roughly 14,000 sit-tat and police left the ranks as part of the civil disobedience movement (CDM) as of March 2023. The NUG claims to offer financial incentives for deserters, but this is unlikely to be a deciding factor in a soldier’s choice. There simply aren’t funds available to create a durable financial incentive to leave; a decision which is complicated by many other factors.
These numbers have increased since the October 27 offensive, and although the totals are unknown, they are stark. In early January 2024, at the capture of Laukkai alone, 2,389 military personnel, including six brigadier generals, surrendered: “the largest surrender in the history of Myanmar’s military”, according to Ye Myo Hein.
Which begs the question: even before the October offensive, were sit-tat recruitments keeping pace with losses?
Not by a long shot. The recent activation of the Conscription law starkly bears this out, but even before the recent offensive, the sit-tat faced ever-growing issues in both recruitment and retention. Their traditional recruiting grounds, such as Sagaing and Chin, are now charnel houses, and many of the young who may have sought sit-tat careers are now rebels instead. The Irrawaddy indicates that applications to the sit-tat’s officer academies are significantly down. While this might constrain talent, talent itself is relative. This sit-tat is hardly a group of innovative tacticians. They throw bodies at problems, including medically unfit ones.
Ye Myo Hein reasonably asserts that the sit-tat is “barely able to sustain itself as a fighting force, much less a government”: they were understaffed even before the coup. However, the sit-tat is used to bleeding, and managing multiple rebellions across both broad topographies and decades. The potential for a sudden collapse has been bandied about, but there is no historical precedent the author is aware of that looks anything like the current situation in Myanmar. However, conscription can be seen to reflect desperation. Other comparable militaries have ‘collapsed’ because they were either miniscule or corrupt or faced overwhelming force, or a combination of the three. The sit-tat maintains a disciplined, hierarchical corruption variant which functions because civilians are the prey, and so this corruption has not yet served to hollow out the institution.
The culture of the sit-tat supports its longevity. A 2021 Deutsch Welle article claimed that soldiers were being “brainwashed” into buying the army’s worldview”. But they already knew that worldview. The sit-tat always has been a Bamar-supremacist, totalitarian organization.[3] While Theravada Buddhism is a part of this identity, it exists more as a marker to distinguish the sit-tat from non-Buddhists, Muslims especially. The sit-tat’s willingness to kill Buddhist monks when the sangha diverges from the sit-tat shows how disposable this marker can be: indeed, to its officer class, the sit-tat may be a religion that supersedes Buddhism, or at least embodies a ‘purer’ form of Buddhism than the monks who have dedicated their lives to its practice.[4] And while the sit-tat’s lower ranks may contain Rawang, Chin, and other non-Bamar and Christian foot-soldiers, the officer class is entirely Bamar. This doesn’t mean that the lower ranks joined because they prescribe to the worldview: escaping poverty is a more plausible rationale.
This culture is supported by insularity.[5] Recruitment is multi-generational. Soldiers and their families live apart from civilians and tend to intermarry. They have their own schools and universities, their own health care, their own insurance and pensions, and their own courts. Civilians, to this group, are entirely untrustworthy, occasionally traitorous. The sit-tat has always ‘safeguarded’ the nation and so they believe they own it. The sit-tat’s sadism is also part and parcel of its culture: gore is bonding materiel. The massacres carried out by soldiers and militias forge a palpable hatred of the sit-tat among civilians, and surely give soldiers the feeling that reprisals await, and there is nowhere else to shelter but in the bloody organization that stains them. In the face of this, the security the Tatmadaw offers, financial and otherwise, is a powerful motivation to stay.[6] This motivation may be seen in the sit-tat personnel who recently fled into Mizoram, India; all opted to return.
With the mitigating circumstance of desperate poverty for many of the rank-and-file, to join this group is to knowingly join a criminal, sadistic, totalitarian endeavor.
Funds
Bodies are one count; cash is another. The sit-tat’s FY 2023-4 budget is US$2.7 billion equivalent – 25 percent of the national budget. The source of their on-budget funding is largely from Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise and revenues linked to extractive industries. The sit-tat has a much larger business structure than the state budget; they directly run two business conglomerates, Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL). MEC and MEHL holdings are vast, expanding across mining, industry, banking, food, and tobacco. Contributions to MEC, MEHL, and associated insurance and pension schemes operated by conglomerate subsidiaries are automatically deducted from soldier’s pay, with select contributions converted to MEC or MEHL shares, further bonding soldiers to the sit-tat.
Loot for the rank-and-file is also an aspect of economic embeddedness. By way of illustration, much livestock was stolen by soldiers and proxies from fleeing Rohingya during the 2017 expulsions that the price of meat temporarily collapsed in Sittwe.[7] Other illicit local economic opportunities for officers in particular abound, which the aforementioned BGFs and allied militias play an important role in, especially regarding the sit-tat’s need for plausible deniability in such illicit businesses. Indeed, the system of promotion in the sit-tat is based in part on the funds which junior officers can amass and funnel upwards. These opportunities remain a fundraising and control mechanism for regional sit-tat commands and BGFs in particular. Narcotics have been a form of conflict resolution utilized by the sit-tat at least since the 1960s, and this became especially evident after collapse of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1989, when the sit-tat made immediate ceasefires with the CPB’s successor organizations and turned a blind eye to their manufacture and trafficking of heroin, and later, methamphetamine. Bertil Linter, Ko Lin Chin, Tom Kramer and others have described these dynamics extensively. Myanmar recently became, again, the world’s biggest opium producer. In exchange for policing territories as state proxies, the sit-tat has turned a blind eye to such illicit economies at least, and more likely, is engaged in the trade.
The application of outside theories upon the sit-tat leadership is a type of anthropomorphism. This includes economics. Myanmar’s GDP growth fell to a negative 18% in the year following the coup, although it did eventually recover to 1%. Before the coup, it averaged a positive 6% per annum. In discarding or being ignorant of economic theories, the sit-tat has demonstrated that it is not as subject to them as N. Gregory Mankiw and other Economics 101 textbook authors would imagine. This also applies benefit to us outsiders in that it demonstrates that economics, for all the ambition of its proselytizers, is a social science, not a hard one. How many times, according to economic predictions, should the country have collapsed under Ne Win or Than Shwe?
Although Myanmar is not experiencing hyperinflation, it is worth comparing it to an extreme example: the hyperinflation in rump Yugoslavia in 1993. In August 1993, inflation climbed to 1,880 percent; at an annualised rate, this totaled 363 quadrillion percent. By December of 1993, 500 billion Dinar notes were printed. At the time, I was a teen blissfully unaware of economics. But I did note while I was there that, in bars, the prices of drinks would change between rounds. And yet Yugoslavia kept going – with no friends save a weak Russia, no natural resources worth mention, no China. The country’s institutions continued under a much more effective sanctions regime than is currently imposed on Myanmar, under what were effectively new “rules of the game” only seen clearly in the rear-view mirror. And so the sit-tat also stumbles onward, economics be damned.
The sit-tat often displays a rawer understanding of how money works than many an economist who would have bet on collapse. The trend of cronyism displays this understanding all too well: the mutuality of oligarchy and junta is a support mechanism that proves durable for all parties, and I hope someday Joe Studwell, former editor of the Far East Economic Review and author of Asian Godfathers and How Asia Works, chooses to write about this interrelation in Myanmar.
That said, Min Aung Hlaing’s recent complaints about finances indicate that even he senses something is economically amiss. But the leadership’s short-sightedness limits their response to inflation to targeting cooking oil producers, threatening local banks that Min Aung Hlaing labels traitorous, and most revolting of all, attempting to rob Myanmar’s migrant workers by demanding they remit 25 percent of their wages home at the regime’s ‘official’ (i.e. fake) exchange rate, in addition to imposing a ten percent tax rate on earnings abroad. Meanwhile the price of rice has doubled, and the military’s answer in the form of price caps will hurt farmers immensely.
Sean Turnell uses the word ‘catastrophe’ in his review of Myanmar’s current economy, but it is only that if one cares about people. It is not a catastrophe if it is seen through the prism of organized crime. Surely demonetization, a tool used by the much-hated Ne Win, and which wiped out the kyat savings of civilians countrywide in 1964, 1985 and 1987, is around the corner, even though it is expressly forbidden in the 2008 constitution.
Factionalism
Sit-tat culture and economic interconnectedness restrict the possibilities of factionalism. The coup and the subsequent crackdown, it is alleged, have led to tensions and divisions within the sit-tat. Terence Lee and Gerard McCarthy evaluate this in the forthcoming “Fracturing the Monolith: Could Military Defections End the Dictatorship in Myanmar?”, while Anders Kirstein Moeller did so in “Peering under the hood: Coup narratives and Tatmadaw Factionalism”. Both attempt to discern the contours of factionalism within the sit-tat. However, it bears reminding that, for all our knowledge of the sit-tat, we do not know what’s happening inside the ranks. Reports of low morale among troops deployed to areas of armed resistance means that the sit-tat deals with the same issues as every other occupying force in history. Low morale in the face of the latest offensive is resulting in surrender, but it has yet to lead to revolt.
It’s fair to assert that any factionalism happening within that olive drab opacity is limited to the point where said factionalism does not threaten to change the organizational philosophy of the group, nor the core beliefs it holds. An intra-sit-tat revolt against Min Aung Hlaing will not occur because he is a Bamar supremacist fascist. Rather, it will happen because he is a Bamar supremacist fascist who is losing. Nor will the sit-tat compete against civilians in a game that they haven’t already fixed in their favor. The system remains totalitarian, supremacist, and monolithic. For those arguing that factionalism is possible, I hope for the same, but we simply don’t know. Nevertheless, these hopes of factionalism within limits have precedent. The previous junta’s ‘opening’ in 2010 dated as far back as 2004 with the arrest of Military Intelligence Commander Khin Nyunt and the deposing of his ‘pro-China’ clique.
Despite the sit-tat’s overarching ideology, there may be a minute amount of pro-NUG elements within it. Select PDF attacks, according to Ye Myo Hein, “were likely only possible with the collaboration of military insiders, and they have aroused anxiety within the military’s leadership.”
Territorial control
The sit-tat has been able to maintain control in all major cities and many of the roads connecting them, but even prior to the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s October 27 offensive, the sit-tat controlled less territory and faced more complex and violent resistance than at any time in their history. Shona Loong starkly illustrates this in Post-coup Myanmar in Six Warscapes.
Back in February 2023, Min Aung Hlaing stated that only 198 out of over 330 townships in Myanmar were ‘100 percent stable’. If we take ‘stable’ as code for ‘under control,’ Min Aung Hlaing was implying that 40 percent of the country’s townships were ‘out of control’. By July 2023, the sit-tat had imposed martial law in 37 townships, including resistance strongholds in Sagaing, Magwe, Chin and Kayah. Prior to the October 27, 2023 offensive, most of Chin state was already under resistance control, as was much of Kayah. The same for Rakhine, which was largely run by the Arakan Army (see below). In Sagaing, Magwe, Chin and Kayah, the sit-tat was forced to rely on air power and artillery. It also faced difficulties in maintaining supply lines and, apparently, ensuring the loyalty of troops deployed in these areas. To shore up its own defense, the sit-tat made changes to the Arms Act to arm pro-junta militias and security organizations. As of August 2023, they began conscripting civil servants into militias in southern Shan and Kayah state, including health and education staff – a telling indicator of the effect of the bleed the PDFs were subjecting the sit-tat to. Other proxies were being mobilized to guard foreign investments the sit-tat could not commit numbers to. In a repeat of the practice of previous juntas, the sit-tat also conscripted criminals. Implicitly, then, recruitment was not keeping up with losses. And territories continued to be lost.
And then came the October 27, 2023 offensive, in which the Three Brotherhood Alliance overran dozens of towns across Northern Shan State, and the garrisons which supposedly were there to defend them. Most of Northern Shan, and within it, the entirety of Kokang, was lost. Offensives began simultaneously in Rakhine, Chin, and Kayah, effecting the loss of nearly all the remaining territory in the latter two, while much of Western Rakhine is also lost to the sit-tat, and where even distant Ramree island is hosting fighting between the AA and the sit-tat. The coordination was not limited to EAOs: PDFs ramped up operations in Sagaing and elsewhere, and the Pa’O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) is now fighting the sit-tat as well. Even the criminal Karen BGF, guardians of Shwe Kokko, has apparently gone over to the resistance. This was a signature moment, and one that the sit-tat, with its decades of successful ‘musical chairs ceasefires’ in which an offensive against one EAO gives another breathing space, could not have imagined. Nor could they have imagined that, in another signature event, the United Wa State Army would assume administrative control of areas the alliance had seized from sit-tat control.
Despite this stunning set of losses, sit-tat tactics are not deviating from past practice. This includes asking China to broker ceasefires which they then speedily violate. This criminal, totalitarian endeavor holds such a supremacist belief in itself that it cannot comprehend battlefield realities..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Many in Myanmar have condemned what they perceive as seriously flawed Western criticism of the Burmese ex-leader.
Description:
"On 18 October 2023, the Brighton and Hove City Council in the United Kingdom revoked the Freedom of the City awarded to Burmese politician Aung San Suu Kyi in 2011. Their special meeting lasted only 18 minutes, with Councillor Bella Sankey, the Labour leader of the Council, stating that it was not right to honour a person who “presided over the ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Muslim Rohingya community” and was “an enabler to racial and religious discrimination and ethnic cleansing”. Sankey was supported by all 50 or so of the Council members present.
This revocation was the latest act by Western institutions and human rights groups, at times inclined to zealotry and intolerance, to humiliate and punish Suu Kyi for her perceived failure to “speak out” against the persecution of the Rohingya Muslim ethnic minority in Myanmar. Yet not one of her critics has ever attempted to say why she supposedly did not speak out, nor offered any word of explanation other than, like Bob Geldof, to denigrate her as a “handmaiden to genocide”.
Their main concern has been to topple her from the pedestal on which they put her, and not to seek to understand her fraught and fragile relationship with the military, which has led to her detention and imprisonment for more than three years.
This year, an invaluable compendium of documents was published by the American Buddhist scholar Alan Clements and his British colleague Fergus Harlow entitled “Burma’s Voices of Freedom”, which includes interviews, articles and speeches by Suu Kyi and several of her Burmese associates. The four-volume set offers a clear and persuasive narrative of her policies from a Burmese perspective, which would come as a complete surprise to many of her Western critics.
Suu Kyi indeed acknowledged that she had not “spoken out” on the Rohingya crisis because to do so would only make matters worse.
Suu Kyi’s consistent approach over the years to the Rohingya – as on all issues – is inspired by the Buddhist virtues of loving kindness (mettā), compassion (karunā), empathetic joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekkhā). In practical terms it is based on:
Reconciliation, not condemnation. A refusal to take sides in the communal disturbances between Muslims and Buddhists in Rakhine State.
Cooperation with the military at all costs. A refusal to condemn publicly, but to search for a modus vivendi with the aim of securing their understanding and support for the country’s political transition.
Determination not to endanger the prospects for democratic change after so many years of military rule, even at the risk of being seriously misunderstood in the West.
Suu Kyi had discussions with a considerable number of Western politicians and personalities once she began to travel overseas in 2012. To some, she would undoubtedly have explained in confidence how fragile was her position, but publicly she did not dare make reference to this. Her spokesman, U Win Htein, confided to Clements on 10 April 2015 that Suu Kyi “did clearly express her position about the Rohingya, but what she expressed was that, if she spoke up for the Rohingya or advocated too heavily on their behalf, it would have unfavourable repercussions among the Burmese … It might help the international community understand the situation, but it won’t help Burma.”
Suu Kyi indeed acknowledged that she had not “spoken out” on the Rohingya crisis because to do so would only make matters worse, sully her relations with the military, and endanger her very political existence. Yet this is what human rights organisations pressed her to do. Instead, Suu Kyi put the interests of her country before her personal reputation. In an interview with NHK World (Japan) on 6 October 2018, she stated, “I don’t care about prizes and honours as such. I am sorry that friends are not as steadfast as they might be. Because I think friendship means understanding, basically, trying to understand rather than to just make your own judgement. But prizes come and prizes go.”
On her decision to represent Myanmar at the International Court of Justice on 11 December 2019, Suu Kyi’s Burmese associates are unanimous that she did not go to The Hague to defend the military, but to appear as a representative of her country in their dispute with The Gambia, and to defend Myanmar’s honour and dignity. The human rights activist and Harvard graduate Ma Thida Sanchuang said in January 2020: “But for the eyes of the general public, Aung San Suu Kyi took the lead to defend our country’s image … The general public’s stand with her on the ICJ case was the signal … to show how much they are still against the military and its party.”
This is entirely opposite to most Western interpretations. Not surprisingly, many of Suu Kyi’s closest collaborators have condemned what they see as seriously flawed Western criticism of her policies, especially on the Rohingya. U Win Htein commented: “They are false judgements. They are misperceptions. They are from the uninformed and misguided … Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is one of the most compassionate people I have ever met.” A senior Buddhist monk, the late Myawaddy Sayadaw Abbot of Mingyi Monastery, was even blunter in December 2017: “Wait and see. Only those who revoked the awards will lose their dignity in the end.” And as Myanmar’s version of Lady Gaga, Phyu Phyu Kyaw Thein, a Christian, noted in January 2020: “But one thing for sure is Daw Suu, as a devout Buddhist, forgives them for she knows that ‘they know not what they say’.”
One day soon, Suu Kyi may be free to put the record straight. Her detractors can then eat humble pie, if they have the moral courage..."
Source/publisher:
The Lowy Institute via The Interpreter
Date of publication:
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Three years after the failed military coup in Myanmar, there is genuine hope within the country for democratic resistance. By the end of 2023 and into the beginning of 2024, Myanmar reached a turning point, with significant successes achieved by the revolutionary movement, particularly on the battlefield. For the first time since the coup, there is a growing possibility that the resistance movement may prevail against the military dictatorship.
Three years after the military coup, approximately 17.6 million people in Myanmar are facing a humanitarian emergency, and 2.6 million people are homeless. The military has been responsible for the deaths of over 4,500 people, including about 500 children. In addition, more than 26,000 individuals have been detained, with 20,000 still languishing in prison.
While the struggle in Myanmar is tragic, marked by a great deal of brutality and significant loss of life, it is also deeply inspiring. The previously deeply divided nation with various ethnic groups has united against the military, which illegally seized power on February 1, 2021. Likely driven by a combination of the military’s significant electoral defeat (in the form of a pro-military party, composed of formed generals) and the personal aspirations of coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the military arrested most of the country’s civilian leadership, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and halted all democratic processes, in order to install a new government, a military junta under the name State Administration Council (SAC). At first, the people of Myanmar faced daunting odds. However, they persevered, and now, three years later, we see the balance of power beginning to shift in their favor.
The prospect of overcoming the junta seemed bleak in the aftermath of the coup, as the military seemed poised to violently suppress the initially non-violent protests that eventually escalated into armed defense. For the first two years, the resistance movement struggled to survive, clinging on despite the military’s vast advantage, eventually reaching a tipping point where the coup leaders could not quash the resistance, yet the resistance could not overcome the junta.
The year 2023 brought a change to this situation: the first half of the year saw an improvement on the side of the revolutionary forces compared to previous years but without major victories. It was only in the second half of the year that the situation changed significantly. With Operation 1027, named after the date of its start – October 27, 2023 –it seems for the first time that the revolutionary forces may eventually emerge victorious.
The duration of this process, however, remains uncertain and will depend on a number of factors, including internal, regional, and international dynamics. Key external players that can influence events in Myanmar include China, Thailand, and India, three neighboring countries. China deserves special attention because it has been extensively involved in Myanmar’s affairs for decades and is known for its ability to turn violence in Myanmar’s border regions on and off like a switch, depending on China’s needs. Moreover, the 2017 Operation has had a strong impact on Myanmar’s relations with China.
For months, China’s central government pleaded with the SAC to crack down on cross-border cyber scam syndicates run primarily by Chinese criminals from guarded compounds on the Myanmar side of the border, controlled by local warlords, but to no avail. Then came the solution for China in the form of Operation 1027, essentially greenlighted by Beijing. In the short term, cracking down on scam centers took precedence over peace on the border. Publicly, China called for a de-escalation of the conflict.
In October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, composed of three ethnic armed organizations joined by the people’s defense forces, known as PDFs (armed units formed post-coup to resist the military regime and recognized by the National Unity Government, the parallel legitimate government formed by representatives elected in the 2020 elections), launched an operation with a dual objective: to eliminate the scam syndicates operating in the region and to confront and defeat the military dictatorship. The first objective led to the liberation of numerous compounds, with the return of the enslaved, mostly Chinese, to their homes. The second objective resulted in unprecedented battlefield losses for the Myanmar military. The second outcome was unexpected by China, as the Myanmar military suffered unprecedented battlefield losses, highlighting the effectiveness and impact of the operation.
Operation 1027, which is still ongoing, has emerged as the most significant threat to the military regime since the coup. The alliance has successfully blocked the junta’s access to the northern part of Shan State, seized key cities and town in the region, and gained control of the Myanmar-China border, thereby disrupting the lucrative border trade (which had previously funneled cash into the hands of the junta). Throughout these developments, China mediated talks between the military and the alliance (with the primary goal of averting a prolonged disruption of border trade). However, the negotiated ceasefires have been tenuous, with numerous instances of breakdown.
There is an interesting dual dependency and influence at play. Operation 1027 was made possible by the broader resistance movement in Myanmar, as the junta has been under attack by a national uprising in various towns across the country over the last three years. This further stretched the junta’s already thinning forces. In turn, Operation 1027 not only capitalized on this weakening of the junta, but also served to significantly strengthen the revolutionary forces in other parts of Myanmar, such as Chin, Kachin, Karen, Sagaing, and Magway. The revolutionary forces in these areas accelerated and began to occupy military bases. As a result, the army suffered losses as several bases fell and many soldiers were detained.
While serious battles between the military and the resistance movement continue, one thing is certain: there is no turning back at this point. At present, everything in Myanmar revolves around the removal of the junta’s cruel rule and, more broadly, the removal of the military’s influence from the country’s political landscape. The entire population shares the belief that the continued existence of a military junta in society is untenable. A return to a compromise situation in the form of a hybrid regime, similar to that of the 2010s, in which the military wields significant political power alongside the civilian government, is not a realistic solution for Myanmar’s future. While the people of Myanmar believe that victory is within reach, it remains to be seen how long this process actually takes – it could be years before we see a real change. But for now, we can look at it through a lens of hope..."
Source/publisher:
Reset Dialogues on Civilizations
Date of publication:
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"Fighting continues in northern Rakhine State since the Arakan Army (AA) launched an offensive against Myanmar’s junta in mid-November last year.
The AA has seized Mrauk-U, Minbya, Kyauktaw and Pauktaw towns and Paletwa in southern Chin State along with numerous junta bases and border outposts.
The AA is attacking Rathedaung town and has told the Regional Operations Command in the state capital, Sittwe, to surrender. Sittwe is the junta’s administrative seat in Rakhine.
The regime blew up a bridge on the Yangon-Sittwe road to disrupt AA troops advances on the city and senior administrative officials have allegedly left Sittwe. Many of Sittwe’s residents have left but The Irrawaddy recently talked to someone who remains in the city.
What is the situation in Sittwe?
The AA has taken most of northern Rakhine State but Buthidaung has not fallen. The AA controls Paletwa, Kyauktaw, Minbya and Mrauk-U along the Kaladan River.
Only Sittwe is left. Many residents have fled and people fear the city could be flattened, like Pauktaw and Minbya.
Those who can afford it have gone to Yangon, Mandalay or Pyay. Half of the city has already fled and many are waiting to buy air tickets. Flights are apparently booked until late April. Canceled tickets cost around 700,000 kyats (US$200), about eight times the normal price.
The regime has blockaded Sittwe, which is surrounded by the Bay of Bengal and some try to escape by sea.
Residents fear fighting could break out at anytime and junta shelling and airstrikes will follow if fighting starts. They know about the regime’s indiscriminate attacks elsewhere.
Many residents cannot afford to leave and there is no way out from Sittwe if fighting breaks out.
We heard junta administrators are leaving Sittwe.
The government neighborhood is heavily guarded and cordoned off. We heard reports that they are moving to Thandwe [200km to the south].
Is there enough food despite the regime’s blockade?
Commodities are running low since the roads were blocked. Shops are selling off their stocks as they want to leave. They are not restocking. Garlic is unavailable and an onion costs 1,000 kyats.
We still can buy peppers from the Muslim villages but the fuel prices make it difficult to get there. Some cycle. A used bike sells for around 500,000 kyats.
Fuel has dropped from 30,000 kyats to around 18,000 kyats per liter. [The Yangon price is around 2,600 kyats].
There are no children’s snacks and rice and cooking oil prices have soared.
Many people left with nothing and they need blankets at night. They also need food. Fighting started more than three months ago and people are facing serious food shortages.
How are transport, communications and health care?
They have cut off internet access. And we can only use [military-owned] Mytel sims to make phone calls but the signal is unstable.
We switched to Mytel but we can’t transfer cash online.
Many people working in Thailand and Malaysia cannot transfer remittances.
I heard Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya and Ponnagyun are deserted.
Hospitals and clinics still operate.
The regime has imposed a curfew in Sittwe. A motorbike taxi driver was shot dead last week. No one knows who did it. Some blamed junta soldiers but others said it was the Arakan Liberation Party. The city is in panic.
How are residents earning a living in Sittwe?
Businesses have not been able to operate for months. People do odd-jobs and business owners eat what they have.
Many motorbike taxi drivers now use cycle-rickshaws due to high fuel prices. Theft has increased. The police are not interested in crime as they are busy ensuring their safety.
Fishing and trade are the main sources of income in Sittwe but businesses have closed and the streets are largely deserted..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-02-21
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"20 February 2024: Comments from SAC-M’s founding members in response to the Myanmar military’s decision to enforce the 2010 conscription law:
Marzuki Darusman: “Myanmar’s youth have been abandoned to wage a three-year long struggle alone against military tyranny in pursuit of a Myanmar built on peace, justice and human rights. If the UN and ASEAN allow Min Aung Hlaing to forcibly conscript millions of young people into his junta death cult, then they will be further complicit in denying Myanmar this future.”
Chris Sidoti: “The Myanmar military’s conscription implementation reflects its desperation. They are losing the war and have run out of ideas. This is an indication that the junta’s total collapse is only a matter of time.”
Yanghee Lee: “Min Aung Hlaing’s forced conscription directive won’t save him or his junta. Instead, his depraved attack on the country’s future illustrates he is willing to destroy an entire generation rather than accept the failure of his disastrous coup. He must accept that the old military playbook will not work this time.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"While the world’s attention has been focused on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the civil war in Myanmar has taken an unexpected turn back toward democracy. In the battle between the military junta — which staged a coup in 2021 to pre-empt the seating of Aung San Suu Kyi’s newly re-elected government — and the representatives of that government, the resistance now seems to be winning.
That shift in what has been at times a horrifyingly brutal war by the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, against its own citizens, has implications for democracy in the region, for China’s regional role and foreign policy, and for the future of an imprisoned leader whose status as an icon of freedom has been tarnished internationally but who remains a national cult figure at home.
This is but the latest chapter in Myanmar’s struggle for democracy, which — from its independence in 1948 through its shedding of the colonial name of Burma in 1989, through the democratic rise of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) — has swung like a pendulum between military dictatorship and elected government.
After the country’s democratic transition began in 2011, Aung San Suu Kyi finally became state counsellor. Her National League for Democracy won another landslide victory in 2020, but the military once more seized power on February 1, 2021 before the government could be sworn in. The coup triggered massive protests. Far more threatening to the military junta, or Tatmadaw, were the speed and skill of the defeated government in galvanizing the entire opposition. Within weeks, they had established an alternative power centre, the National Unity Government (NUG) — for which I, full disclosure, serve as an unofficial advisor — with multi-ethnic representation in its leadership, including the Rohingya, for the first time in the nation’s history.
Thousands of young people fled to the cities to join the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) — the NUG’s army — transformed from shop clerks and students into guerrilla fighters in training camps in the highland jungles. Today, the PDF and the ethnic armed organizations fight under joint commands, their unity a weapon against decades of tactical ethnic division sown by the military. They have now seized nearly half of the national territory.
Three things make this challenge different from any previous battle with the Tatmadaw. First, today’s resistance struggle comes after nearly a decade of partial democratization under the NLD. Many of the young soldiers fighting the army today were part of the first generation to grow up under increasing — if still fragile and partial — democracy. They want it back.
Secondly, the army badly miscalculated the skillful political leaders of the government they had deposed. The NUG quickly reached out internally to build political and military alliances with the now-powerful ethnic community governments and armies; and externally to a broad network of international allies.
Within a year, the PDF and the so-called “ethnic armed organisations” were creating new legal, medical and educational institutions on the ground in liberated territories. A year later, a series of attacks by the NUG’s military joint commands were inflicting heavy losses on the Tatmadaw.
Many of the young soldiers fighting the army today were part of the first generation to grow up under increasing — if still fragile and partial — democracy. They want it back.
Finally, the wanton cruelty and lawlessness with which the junta waged war; bombing schools, hospitals, and entire villages began to turn sentiment even in its former strongholds. The opposition took in thousands of defectors and many thousands of Myanmar people fled into neighbouring countries. This year, the army has begun forcible kidnapping of citizens to serve as its porters and human shields. It recently announced a massive conscription drive, which the NUG has vowed to resist.
The most serious turning point came last fall, when the world was watching the Middle East. On October 27, the joint rebel forces of the Three Brotherhood Alliance staged “Operation 1027”, capturing key cities, towns, and military basesalong the northern border with China. It was a shock to the junta and a deep concern to Beijing. China’s always-opportunistic foreign policy was strained by this new turn in the conflict. They had carefully balanced support for the junta, feeding it billions of dollars in resource revenues and military assistance, and the ethnic organizations, several of whom were of majority Chinese ethnicity. It seems likely that as the opposition continues to seize more territory, and morale among the junta forces sags more and more deeply, that China will in the end support the opposition. China rarely backs a loser, and the junta’s days seem numbered.
The big question facing the NUG now is what happens the day after victory. The country has no history of shared governance. In some areas, they have only decades of warfare. The institutions on the ground, for a country of 55 million people, in medicine, law and local governance are shallow or non-existent. The challenges of finding common ground among peoples who are separated by language, history, and in the case of the Rohingya and other Muslims, by religion, could not be more daunting.
Some regional pundits predict that a new opposition government will inevitably fail over internal tensions within a year or two and the army will come marching back in. That is not merely spin on behalf of the war criminals who lead the Tatmadaw. They have billions of dollars squirrelled away from decades of corruption. They have a massive military infrastructure. They have a record of success in stirring up conflict between and among the various ethnic communities who surround them.
Still, it would not be prudent to see this latest battle against the military as facing the same end as previous collisions. For the reasons cited above — new alliances, a new generation of citizen soldiers committed to democracy, and a skillful and demonstrably capable cadre of leaders already successful in creating a new government with a broad commitment to a loosely federal democracy; this time, the odds are better.
The early months, post-victory, will turn on how quickly and how firmly a new government can bring all of its internal partners to agree on some governance minimums. They have wisely set the consensus bar low, and the transition process long. They recognize that communities that have operated as nation states, with their own legal systems, taxation frameworks, and local bureaucracies are not quickly going to cede all of that to a new central government in Yangon.
Nor are they going to be willing to make detailed long-term commitments without some evidence that there is a feasible path forward that includes everyone. The tension has already emerged behind the scenes between the seize-the-moment, ‘go faster’ caucus and the careful, ‘slow and patient’ caucus.
As Canada’s constitutional wars revealed, the only successful path forward — with far fewer issues and groups — is one of slow trust-building, endless meetings that build that trust, friendships across borders, and the recognition that one may need many small steps over many years before even seeing the finish line. Our process took nearly 40 years, from Victoria to Charlottetown, and is only partially successful to this day. Canada and other nations have contributed some of our best brains in constitution-making to the most difficult and risky task there is in governing.
Another key early task will be swift investigation and then prosecution of war crimes. Not only because it is the essential moral responsibility after a conflict so targeted at killing women and children, but also because it will give early proof and confidence to a skeptical nation that this time it really will be different.
Russia and China have been aiding the junta in training and equipment on the battlefield. They have to understand that they could become the targets of greater sanctions than those already imposed —and that they are wasting their time and money on a losing battle. The ASEAN nations have been powerless in attempting to find a way to return to democracy — not entirely surprising, since fewer than half of the members can claim any democratic credentials themselves.
Canada has an international expert on Myanmar in our service in UN Ambassador (and Policy contributor) Bob Rae, who did the definitive study of the Rohingya genocide and its consequences. He remains deeply involved in bridge-building among allies of the fight for democracy. The EU and the US have both strongly condemned the junta, and granted money and political support to the NUG.
This year could be the year that these elements come together. With greater public support, and private assistance from its international allies, 2024 could be the year that Myanmar returns to the club of nations attempting to build stable and free democracies.
Veteran political strategist and Policy Contributing Writer Robin V. Sears lived and worked in Tokyo as Ontario’s senior diplomat and later as a management consultant in Hong Kong. Today he serves as a volunteer senior advisor to the leadership of the NUG..."
Source/publisher:
Policy Magazine
Date of publication:
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"As the resistance forces gain momentum in the Spring Revolution, the Myanmar military, disparagingly known as the Sit-Tat, finds itself increasingly on the defensive. Amidst this backdrop, the State Administration Council (SAC) announced on February 10, 2024, the enforcement of the 2010 Conscription Law, a move widely perceived as another ill-judged attempt by General Min Aung Hlaing to drag the entire nation down with him.
The People’s Military Service Law, enacted by the State Peace and Development Council—the precursor to the SAC—and signed into law by General Than Shwe on November 4, 2010, mandates service in the armed forces for all men aged 18 to 35 (extending to 45 for those with professional expertise) and women aged 18 to 27 (extending to 35 for those with professional expertise) for a period of two years, which can be extended to five years during national emergencies. Failure to comply with conscription can result in imprisonment for up to five years, a fine, or both.1,2
The question arises: why resurrect this 14-year-old law now? The apprehensive coup leader highlighted the law at the Veterans Convention on November 22, 2021, and again at the SAC’s annual meeting on February 2, 2022.3,4
According to Ye Myo Hein, a visiting Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, the Sit-Tat had approximately 150,000 members, including around 70,000 combatants, as of May 2023.5 However, there has been a significant decrease in morale and numbers among the military due to a series of defeats inflicted by the coordinated democratic forces across Myanmar as well as an increase in casualties, desertions, defections, and detentions as prisoners of war since Operation 1027 in October 2023.6,7In addition to colossal losses on the battlefields, the junta has also experienced severe setbacks on the economic front due to Western sanctions.
In a desperate bid to replenish his depleted forces, General Min Aung Hlaing attempted two unsuccessful measures. On November 14, 2023, the members of the University Training Corps were ordered to report their biodata to the Directorate of People Militia and Border Guard Forces. On December 21, 2023, 645 deserters were released from prisons under a decree with the stipulation that they re-enlist.9
After these two attempts failed, the “Commander-in-Mischief” opted for what many see as a last-ditch effort: the enforcement of Conscription Law on February 10, 2024, followed by the activation of Reserved Military Force Law on February 13, 2024.10 The latter mandates veterans to serve in the reserved force for five years post-retirement.
The repercussions of the Conscription Law have far-reaching consequences, affecting not only the people and the junta but also the revolution and neighboring countries. The plan to draft 60,000 young men and women starting in mid-April has already triggered widespread panic, prompting a mass exodus of the youth. Families of the 13 million youth in Myanmar are feeling the acute impact, compounded by economic hardships, shortages of essential goods, soaring prices, and inflation. The private sector is further burdened, being compelled to continue paying salaries for drafted employees.
This law will essentially sanction a longstanding abusive practice of coerced military service, which has been both ad hoc and illegal. The generals may hope to replace experienced troops with these inexperienced recruits, using them primarily as cannon fodder. However, forced enslavement runs the risk of these reluctant conscripts turning their weapons against their own ranks or becoming informants. Morale is expected to plummet further as troops witness their relatives being forcibly conscripted, potentially driving more individuals to join the armed resistance.
In response, the National Unity Government (NUG) issued a statement on February 13, 2024, stating that “the NUG of Myanmar, in collaboration with allied organizations will take all necessary measures to prevent the junta’s attempted roll out of forced conscription and will address dangers faced by the public.”8 This reflects a strategic and thoughtful approach by the NUG and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) to avoid the pitfalls of the junta’s scheme, which would result in the displacement of young individuals—a scenario that would pose immense challenges in terms of accommodation, basic needs, and security.
In the words of Sun Tzu, “Know thyself and know thy enemy,” and “Who wishes to fight must first count the cost. Don’t let sacrifices sneak up on you. Whatever path you take, know the consequences.” The revolutionary leaders are thus urged to remain vigilant, not allowing the junta’s actions to distract from the broader goals of the revolution.
The international community, and particularly neighboring countries, must brace for a massive humanitarian crisis due to significant influx of migrants, including a surge in unregulated and hazardous labor migration, on top of the existing refugee crisis and cross-border instability. This situation underscores the role of the Myanmar military as the primary source of chaos within country and a key contributor to regional instability.
Despite the turmoil, there lies an opportunity to dismantle the military dictatorship. The people of Myanmar are called upon to deepen their engagement in the Spring Revolution and to support the revolutionary forces with prudence, patience, and perseverance. The revolution must ensure that conscription becomes a constriction not for the people’s movement but for the military dictators themselves.
References:
http://www.asianlii.org/mm/legis/laws/pmslpadcln272010638.pdf
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/six-key-points-about-myanmars-newly-enforced-conscription-law.html
https://vk.com/@sac.council-mnof
https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/junta-leader-wants-conscription-law-2020-02042022065126.html
https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/myanmars-military-smaller-commonly-thought-and-shrinking-fast
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/charting-the-shifting-power-balance-on-myanmars-battlefields.html
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/the-existential-threat-facing-myanmars-junta.html
https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/02/15/7181
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gH1Fu9B_TT0
https://www.myanmaritv.com/news/myanmar-reserve-forces-law-sac-enforced-reserve-military-force-law ..."
Source/publisher:
East Asia Forum
Date of publication:
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"The People’s Representatives Committee for Federalism (PRCF) published its constitution for a federal democracy on Feb. 12.
The committee comprises 12 political parties: the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, Arakan League for Democracy, Karen National Party, Zomi Congress for Democracy, Democratic Party for a New Society, United Nationalities Democracy Party, Danu Nationalities Democracy Party, Daingnet National Development Party, Mro National Democracy Party, Karen National Party, Shan State Kokang Democratic Party and Mon Affairs Association.
Previously known as the PRF, the committee changed its name to PRCF in March 2021.
Sai Kyaw Nyunt, a joint secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, recently spoke with The Irrawaddy about the objectives of the constitution and its most important features.
What is the intention of publishing a constitution?
It has been nearly two years since we drafted the constitution in 2022. So, we decided that it was time to publish it.
What is the PRCF?
The PRCF was formed after the 2021 coup. It comprises primarily members of the United Nationalities Alliance and their partners.
The PRCF mentioned three main tasks in its statement about publishing its constitution. Can you elaborate on them?
We can’t accept any form of dictatorship, either military dictatorship or civilian dictatorship. The conflict in our country since independence is deeply connected to the constitution. The 1974 constitution did not meet the wishes of the people and the same is true of the 2008 constitution.
In our view, federalism is the best [form of government] for this highly diverse and multi-ethnic country. But federalism alone is not enough. There must also be democracy. So, there is a need for a federal, democratic constitution. But again, a constitution alone is not enough. Peaceful co-existence is also critically important for us to come together to form and maintain a union.
How do you see the current political landscape in Myanmar?
Myanmar is at war now. We are politicians so we don’t know much about military affairs. Military solutions alone can’t solve problems in a country. Space for politics is necessary. It is more powerful than military action in terms of fulfilling the wishes of the people. We want things handled peacefully.
So, your political parties prefer non-violence?
We don’t want to say which is right and which is wrong. I am only talking about our tendency. By political means, I mean…… you don’t necessarily have to establish a party and contest the election. You may oppose the voting, and release statements about your views. These are all political means. Dialogue is also a political means. This is what we believe.
What drove the PRCF to design a constitution?
Eleven of the 12 organizations in the PRCF are political parties. We believe certain conditions must be met for our country to have greater peace and stability. So, we have designed the constitution, outlining the conditions that we think are necessary to have peace and stability. Those parties have won votes and support from people in their respective constituencies. So, we designed the constitution to convey our idea about an ideal union.
What are the salient points about your constitution?
We refer to four documents: the fundamental principles of the PRCF, the fundamental principles in a federal democracy charter, the constitution from the Federal Constitution Drafting and Coordinating Committee, and the constitution from the UNA and allies. Our constitution touches upon new topics, such as financial matters, relations between government agencies, and administration and public services.
So, is it fair to say the constitution drafted by the PRFC is one that reflects the federal democracy charter declared by anti-regime political forces?
We can’t say so. Many organizations, including ethnic armed organizations, were involved in designing the federal democracy charter. Our constitution was drafted solely by PRCF members, but it can be used as a draft for all the stakeholders to discuss in the future.
Will you accept recommendations, if there are any, to your constitution?
We are willing to accept any recommendation that does not go against our principles.
The military regime upholds the 2008 Constitution. What will you say if they say they don’t accept your constitution?
We represent people to a certain extent, and we live among the people. So, the constitution represents our view of what this country should be like. Everyone is aware that one group or organization representing all the others was not successful. We need to try to write a constitution that is acceptable to all by negotiating between all stakeholders.
How did stakeholders in the country respond to your constitution?
No one has yet strongly responded to our constitution. It was only published recently, and perhaps stakeholders are still studying it. Our constitution is largely based on documents of ethnic armed organizations, ethnic political organizations and ethnic Bamar organizations. So, there won’t be much difference between ours and theirs.
There might be differences in the way we operate, but I don’t think there will be much disagreement regarding policies. The policies of the regime and the military, however, can be markedly different from ours. In the future, we will have to accept what is best for the people.
What is the PRCF’s next step?
We established political parties to do our share for the country. So, we will continue to work in our way to restore peace and build a country that all citizens want to see..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"For all the rhetoric surrounding Myanmar’s instability since its coup d’état in 2021, those paying close attention to Myanmar recognize an even more important fact: it may only become more unstable. The essential combination of historical precedent and political theory suggests that not only is Myanmar better off with a centralized government, but that if it maintains its crash course towards decentralization, it will result in devastating consequences for all different populations in Myanmar. If international actors advocating for the restoration of a democratic Myanmar fail to intervene or otherwise assist democratic advocates in Myanmar, the ensuing conflicts will ravage the state and destabilize an increasingly strategically important region.
The inherent nature of Myanmar as a multi-ethnic state has been a source of division since its independence in 1948. Its consistent oppression of the Rohingya people resulted in massive sources of conflict in 2012 and 2017, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Yet the recent coup has in many ways united many minority groups, creating a common enemy out of the oppressive majority government, which has forced armed rebel groups to work synchronously to effectively combat the military government. Al Jazeera reports that the unity of these armed groups has resulted in the creation of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, composed of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, which have waged combat against the military junta quite effectively, and garnered significant momentum since late 2023.
When considering the overall instability of the region, the military junta’s proven inability to establish sovereignty at home and legitimacy abroad has become flashpoints of concern. The Associated Press reports that inflation and displacement are increasing in Myanmar, whilst economic growth remains stagnant at best. Furthermore, as armed groups establish their own regions of governance, the decentralization of power will likely result in further economic decline and civilian safety. According to the United States Institute of Peace, the junta’s inability to maintain control over specific regions controlled by ethnic minority groups has also destabilized trade in the region, led to increased crime, starvation, and homelessness. It must be acknowledged that the current form of governance in Myanmar is unacceptable from a moral and political standpoint. The Guardian reports that since the military took over in 2021, 4,000 civilians have died at the hands of the military, and the possibility that crimes against humanity have been committed has been raised by multiple rights groups. Yet the success of armed groups in rebelling against the military has and will continue to only increase these issues. Decentralization has rarely worked in global politics, and although the prospect of multiple ethnicities experiencing self-determination appears a flowery and conclusive concept, the inevitable consequences are frightening. Even in scenarios where ethnic, religious, or racial groups have managed to split into their self-governing states, it is not a process that has occurred peacefully or accompanied by economic growth. Whether it is an artificial split, a practical split, or a blend of both, the potential for genocide, protracted conflict, and continued oppression persists. Examples of these are plentiful, whether it be Yugoslavia in the early 1990s or Palestine in the 1940s, these regions still maintain incredibly volatile conflicts. Myanmar appears to be set on the same path if multiple ethnic groups continue to establish power within their own regions and decentralize Myanmar as a whole.
It becomes increasingly imperative that the U.S. and other powerful actors stand by supposed liberal values and intervene. The prospect of increased instability in Myanmar is disconcerting to all actors in the region and on the international stage. Additionally, the idea that a democratic state could turn into a decentralized failed state within a decade raises serious concerns about the international community’s commitment to these ideals and capability in addressing them. Amid this crisis, China has become an increasingly relevant actor, stepping in to act as a mediator between rebel groups and the military junta, reports Reuters. Motivated by threats to trade and the potential for a refugee crisis, China has acted in its own self-interest in attempting to stabilize the conflict as much as possible. This contrasts sharply with the actions of important Western actors, who provide only lip service to the values of democratic freedom and anti-authoritarianism that they purportedly espouse. Sanctions and condemnations are insufficient in providing necessary change, and China’s proposed rules of order in international politics will only gain more traction the longer the West allows states to drift further towards authoritarian structures. Advocacy for the restoration of Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic government should become a focal point of the Biden administration’s Southeast Asian foreign policy agenda. If it does not, the U.S. becomes complicit in the demise of yet another potential democracy..."
Source/publisher:
The Diplomatic Envoy - Seton Hall University
Date of publication:
2024-02-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"The United States strongly condemns the January 7 airstrike on Kanan Village in the Sagaing Region town of Khampat, Burma. Reporting indicates this latest attack killed at least 17 civilians, including nine children. This is yet another example of the horrors experienced by people in Burma since the military coup and the violence it has fueled across the country.
We reiterate our call on the Burma military regime to cease all forms of violence, free all those unjustly detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. The regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including with regard to the protection of civilians.
We reaffirm our continued support of the Five Point Consensus, and stress that the United Nations Security Council must fully implement Resolution 2669 and also consider further actions to stem the regime’s violence. The United States underlines its commitment to using all tools at the Security Council’s disposal to support ASEAN’s efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis, a commitment affirmed by the vast majority of the Security Council.
The United States will continue to support peace, human rights, and an inclusive dialogue to promote genuine and inclusive democracy in Burma through our work with members of the Security Council, other UN Member States, and regional partners, including ASEAN.
The people of Burma, after nearly three years since the military wrested power away from the democratically elected government, are looking to us all for support. The international community must step up and speak out..."
Source/publisher:
United States Mission to the United Nations Office of Press and Public Diplomacy
Date of publication:
2024-01-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"This decision, mandating service for men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27, comes amidst intensifying conflicts with resistance forces and widespread international condemnation of the junta’s legitimacy and actions. As a result, a significant exodus towards relative safety is underway, with Thailand becoming a primary destination for those fleeing conscription and conflict.
Thailand stands at a crossroads, presented with a humanitarian dilemma and a strategic opportunity. The flow of young, potentially skilled individuals from Myanmar poses a question of not just moral duty but also of long-term benefits to the Thai workforce and society at large. It is a moment that calls for compassion, foresight, and leadership from the Thai government and its people.
First and foremost, welcoming the young refugees from Myanmar is a humanitarian imperative. These individuals are seeking to escape serving a regime that has been widely criticized for its oppressive tactics, human rights abuses, and illegitimate claim to power..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Now
Date of publication:
2024-02-16
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese refugees in other countries, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
more
Description:
"Several senior members have split from the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and formed a splinter group to fight Myanmar’s military regime.
Calling itself the New Mon State Party (Anti-Dictatorship), the group is led by former NMSP secretary-general Nai Zeya, deputy commander-in-chief Brigadier-General Salun Htaw, and executive committee member and internal affairs department head Nai Banyar Lel.
The breakaway group said they would join with anti-regime forces including the parallel National Unity Government.
The breakaway came after the NMSP resolved at its 11th general meeting to continue abiding by the ceasefire deal it signed with Myanmar’s military in 2012.
The NMSP signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2018.
The party has maintained ties with the junta since the 2021 coup to avoid armed conflict and the resultant suffering for Mon people.
However, the splinter group’s deputy leader, Nai Banyar Lel, said dialogue with the regime would not help to establish a federal union that ensured national equality and self-determination.
NMSP and regime officials have held three rounds of talks since the coup amid deep disagreement over troop deployments, Nai Banyar Lel explained.
“Integration with the regime means our troops must be under their command. They suggested that older members of our party should establish a political party and do business, while younger members could serve in the Myanmar military. So, I don’t believe we can achieve our aspirations by holding talks with the regime. My view is we will only be able to achieve our goal when the military dictatorship ceases to exist,” he said.
The ceasefire had proven meaningless when the regime conducted air and artillery strikes on Mon villages while holding talks with the NMSP, he added.
Nai Banyar Lel said his group would carry out military operations in areas where the NMSP is not active.
Ethnic Mon scholar Dr. Pyinnar Mon, an Indiana University-educated doctor of political science and executive director of the Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center, said the two groups still share a common goal of federal democracy.
“One group wants to establish federalism by fighting, and the other wants to establish federalism via political dialogue. Their political objectives are the same, and they only need to avoid confrontation with each other,” he said.
The regime has not yet responded to news of the Mon breakaway.
The regime has been shunned by all Myanmar ethnic groups, including majority Bamars, as well as the international community, said Nai Banyar Lel.
“This is the biggest popular revolt since independence. The Myanmar military is in chaos and faces a growing crisis. So, today is the best time to eliminate the military dictatorship,” he said.
The Irrawaddy was unable to obtain comment from NMSP spokesman Nai Aung Mangay about the breakaway..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political analysis of Burma and the region, Mon (cultural, political)
Language:
more
Description:
"The junta’s Labor Ministry has instructed overseas employment agencies to suspend recruitment drives as of Feb. 13, according to the Myanmar Overseas Employment Agencies Association (MOEAA).
The suspension comes after the regime introduced mandatory military service for the young population, which is expected to trigger a stampede for the border. Nationwide, 14 million people – 6.3 million men and 7.7 million women – are eligible for conscription, according to the 2019 census.
The ministry has not issued an official suspension notice but instead replied to agencies seeking permission to post recruitment letters that it had stopped accepting international employment offers.
“The ministry said it had suspended accepting job offers from around the world as of Feb. 13. It did not say how long the suspension would last,” said an MOEAA official.
The abrupt suspension has created problems for employment agencies, said a manager.
“We have to spend a lot of time to get a letter of job offers. We have to negotiate an agreement with the foreign employer, and there is a long process before we get the contract to hire people for him. The ministry has now suspended it abruptly, which causes problems for us,” said the manager.
The order does not affect people hired for job contracts posted before Feb. 13.
Employment agencies send 500 to 800 legal migrant workers daily to Thailand under a government-to-government memorandum of understanding. Between 200 and 300 people are sent daily to other countries, including Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Japan.
The conscription law, which was activated by the regime on Feb. 10, requires all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to serve in the Myanmar military for two to five years.
The call-up to fight in a military widely reviled for perpetrating countless war crimes on civilians is expected to accelerate young people’s plans to study or work abroad..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, International labour standards and mechanisms
Language:
more
Sub-title:
After a recent junta announcement on mandatory service, youths look for ways to get to Thailand.
Description:
"Young people in Myanmar’s commercial capital are lining up outside the Thai embassy to apply for visas and looking for other ways to leave the country following an announcement from the junta regime that it will call up conscripts for mandatory military service.
Starting in April, about 5,000 people each month will be enrolled into the military to perform “national defense duties,” junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun said in an interview with BBC Burmese.
Zaw Min Tun told several junta-affiliated newspapers on Thursday that as many as 50,000 men will be recruited this year into the military, which has suffered numerous battlefield defeats and large-scale surrenders in recent months.
In Yangon, young people have already started heading for the Thai border, which is about 420 km (260 miles) away, several residents told Radio Free Asia.
About 50 people – most of them young – had already formed a queue in front of the Thai embassy at 5:30 a.m. on Thursday, one Yangon resident, who didn’t want to be named for security reasons, said to RFA.
Additionally, young people riding on city buses are talking to each other about entering the Buddhist monkhood to avoid military service if they get out of the country, the Yangon resident said.
They all seemed deeply worried, he added.
Because of the recent rush of visa applicants, the Thai embassy said in a statement on Wednesday that only 400 applicants would be accepted per day.
Also, the Buddhist University in Thailand’s city of Chiang Mai, which has an affordable tuition fee, announced Wednesday that it is no longer accepting applicants from Myanmar because it had already received too many applications.
‘They have lost their way’
An poor job market and the turmoil of the ongoing civil war had already made it very difficult for young people to build a life for themselves in the country, a young man who also lives in Yangon told RFA.
Now, with the enforcement of the conscription law, young people know for certain that they don’t have a future in Myanmar, the young man said.
“All of them are preparing to leave the country because there are no jobs for them,” he said. “Now, with the implementation of this conscription law, they have lost their way.”
The young man said he had been searching for jobs in Japan, but is now focusing on finding work in neighboring Thailand.
“I heard that the junta is blocking workers from going abroad,” he said. “I also heard that [they block] new job offers by foreign countries. It’s hard to leave the country.”
Sai Kyi Zin Soe, a political commentator, said that targeting young people – who typically have the highest productivity among all age groups – will damage the country’s economy and cause widespread resentment.
“It is natural for many people who have their own goals in life to avoid armed conflicts,” he said. “They are educated young people. They can learn things. We see the targeting of this age group for use in conflict – to gain political advantage – as a very bad move.”
State-level committees
Zaw Min Tun’s comments on Thursday about conscription followed a Feb. 10 announcement from junta leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing that a military service law enacted in 2010 by a previous military regime would go into effect immediately.
Enforcement of the law comes as anti-junta forces and ethnic armies have scored significant victories against the military in Myanmar’s civil war, which escalated in October 2023 when the rebel groups joined together and launched new offensives, causing significant casualties.
Under Min Aung Hlaing’s directive, Burmese men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 could face up to five years in prison if they refuse to serve for two years.
Doctors, engineers and technicians – aged 18-45 for men and 18-35 for women – must also serve, but up to five years.
In the initial rounds, fewer women will be recruited, Zaw Min Tun told state media.
The junta will appoint a central committee and regional- and state-level committees to oversee the conscription, according to Zaw Min Tun. But because the junta would have to provide salaries, food and other items, the military won’t need more than 50,000 recruits, he said.
“I want to emphasize that we will not call up everyone who is eligible for military service,” he said.
The CIA World Factbook estimated that last year Myanmar’s military had somewhere between 150,000 and 400,000 personnel.
The Washington-based U.S. Institute of Peace has suggested that 21,000 service personnel have been lost through casualties, desertions and defections since the February 2021 military coup d’etat, leaving an effective force of about 150,000..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Other laws impacting on civil and political rights
Language:
more
Description:
" Three years ago today, on February 1, 2021, Myanmar’s military junta seized power in a violent and deadly coup. Since then, the junta has escalated its attacks, both online and offline, perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity, violating human rights every day.
Despite thunderous silence and dwindling support from so-called global allies, the people of Myanmar are unwavering in their determination to courageously resist the military, and take back control of their country. 2024 is a critical turning point in their fight. The international community must urgently stand with the people of Myanmar, offering not only solidarity, but also concrete resources to help topple the military junta and consign this troubled chapter to the history books.
The Myanmar people’s resistance to dictatorship needs international support to dismantle the digital “iron curtain” built by the junta to track and target the people of Myanmar. Otherwise these same people will continue to be crushed and terrorised by a surveillance state intent on destroying lives, livelihoods, and any resistance to their oppressive rule. Only when these oppressive structures fall can the people of Myanmar rebuild a new country that reflects their vision and courage.
A digital “iron curtain”
The military’s complete control of Myanmar’s telecommunications network allows it to use internet shutdowns and communications blackouts to facilitate vicious attacks and block humanitarian aid from reaching those who need it. In 2023, the military weaponised shutdowns and blackouts, especially in conflict zones where resistance is strong. Reports reveal that, before bombing towns and villages, the military frequently uses jamming devices installed on military scout aircraft to block all communication networks.
This means that people seeking safe paths to flee the conflict are unable to communicate with each other, wounded people cannot seek medical assistance, and families are cut off from critical humanitarian support.
It is difficult to document the exact number of regular internet shutdowns imposed by the junta, but they likely number in the hundreds. According to a report by the Myanmar Internet Project, 11 out of 14 states have experienced shutdowns, with prolonged shutdowns common in areas of escalating conflict, including Bago, Kachin, Karenni, Kayin, Magywa, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan.
The rise of a surveillance state
Under the guise of creating e-government projects, Myanmar’s military is raising funds and collecting resources to strengthen its massive surveillance infrastructure, pushing forward with data collection projects like the national census, e-ID system, and the establishment of a “National Database”.
In 2023, the military announced that it was developing an e-government masterplan to provide public services and sought support from international organisations, including the UNFPA, to do so. Despite no such support being provided, the military continues to seek support from other countries, including in the form of domestic and foreign technologies to run the projects.
The military needs to track and target those who oppose its reign of terror. So far, the military’s e-ID system contains the personal data of 52 million people (including six types of geographic data) and data from over 13 million households. It’s also thought that the military has collected biometric data from 2.1 million people in Myanmar — this includes fingerprints, facial features, and eye pupil scans. The military also surveils people in several other ways:
Checkpoints restrict people’s right to freedom of movement, with unlawful arrests occurring frequently.
Random security checks, including indiscriminate inspections of ID documents and phones and other devices, are conducted on the street.
Financial activities are monitored; Radio Free Asia reports that more than 700 mobile payment account were closed in the month of May 2023 alone.
The international community must stop all forms of support that allow the military to strengthen its surveillance infrastructure against the people, even as they present them as “pro-people” propaganda projects.
An ongoing campaign of terror
The military is weaponising the law to violate fundamental human rights, including the right to information and freedom of expression, as part of efforts to legitimise its abusive acts:
Failure to register a SIM can put you in prison for up to six months. The military is using section 72 of the Telecommunications Law to justify the SIM registration order.
The military has adopted extensive by-laws to the Anti-Terrorism Law, giving them the power to censor activities against the military, intercept electronic communication data, and obtain people’s location data. At the start of 2024, documentary filmmaker, Shin Daewe, was sentenced to life in prison under this law.
The military is criminalising online expression, criticism, and journalism. Data for Myanmar shows that an average of 65 individuals per month were detained for criticising the junta and supporting anti-juta activities on social media platforms, with more than 1,300 arrested for their social media content. Sixty-four journalists are in detention, making Myanmar one of the world’s biggest jailers of journalists, second only to China. In 2023, many artists, celebrities, and social influencers changed their Facebook profile pictures to black in solidarity with the victims of military atrocities. Many individuals who commented, liked, or shared posts or news reports about anti-coup movement activities were arrested. Byuhar, a hip-hop singer who criticised the military during a Facebook Live for its failure to provide a regular electricity supply was given a 20 year prison sentence. Meanwhile U Ye Htut, who served as Information Minister under the Thein Sein government in the early 2000s, was given a ten year jail sentence for his Facebook post criticising the military’s policies.
To push back against the junta’s increasing campaign of repression against the people of Myanmar, the international community must:
Establish and commit resources for a coordinated action plan to provide the people of Myanmar with alternative access to telecommunication services. Local communities in Myanmar struggle to use satellite communications or other means to resist the military’s control and authoritarian grip over communication networks. With a coordinated action plan, people in Myanmar can push back against worsening digital authoritarianism.
In areas of crisis and conflict, recognize and fund alternative access to the internet and other communication channels as critical tools for protecting lives and fundamental human rights.
Cut off or prevent financial, technical, and other forms of support that benefit the military’s massive surveillance infrastructure. In 2023, the military had difficulty securing funding from other countries or from international organisations for its e-government projects. This was a welcome step and must continue. The international community must deepen its efforts to stop the sale of dual-use surveillance technologies to Myanmar.
Push tech and telecom companies to uphold human rights and make them accountable when they fail to provide effective remedy for violations. Governments must not allow companies to profit from the suffering of Myanmar’s people.
Stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar. The international community must provide support to the people of Myanmar so they can resist the abuses of the military, while addressing the emerging challenges of building a new nation state.
Companies must:
Urgently explain how they conduct due diligence to ensure that their operations and products in Myanmar do not negatively or adversely impact human rights. Telcos must do this without delay, as their partnerships with the military significantly enable the military junta’s human rights abuses. Companies producing or selling other types of technologies, including dual-use surveillance technologies, must stop all transactions involving the military and its allies.
If leaving the market becomes the ultimate decision after a thorough human rights due diligence process, ensure that comprehensive remedies are in place to address the human rights impacts of the departure. Companies must be held accountable for irresponsible exits out of areas of crisis and conflict.
Conduct heightened due diligence to ensure that their products and services are not used in violation of human rights by the military or by military-controlled institutions, and immediately remove these products or services from the market if they are being used to facilitate rights abuses. Invest significant resources to implement human rights-based content moderation practices, data protection policies, and privacy safeguards to resist increasing attempts to extend surveillance, censorship, and rights violations.
Pursue genuine public engagement in its decision-making process and implement effective remedies when human rights violations are committed..."
Source/publisher:
Access Now
Date of publication:
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"Regarding international concerns about online scam activities, including illegal casino gambling along the border of Karen State, the position of the Karen National Union (KNU) is as follows. 1. The emergence of online scam activities and illegal casino gambling is rooted in the poor system and corruption practiced by the successive governments of Burma (Myanmar) and is because of the lack of responsibility, accountability and rule of law of the successive governments. 2. The SAC is directly benefiting from these illicit businesses and are protecting and supporting them from behind. This has resulted in various social problems, not only for the Karen people in Karen State, but also for all those involved, and brings instability to the region, threatening global financial security and economic stability. 3. The KNU is absolutely opposed to any illicit business and is willing to combat the online scams and illegal casino gambling businesses. 4. The KNU is ready to cooperate with neighbouring countries and international organisations to clear out the online scam activities and illegal casino gambling businesses..."
Source/publisher:
Karen National Union
Date of publication:
2024-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Karen National Union (KNU), Illegal Economy - general, Gambling
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
192.08 KB
more
Description:
"A military coup in Myanmar in February 2021 has led to widespread conflict and has had a severe impact on its health care system. Many health care workers have been involved in civil disobedience and protests against the coup, including boycotts. Organisations such as the WHO and Insecurity Insight have also reported on attacks on health care in the country. Since February 2021, the UK government has provided over £120mn in humanitarian and development assistance in Myanmar.
On 29 of February 2024, Lord Crisp (Crossbench) is scheduled to ask the following question for short debate:
Lord Crisp to ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the role that the United Kingdom could play in supporting health workers in Myanmar, and contributing to the reconstruction of the country’s health system.
1. The 2021 military coup
Headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s National League for Democracy (NLD) took power following elections in 2015 after decades of military rule.[1] Elections in 2020 led to further NLD gains and the military made an accusation of electoral fraud. In February 2021, Myanmar’s military commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing launched a military coup that overthrew the elected government.
A civil disobedience movement (CDM) developed following the coup. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H Andrews, stated that this led to the development of a national unity government:
Following the formation of CDM, members of parliament who had been elected in the November national elections but prevented from taking their oath of office by the junta established the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. From the Committee emerged the broader and more inclusive National Unity Government in April, to provide leadership, build international support and serve as the legitimate representatives of the people of Myanmar.[2]
Militias formed in opposition to the coup, including as part of the ‘People’s Defence Force’ (PDF) under the National Unity Government.[3]
The UK government has said that a wide range of people were involved in the protests:
In response to military rule, people from a range of backgrounds and professions took part in large scale protests across Myanmar throughout 2021. Sources differ on the scale of the protests from daily figures of 10s to 100s of thousands depending on the location and timing. However, the UN summarised that by March 2021 millions of people had protested across 100s of towns. ACLED [The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project] recorded over 6,000 anti-coup demonstration events throughout 2021. In 2022, direct action continued but evolved to include civil disobedience, flash mobs, silent strikes and smaller anti-junta protests across the country.[4]
The response of the military has included violence and arrests:
Military response to opposition includes violent oppression of peaceful protests, arbitrary arrests of protestors and family members, property raids and seizures (particularly of NLD members), and to a lesser extent enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Threats, harassment, violence, and direct attacks occur against those associated with or perceived to support pro-democratic or anti-junta groups, and on civilians in areas where there is conflict between the military and armed groups.[5]
In a written statement in February 2023 marking two years since the coup, minister of state at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Anne-Marie Trevelyan, said the coup had led to millions needing humanitarian assistance:
The consequences for domestic and regional stability are clear; over 17 million people are now in need of humanitarian assistance—a staggering increase of 16 million in just two years; over 1.5 million people are displaced within Myanmar, with a million more in neighbouring Bangladesh, Thailand and India; illicit economies are thriving; and democratic gains have been reversed. Recent figures indicated Myanmar suffered some of the most intense violence in the world in 2022, with conflict-related deaths second only to Ukraine. There is a clear trajectory of increasing violence, human rights violations and abuses, to which the UK has responded with a range of tools.[6]
Ms Trevelyan said the UK condemned the “brutal actions” of the military regime and supported “all those working peacefully to restore democracy in Myanmar”. She said that the military must engage with the National Unity Government and respect the “democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar”:
We support all those working peacefully to restore democracy in Myanmar. The military must engage in inclusive and meaningful dialogue with the full range of opposition voices, including the National Unity Government (NUG), and respect the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar. In 2022, UK ministers spoke regularly with counterparts in the NUG. We call on the military to immediately end its campaign of violence and release the thousands of people it has detained arbitrarily, including Aung San Suu Kyi. The military must engage in inclusive and meaningful dialogue with the full range of opposition voices in order to respect the federal, democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar.[7]
In a January 2024 answer to a written question asking when the UK government had last raised the treatment of pro-democracy advocates in Myanmar at the UN, the government said it had co-sponsored a resolution at the UN general assembly and supported the International Criminal Courts investigation of acts committed against the Rohingya:
On 15 November 2023 the UK co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution calling on the Myanmar military to release all those who have been arbitrarily detained on political grounds. We will continue to seek opportunities to raise our concerns at the UN and other multilateral fora. We support the International Criminal Court Prosecutor’s initiative to investigate acts committed against the Rohingya. In November, we jointly filed a declaration of intervention at the International Court of Justice in The Gambia’s case alleging Myanmar has perpetrated genocide against the Rohingya, in order to set out our interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Genocide Convention before the Court.[8]
2. Impact of the coup on Myanmar’s health system
The World Health Organization (WHO) has said “the crisis has spread in such a way” that the entire population of Myanmar, 56 million people, are now facing some level of need.[9] The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has stated that a third of the population, 18.6 million people, are now estimated to be in humanitarian need.[10] The OCHA’s ‘Humanitarian needs and response plan’ (December 2023) for Myanmar estimates that 12 million people will need humanitarian health assistance in 2024.
The OCHA has stated that whilst the provision of public essential health services has “partly resumed” in large urban areas, overall access to health care, essential medicines and medical supplies continues to be “fragile, fragmented, and uneven”.[11] The OCHA says that this is exacerbated by long-term inequalities and that the health system is deeply politicised, which is affecting the return of health workers. This in turn hinders access to health care particularly for girls, women, people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups. The WHO has also reported that whilst the situation has improved in some large cities, overall health service access is still severely constrained:
The health services remain significantly impacted by the increasing conflicts and security and economic stress. While a reversal in the trend in the provision of services is observed in some large cities, such as Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon, since the pandemic and the events of February 2021, the overall access to health services remains severely constrained and fragmented, with a heavy reliance on local partners supporting their own communities.[12]
The WHO has said that prior to the current situation Myanmar had made progress in reducing the prevalence of communicable diseases, including malaria and tuberculosis.[13] The WHO said Myanmar had also shown “remarkable progress with regard to key sustainable development goals (SDG) targets of maternal mortality, newborn mortality and child mortality”.[14] However, it has stated that the established monitoring systems, such as District Health Information System 2, that allowed for an evidence-based determination of the functionality of Myanmar’s current health system “are non-functional”. The WHO’s country office therefore developed “alternative, ad hoc monitoring systems” to allow it to monitor access to health services:
The data had been collected by observation from 360 townships by WHO field-based staff and Myanmar Country Office staff since April 2021. WHO, in collaboration with the World Bank, has conducted a phone survey across Myanmar to analyse the current situation regarding access to health care and medicines, and private sector providers’ response. Increased challenges to availability and affordability of essential medicines were observed while difficulties in transporting supplies to conflict-affected areas were also noticed.[15]
The WHO reported that the Covid-19 pandemic had impacted medical training resulting in the “closure of all training institutions throughout the year 2020 with no graduation of the health workforce cadres, adding to the constraints”.[16]
The WHO has characterised health care in Myanmar as facing the following challenges:
In Myanmar, people are facing heavily restricted access to formal health services, including those run by public hospitals and de facto government clinics. Moreover, a large share of households continues to depend on health care services that are provided by private health care facilities while self-care remains a key approach adopted by them. Additionally, ethnic health organizations (EHOs) continue to fill significant gaps in health care provision. Lack of primary health care in villages, high cost of secondary health care at hospitals and movement restrictions in availing tertiary health care in capital cities continue to hinder access to health services. These restrictions are causing life-threatening suffering, notably mental and psychosocial burden, and death from medical emergencies. Minorities and other ethnically vulnerable populations continue to face severe constraints and a fragmented health care system in the wake of Covid-19 and the political changes in February 2021. Although Myanmar was hit by the deadliest wave of Covid-19 during June–September 2021, severely disrupting health sector functioning, the third and fourth waves in 2022 continued to put the health system under strain. The health system was crippled by a limited bed capacity, challenges to making oxygen and essential medicines available, and an inadequate health workforce, leading to excess death and disability. However, since then, the testing capacity and the vaccination rate have increased, which in turn have improved the level and development of seroprevalence.[17]
The WHO has said that nearly half of Myanmar’s population (46%) is reported to be facing poverty, with “serious repercussions for the cost of health care”. It has said, that particularly in conflict areas, access to health care has been put out of the reach of common people by:
significant shortages of key essential medicines
continuing supply chain disruptions
high inflation rates (about 20% in 2022–23)
The WHO also said that a “continued depletion of tax revenue” had resulted in budgets cuts to the health sector.[18]
The WHO has said the “total collapse” of the health management information system has meant that the availability of data is constrained. This has led to health programmes related to diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDs seeing a reverse in data collection and analysis used to monitor these diseases and assist with their prevention and control. The WHO has said that a new law had forced several NGOs to either shut down or reduce their operations:
Declaration of a new Registration Law, mandating civil society organizations including health facilities and associations in 2022, has forced a sizeable number of NGOs to either shut down or partially close operations. The new law has crippled their functions, restricting access to financial resources from donors, in a considerable manner.[19]
The UNHCR stated that the law made “registration compulsory for both national and international non-governmental organizations and associations”.[20]
2.1 Health workers in Myanmar
Particular concern has been raised about the impact of the current situation on health workers in Myanmar. BBC News reported that organised resistance to the February 2021 coup “started with health care workers announcing a boycott of state-run hospitals”.[21] The WHO has also said that health workers “were among the first to express dissent with regard to the military takeover through civil disobedience; this involved 50% of the health workforce in the public sector”.[22] It said this led to a “significantly reduced health workforce in the public sector”. The WHO has said that the ‘national health workforce account’ could not be updated due to “limitation in engagement with the de facto authority since 2021”.
There have also been attacks on health services following the coup. The WHO has said that there have been 385 attacks on health care reported via its surveillance system since the coup:
Since February 2021, more than 385 attacks on health care have been documented via the WHO’s Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA). These attacks have led to at least 58 deaths and 188 injuries. Each attack is deeply concerning as it affects access to and availability of essential health services–especially for women, children and other vulnerable groups.[23]
The non-governmental organisation Insecurity Insight has reported that there have been 1,087 attacks on Myanmar’s health system since the 1 February 2021 coup.[24] It has said “at least 880 health workers have been arrested, 97 killed and 117 injured undermining health care providers’ ability to maintain safe staffing levels to effectively meet patient needs”.
The OCHA has said that whilst the numbers of attacks reported differ between organisations they continue to be among the highest globally:
Attacks on health care are monitored by a number of organizations, notably World Health Organization and the non-governmental organization (NGO) Insecurity Insight. Across all tracking efforts, reported attacks on Myanmar’s health care system continue to be among the highest globally in 2023, varying between at least 66 to 330 depending on the different definitions and levels of verification used. Even considering likely underreporting, indicative records shows that at least 14 health workers were killed and 21 wounded in 2023, with local aid workers most at risk.[25]
The non-governmental organisation Physicians for Human Rights has said that attacks on health care workers “include arbitrary arrests, detentions, and violence committed against all types of health care workers, ranging from doctors and nurses to emergency medics and volunteers”.[26] In a report published in January 2022, Physicians for Human Rights reported that at first attacks were primarily targeted at health workers involved in nationwide protests:
Initially, attacks primarily involved Myanmar security forces taking action against health workers participating in nationwide protests, the Civil Disobedience Movement [CDM], and the provision of medical care to injured protesters and bystanders.[27]
However, the organisation has said that over time the attacks changed:
Over time health care workers believed to have ties to the NUG [National Unity Government] or PDFs [People’s Defence Force] were targeted, including during raids of health facilities and charity organizations accused of aiding injured PDF members or supporters. Attacks by other armed actors on health care workers have emerged, particularly against those who have continued or returned to their civil servant roles and have reportedly pressured staff participating in CDM to return to work, or are believed to be military informants.[28]
The OCHA’s humanitarian response plan has said that an estimated 372 medical teams are needed to meet humanitarian needs across Myanmar, “with a current gap of 202 teams”.[29] The OCHA has said the effective provision of health assistance is being undermined by a series of factors, including armed conflict and limited funding:
Amid the continuation and escalation of armed conflict, limited funding and legal, administrative and security barriers persist in undermining the effective provision of adequate health assistance to an increasingly vulnerable population.[30]
Number of workers in Myanmar’s health system before the coup
In a section on the status of Myanmar’s health system “pre-crisis”, the WHO expressed concern that the density of health workers in the country was one of the lowest in the South-East Asia region.
Prior to 2021, the WHO had observed a density of 17.8 health workers per 10,000 population in Myanmar. It has said an average of 22.8 health workers per 10,000 population is required to deliver a package of health services, compatible with the health Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).[31] The MDGs were 8 goals that UN members agreed to try to achieve by the year 2015.[32] They have been superseded by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[33] The WHO now estimates that 44.5 health workers per 10,000 population are required to “adapt services to the standards” of the SDGs. However, the WHO has described Myanmar as having one of the lowest health worker availability levels in the region, with issues including the even deployment of staff:
Comparing health worker densities across countries in the South-East Asia Region and with the thresholds just described, Myanmar is one of the countries with the lowest health worker availability; it is only above Bangladesh. Beyond the overall limited availability of human resources in the system, deployment is also suboptimal since it is based on norms linked to facility nomenclature and size rather than on need or performance. The resulting allocation leads to insufficient personnel in some areas and exceeding capacity in others, along with inadequate skill mix, as proven by the limited number of complete critical care teams to run ICU beds during the COVID-19 crisis.[34]
3. UK government assistance to Myanmar
In March 2023, Lord Crisp (Crossbench) asked the government in an oral question what support it was providing for health workers in Myanmar “who are caring for patients outside the areas controlled by the military government of that country”.[35]
Responding for the government, then minister of state at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Lord Goldsmith, said that Myanmar’s health system had been in crisis since the coup and the UK was a leading donor on supporting health care needs in the country:
My Lords, Myanmar’s public health care system has been in crisis since the coup. We are concerned about Myanmar’s level of basic health care services and childhood immunisation rates. The UK is a leading donor on supporting health care needs in that country. This financial year, the UK has provided £13.95mn for health care in Myanmar, which is being delivered by the UN, by civil society and by ethnic health care organisations. This support is saving the lives of vulnerable women and children.[36]
Lord Goldsmith also said the UK government supported health professionals in Myanmar who were risking their lives:
We applaud the Myanmar health professionals who are risking their lives to continue treating patients. We commend the NHS volunteers who are sharing their skills and knowledge with colleagues and friends in Myanmar, taking huge risks in doing so. I absolutely pay tribute to them. Since the coup, we have provided around £100mn to support those in need of humanitarian assistance, to deliver health care and education for the most vulnerable and to protect civic space. In 2021–22, we provided nearly £50mn in aid to Myanmar, including £24mn of life-saving assistance for 600,000 people. I am not in a position to comment on future expenditure, but I think it is very clear from our recent track record that this remains a priority focus for the FCDO.[37]
As part of its approach to increase transparency in the government’s aid spending, the FCDO publishes the ‘UK–Myanmar Development Partnership Summary’ (17 July 2023). This provides an overview of the department’s development activity, development priorities, and financial information (including budgets and breakdowns of spend) in Myanmar. This sets out information on key programmes, including the ‘Myanmar-UK health partnership programme’:
[The] Myanmar-UK Health Partnership programme (MUHP)—£6mn—aims to promote equitable access to health services for people from the most disadvantaged areas in Myanmar—especially in ethnic and conflict-affected areas—and to enhance the health partnership between the UK and Myanmar. The key intended impacts of the programme are: a reduction in maternal, newborn and child illness and deaths; and a reduction in the burden of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), drug-resistant tuberculosis and malaria through supporting stronger local health responses including in partnership with UK institutions.[38]
In December 2023, the government said it had provided over £120mn in humanitarian and development assistance in Myanmar, “focussed on life-saving assistance, emergency health care, water, hygiene and sanitation services, and education”.[39] In July 2023, the government provided the following breakdown of spending on official development assistance (ODA) by year:
From 1 Feb 2021 to 31 Mar 2022: we provided £8mn
In financial year 2021/22: we provided £49.5mn
In financial year 2022/23: we provided £57.3mn
In financial year 2023/24: our allocated budget is £30.1mn (we have spent £5.13mn so far).[40]
4. Further reading
OCHA, ‘Myanmar humanitarian update No 35: 2023 year in review’, 12 January 2024
Medicins San Frontieres, ‘Health workers struggle to respond amid severe restrictions in Rakhine state’, 16 January 2024
Physicians for Human Rights, ‘“Our health workers are working in fear”: After Myanmar’s military coup, one year of targeted violence against health care’, January 2022..."
Source/publisher:
House of Lords Library - UK Parliament
Date of publication:
2024-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Public Health
Language:
more
Description:
"The government in Myanmar has announced compulsory military service for all young men and women as the country's turmoil continues.
The army seized power from the civilian government in a coup in February 2021.
But in recent months it has been defeated in a series of battles with ethnic militias and anti-coup fighters.
The move announced on Saturday will require all men aged 18-35, and women aged 18-27, to serve at least two years under military command.
No further details have been released. But in a statement, the junta said its defence ministry would "release necessary bylaws, procedures, announcements orders, notifications and instructions".
The military has faced a series of humiliating defeats in recent months.
At the end of last year, three ethnic insurgent armies in Shan State - supported by other armed groups that oppose the government - captured border crossings and roads carrying most of the overland trade with China.
Last month, the Arakan Army (AA) said it had taken control of Paletwa in Chin State and the last military post in Paletwa township, the hilltop base at Meewa.
The military-installed president of Myanmar, Myint Swe - a former general - has previously warned the country is in danger of breaking apart if the government could not bring fighting under control.
A law allowing conscription was introduced in Myanamar in 2010, but has not been not enforced until now.
Under the legislation, the terms of service can be extended up to a period of five years during a state of emergency. Those ignoring summons to serve can instead be jailed for the same period.
A state of emergency was announced by the country's junta in 2021 and was recently extended for a further six months.
Myanmar had endured almost 50 years of rule under oppressive military regimes before the move towards democracy in 2011.
On 1 February 2021, the military announced it had taken control of the country.
Disorders and fighting have affected the country ever since, with more than one million people being displaced and thousands killed.
The performance of the army in its recent battles with ethnic armed groups - some of which have ended in defeats and retreats - has sparked criticisms and doubts among its supporters..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of publication:
2024-02-11
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Sub-title:
State media report all men aged 18-35 and women 18-27 must serve for up to two years and up to five years in a state of emergency
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta has declared mandatory military service for all young men and women, state media said, as it struggles to contain armed rebel forces fighting for greater autonomy in various parts of the country.
All men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 must serve for up to two years, while specialists like doctors aged up to 45 must serve for three years. The service can be extended to a total of five years in the ongoing state of emergency, state media said on Saturday.
The junta “issued the notification of the effectiveness of People’s Military Service Law starting from 10 February 2024,” the junta’s information team said in a statement.
Myanmar has been gripped by chaos since the military seized power from an elected government in a 2021 coup, which sparked mass protests and a crackdown on dissent.
Three years on, the junta is struggling to crush widespread armed opposition to its rule. Since October, the Tatmadaw, as the military is known, has suffered personnel losses while battling a coordinated offensive by an alliance of three ethnic minority insurgent groups, as well as allied pro-democracy fighters who have taken up arms against the junta.
The success of this offensive and the military’s failure to mount a counterattack has dented morale among low- and mid-level officers, according to several military sources, all of whom requested anonymity.
Analysts have said the Tatmadaw is struggling to recruit soldiers and has begun forcing non-combat personnel to the frontline.
A “national military service system involving all people is essential because of the situation happening in our country,” junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun said in an audio message released by the information team.
A law mandating conscription was introduced in 2010 but has not been enforced until now. Those who fail to comply with the draft face imprisonment for up to five years, the legislation says.
Saturday’s statement did not give further details but said the junta’s defence ministry would “release necessary bylaws, procedures, announcements orders, notifications and instructions.”
It did not give details on how those called up would be expected to serve.
More than 4,500 people have been killed in the military’s crackdown on dissent and over 26,000 arrested, according to a local monitoring group..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication:
2024-02-11
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Other laws impacting on civil and political rights
Language:
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Feb 1 to 7, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Tanintharyi Region, and Kayin State from February 1st to 7th. 4 children died and 10 children were injured by the bomb dropping airstrike of Military Junta in Demoso Township, Kayah State on January 5th. Military Troop arrested over 300 civilians and used them as human shields from Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Mandalay Region, and Kayin State. A female political prisoner from Mandalay O Bo Prison died from a lack of medical treatment and care.
Over 8 civilians died and over 30 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 12 underaged children were injured and 9 died when the Military Junta committed abuses.7 civilians were injured and 1 died by the landmine of Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-02-09
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
350.67 KB 346.43 KB 469.63 KB
more
Description:
"When a country is strong and united, no one can manipulate and control it. But if, like Myanmar, it is weak and fragmented, this weakness will be exploited. China’s actions in Myanmar since the coup offer a textbook example of how superpowers take advantage of political crises in smaller countries to advance their own interests.
In recent months, China has intervened in northern Myanmar to consolidate and strengthen its geostrategic position in the region, where the two countries share a more than 2,000-km-long border.
There is no doubt that the West’s sanctions since the coup have weakened the economy in Myanmar and that China today is an important source of financial assistance and political backing for the regime. But when the junta was slow to respond to Beijing’s demands for a crackdown on transborder crime and online scam syndicates along the countries’ shared frontier, China decided to take concerted action.
Beijing gave its tacit approval to ethnic armed organizations based in northern Shan State to launch Operation 1027 to target “pig butchering”, as the online scam and other crime .
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Arakan Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army—who together form the Brotherhood Alliance—launched coordinated attacks against the military regime in northern Shan State in late October.
To the surprise of seasoned observers the operation was highly successful. The alliance’s forces seized Laukkai, the capital of Kokang, after about two months of fighting the regime’s troops and its allied militias.
As a result, China, in collaboration with the ethnic armies in the north, was able to crack down on the online scammers and criminal activities on the Myanmar side.
After losing a large swath of territory in northern Shan to the alliance, the regime in December asked Beijing to intervene on its behalf. Junta-appointed acting President Myint Swe commented that the offensive could “break the country into pieces” if left unchecked.
China then forcefully intervened to halt the successful offensive after the MNDAA regained Laukkai City.
In December, after the fighting spread to Rakhine State, China and the regime signed an addendum to their concession agreement for the massive China-backed deep seaport project in the state’s Kyaukphyu Township. And in late January, economic attaché Quyang Daobing of the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar met with junta investment and commerce officials to discuss cooperation on China-Myanmar megaprojects, the safety of Chinese citizens employed by those projects, and matters related to improving the quality of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor—a component of Beijing’s vast Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure development scheme—among other things.
There’s only one word for it: Ingenious. China has minimized its costs and maximized its profits. Today, its protectorates are expanding in northern Myanmar along with its control and influence over ethnic armed forces in the region.
And even as this relationship deepens, the regime continues to depend on China for investment and military supplies, not to mention political backing at the UN.
Recently, the military regime handed over to Chinese authorities six alleged bosses of online scam empires in the Kokang region of Shan State along the Chinese border. It was widely suspected that the crime syndicates had been protected by the regime.
The suspects were named in an arrest warrant issued by Chinese authorities in December for alleged involvement in online scams in Laukkai.
When Operation 1027 started, China’s official position was that easing the situation in northern Myanmar would be in the interests of all parties and conducive to peace and stability in the China-Myanmar border area. Its Foreign Ministry said continually that China and Myanmar are friendly neighbors and that China has always respected Myanmar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. To Myanmar people this all just sounded like a joke—and not a particularly funny one at that.
China maintains a number of geostrategic and economic interests in Myanmar, including infrastructure projects and a gas pipeline that connects with Yunnan Province, not to mention access to the critically important Indian Ocean, with its trade and transit routes.
Beijing will invest more in northern Shan State as the “provinces” under China’s influence become more autonomous.
The Wa and Kokang, as well as the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)—better known as the Mongla Group—are effectively dependent on China for internet services, currency, and supplies and logistics. They issue their political statements and conduct their administrations in the Chinese language. Since Operation 1027, the MNDAA has forged a stronger alliance with the Wa and its new generation of leadership, who bring strengthened military and administration capacities.
For its part, the Wa region is, in effect, a wholly autonomous buffer state between Myanmar and China with its own administration, schools, hospitals, courts and trading companies. It is like a small Chinese province, even if the Wa continue to fly the Myanmar national flag over it.
This is only the beginning. China’s influence has become so strong that, as far as its neighbors are concerned—and whether they like it or not—having a poor relationship with Beijing is simply not an option.
The Myanmar regime and the country’s ethnic forces know that China will always act in accordance with her own interests.
So, of course, do Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, but Myanmar, with all its complexity and now devastated by civil war, is in a far weaker position than its Southeast Asian neighbors.
Since the coup, only one “winner” has emerged so far—Myanmar’s powerful neighbor to the north..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-02-08
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Will Myanmar’s instability subside anytime soon?
Description:
"This year is the third anniversary of the military coup led by Myanmar’s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing that ousted the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. Over the last three years the Tatmadaw has plummeted the country into ever-increasing violence and despair.
Millions of civilians have been forced to flee from their homes because of the fighting between the Myanmar military and the opposition forces -- a collection of experienced ethnic armies, civilian militias and recently formed activist-based defence forces. Throughout the country there is a burgeoning humanitarian crisis threatening to engulf the country in serious starvation. On top of that a major economic crisis that has sent the Myanmar currency, the Kyat, tumbling -- it is now more than 3,500 kyat to the dollar: Less than half its value before the coup. Sources in the country's central bank have confirmed the lack of foreign currency has made it difficult to pay for imports.
There is an acute shortage of oil, gas, and petrol: Motorists face increasingly long waits at the pumps, and the price of fuel has sky-rocketed; electricity shortages and black-outs are worse than they have ever been -- reminiscent of the mid-1990s, when black and brown outs were endemic. Residents in Yangon and Mandalay complain that they get less than four hours of electricity a day, and even that is irregular and intermittent. In fact, some economic analysts believe the military government will run out of money by the end of February.
On the ground, only the Tatmadaw's superior air power has kept them in the game. Only concerted carpet bombing of civilian targets, which has wreaked havoc and devastation on areas deemed to be giving assistance or are sympathetic to the so-called revolutionary forces, has helped them maintain a certain degree of superiority. But even that is now under threat with the Kachin forces having downed two aircraft recently.
In the last three months, ethnic forces in the north of the country -- known as the Three brotherhood -- the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) -- have launched highly coordinated and well-planned attacks on Myanmar's Tatmadaw. During that time, the army has suffered severe losses on a scale not experienced since the days of independence. Since October 27, 2023, when the current ethnic offensive was launched, the Tatmadaw has lost nearly 40 townships, over 500 army outposts, and more than 10,000 troops have been killed, injured, or have surrendered or defected. Myanmar's military now faces an existential threat for the first time in its more than seven-decade history.
Morale and discipline within its ranks are at their lowest ebb. Changes to training schedules and military preparations in the last decade under the current commander-in-chief has left the armed forced inadequately trained and unready for armed battle. The last time the Tatmadaw was engaged in full-scale military action was in the mid-nineties against the Karen National Union -- apart from an extended skirmish against the MNDAA in 2009. The current battles in the north have left the army further demoralized. And the sentencing of the handful of commanders in charge of the recent Tatmadaw surrender to the MNDAA won't have helped morale or discipline either.
What's happened to the Tatmadaw in the last three years, especially the last three months, has been unprecedented, a former senior officer in the Tatmadaw has admitted. He blamed a lack of discipline in the lower ranks for the spate of surrenders, especially amongst the junior officers. Military families are also questioning the continued violence, fearing for their safety. The democratic forces' use of drones has been a major ingredient that has helped level the military playing field. They have proven crucial in the battle for territory, and instilled a measure of fear amongst all civilians, especially military families.
The personal safety of leading government and business figures has also become a matter of serious concern. Several prominent businessmen who fled abroad after the coup are being courted by the regime and encouraged to return. Their hesitancy to do so however was interpreted as hinging on safety concerns.
But this concern about personal safety extends right up to the very top, where it is increasingly accentuated. Sources close to top general, Min Aung Hlaing, have revealed that he has become increasingly paranoid and generally becoming more and more isolated. His concern for his personal safety has extended to having all Myanmar visitors, including the number two general, Soe Win, fully searched before they can see him. His precarious situation appears to be playing on his mind. He suffers from acute insomnia, according to sources close to the general. He cannot sleep without having an injection administered every night.
To many, Min Aung Hlaing has become the most hated and despised army commander of all time.
He is loathed throughout the ranks within the Tatmadaw. No one has a good word for him. He is universally blamed for the mess of the last three years. There is widespread ill feeling -- especially amongst nationalist Buddhist monks and the Ma Ba Tha. One of their number publicly called for Min Aung Hlaing to step down and hand power to Soe Win. He was briefly arrested after the outburst and quickly released. More crucially, Soe Win was moved from the War Office and replaced.
In the meantime, the push for Min Aung Hlaing to step down is gathering support, albeit under the surface. A group of former senior military officers, mostly associated with former president Thein Sein, are marshalling their supporters and preparing to launch a putsch. They call themselves nationalist hardliners. For the present they are biding their time to see what the early days of February bring.
Today, Min Aung Hlaing must convene the National Defense and Security Council. At that meeting he must either extend the current state of emergency for another six months or form a "civilian" provisional government to oversee the next steps towards his plans for an election, which he says will be in the first quarter of 2025. This is after a census is held this October which would pave the way for the electoral rolls to be compiled.
For the time being, all eyes are on that meeting today -- the day of the anniversary: It may help clarify the direction Myanmar's military supremo is plotting, although by the same token it may also spell the end of Min Aung Hlaing's brutal and illegal reign -- but not immediately..."
Source/publisher:
"Dhaka Tribune" (Bangladesh)
Date of publication:
2024-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"As the conflict in Myanmar enters its third year, we see an under-reported war marked by a sharp rise in the use of explosive weapons. Reports by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) indicate a 114% increase in such attacks by the military government in 2023, highlighting escalating tensions between the military, the People’s Defense Forces, and Ethnic Armed Organisations seeking autonomy. Consequently, the conflict resulted in 2,164 reported civilian casualties from explosive weapons in 2023, including 745 fatalities, reflecting a 121% and 155% increase in casualties and deaths, respectively, over 2022. The military is linked to 85% of these civilian casualties and 88% of the fatalities.
Since 2010, AOAV has recorded 1,825 explosive weapon incidents in Myanmar, leading to 4,343 civilian casualties, including 1,450 deaths. Notably, 50% of these casualties, and 51% of those fatalities, occurred in the last year alone, emphasising the conflict’s intensity.
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) identifies Myanmar as the most violent among the 50 wars it tracks globally, with an estimated death toll of at least 50,000 since the 2021 military coup, including at least 8,000 civilians.
The conflict has displaced approximately 2.3 million people, according to the United Nations, yet it has received relatively muted international attention compared to crises in Ukraine and Gaza. This discrepancy is attributed to Myanmar’s lower strategic significance to Western powers and the complexities within its borders.
Human Rights Watch has praised the resilience and grassroots resistance of Myanmar’s people against military oppression and human rights abuses. However, the international community’s focus has shifted, with criticisms of the lack of attention to Myanmar’s plight compared to other global conflicts.
The widespread use of air strikes and shelling by the military and the junta’s political isolation, dismissing diplomatic efforts by regional entities like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, have drawn criticism. The complexity of the situation and the junta’s refusal to engage in dialogue present significant challenges to resolving the conflict.
The United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has expressed deep concern over the escalating violence, appealing for the protection of non-combatants and the facilitation of humanitarian aid. The displacement crisis has grown, with two million people affected.
Recent successes of an alliance of ethnic armed groups in Shan State, along with increased operations by ethnic Karenni insurgents in Kayah State and Volunteer People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) capitalising on military setbacks, indicate a shift in the conflict’s dynamics. Despite being less experienced, PDFs have shown improved capabilities and often collaborate with seasoned ethnic soldiers.
The military’s loss of control over significant border areas and reports of low morale and recruitment challenges within its ranks suggest a strained capacity to respond effectively to the expanding resistance. The failure to counter-attack in Shan State highlights either a lack of resources or a misunderstanding of the opposition’s strength.
Overall, the conflict in Myanmar has been characterised by the military government’s tried and tested ‘Four Cuts’ strategy, targeting the civilian networks that sustain the opposition. This means, over the past three years, towns and villages, schools and hospitals, have borne the brunt of military violence.
As non-state actors continue to escalate their resistance, and the military junta escalates its own established strategies in response, civilians will inevitably continue to suffer acutely and disproportionately as a result of this devastating conflict.
Dr Iain Overton, CEO of Action on Armed Violence, warns “The conflict in Myanmar, as it enters its third year, is a tragic testament to the escalating use of explosive weaponry in warfare, marking a period of intense and under-reported violence. Our data reveals a staggering 114% increase in explosive weapon attacks by the military government in 2023 alone. This sharp escalation underscores the growing tensions between the military, the People’s Defense Forces, and Ethnic Armed Organizations. Such figures are a clear indicator of the intense suffering and instability faced by the people of Myanmar, further exacerbated by the international community’s shifting focus away from their plight. As this conflict continues to evolve, with the military facing challenges on multiple fronts, the need for a concerted and meaningful international response has never been more urgent.”..."
Source/publisher:
Action on Armed Violence (London) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2024-02-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Jan 22 to 31, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Tanintharyi Region, Chin State, Rakhine State, and Shan State from January 22nd to 31st. Military Junta arrested a civilian from the Mandalay Region and 5 from the Sagaing Region and used them as human shields. 8 civilians died by the arresting and killing of Military Junta troops within a week. A female political prisoner from Magway Prison died from the lack of medical treatment and care.
Over 50 civilians died and about 50 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 3 underaged children were injured and 1 died when the Military Junta committed abuses. Civilians left their places 6 times because of the Military Junta Troop’s marching and raiding within a week. 4 civilians were injured by the landmines of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-02-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
1.43 MB 1.59 MB 473.24 KB
more
Description:
"1 February 2024: The international community must formally recognise Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) and establish a special tribunal to prosecute the military for the commission of international crimes, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
SAC-M hosted an online panel discussion “Emerging Realities in Myanmar: What Can the International Community Do?” to mark the third anniversary of the start of the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, which sparked the Spring Revolution.
His Excellency Duwa Lashi La, Acting President of the NUG, opened the event by addressing the historic successes of recent revolutionary offensives against the military junta.
“The Spring Revolution’s military triumphs have shattered a decades-old myth: that the Myanmar people can never topple the military,” said H.E. Duwa Lashi La. “This has now been replaced by the evident truth that the criminal military will never crush the will of our people.”
The junta has responded to its mounting territorial losses with intensified aerial bombardment and indiscriminate shelling of towns and villages under resistance control and in contested areas.
“The junta’s collapse is inevitable. The real question is when, not if, and how much devastation will occur before the end,” said Marzuki Darusman, SAC-M founding member.
The humanitarian impact of the junta’s persistent attacks is enormous and growing at an increasing rate, yet international assistance is limited.
“Every aspect of people’s basic needs – food, shelter, health care – is an emergency need right now,” said Esther Ze Naw Bamvo, a leading Kachin social justice advocate. “Almost all of the citizens from cities in conflict areas have moved to [Ethnic Revolutionary Organisation]-controlled areas. If the international community wants to provide direct support to the Myanmar people, they should find ways to contact and work with local [civil society organisations] and those organizations who are working in these areas.”
Action must be taken to apply pressure on the junta to cut its capacity to commit atrocities and other human rights violations, said SAC-M. Ending the military’s impunity was highlighted in particular.
“I believe that establishing a special criminal tribunal for Myanmar is the path forward that we all need to pursue,” said appeals prosecutor Martin Witteveen. “Accountability and criminal law will not solve every problem, but without a credible accountability, the problem will certainly not be solved.”
At the same time, action must be taken to support the democratic movement and facilitate the realisation of the Myanmar peoples’ clearly expressed democratic will and aspirations.
SAC-M founding member Yanghee Lee called on the international community to recognise the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar: “The NUG are not a shadow government and they are not a government in exile. The NUG is the de facto government and the legitimate government.”
Marzuki Darusman echoed this call: “It is clear that it is time for the international community to get off the fence and fully back the people and their representatives in the form of the NUG and the [National Unity Consultative Council]. This is the way forward to peace, stability, and democracy—no less than what Myanmar deserves.”
H.E. Duwa Lahsi La, in his closing remarks, urged the international community to join the Myanmar people as they stand firm in their resolve to deliver a truly federal Myanmar that is united, free and fair.
“There is still time for the international community – ASEAN, the UN, our neighbours and other nations – to stand with us on the right side of history.”
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-02-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
136.55 KB
more
Description:
"The Myanmar military cartel must be dismantled
In February of 2021, the Myanmar military launched its illegal attempt to seize power. In the three years since, the junta has failed to gain control of the country because of the courageous resistance of Myanmar people.
The Myanmar military has a decades-long record of mass killings, torture, sexual violence and other gross human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities in particular. Since the attempted coup three years ago, the junta has committed widespread atrocity crimes and grave human rights violations with total impunity, and caused an economic and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The military's unprecedented violence and inhuman acts have been enabled by a network of domestic and international companies, illicit trade in natural resources and drugs, and ASEAN’s provision of diplomatic, military, technical, financial and intelligence.
How has the resistance movement come this far?
Spring Revolution: On the ground in Myanmar, ordinary people rose up across ethnic, religious, generational and class lines. They organised strikes against the illegitimate junta, boycotted military businesses and took up arms alongside ethnic armies to defend democracy. The Myanmar military has lost thousands of troops through defection and many others have surrendered. They continue to lose ground on all fronts to an alliance of ethnic armies and Spring Revolution resistance and defence forces.
Humanitarian Aid: People-to-people community-based emergency humanitarian aid have supported and saved lives of the most vulnerable population displaced by the Myanmar military's campaign of terror. They continue to resist the military junta as frontline humanitarians.
Sanctions: Courageous people throughout Myanmar, the diaspora and civil society organisations around the world acting in solidarity urged governments to act. Coordinated targeted sanctions are hitting the military’s global arms and financial network.
Boycotts: Mass boycotts against military products have hit the generals’ hip pockets and irreparably hurt their corrupt network of businesses. Products like Myanmar Beer, Red Ruby cigarettes and Mytel sim cards have been removed from shops and publicly destroyed. Divestment: Under pressure, companies have cut ties with the military and its businesses, and shareholders have divested from companies that continued business as usual with the junta. Multinational corporations have divested hundreds of millions of dollars from business with the military.
Together we can dismantle the military cartel.
In 2023, Justice for Myanmar published a report identifying 22 foreign governments, 26 intergovernmental organisations (including 14 UN entities), 8 foreign financial institutions, and 8 other international organisations that have provided the junta with political and financial support.
The report also recognises “an increasing number of governments and organisations that have taken steps to prevent or rectify their support for the military junta”.
While rounds of sanctions have been imposed by the US, UK, Canada, EU and Australia on senior junta individuals and some of the junta’s business interests, ASEAN’s approach to the Myanmar military junta has been one of enablement and complicity. ASEAN has allowed the junta to participate in and even lead regional initiatives for military cooperation and training. Notably, Singapore remains the third biggest supplier of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military since its coup attempt, in a trade valued at $254 million from at least 138 Singaporean companies, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “For three years the people of Myanmar have successfully blocked the illegal military junta from taking control of their communities, country and future.
“The people of Myanmar have refused to accept or legitimise the junta.
“Myanmar’s federal democracy forces are rapidly expanding territorial, governance and administrative control and thousands of soldiers have defected or surrendered from the military itself.
“Targeted sanctions have hit the military cartel’s global network and multinational corporations have divested hundreds of millions of dollars from business with the illegal junta.
“It’s a three-year long losing streak caused by pressure from all sides.
“The international community needs to unite around the use sanctions and step up to finally cut off the flow of revenue and arms, equipment, technology and jet fuel to the junta to protect civilian lives.
“They must listen to the Myanmar people resisting the military and act in solidarity now.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
141.13 KB 139.38 KB
more
Description:
"Poor decision-making and an inflexible strategy are compounding the junta’s losses and driving discontent among army commanders.
On 5 January, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) accepted the conditional surrender of the Laukkaing Regional Operations Command, giving it control of Laukkaing city, the prime objective of the joint anti-junta Operation 1027. One hundred kilometres to the west, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) has expelled junta forces from large towns and strategic roadways and gained near-total control of its primary area of operation. On the other side of the country, in Rakhine State, the Arakan Army’s (AA) campaign has accelerated in recent weeks, resulting in the rapid retreat of junta forces. And yet the impact of Operation 1027 is not confined to the battlefield, with the junta’s failure to stem its losses stirring deep dissatisfaction among its ranks according to sources close to the army and regime.
After spending three years on the sidelines, the Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the MNDAA, TNLA and AA, entered the post-coup war by launching Operation 1027 along the border with China in late October 2023. The blitz has expelled the regime from swathes of territory in the country’s north and inspired fresh attacks by opposition forces elsewhere. This month’s conflict update explores recent battlefield developments and analyses what went wrong for the regime’s forces in northern Shan State, where a new ceasefire came into effect on 11 January.....Following two rounds of talks brokered by Beijing, junta forces ceded control of Laukkaing
city to the MNDAA on 5 January. About 2,400 personnel, including six brigadier generals, were granted safe passage as a part of a negotiated withdrawal.....Junta soldiers managed to disable or destroy some of their larger weapon systems before leaving, but were required to surrender their small arms.....The Myanmar armed forces expelled the MNDAA from Laukkaing in 2009, so the city’s capture marks the end of a nearly 15-year campaign to ‘return home’. The MNDAA is now effectively in control of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (SAZ).
In December 2023, Chinese officials began pressuring the Brotherhood Alliance to de-escalate and negotiate with the junta. The MNDAA mostly complied, having already won itself a favourable bargaining position.
The TNLA’s progress had been more limited. The group responded to Chinese pressure by instead accelerating assaults on junta bases and towns. The MNDAA assisted its partner by sending units to fight in TNLA uniforms.....The TNLA is now effectively in control of the Palaung SAZ, the heartland of the Ta’ang people. It also secured a land bridge to the Myanmar–China border by capturing Namhkam Town on 18 December.
The TNLA has made inroads outside the SAZ as well. Ta’ang fighters captured Namtu Town on 28 December, and occupied the town of Kutkai after the junta withdrew on 7 January.....TNLA fighters also captured Monglon and a small base outside
Mongmit Town. The bases lie near or along a key weapons-smuggling route that links Shan to both Kachin and Myanmar’s interior.....Though the junta retains an isolated presence at Muse, the country’s largest border gate, it has lost control of the two most important roads linking Myanmar to China. Many of the units forced out by the Brotherhood Alliance have regrouped in Lashio......After a slow start, the AA’s offensive in Rakhine and southern Chin states began to accelerate in late December.....The AA has overrun more than 20 outposts across
Paletwa Township, Chin State. On 15 January, AA fighters captured Paletwa Town.....Though some regime outposts remain, the AA is now the dominant force in Paletwa. Control here opens access to the Indian and Bangladeshi borders, and an alternative supply route via Matupi, Chin State.....The fighting between the AA and the regime has implications for regional development. A key segment of India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, a US$500-million effort to link Kolkata with Mizoram, runs through Paletwa.....On 7 and 8 January, the AA fired rockets at the Dhanyawadi naval base on Ramree island, just ten kms from the terminus of the Sino-Myanmar pipeline. China plans to build a Special Economic Zone and deep-sea port on the island.....Elsewhere in the country, opposition forces continue to experience advances and setbacks.....Inspired by Operation 1027, a coalition of Karenni resistance groups began a large-scale assault on Loikaw, the Kayah State capital, on 11 November. Despite the initial capture of about half the city, the offensive has stalled.....But the operation forced the regime to pull its forces from other positions around the state, allowing the Karenni resistance to consolidate control across remote areas and several small towns.....In the southeast, an opposition coalition involving elements of the Karen National Union (KNU) and People’s Defense Forces (PDF) tied to the National Unity Government (NUG) has not recreated the territorial successes seen elsewhere.....An early December assault on the town of
Kawkareik failed, but the fighting over the past month has disrupted Asian Highway 1, the main trade route between Thailand and Myanmar.....In early November, coalition forces captured the police station and bridge at Chaung Hna Khwa, on the border of Mon and Kayin states. Regime forces retook the village on 29 December, though the bridge is now destroyed.....On 4 January, a joint KNU and PDF unit destroyed a
small bridge along the road somewhere between the towns of Kyauktaga and Phyu. That same day, opposition fighters reportedly downed powerlines near the village of Zee Kone.....In early November, PDF fighters linked to the NUG took part in the capture of Kawlin and Khampat, the first towns to fall in Sagaing Region. The NUG now claims to administer both.....To deny the NUG’s ability to govern, the junta has adopted a strategy of attacking civilians in the towns, probably with the aim of making the areas uninhabitable.....On 28 December, junta soldiers stationed in Wuntho Town fired shells at Kawlin, which lies just 12 km to the south. Four civilians, including two children, were reportedly killed. Six more civilians were killed by a second artillery attack days later.....On 7 January, a regime airstrike on the edge of Khampat reportedly killed 17 civilians, including nine children. Twenty more civilians were wounded.....Junta missteps compound losses
As early as the second week of Operation 1027, Chinese officials acting as mediators suggested to the junta that it allow the MNDAA and TNLA to administer their own areas. The junta refused to concede territories it had not yet lost, like Laukkaing, and opted to fight it out instead. But the army ultimately failed to launch a counter-offensive or utilise available resources to defend its remaining positions. Though some battalions pivoted to mobile defense, many were left to guard exposed or isolated hilltop positions and so they were overrun, partially destroyed, or forced to surrender. Sources indicated that Naypyidaw’s inflexible strategy and the avoidable losses that followed have harmed morale among ground commanders.
The army’s withdrawal from Laukkaing on 5 January forfeited its greatest bargaining chip, yet it is unclear what, if anything, the junta received in exchange. According to various reports, the second round of talks held between 22 and 24 December had not produced a concrete agreement on the fate of Laukkaing. Surprisingly, the withdrawal took place before all sides convened in Kunming, China for a third round of talks on 10 and 11 January. This suggests that the city’s commanding officers may have prematurely withdrawn, leaving the junta with little to no leverage over its opponents. Media reported that the six brigadier generals were detained upon arriving in Lashio after the withdrawal. A source confirmed that at least five of them are facing court martial. The ceasefire deal struck on 11 January appeared to freeze the conflict along the new lines of demarcation that the Brotherhood won by force, so the regime’s acceptance is indicative of a decisive defeat, rather than a compromise.
Moreover, the junta can no longer access the border area in Shan State, raising the prospect of a long-term inability to tax a significant portion of the country’s trade with China. Its losses now include large towns like Hseni and Kutkai, which were not necessarily primary objectives for the Brotherhood Alliance. By refusing to bargain, the junta has lost more territory, depleted its fighting strength, allowed the capture of large arms and munitions stockpiles, and precipitated a crisis of confidence among its officer corps. Several sources close to the regime and army have indicated widespread dissatisfaction with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and even consideration of a leadership change among at least some internal elements.
While the territorial losses inflicted by Operation 1027 do not pose an existential threat to the regime, the embarrassment of the defeat and its impact on morale could potentially generate some internal instability. Yet any effort to sideline Min Aung Hlaing will be difficult. Since the coup, the junta leader has carefully consolidated his power by removing potential rivals from important positions (the regime announced a reshuffle of several senior officials immediately after the fall of Laukkaing). Although Min Aung Hlaing has lost respect, unseating him would also equate to challenging the long-standing norms of the Tatmadaw, which most senior officers still view as sacrosanct. Moreover, it would be hard for any reform-minded faction to initiate a negotiated transition, given how deeply the regime is reviled both at home and abroad..."
Source/publisher:
International Institute for Strategic Studies (London)
Date of publication:
2024-01-19
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
939.55 KB
more
Description:
"The persistent conflicts plaguing Myanmar since its independence in 1948 remain unresolved as it fails to address the root cause of the issue. The result has been an enduring struggle for ethnic rights, leading to the world’s longest-running civil war.
Despite the constitution’s proclamation in September 1947, genuine union and equality as promised have not been realized. Ethnic nationalities, notably the Shan and others, have not experienced the equality envisaged in the constitution. The military regime’s exclusion and marginalization of non-Bamar ethnicities, coupled with a policy of Burmanization, have suppressed the cultural, linguistic, historical, and ethnic expressions of other nationalities.
The military government’s inability to meet ethnic nationalities’ demands has prompted uprisings by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) seeking increased autonomy or independence. Even officially recognized ethnic nationalities face challenges in enjoying full civil and cultural rights. For example, many Shan Saophas and politicians attempted to establish a federal system in 1958-1961, however they were met with repression. This led many to take up arms against the military regime.
The military regime’s unitary system has been marred by inequalities and imbalances, perpetuated through a perceived correlation between population size, political legitimacy, and entitlements. It divides the 135 ethnic groups and restricts legislative representation to those with suitable population sizes.
In addition, the 2008 Constitution, one of the world’s lengthiest, further entrenched these disparities. These divisive tactics aimed to prolong its dictatorship. It only gives self-administered areas for some groups such as the Danu, Kokang, Naga, Palaung, Pa-O, and Wa. Consequently, the ongoing conflict in Myanmar is not merely a problem among ethnic minorities but stems from the country’s governance structure. The absence of a federal system, where every nationality enjoys equal rights, exacerbates the situation.
To achieve peace and unity in Myanmar, a shift in the system, rather than a mere regime change, is imperative. All nationalities within the country must collaboratively build and reform a system that paves the way for a genuine federal and democratic union..."
Source/publisher:
"Shan Herald Agency for News" (Chiang Mai)
Date of publication:
2024-01-07
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Federalism, ethnic conflict and the politics of national reconciliation - general studies and sources, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Thailand would need to implement essential refugee policies that align with international standards to deal with the ongoing humanitarian crisis
Description:
"Thailand lies at a critical intersection in Southeast Asia, where the vibrant tapestry of cultures meets the complex weave of geopolitics. As the nation grapples with the escalating number of Myanmar refugees, it's not merely facing a geopolitical conundrum but a humanitarian crisis which demands global attention.
Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin is actively advocating for Thailand to play a central role in engaging with the Myanmar military regime to address the two-year civil war. While agreeing to adhere to the peace plan proposed by the regional bloc Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), he underscores the geographical proximity between Thailand and Myanmar, leading to an influx of displaced individuals seeking protection. This exodus, in turn, necessitates the provision of essential services to address their needs.
While agreeing to adhere to the peace plan proposed by the regional bloc Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), he underscores the geographical proximity between Thailand and Myanmar, leading to an influx of displaced individuals seeking protection.
PM Srettha's recent statement indicates a shift in Thailand's approach from the previous government's stance, which largely supported the Junta, to a more humanitarian-focused role. However, the current government's engagement remains limited to the Junta, highlighting the need for broader connections with other groups.
Roots of displacement
The Kayin State, formerly the Karen State, has witnessed a history of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Junta, particularly against the Karen ethnic minority seeking greater autonomy. Well-documented instances of systematic violence, including rape, torture, and forced labour, explicitly targeting Karenni women and girls, showcase the severity of the situation. The military's use of both women and men as human shields violates international humanitarian law.
The coup has exacerbated the crisis and made these people easy targets of violence. There are restrictions on travel and a shortage of essential resources in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar. Humanitarian workers are adapting by seeking alternative routes to deliver aid materials and avoid harassment and detention by military forces. Consequently, a growing number of individuals, including men, women, and children, are seeking refuge along the Thai-Myanmar border to escape the worsening conditions.
Attending the displaced
Bangkok's historical role as a haven for displaced people, mainly from Myanmar, is evident. Since the mid-1980s, the nation has provided shelter to approximately 90,801 displaced people from Myanmar across nine camps. However, following the coup in Myanmar in February 2021, an additional 45,025 displaced people sought refuge. Thailand's humanitarian efforts include providing temporary shelters, a few core relief items, food, and medical assistance.
Humanitarian workers are adapting by seeking alternative routes to deliver aid materials and avoid harassment and detention by military forces.
Despite allowing these new arrivals to stay in temporary shelters near the border, the Thai government has sporadically pushed them back. Notably, these recently displaced populations are not allowed to enter established refugee camps, and Thai officials impose stringent restrictions on their movement.
In July 2023, around 9,000 hapless people sought safety in Thailand's Mae Hong Son district due to frequent airstrikes in Karenni State. Initially, Thai authorities permitted them to stay in temporary shelters, however, on 21 October, they were asked to return to Myanmar within two weeks. Consequently, the shelters were vacated as people walked back across the border into Karenni State, a journey taking four to five days. Many resettled in Doh Noh Ku, a settlement for internally displaced people at the Thai-Myanmar border.
Pushbacks persisted until 27 October, coinciding with an offensive by a coalition of armed ethnic and resistance groups against the Myanmar military in northern Shan State. Subsequently, opposition forces elsewhere in Myanmar launched attacks against the military, prompting retaliatory airstrikes, including in Karenni State. By 27 November, over 2,387 Myanmar individuals had fled again, crossing back into the Mae Hong Son district.
The Thai Foreign Minister's announcement on 3 December to construct shelters for displaced people underscores a recognition of the escalating violence and the potential for more people to seek refuge.
Pushbacks persisted until 27 October, coinciding with an offensive by a coalition of armed ethnic and resistance groups against the Myanmar military in northern Shan State.
On 8 December, Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs disclosed that Myanmar officials had reached an agreement to establish a task force to enhance humanitarian aid for those displaced within Myanmar due to the ongoing conflict. Despite good intentions, concerns arise about the effective distribution of assistance to all affected regions, considering the track record of the Junta.
Predicaments
Thailand's response to the crisis is challenging. The delicate balance between engaging with the Myanmar military regime and advocating for humanitarian provisions poses a diplomatic dilemma. The strain on resources and infrastructure due to the growing refugee population is a significant concern. The need for sustained efforts, both domestically and through international collaboration, is crucial to address the humanitarian crisis effectively.
Thailand's response is constrained by its non-ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol. However, in 2018, Thailand voted in favour of the Global Compact on Refugees, and subsequently, the National Screening Mechanism (NSM) was established in 2019. The NSM aims to grant “protected person” status to foreign nationals in Thailand who are unable or unwilling to return to their home countries due to a well-founded fear of persecution, as determined by the NSM Committee. Despite delays in application due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in March 2023, Thailand's Cabinet approved a regulation outlining the procedure and eligibility criteria for individuals seeking NSM status, which officially came into effect on September 2023. Additionally, the rollout of the NSM will occur incrementally as the Thai government, with technical assistance and advocacy from UNHCR, continues to develop the comprehensive set of procedural standards and policies needed for its implementation.
The NSM aims to grant “protected person” status to foreign nationals in Thailand who are unable or unwilling to return to their home countries due to a well-founded fear of persecution, as determined by the NSM Committee.
However, concerns exist regarding the NSM's effectiveness and legal subordination to the Immigration Act. While Clause 15 of the NSM regulation delays the deportation of individuals asserting protected-person status, it fails to shield them from arrest, detention, or prosecution based on their immigration status. Additionally, as the NSM is legally subordinate to the Immigration Act, the predominant experience for refugees seeking protection under the NSM in Thailand would involve initial encounters with arrest, detention, and prosecution. There also remains apprehension that the NSM excludes migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos under its provision from receiving adequate protection in Thailand.
Actions required
To address the challenges, the Thai government should utilise the power granted by Section 17 of the Immigration Act to exempt NSM applicants from arrest, detention, or prosecution. Explicit provisions for determining protected status under NSM need to be established. Exempting refugees from arrest, detention, and prosecution under the Immigration Act, as emphasised in an open letter by eight organisations on 12 December, will signal Thailand's commitment to the Global Compact on Refugees.
Urgent action from Thai authorities is imperative to enhance efforts in granting appropriate status and protection to those fleeing persecution, aligning with international standards.
The escalating Myanmar refugee crisis necessitates a comprehensive and swift response from Thai authorities. While challenges persist, Thailand can set an example in the region by implementing essential refugee policies. Addressing humanitarian concerns, engaging in regional cooperation, and enacting necessary policy reforms are imperative for Thailand to effectively manage the evolving crisis and provide sustainable solutions for refugees and displaced persons..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of publication:
2024-01-05
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
more
Description:
"Opinion:
“We Won’t Be Satisfied Until the end Of The World”[1]
Over the past couple of years, it has not been uncommon to come across headlines such as “Why Has the World Forgotten About Myanmar?”, “U.N. Rapporteur: Myanmar Crisis ‘Has Been Forgotten’”, “Myanmar’s ‘forgotten war’”, and “Myanmar: the Forgotten Revolution”. To be sure, while the uprisings in countries such as Sudan (2019-2022), or the Palestinians’ ongoing resistance to settler-colonial genocide in the Gaza Strip, have received international coverage from major media outlets, it seems that the world has all but forgotten about the ongoing struggle against Myanmar’s military dictatorship, which will enter its third year in 2024. This is particularly striking in light of the International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) most recent report on “The top 10 crises the world can’t ignore in 2024,” which listed Myanmar as the country that is currently undergoing the fifth most urgent humanitarian crisis and projects a worsening of the situation for, what IRC classifies as, approximately three million “Internally Displaced Persons” (IDPS). According to the language of the report, in terms of the total number of persons in need, the crisis in Myanmar is rivaled by only four other countries: Sudan, the Gaza Strip and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, South Sudan, and Burkina Faso. And as of December 2023, outside of “Ukraine and Syria, Myanmar recorded the highest number of conflict-related incidents (more than 8,000) for the year.”
The 1221 Coup[2]
On 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s Army (Tatmadaw) staged a successful coup which saw the arrest of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and the installation of the Army as Myanmar’s new governing authority, led by Army Chief, Min Aung Hlaing. In the weeks and months that followed, the country witnessed mass demonstrations against the military junta as well as its brutal repression by the military junta, including the army’s use of live ammunition against protestors. According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), “at least 6,337 civilians were reported as killed and 2,614 as wounded for political reasons in Myanmar in the twenty months between the military coup of February 1, 2021, and September 30, 2022.” Meanwhile, the United Nations Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) expressed concerns similar to those of IRC in their December 2023 report, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan: Myanmar, concluding that more than two years of a military junta has resulted in an all but “grim” humanitarian landscape “with a third of the population” now said “to be in humanitarian need.”
According to the report findings, the military junta’s “attempt to suppress opposition and consolidate power” has included the use of “systematic violence against the civilian population resulting in over 4,000 deaths, tens of thousands of arbitrary arrests and other human rights violations, including the use of sexual and gender-based violence.” While the State of Emergency imposed by the military in 2021 remains in place alongside restrictions on the freedom of assembly in 127 townships, Martial Law has now been imposed on 59 out of 330 townships across the country. And to make matters worse, the difficulty in satisfying basic subsistence needs for a growing number of Myanmar’s population has been compounded by “the devastating impacts of Cyclone Mocha in May…placing the people of Myanmar in increasing peril.” In total, “some 18.6 million people are estimated to require humanitarian assistance in 2024 — one million more than the same time last year — with the number of displaced people expected to continue steadily rising during the year from the record 2.6 million at the end of 2023.” By 2024, an estimated $994 million will be required to address the needs of more than 19 million people in Myanmar.
From 3D Printed Warfare to Operation 1027
A military dictatorship that the world has all but been happy to forget and the worsening effects of compounded political, social, and environmental crises: it is on all of this that the people of Myanmar, displaced in their millions, have nourished themselves and refined their struggle. What began as a popular uprising has transformed into an exodus to the countryside to take up makeshift arms — ranging from bow and arrows to refurbished wooden rifles — against Min Aung Hlaing’s military. Thus unfolded a now three-year-long protracted guerrilla war, wherein resistance fighters have reached the point of being able to 3D print drones capable of carrying explosives in various, nondescript, caves amidst an otherwise ordinary South East Asian landscape. Speaking with a Dutch journalist who spent time with one armed resistance unit, one guerrilla who goes by the name “3D” (a nom de guerre stemming from his overseeing of the manufacture of 3D printed guns and drones) said, “[the military] can’t win on the ground, so they resort to bombing us from above. We can’t defend ourselves. All we can do is hide…Drones are the only thing we have to make them feel even a fraction of the trauma we feel when they bomb us with their fighter jets.” Despite their capability to engage in warfare both on the ground and in the air, analysts have tended to view Myanmar’s armed conflict as a stalemate with no clear end in sight.
However, on 27 October, the anti-junta coalition known as ‘The Brotherhood Alliance’ — made up of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Arakan Army (AA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) — “launched a coordinated offensive taking control of several military posts and towns near the border with China,” with additional news of the MNDAA having “closed the roads from the trade hub of Lashio to Chinshwehaw and Muse on the China border in advance of a ‘major offensive.’” After a mere two weeks, “anti-junta fighters operating with ‘unprecedented coordination’ have overrun 100 military outposts and the junta stands to lose control of key border crossings that account for some 40% of cross-border trade, and a vital tax revenue source.” According to analysts, “the current offensive poses the biggest threat to the junta’s grip on power since the 2021 coup.” Speaking with DW, Anthony Davis, a Bangkok-based security analyst, said, “the offensive has denied the military regime access to key trade hubs on the Chinese border and the revenue derived from them,” while emphasizing the offensive’s “potential to bring down a regime that is already facing deep economic and political crises.”
Earlier this month, China succeeded in brokering “a ceasefire [agreement] in northern Myanmar between the junta and an alliance of rebels.” A few days into the ceasefire, however, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) announced that “it had taken control of the town of Namhsan in northern Shan state as well as the so-called 105-Mile Trade Zone, a key trading area on Shan state’s border with China.” Despite this shift in China’s regional policy and demonstrated willingness to assume a more active, diplomatic, and despite China’s interest in eliminating forms of illicit and illegal activity along its shared border with Myanmar, one of the main allies of the Brotherhood Alliance, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) — the military wing of the de facto ruling party, the United Wa State Party (UWSP) in Wa State, a self-administered division in the north-eastern part of the country — continues to be “entirely equipped with modern weaponry and equipment produced in China”. Hence, Davis noted, given China’s “powerful influence over the UWSA, [it] could undoubtedly affect a major reduction in munitions reaching northern groups if it wanted to.” As things currently stand, China has yet to show any interest in reducing the cross border flow of arms and munitions that make it into the hands of the UWSA.
‘Kabar Ma Kyay Bu’
Myanmar’s is a young war relative to those waged by imperial states from the global North, especially when the median age of the country’s population is 29.6 years. And the youthfulness of this armed struggle is something on full display amongst the various guerrilla camps spanning its countryside. Having previously lived as precariously employed workers, delivery drivers, university students, engineers, and the like; never having seen a day of military combat in their lives before the armed resistance against the military junta; Myanmar’s 20-somethings are now seasoned guerrilla fighters initiated into that long tradition of the struggle for liberation using armed resistance.
[1] This title is taken from the Burmese-language anthem ‘Kabar Ma Kyay Bu,’ which was sung during the 1988 People Power Uprisings (also known as the “8888 Uprising”). On 8 August 1988 (8/8/88), in what was then still known as Burma (present-day Myanmar), a major wave of protests and strikes ushered in a period of national mobilizations. This wave of protests, which has come to be known as the People Power Uprisings, culminated in a harsh crackdown and eventual military coup on 18 September 1988. This 1988 anthem of the People Power Uprisings would be sung once again by demonstrators during the 2021 protests against Myanmar’s military (Tatmadaw) coup d’etat.
[2] In a country known for auspicious dates, just as the People Power Uprisings have come to be known as the “8888 Uprisings”, the military coup of 1 February 2021 (1/2/21) was quickly dubbed the “1221 coup.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Zamaneh" (Amsterdam)
Date of publication:
2024-01-05
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"As Operation 1027 shifts the balance of power from the Myanmar military to revolutionary forces, we argue that the on-the-ground sociopolitical realities advocate moving past conventional nation-state models, and even the federalism debates, and demand a political will to adapt to the Mandala order, a governance style indigenous to Southeast Asia for centuries before the colonialism of the West. The future of Myanmar centers on transformative political visions that reject the reestablishment of a “national/federal army” and “central state”. It is fundamental to accept this paradigmatic change because only this will enable all parties involved to embrace and align with the emergence of various governance systems, as the material reality demands. Next, we must insist that these systems are democratic, inclusive, responsive and well-coordinated.....Beyond nation-state and federalism .....Myanmar’s economy has transitioned into a war economy. On the military junta’s side, the domestic economy has collapsed, hit by bank runs, inflation and, in rural areas, the inability to farm due to village burnings, as well as increased military spending amidst reduced public service budgets, as reflected in a recent report by the World Bank. Soaring dollar exchange rates and aviation fuel and gasoline prices, combined with international pressure and sanctions, make their fuel-dependent administration unsustainable. On the revolutionary and ethnic armed organization (EAO) side, Operation 1027 symbolizes a transition from guerrilla tactics to a coordinated alliance-led offensive with significant public support and resource flow. Despite the fact that the Myanmar public has endured unprecedented hardships, there seems to be no desire for the military to succeed, even if it would bring a return to stability. Coupled with the declining morale among the rank-and-file soldiers, as evidenced by unprecedented defections during Operation 1027, the larger picture and economic analysis points to the fact that the military will not be able to continue this fight.
Despite the military generals’ lack of interest in pursuing a political exit, the international community is reluctant to decisively support the revolution, preferring to safeguard their own interests—a stance akin to the Burmese saying of “trying to get the snake out without breaking the cane” (မြွေမသေ တုတ်မကျိုး). Having provided little substantive support, now they presumptuously debate Myanmar’s future and what the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and EAOs should do, obsessing over a “power vacuum” and “political fragmentation”. This stance stems from the assertions of certain politicians and analysts who warn that the chaos following the military’s collapse might intensify into greater violence and conflict. Such a perception is not only misguided but ironically might cause the very chaos they anticipate.
We emphasize that the chaos and violence could only happen for two reasons: externally due to attempts to reimpose central control, rather than the lack of it, and internally because of attempts to create exclusive ethnic-based systems in regions with diverse ethnic populations. In fact, it is mainly the analysts and elites who are wary of what they call “political fragmentation”, not the local populace, who have experience with Mandala-like political arrangements, with two or more than two political authorities trying to govern them, such as those seen in the long-sustaining Wa State. This may sound quixotic to the political elites but it is very practical and realistic for the local populace.
The realities on the ground demand a new imagination beyond the conventional nation-state. Now is the opportune moment to offer the people a governance system they are familiar with, rather than enforcing a federal system with extensive decentralization; even setting up a federal system will invariably require a somewhat central authority—a “federal government”. Such models, dependent on a nation-state structure, would necessitate the NUG—or whoever is charged with the task—successfully uniting all EAOs under a singular political leadership and vision, which is next to impossible and a feat that no politicians have achieved over seven decades. The current fixation on establishing a central command stems from persistent assertions by Western analysts, who argue that the lack of unity among opposition forces is the reason why the foreign governments were not providing meaningful assistance to them. If the international policy industry insists the NUG and EAOs must create a central command under a singular political leadership, it is bound to fail spectacularly.
While opposition groups share the objective of overthrowing the junta, on-the-ground political realities are almost antagonistic to a single, central command or joint command. A prime example is in Chin State, where, despite military successes, politicians face growing internal divisions, rooted in both geographical and linguistic differences. Similarly, in Shan State, local Shan groups express frustration over being marginalized and have held longstanding grievances against the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). In central dry regions too, there are reported conflicts among the opposition armed groups and governing bodies. Meanwhile, groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Arakan Army (AA) have also explicitly stated their political vision of achieving a confederation, differing from other factions’ goals.
Myanmar’s present landscape makes one recall the historical period following the disintegration of the Bagan Empire in the 13th century, which saw 250 years of political interregnum, characterized by the emergence of multiple regional powers such as the territorially limited local kingdoms of Myinsaing, Pinya, Sagaing, Taungoo, Hanthawaddy, Ava and others, including the notable rise of the Tai people with the establishment of the Lanna kingdom. Currently, various groups exert control over specific territories, necessitating both domestic and international negotiations for effective governance. For instance, Chin communities now administering India-Myanmar border towns and the MNDAA initiating governance in the Kokang region, bordering China, must engage in complex discussions with multiple actors. Similarly, the NUG, now in control of the town of Kawlin, faces the challenge of implementing effective administration.
This power structure reflects the dynamics of the Mandala system, characterized by local autonomy and complex alliances, a system from the not-so-distant past and familiar to the local populace. The Mandala system, unlike a modern nation-state, features multiple political power centers (kingdoms back in those days) with diminishing political power as one moves away from the center, characterized by ill-defined, porous boundaries in contrast to the well-demarcated borders of nation-states. Within this Mandala system, these polities existed in a hierarchical order, with lesser tributaries and a possible supreme king or overlord. Allegiances were fluid and overlapping, and yet, as Thongchai Winichakul puts it, “each king had his own court, administrative and financial system, tax collection, army, and judicial system”. Thus, these polities maintain distinct autonomy and independence.
The call for a new, responsive Mandala
With our call for a new responsive Mandala, the better focus would be on ensuring democratic, inclusive and representative governances, rather than attempting to re-centralize control or establish a federal/national army. This approach involves: 1) acknowledging the emergence of multiple governance arrangements across Myanmar, no matter whether it is called “federal” or “confederal”; 2) prioritizing the establishment of democratic, inclusive and representative governance in captured territories, recognizing that international recognition is secondary to providing effective local governance for residents whose immediate concern is sustenance; and 3) avoiding the expenditure of time and resources on creating a centralized command structure, and instead fostering coordination mechanisms across different polities.
Perhaps more importantly, the new political system or systems in Myanmar must transcend narrow ethnic identities, acknowledging the diverse populations across regions, be it Shan Land (ရှမ်းပြည်), Arakan Country(ရခိုင်ပြည်) or Sagaing Nation (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း). An ethnic-based political system in places like Arakan (Rakhine) or Shan will be a recipe for disaster as the current armed conflicts have already witnessed rising inter-ethnic tensions. In the same spirit, the calls to establish a Bamar state overlook the diverse ethnic populations in the central dry regions, not to mention the Chinese, Hindu or Muslim communities who have been persecuted by successive governments. Instead, efforts should focus on establishing democratic and inclusive governance systems that reflect the Mandala-like order today.
The specific form of these new polities, whether one-party systems akin to Singapore, constitutional monarchies like Thailand, Sweden or the UK, or even communist systems like China or Vietnam, is secondary to their adherence to these democratic inclusive and responsive principles of governance. This is what the internal actors starting with the NUG should aim for. At the same time, the international community must be prepared to accept this, not push for a single political authority who will represent the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
While the role of armed groups in the current stage of Myanmar’s revolution is undeniable, it’s crucial to remember that the military success of these armed groups stems from unprecedented civilian participation and public support. The revolution must center on the people, not the armed groups, ensuring these groups remain accountable and adhere to democratic principles. While the abolition of all armed forces should be a political aim for the long term, the immediate priority right now is to embrace the emerging Mandala-like political arrangements, avoiding the futile pursuit of a centralized chain of command under a singular political leadership. The focus must now shift to ensuring that these emerging political entities embody democratic, inclusive and responsive governance systems tailored to meet the immediate needs of the people, providing the essential services and support required in the here and now. This approach, grounded in current realities, paves the way for a more stable and prosperous future for the peoples of Myanmar.
Htet Min Lwin is a scholar of religion, social movements and revolution, currently writing a PhD at the York Centre for Asian Research at York University, Toronto.
Thiha Wint Aung is a political scientist who holds an MA from the Central European University (CEU) and an MPP from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo, Japan..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2024-01-04
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, International Bill of Human Rights
Language:
more
Sub-title:
But high-profile prisoners such as Aung San Suu Kyi , and many of those serving long terms, were not part of the release.
Description:
"UPDATED on January 4, 2024 at 4:08 p.m. ET
Myanmar’s junta granted amnesty to 9,652 prisoners on Thursday, according to a statement released by the junta’s State Administration Council said.
The prisoner release took place on the 76th anniversary of the country’s independence from the United Kingdom.
The amnesty was conditioned on the agreement that, should they reoffend, they would be required to serve both the remaining sentence and any new punishment.
About 114 foreign prisoners were included in the amnesty, according to a separate statement from the junta. It said they were released to maintain friendly relations with other countries.
Among those released is Kaung Set Lin, a photojournalist from the Myanmar Press Photo Agency in Yangon, who had been sentenced to three years on charges of damaging public interest.
Kaung Set Lin was arrested while injured when police and soldiers, using a vehicle, charged into an anti-coup protest he was covering on Pan Pin Gyi Street in Yangon's Kyimyindaing township.
“Yes, he is freed. My son is among the released. Now we are about to go home. Needless to say, I am so happy. I wanted to see my son’s face before I died. Now my wish has come true,” Myo Myint, the father of the journalist, told RFA Burmese.
Kaung Set Lin's mother died while he was incarcerated.
“My mother died of cancer. I didn’t get a chance to see her at the last moment. But as a son, I was dutiful," he told RFA Burmese. "Until now, I never made my mother feel she had a low prestige. I want all my remaining [political prisoner] brothers to be released as well.”
'Nothing but pray'
Another six of Kaung Set Lin's co-accused were released today. However, Hmu Yadana Khet Moh Moh Tun, a reporter from the Myanmar Press Photo Agency, who was arrested the same day remains imprisoned.
Her mother Myint Myint Maw said that she wanted her daughter to be released, though she could do nothing but pray.
“Anyway, I'm expecting her release. But since she has been sentenced for two more charges, I don’t expect much," she said. "When the others were released, I just sent prayers and love for her. "[The authorities] have to release her, so I can do nothing but pray. She will be free only when they release her, so I feel bad.”
However, another journalist, Hmu Yadanar Khat Moh Moh Tun from the Myanmar Press Photo Agency, who was arrested alongside him, has not been released.
Actress Thin Zar Wint Kyaw and model Nan Mwe San, who faced criticism from the junta and were sentenced to several years in prison on charges of undermining Myanmar culture and sexual orientation, were also released, according to media reports. But RFA has not been able to independently verify this information.
More than 1,000 prisoners were released from Mandalay’s Obo Prison on Thursday, and among them were Dr. Ye Lwin, former Mandalay mayor, and Kyaw Zeya, a member of the Mandalay City Development Committee, both served under the National League for Democracy-led government, lawyers said.
While a few political prisoners were released today, detained former political leader Aung San Suu Kyi and former President Win Myint, who have received lengthy prison sentences under various charges, along with members of the NLD government, lawmakers, university students and democracy activists remain incarcerated.
'No hope' for those given long terms
A family member of Tun Tun Hein, NLD-led government’s deputy speaker, said he has not heard any news about his release yet.
Tun Tun Hein, the 72-year-old deputy speaker who also served as the chairman of the country’s lower house in the parliament, had been sentenced to more than 30 years.
“I wished he would be released because he is old. I hope he comes out with amnesty and I am praying for it. I haven't heard any news yet,” said the family member.
A lawyer, who is handling the cases of political prisoners and requested anonymity for security reasons, informed RFA Burmese that none of the political prisoners serving long-term sentences were among those released on Thursday. Only those who had been sentenced to terms between two and three years and were close to their scheduled release dates were freed, the lawyer added.
A family member of a political prisoner who was sentenced to a long jail term in Thayet Prison in Magway region said that there was no hope for those who have been given long prison terms.
“There is no expectation for their release. They [the authorities] released the inmates who have just two, three or four, five more months to serve. They don’t release people who have to serve for four, five or six more years," he said.
Based on the junta statements, there have been 14 amnesties granted since the coup, including the one on Thursday. In total, more than 92,000 prisoners have been released during these amnesties, but only a small number of them were political prisoners.
According to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, or AAPP, in 2023 alone, the junta released more than 20,000 prisoners, but only 2,400 political prisoners were among them..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-01-04
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Human Rights and international relations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
more
Description:
"၁။ ယနေ့သည် ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၏ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို တိုင်းတစ်ပါး သားတို့မှ ကျူးကျော်နယ်ချဲ့သိမ်းပိုက်မှုကြောင့် နှစ်ပေါင်း(၆၀)ကျော်ကြာ သူ့ကျွန်ဘဝဖြင့် နေထိုင်ခဲ့ ရာမှ ဖိနှိပ်မှုအမျိုးမျိုးတို့ကို ခေါင်းငုံ့မခံလိုစိတ်၊ လွတ်လပ်မှုကို မြတ်နိုးသောစိတ်တို့ဖြင့် တောင်တန်း ပြည်မတိုင်းရင်းသားခေါင်းဆောင်များ စုစည်းပြီး ကျူးကျော်သူများကို ရဲရဲဝံ့ဝံ့ ပြန်လည်ရုန်းကန် တော် လှန်နိုင်မှုကြောင့် တိုင်းပြည်၏ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာနှင့် ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ်ဖန်တီးခွင့်ကို လက်ဝယ် ပိုင်ပိုင် ပြန်လည်ဆုပ်ကိုင်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး လွတ်လပ်သော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်အဖြစ် ရပ်တည်နိုင်ခဲ့သည်မှာ (၇၆)နှစ်ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့သည့် အခါသမယဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံးသည် တိုင်းတစ်ပါးသားတို့၏ ကျူးကျော်မှုကို တော် လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ကာ သူ့ကျွန်ဘဝကလွတ်မြောက်ခဲ့ကြသော်လည်း လွတ်လပ်ရေးရပြီးနောက် ခေတ် အဆက်ဆက်တွင် တိုင်းပြည်အာဏာကို လိုချင်တပ်မက်စိတ်ဖြင့် မတရားရယူ ပိုင်ဆိုင်လိုကြသော စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၏ လက်နက်အားကိုး အနိုင့်အထက်ပြုကျင့်မှုများ၊ အခြေခံလူ့အခွင့်အရေးများ ချိုးဖောက်ပိတ်ပင်မှုများကို ကာလရှည်ကြာစွာ တွေ့ကြုံခံစားကြရပြီး စစ်ကျွန်ဘဝကို ထပ်မံရင်ဆိုင် ကြုံတွေ့ခဲ့ကြရသည်။
၃။ မင်းအောင်လှိုင်ဦးဆောင်သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ရက် နေ့တွင် တိုင်းပြည်အာဏာကို မတရားလုယူရန် ထပ်မံကြိုးပမ်းပြီး ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် စစ်အာဏာ ရှင်များထက် ပိုမိုဆိုးဝါးပြင်းထန်သော စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ကျူး လွန်လာခဲ့ရာ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံးက ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကို ဆင်နွှဲကာ ရရာလက်နက် စွဲကိုင်တော်လှန်ကြရသည့် အခြေအနေအထိ ဆိုက်ရောက်လာခဲ့ပေသည်။ လက်ရှိ အချိန်ကာလသည် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုအားနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၌ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ပေါ်ထွန်းခဲ့သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်ဆန့်ကျင်ရေး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုများ အားလုံး၏ အခြေခံကောင်းများ စုစည်းပေါင်းစုံပြီး အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အမြစ်ဖြတ်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ် ထူထောင်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် အလားအလာကောင်းများ ရရှိပိုင်ဆိုင်နေသော အချိန်အခါကောင်းလည်းဖြစ်ပေသည်။
၄။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၊ မျိုးဆက်သစ် တော်လှန်ရေးခေါင်းဆောင်များ အားလုံးအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့အားကိုယူကာ ထိုအချိန်အခါကောင်းကို အမိအရကိုင်စွဲရယူပြီး သမိုင်းတွင် ရရှိခံစားခဲ့ဖူးသည့် ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ်မှုအပေါင်းတို့မှ အပြီးတိုင် လွတ်မြောက်ခဲ့သည့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးအသီးအပွင့်ကို တဖန်ပြန်လည် ရရှိခံစားကြရတော့မည့် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုဆီရောက်သည်အထိ တွဲလက်မဖြုတ်စတမ်း၊ အသံမစဲ အလံ မလှဲစတမ်း ဆက်လက်ထုဆစ် ပုံဖော်သွားကြပါစို့ဟု အလေးအနက် ပန်ကြားရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-01-04
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.45 MB
more
Description:
"On behalf of the United States of America, I reaffirm our commitment to the people of Burma as they mark the 76th Anniversary of the country’s independence on January 4.
The United States has long supported the people of Burma and their right to chart their own future toward a cohesive union. The military’s campaign of violence since the February 2021 coup has not dimmed the strong commitment of the people of Burma to regain their prosperity and advance the goals of freedom, peace, and justice. We mourn and honor the lives lost in this pursuit.
We stand in solidarity with the people of Burma in their resolve to bring democracy, self-determination, stability, and security to their country. The military regime must end its violence, release all those unjustly and arbitrarily detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and recognize the people’s desire to return to the path of progress and inclusive democracy..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Department of State
Date of publication:
2024-01-03
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Dec 22 to 31, 2023
Military Junta Troops launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Mandalay Region, Bago Region, Shan State, Rakhine State, and Kayin State from December 22nd to 31st. Military Junta Troop also burnt and killed 7 civilians from Bago Region, Nattalin Township. 2 political prisoners who were tortured in Insein Prison, Yangon Region, and Pathein Prison, Ayeyarwady Region, died because of the lack of medical treatment.
Over 50 civilians died and over 50 were injured within a week by the Military’s heavy and light attacks. Over 10 underaged children were injured and over 10 died when the Military Junta committed violations. A civilian was also injured by the Military Junta’s landmines. A bridge and a road from Northern Shan State were destroyed by the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2024-01-03
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
284.84 KB 267.92 KB 1003.9 KB
more
Description:
"UPDATED at 10:05 ET on Jan. 2, 2024.
The end of the junta is near amid mass desertions and surrenders of junta troops, said Myanmar’s shadow government on Monday.
“We have seen the mass deserting and surrender of the military council soldiers unprecedented in military history ... Looking at these, it can be said that the end of the [junta] military council is near,” said Duwa Lashi La, the acting president of the National Unity Government (NUG) during his new year’s address.
“Junta troops are facing the situation where its soldiers are either surrendering or being captured in battles on a daily basis,” said the interim leader, adding that 550 military junta soldiers have surrendered during "Operation 1027" by the rebel Three Northern Brotherhood Alliance.
The alliance, which includes the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, has overrun dozens of military outposts and camps and taken control of several key cities in northern Shan state since launching their offensive on Oct. 27.
The rapid gains are the biggest setbacks experienced by the military since it took over the country in a February 2021 coup, prompting junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing in late November to issue a rare acknowledgement of the rebel’s successes.
Analysts suggest that the civil war may be at a turning point -- although that is far from clear at present.
Duwa Lashi La also cited a statement by the Karen National Union, or KNU, as saying that more than 18,000 military soldiers have been killed in the KNU-controlled areas since the coup.
The acting president’s speech came a few days after an intense battle between the anti-junta Arakan Army (AA) and junta troops in Paletwa township, Chin state, on Dec. 29, 2023.
As a result of the battle, more than 80 military junta soldiers crossed the border and fled to India’s Mizoram state, according to Paletwa residents.
India-based the United News of India reported on the same day that 83 junta soldiers entered Tuisenlang village on the Mizoram-Myanmar border.
UNI stated that the junta soldiers would be sent back to Myanmar, noting that there were four instances in November and December last year when junta soldiers escaped to the Indian state of Mizoram.
A Paletwa resident who wished to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals told Radio Free Asia last Thursday that the military council troops had fled to the Mizoram side, fully armed.
The resident added, however, he could not confirm whether the junta soldiers were repatriated to Myanmar.
As of Tuesday, the junta’s military council has not commented on the soldiers who fled to India.
Aung Cho, junta council’s spokesman for Chin state and Chin state’s secretary, by phone, has also not responded to RFA’s inquiries..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-01-02
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
more
Description:
"As we step into the new year, Myanmar heralds a historic new beginning, the echoes of an indomitable spirit thundering louder than ever before. This journey unfolds with a glimmer of hope, marking the first instance where the once-mighty Myanmar military finds itself unnerved under the control of bloody coup makers—the generals—facing unprecedented threats in their history. Despite the daunting challenges that have befallen our people and our beloved Myanmar, joy emerges from the strength, courage, and resilience displayed by the brave citizens.
In the face of unspeakable pain, suffering, death, and destruction inflicted by the genocidal military junta, self-proclaimed as the State Administrative Council (SAC), the people of Myanmar stand undeterred. Their unwavering commitment to freedom and peace fuels the collective spirit, ensuring not just survival but triumph. This new beginning in Myanmar's history is a testament to the millions who, despite extraordinary sacrifices, declare a resounding "NO" to the reign of terror imposed by genocidal military generals for several decades.
For the first time in Myanmar's military history, freedom fighters from across the nation have seized more than 400 military bases belonging to the brutal military junta, which has lost more than 18,000 foot soldiers in Thai-Burma border states alone. These extraordinary individuals, mostly young and ordinary citizens turned heroes, safeguard the future, liberating and reclaiming dozens of towns, districts, and thousands of villages from the hands of the military junta. These liberated towns and villages mark a new beginning, experiencing decentralization according to federal democratic values and principles under community-led local governance. Some states are taking this new beginning by forming interim executives, legislatures, and judiciary bodies according to the Federal Democratic Charter of Myanmar (FDC). This historic territorial shift marks the first time military bases and territories have been lost to civilians.
Another new beginning in Myanmar's history is the historic unity in diversity, clearly laid out in the Federal Democratic Charter of Myanmar (FDC), a roadmap toward the new Myanmar, "Federal Democratic Myanmar." Yet another milestone is the defection of tens of thousands of uniformed men and women who once served the genocidal military junta.
These new beginnings in Myanmar's history were made possible by the sacrifices of the brave people of Myanmar for the cause of freedom and federal democracy. The Civil Disobedient Movement (CDM), a non-violent force, remains unshaken despite 35 months of pain, suffering, and relentless acts of terrorism by the brutal junta. As the indomitable will of the people persists, brave freedom fighters comprised of the People's Defence Forces (PDF), Local Defence Forces (LDF), and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) lay down their lives today for freedom, where a brighter tomorrow awaits us all. In honoring those who sacrificed their lives for freedom and federal democracy, we dedicate our present to the future of our people. Although we cannot change the past, we steer history toward freedom from the clutches of the genocidal military in Myanmar.
Since the attempted coup on February 1, 2021, Myanmar has witnessed the loss of 4273 innocent lives, 25656 unjust arrests, and the destruction of over 90,000 homes. More than 2.6 million people face homelessness, and nearly 19 million are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Over 45 million struggle below the poverty line. These unspeakable suffering and crises are the direct result of genocidal military generals' attempted coup in 2021. Decades ago, Myanmar was the rice bowl of Asia, but the shackles of dictatorship plunged it into poverty and a terrible crisis. The people of Myanmar, however, are destined to win. Myanmar's future, bright as the stars, foresees a return to global prominence, becoming not just the rice bowl of Asia but the world.
We renew our gratitude to the countries and people around the world who have helped Myanmar in this darkest moment of her history. But we respectfully request once again to our neighbors, ASEAN, and the international community to unite and embrace the democratic will of the people of Myanmar and their sole representatives. Together, we can bring an end to the genocidal military's reign of terror, embrace federal democratic values and principles for peace and prosperity for the entire region, and pave the way for lasting peace and stability not just for Myanmar and the region but for the world.
The new future of the new Myanmar promises the triumph of goodness over evil, banishing darkness while light prevails. Peace and prosperity await not only our people and our nation but the entire region, transcending barriers of race, religion, gender, background, and ethnicity. Our vision extends globally as we strive for a better world. The people of Myanmar are resolute, determined to elevate their struggle for freedom and federal democracy. In the new year of 2024, their fight for freedom remains unwavering, a battle between life and death, light and darkness, justice and injustice, freedom and tyranny, federal democracy and military dictatorship. As they march into the new year 2024, the people of Myanmar stand firm, unwavering in their fight for freedom..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2024-01-01
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
1.71 MB 1.7 MB
more
Description:
"“Right now, the SAC has planted landmines near villagers’ plantations and farms and we [civilians] don’t know where [exactly]. When there are no explosions, then things will be in peace. The SAC should not act this way. The SAC labels […] civilians as soldiers.” [1]
Testimony of a villager from Noh T’Kaw Township, Dooplaya District.
1. Introduction
Since the 2021 coup[2] and the subsequent intensification of armed conflict, the use of landmines has proliferated in Southeast Burma (Myanmar)[3]. Landmines are used by not only the State Administration Council (SAC)[4], but all armed actors in Southeast Burma, to both protect territory and attack opponents. Villagers are severely impacted by this proliferation and expansion of landmine use in the ongoing conflict and the SAC has been increasingly targeting civilians directly with these indiscriminate weapons. In locally-defined Karen State[5], this is causing civilian deaths and injuries and affecting the lives and livelihoods of villagers.
This briefing paper presents incidents of landmine explosions in civilian areas since the 2021 coup and examines the impacts and needs of the affected communities. The first section provides a brief overview of the context of landmine contamination in Southeast Burma. Secondly, evidence of landmine casualties and the impact on local communities, as well as the challenges and risks that villagers face, are presented. Thirdly, a security and legal analysis of the situation is conducted, as well as a set of policy recommendations provided for local and international stakeholders.
2. Contextual overview
Burma is the only country in the world where the ‘state security forces’ actively use landmines within its territory against their own civilian population[6]. Burma is not a party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and it is listed as one of the 12 remaining landmine producers by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)[7]. According to the United Nations’ Myanmar Information Management Unit, all states and divisions, as defined by the Burma government, have been contaminated by landmines over the past decades.[8]
In the decades of conflict between the Burma Army[9] and armed resistance groups around the country, landmines have long been used to secure contested territory. However, the Burma Army has directly and actively targeted civilians with landmines as part of the “four cuts” strategy which aims to destroy links between insurgents, their families, and local villagers by cutting off food, funds, intelligence, and recruits to ethnic armed groups[10]. To prevent resistance forces from knowing where landmines are planted, the Burma Army has often deliberately withheld this information from civilians. Landmines remain in place from the decades of conflict, and the Burma Army is actively planting new landmines amid the intensified conflict as they seek to affirm nationwide military control following the 2021 coup. The current armed conflict has created immense difficulties preventing mine clearance programs from being implemented.
Karen State has a high level of landmine contamination[11]. Human rights abuses related to landmines are not a new issue; landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) have posed a persistent threat to villagers throughout the decades of conflict.[12] With new landmines being extensively planted across Southeast Burma by both the SAC and armed resistance groups, there is now a combined danger of old and new landmines. These new landmines are being planted in areas unavoidable to villagers and they are increasingly not only accidental victims but are often targeted with landmines by the SAC and its affiliated armed groups.
According to Article 2.2 from the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, a mine is defined as “a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.”[13] According to KHRG documentation, the SAC primarily uses factory-made mines whereas the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[14], mostly use handmade mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and anti-vehicle tripwire bombs.[15] KNLA handmade mines are not as powerful as SAC factory-made mines and, usually, factory-made can remain active for decades, whereas handmade mines usually have a lifespan of six months. Nonetheless, both pose a significant threat to local communities. The KNLA sometimes informs local villagers where soldiers plant landmines, but often not adequately. The SAC usually fails to inform local villagers where they plant landmines, or purposely conceals their location, presenting immense danger when this occurs in civilian areas.
3. Factual summary: Landmine incidents and impacts on local communities
This chapter presents incidents of anti-personnel landmine explosions and their impacts on local communities in Southeast Burma since the 2021 coup. Since February 2021, KHRG has received reports from across all seven KHRG operational districts[16] containing evidence of 64 landmine incidents involving villagers, which resulted in at least 21 deaths and 60 people injured, including children. These reports were collected by local community members trained by KHRG to document the human rights situation in Southeast Burma. Landmine incidents are often underreported because of security concerns preventing researchers from travelling to certain areas and victims/survivors lacking knowledge of how to report incidents. Therefore, the actual number of casualties resulting from landmine incidents is expected to be much higher.
Although both the SAC and armed resistance groups use landmines for military purposes −self-protection or territory defence− the main victims of landmine explosions are villagers as landmines are planted in villages, plantations and roads. From analysis of this information, some trends in landmine incidents in Karen State are explored: landmines are commonly stepped on when villagers are engaging in essential livelihood activities, landmines are harming villagers often in the aftermath of fighting between armed groups, and there is inadequate warning about landmine contamination. The impacts of landmine incidents are also presented, including coping with deaths and injuries, livestock being harmed, and restricted freedom of movement.
I. Trends of landmine incidents in locally-defined Karen State since the 2021 coup
a) Villagers stepped on landmines while engaging in livelihood activities
The majority of landmine-related incidents documented by KHRG since the 2021 military coup involved villagers who stepped on landmines while engaging in their livelihood activities. These landmines were planted near or in villagers’ plantations and farms. Farming and crop plantations are the main source of livelihood for most rural communities in locally-defined Karen State and these landmines are unwittingly triggered when villagers are working, usually unaware of the contamination.
For example, on February 16th 2023, two villagers, Saw[17] A--- and Naw[18] B--- (a father and his daughter), from C---, Ma Kah Heh village tract[19], Bu Tho Township, Mu Traw District, went out to cut bamboo in order to fence their farmlands.[20] Saw A--- stepped on a landmine and sustained injuries on his right leg, that later had to be amputated. Naw B---, also stepped on a landmine when she went to help her father. Her legs were seriously injured by the landmine explosion, resulting in a double amputation. Residents of A--- village believe that these landmines were planted by KNLA soldiers from Battalion #15 because the KNLA had informed some villagers about the planting of landmines in the surrounding area one week beforehand.
Although villagers are sometimes aware of landmine contamination, they often have no choice but to pass through contaminated areas to carry out essential livelihood activities. For example, on June 20th 2021, Saw D---, a 32-year-old villager from E--- village, Aur’Naung Pat Kan Ywar village tract, Hpapun Town, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District, stepped on a landmine while he was returning home from his fields in the hills.[21] Due to the injuries he sustained from the landmine explosion, doctors at Hpa-an Hospital had to amputate his right leg. His left leg was also broken by the explosion, and the landmine shrapnel injured his scrotum. He had stepped on a landmine on one of the paths in the forest, where there were no signs indicating landmine danger. His family and local villagers are unaware of who planted the landmines in this area, however they believe that they were planted in 2021. The local authorities had previously informed villagers about the contamination of landmines and told villagers not to go to prohibited areas. However, the victim’s sister explained that her brother cannot avoid going to the forest due to the need to sustain his family’s livelihood. Similarly, Naw F---, a villager from G--- village, Kheh Kah Hkoh village tract, Ler Doh Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, described.
We are now afraid to use that road because of the two [landmine] incidents that happened in the same area. We do not dare to go to the areas surrounding the village. We are so worried. Even though we were told not to use the prohibited road, we need to go to town to buy goods. If we don’t, we will have nothing left to eat. […] The villagers living in this village buy their food in town. How can we survive without being able to travel to buy food?”[22]
b) Villagers stepped on landmines left behind after fighting
Landmines are actively used in the conflict areas of Southeast Burma. As a result, some villagers have stepped on landmines planted after fighting between the SAC and armed resistance groups. For instance, on November 26th 2022, fighting broke out in H--- village, Than Moe Taung village tract, Daw Hpa Hkoh Township, Taw Oo District, between SAC soldiers based in H--- village and the combined forces of the People’s Defence Force (PDF)[23] and Northern Than Taung Peace Group (Aye Chan Yay A’pweh)[24]. Following the clash, SAC soldiers repaired their army camp and planted more landmines in the area, including in locations further away from their camp and on villagers’ land. Two or three days after the fighting, SAC soldiers notified villagers not to use Than Moe Taung Road and restricted access to it because of landmines planted there. On January 13th 2023, Daw[25] I---, a 68-year-old female villager from H--- village, stepped on a landmine on Than Moe Taung Road when she was returning from collecting wood nearby. Her left leg below the knee was blown off and she sustained severe injuries to her right leg, left arm and face. Daw I--- died before other villagers could arrive to help. Although local villagers stopped using the road, the victim’s son believes that his mother might have forgotten the warning and restriction due to her advanced age.
On other occasions, the SAC and its allies have purposely planted landmines inside villages to prevent civilians from returning to certain areas or near infrastructure, including medical clinics and religious buildings. For instance, on November 16th 2021, the junta-affiliated Border Guard Force (BGF)[26] Company #3 entered a village located in Pwa Gaw village tract, Hpa-an Township, Doo Tha Htoo District, and destroyed the medical clinic buildings and looted materials. They threatened local villagers not to enter the clinic compound anymore. Villagers assume the BGF planted a landmine in the clinic and did not feel safe going back.[27]
c) Inadequate warnings and a lack of mine awareness training
The SAC fails to adequately mark contaminated areas with signposting or inform villagers in Southeast Burma of the location of landmines they have planted in the area. Armed resistance groups usually inform villagers orally, however, these warnings are also often inadequate. The information villagers receive is incomplete and the precise location of landmines remains unknown and unmarked. For example, on June 29th 2021, Saw J---, a 10-year-old villager from K--- village, Ma Htaw village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District, stepped on a tripwire that detonated a landmine while he was returning home from L--- village, where he had gone to retrieve a box that contained clothes and books.[28] From the explosion, the victim sustained injuries to his face, neck, leg and abdomen. After the incident, he was sent to the SAC military’s Tactical Battalion #340 hospital situated in Hpapun Town to receive treatment. The medical staff were able to remove all of the shrapnel that hit his body. The victim was discharged from the hospital on July 27th 2021. His injuries took many months to heal fully. Before the incident, villagers were informed by the local KNU authorities that there was landmine contamination in the area. They were told to remain only on the road and not to wander anywhere to the sides of the road. According to the victim’s brother, these landmines were planted in May 2021 by the local ethnic armed groups. Even though Mine Risk Awareness training was provided to the villagers in 2020, the family of Saw J--- was unable to attend that training; they only received pamphlets containing landmine awareness information. No one has previously been injured due to landmine explosions in K--- village, and this was the first time that any landmine has exploded in or near the village. Despite the warnings from the local authorities not to go to places where there is landmine contamination, landmines planted near the road and surrounding areas pose a danger to local villagers nonetheless. Furthermore, there were no signs indicating where landmines have been planted in the vicinity of the village.
This lack of information provided on landmine contamination contributes to a high rate of incidents. Many local communities also lack Mine Risk Awareness training so they may not recognise landmine tripwires or contaminated areas. For example, on October 20th 2022, M--- , a villager from N--- village, Maung Khee village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District accidentally triggered a tripwire landmine when he went to make charcoal beside an SAC military camp near the village.[29] Local villagers assumed that the landmine has been set by the SAC. The victim was sent to Waw Lay Hospital, Waw Lay Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District. No Mine Risk Awareness training had been provided in N--- village. The victim does not have any relatives, so his neighbours and other villagers took care of him and supported him. No organisations financially supported him. M--- was discharged from the hospital and has since recovered from his injuries.
According to KHRG documentation, many local communities in locally-defined Karen State do not receive Mine Risk Awareness training. Many villagers, especially children, have stepped on landmines because they were not aware of landmine contamination in their communities. One of the main challenges that villagers face in accessing mine awareness training in their communities is the ongoing armed conflict. These trainings are usually provided by local organisations such as Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) and the Karen Teacher Working Group (KTWG) in all districts in locally-defined Karen State. Due to the conflict, it is difficult for local NGOs or other service providers to provide training for villagers in a safe place. As villagers always have to flee for their safety because of fighting, shelling and air strikes, villagers do not have time to receive training. The few organisations providing such training to local communities cannot reach all rural areas since some communities are in remote, hard-to-reach areas.
Thousands of people are internally displaced in Karen State, often many times over, due to the ongoing armed conflict.[30] When fleeing conflict, these internally displaced people (IDPs) must establish settlements in safe areas away from fighting and attack. Due to the high rate of landmine contamination across the state, rarely signposted, IDPs are at risk of landmine explosions when seeking safety in new areas. For instance, in early 2021, villagers from Xx--- village, Meh Way village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District, had to flee fighting in their area and were displaced to a place in Bilin Township. As Ashin[31] Xc---, a monk from Xx--- village, explained, these villagers were deeply afraid of the landmine contamination in the area they fled to, as they had no way of knowing where the landmines were. Moreover, as landmines are often left behind after fighting, Ashin Xc--- explained that IDPs were also afraid to return home to their villages because of new landmine contamination.[32]
II. Impacts of landmine incidents on local communities
From KHRG reports, 21 villagers were killed and 60 villagers were injured, including children, by landmine explosions in Southeast Burma from February 2021 to November 2023. The survivors of these explosions are faced with many challenges, including coping with their physical injuries, the psychological impact of the traumatic incident, high medical costs, and livelihood challenges due to an inability to work or the loss of livestock from landmine explosions. This section will discuss the impacts on survivors of these landmine incidents and their families.
a) Challenges facing landmine explosion by survivors and their family members
For the survivors who lost limbs or sustained other serious injuries from landmine explosions, it severely disrupts their ability to work, particularly if they rely on manual labour for plantation farming. For example, on June 13th 2023, at around 2 pm, Saw O---, a 41-year-old man from P--- village, Yaw Ku village tract, T’Nay Hsah Township, Hpa-an District, stepped on a landmine as he was going to the forest to collect some wild plants from a place near to a deserted Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)[33] army camp.[34] His right foot was badly injured in the explosion. With his foot wounded, he travelled back alone from the jungle to a local villager’s tent. He was initially taken to the Q--- hospital, but they could not provide adequate medical care there. Therefore, he was transferred to R--- hospital, Pee T’Hka village tract, Ta Kreh Township, Hpa-an District, for medical treatment. He has now been discharged from the hospital however he was bedridden for months after the incident. Due to his injury, his inability to work threatens his family’s livelihood.
Landmine survivors often face financial difficulties in getting treatment because of the high costs of medical care. For example, in October 2022, P---, a 36-year-old villager, from T--- village, Htee Moh Pgha special area, K’Ser Doh Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, stepped on a landmine while he was going to drink water in someone’s house in his village. After the incident, the victim was sent to the general hospital in Tavoy City, Mergui-Tavoy District, where his right leg was amputated. While he was in the hospital, the SAC soldiers came and told him that this incident happened to him because he had a connection with the PDF. They did not take any responsibility for him. The cost of the hospital treatment was around 3,000,000 kyats [1,427 USD][35] meaning he needed to sell his car and motorcycle to afford the treatment. Due to the loss of his leg, it was difficult for him to work and support his family in daily life; he has three children. After being discharged from the hospital, he returned to his village and stayed with his relatives.
The lack of adequate support is also prominent in cases of landmine explosion incidents. Some victims received some support from various stakeholders after the incident and villagers and close relatives sometimes help victims and their family members in terms of transportation and providing a little financial support. However, the support is not sufficient to meet their needs and all victims and their family members would benefit from long-term assistance programmes to help overcome the consequences of the incident on their ability to secure their livelihoods.
b) Livestock killed and injured
In 11 instances reported to KHRG, villagers’ livestock were killed and injured in landmine explosions. This also resulted in villagers’ livelihood challenges because animals such as cows and buffalos are used for farming and selling as a source of income. For example, on September 7th 2022, at about 11 am, a herd of cows belonging to U[36] U--- from V--- village, Noh T’Kaw village tract, Noh T’Kaw Township, Dooplaya District, stepped on a landmine that was planted by SAC soldiers near Infantry Battalion (IB)[37] #283 camp while the animals were roaming near the camp in V--- village.[38] Local villagers knew that the landmine was planted by SAC soldiers because the soldiers themselves told them so. A cow was killed and two others were severely injured by the landmine explosion. The severely injured cows were killed to be sold by their owner.
Other incidents also happened in Hpa-an District. In January 2023, one of the cows owned by a villager named W--- stepped on a landmine at A’Leh Bo Deh army camp (an SAC camp), Htee Wah Blaw village tract, T’Nay Hsah Township, Hpa-an District and broke a leg.[39] Again, in January 2023, one of the cows of a villager named X--- was killed by a landmine near Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[40] #356 located in Thin Gan Nyi Nuang military camp, Myawaddy Township, Hpa-an District. On January 24th 2023, three cows owned by a villager named Saw Y--- were injured and two of his cows were killed by a tripwire mine explosion. This tripwire mine was set up by SAC LIB #357 beside Saw Z---’s farm. The SAC had planted landmines near the villagers’ farms but did not inform the villagers about them, and so the villagers released their cows unaware of the mine contamination. After the landmine explosions, the SAC soldiers asked to whom the cows belonged but no one answered because they knew the owner would be made to pay for the landmines that exploded. After these incidents, the SAC informed villagers from Aa--- village and Ab--- village that the cows’ owners would have to pay for landmines if their cows stepped on landmines again. The SAC soldiers also restricted some areas in Htee Wah Blaw village tract so villagers could not let their cows go and pasture there.
c) Restricted freedom of movement
Landmine contamination remains a barrier to villagers’ freedom of movement and is an obstacle to their pursuit of everyday livelihood activities. Villagers can often not safely travel to their farms and plantations, nor to towns to buy food and other essential supplies. For instance, on March 1st 2021, three villagers from G--- village, Kheh Kah Hkoh village tract, Ler Doh Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, were hit by a landmine explosion at Ac--- place when they travelled to Ler Doh Town on two motorbikes to purchase goods for their shop.[41] The incident place was three miles away from G--- village. Saw Ad--- and Naw Ae--- died instantly and another villager sustained shrapnel injuries to his lips and legs. The injured villager immediately returned to the village and informed the victims’ families and the local authorities about the incident, after which they went to the incident location and brought back the bodies of the victims to the village. Local villagers have stopped going to certain areas and using the contaminated road since this incident.
4. Analysis: patterns of abuses and violations of international law
Survivors and victims’ family members require long-term support in the aftermath of landmine incidents, including psychological care, medical rehabilitation and financial support to support livelihoods. The impact of landmine contamination on villagers across Southeast Burma is severe and increasing; their needs must be met by assistance from NGOs, community-based and civil society organisations (CBO/CSOs), and international organisations operating in Southeast Burma.
The incidents presented in this briefing paper primarily involve landmines planted in farms, plantations or close to roads, which villagers unknowingly trigger while conducting their livelihood activities. Landmine incidents were also found to commonly occur as a direct result of fighting between armed groups in civilian areas: they are lain to control territory and not cleared in the aftermath of conflict, nor is adequate information of contamination spread among communities. Many children are victims of landmines in Southeast Burma; they are often even less aware of the location or dangers of contaminated areas than adults. A lack of mine awareness training in affected communities was a notable feature of many incidents. Villagers cannot avoid the risk of landmines when they lack knowledge of the location of contaminated areas and, as has been discussed, sometimes have to walk through known contaminated areas by necessity to secure their livelihoods.
The use of landmines is an active and systematic strategy used by the SAC in Southeast Burma to attack both military and civilian targets. This is evident from the wealth of incidents documented in civilian areas, surrounding villages, on villagers’ land and plantations, and on roads used daily and the SAC’s often deliberate withholding of information on contaminated locations. Whilst armed resistance groups may use landmines to protect territory, including villages, from attack and sometimes inform villagers orally, civilians are nonetheless not adequately protected and contaminated areas are rarely signposted, which should be a minimum precaution. Landmines are always planted with intention to harm, and where civilians are targeted, severe violations of international law have taken place. Landmines do not distinguish between combatants and civilians in their victims, as anyone could trigger them. All parties of a conflict must ensure civilians are not targeted and are protected from their military operations. Landmine usage violates this principle of distinction between civilians and combatants, the basic tenet of international humanitarian law.[42]
The Burma government is one of few non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty (1997), which prohibits the use of anti-personnel landmines, and is an international pariah in using them against domestic civilians.[43] As Matt Wells, Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Deputy Director, states, “at a time when the world has overwhelmingly banned these inherently indiscriminate weapons, the military has placed them in people’s yards, homes, and even stairwells, as well as around a church”.[44] Landmine usage by the SAC is one of many examples of civilians being targeted without distinction from combatants. Villagers are not inadvertent victims, the use of indiscriminate weapons inside villages and in areas unavoidable to civilians shows deliberate targeting and clear motivation.
As specified in Article 51 (5) of Additional Protocol I of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1980), weapons that cannot be exclusively directed towards military targets and thus cause indiscriminate damage, are prohibited.[45] When lain in areas roamed by civilians, landmines do not discriminate their victims, and so are prohibited. Despite the Burma government’s non-acquiescence of this Convention, its terms are nonetheless applicable according to the ICRC commentary of rule 81: Restrictions on the Use of Landmines of customary international humanitarian law.[46] State and non-state armed actors must adhere to the obligations outlined in the Convention to ‘take all feasible precautions to protect civilians from the effects of these weapons’, and to ‘take special precautionary measures such as marking and signposting of minefields’.[47] The incidents presented in this briefing paper attest to the failure of all armed actors in Southeast Burma to do so.
Whilst some armed groups may use landmines to protect areas from SAC attacks, including villages or bases, the incidents documented demonstrate their usage does not take sufficient precautions nor adequately inform villagers, and thus also fall short of customary laws to which they are also beholden to follow. Despite the Burma government not being a signatory of either the Mine Ban Treaty (1997) or the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1980), customary international humanitarian law reaches beyond these Conventions; all armed actors must adhere to international standards, ensuring villagers in Southeast Burma are able to live in peace, with their right to life, livelihood, and security honoured and protected.
Recommendations
To international stakeholders and aid agencies:
Acknowledge that the military junta is the reason for the current human rights and humanitarian crisis, and abstain from giving legitimacy to the junta, including by signing agreements with them and presenting them with credentials. Seek justice and hold the SAC accountable for their use of landmines against civilians, by prosecuting leaders in international courts, including at international criminal court (ICC), and through universal jurisdiction proceedings. Broaden the scope of international investigations to include human rights abuses faced by the Karen people, especially in regards to injury, death, and displacement due to landmines. Implement further coordinated and strategic sanctions on the SAC, junta officials, and weapons/landmine suppliers, to weaken the junta’s capability to finance their campaigns and attacks on civilians. Support local organisations active in providing Mine Risk Education services, with an emphasis on educating children, in rural areas in Southeast Burma. Support, coordinate and promote local initiatives aiming at mapping contamination sites and landmine clearance programmes. Work with local service providers to establish and implement long-term assistance programmes for landmine victims and their families, as well as communities whose livelihoods are affected by landmine contamination.
To the Karen National Union (KNU) and affiliated armed actors:
Refrain from planting new landmines and remove all existing landmines near or in villages. Demand that soldiers distinctly mark landmine-contaminated areas with signposting and properly inform local villagers about their locations. Continue to work with Karen civil society organisations (CSOs) to offer more Mine Risk Awareness programmes and increase victim assistance..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication:
2023-12-22
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.8 MB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန နှင့် မဟာမိတ်များ စစ်ဒေသအလိုက် တည်ဆောက်ထားသည့် Chain of command အောက်တွင် ပါဝင်လျက် Code of Conduct စစ်ဘက်ဆိုင်ရာ ကျင့်ဝတ်များနှင့်အညီ ဆောင်ရွက်မည်ဟူသော သဘောတူညီချက်ဖြင့် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ယင်းမာပင်ခရိုင်၊ ပုလဲမြို့နယ်တွင် အခြေစိုက်သည့် မြန်မာ့တော်ဝင်နဂါးတပ်တော် (MRDA)၏ တပ်ဖွဲ့များကို ယင်းမာပင်ခရိုင် တပ်ရင်းအမှတ် (၃)၊ (၄)၊ (၅)၊ (၆) အဖြစ် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ (၁၄) ရက်နေ့ရက်စွဲဖြင့် အသိအမှတ်ပြုကွပ်ကဲမှု ရယူခဲ့ပါသည်။
၂။ ကွပ်ကဲမှုရယူပြီးနောက် အခြားပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် တပ်ရင်းများနည်းတူ တပ်ရင်း ထောက်ပံ့မှုများကို ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ၊ မေလ မှစတင်၍ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ရာ ယခုအချိန်အထိ စုစုပေါင်း ကျပ်သိန်း ၃၁၈,၀၀၀,၀၀၀ (မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ သိန်းပေါင်း သုံးထောင် တစ်ရာ ရှစ်ဆယ်သိန်း တိတိ) (ခန့်မှန်းအမေရိကန် ဒေါ်လာ (၁၂၂,၉၇၆.၄၈)) ထောက်ပံ့ခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
၃။ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် တပ်ရင်းများအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြု ကွပ်ကဲမှုမယူမီကာလကလည်း MRDA ၏ ထုတ်လုပ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းများအတွက် စုစုပေါင်း ခန့်မှန်းအမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၂၄,၁၆၆.၆၇) ထောက်ပံ့ခဲ့ပြီး ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးထောက်ပို့တပ် (PRF) အပါအဝင် ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှတဆင့် ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပ အလှူရှင်များ၏ လှူဒါန်းမှု စုစုပေါင်း ခန့်မှန်းအမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၂၈,၀၇၀) ကိုလည်း ဆက်သွယ်ပေးပို့ခဲ့သည်။
၄။ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ အတွင်း MRDA အနေဖြင့် ၎င်း၏ ရန်ပုံငွေဖြင့် လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းဝယ်ယူနိုင်ရန် အတွက် မဟာမိတ်များနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခဲ့ရုံသာမက ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနက ခန့်မှန်း အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၉၀,၀၀၀) ကို အားဖြည့်ထောက်ပံ့ပေးခဲ့သည်။
၅။ တော်လှန်ရေးကာလ အစောပိုင်းတွင် MRDA အတွက် မောင်းပြန် (၅) လက်နှင့် ဆက်စပ်ခဲယမ်းများကို ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် လည်းကောင်း၊ ဗုံးပစ်လောင်ချာ (၁၅) လက်နှင့် ဆက်စပ်ခဲယမ်းများကို အမှတ် (၁) စစ်ဒေသမှ တဆင့် လည်းကောင်း ထောက်ပံ့ပေးခဲ့သည်။ ထို့အတူ အသိအမှတ်ပြု ကွပ်ကဲမှုယူပြီး ဖြစ်သော တပ်ရင်း လေးရင်း အနက် ယင်းမာခရိုင်အမှတ် (၆) တပ်ရင်းကို မောင်းပြန် (၉၃) လက်နှင့် ဗုံးပစ်လောင်ချာ (၇) လက်တို့ကို တပ်ဆင်ပေးခဲ့သည်။
၆။ ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးမဟာမိတ်များအနေဖြင့် ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ် အောင်မြင်ရေးအတွက် တိကျခိုင်မာ၍ ရှင်းလင်းပြတ်သားသည့် ကွပ်ကဲမှုစနစ် တည်ဆောက်လျက်ရှိရာ ယင်းမာပင်ခရိုင်တပ်ရင်း (၃)၊ (၄)၊ (၅)၊ (၆) တို့သည် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် (PDF) တပ်ရင်းများအဖြစ် ဆက်လက်ခံယူလျက် Chain of Command နှင့် Code of Conduct (COC) နှစ်ရပ်ကို လေးစားလိုက်နာဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန နှင့် စစ်ဒေသကလည်း ဆက်လက်အသိအမှတ်ပြုထောက်ပံ့လျက် ကွပ်ကဲမှုရယူ ဆောင်ရွက် သွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
274.15 KB
more
Description:
"On 14 March 2022, the Myanmar Royal Dragon Army (MRDA), stationed in Yinmabin District of Pale Township in Sagaing Region, officially underwent a restructuring process. As part of this transformation, the MRDA's forces were reorganized into Yinmabin District battalions numbered (3), (4), (5) and (6). This reconfiguration was carried out with a commitment to honor the Chain of Command and the Code of Conduct jointly established by the Ministry of Defence of the National Unity Government and allied Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations.
Similar to other People's Defence Force battalions operating under the same command structure, these Yinmabin battalions have received financial support totalling MMK 318,000,000 (EUSD 122,976.48) since May 2022 through to the present date.
Prior to their integration into the command structure, the MRDA received roughly EUSD 24,166.67 in support specifically allocated for weapon production. Additionally, donations totalling around EUSD 28,070, including contributions from local sources and the diaspora (including the People's Revolutionary Supply Family), were channelled through the Ministry of Defence.
In March 2022, the Ministry extended support to the MRDA by providing approximately EUSD 90,000 for the purpose of procuring weapons. The Ministry also collaborated with allied parties to facilitate the acquisition of these weapons.
During the early phases of the revolution, the MRDA was initially supplied with five automatic rifles and ammunition through the Ministry, and 15 grenade launchers with ammunition via No. (1) Military Region. Among the four Yinmabin District battalions under the command, Yinmabin District battalion No. (6) was outfitted with an impressive arsenal, including 93 automatic rifles and seven grenade launchers.
As the People's Revolutionary allies work diligently to establish a well-defined and resolute command structure aimed at securing victory in the defensive war, Yinmabin District battalions No. (3), (4), (5) and (6) are committed to maintaining their roles as People's Defence Force battalions. They will steadfastly adhere to the Chain of Command and the Code of Conduct. It is hereby declared that both the Ministry of Defence and No. (1) Military Region will provide all forms of support to these battalions, and that they will remain under their existing command structure..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
44.61 KB 274.15 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ အမှတ်တံဆိပ် (Logo) နှင့် ကာကွယ်ရေး ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး၏ လက်မှတ်များကို ဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် သက်ဆိုင်သော စာများ၊ သဝဏ်လွှာများနှင့်အခြားခွင့်ပြုချက် ရရှိသည့် လုပ်ငန်းများတွင်သာ အသုံးပြုရမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် မလိုလားအပ်သော ရှုပ်ထွေးမှုများ မဖြစ်ပေါ်စေရန် အတွက် အထက်ဖော်ပြပါ အမှတ်တံဆိပ် (Logo) နှင့် ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး လက်မှတ်များကို ဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ တရားဝင်(စာဖြင့်) ခွင့်ပြုချက်မရှိပဲ မည့်သည့်နေရာတွင်မျှ အသုံးပြုခွင့် မပြုကြောင်းနှင့် အသုံးပြုနေကြောင်းတွေ့ရှိပါက တိုင်ကြား မှုများဆိုင်ရာကော်မတီ (Email : [email protected]) သို့ အကြောင်းကြားနိုင်ပါရန် အသိပေး ထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
173.09 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ယနေ့ မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၃၈၅ ခုနှစ်၊ ဝါခေါင်လပြည့်နေ့ (ခရစ်နှစ် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဩဂုတ် လ ၃၁ ရက်) သည် တန်းတူညီမျှရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်တို့အတွက် လက်နက်ကိုင်တိုက်ပွဲ ဝင်ခဲ့သော မွန်အမျိုးသားတို့၏ (၇၆)ကြိမ်မြောက် မွန်တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလွတ်လပ်ရေးရပြီးချိန်တွင် မွန်တိုင်းရင်းသားများနေထိုင်ရာ သီးခြားပြည်နယ် သတ်မှတ်ဖော်ထုတ်ပေးရေး၊ တန်းတူညီမျှမှုနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် ရရှိရေး စသော ရည်မှန်းချက်များကို ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန် ဇာသပြင်ကျေးရွာတွင် မွန်မျိုးချစ်လူငယ် (၂၇) ဦးမှ ဦးဆောင်၍ "ခေတ်သစ်မွန်လက်နက်ကိုင်တပ်"ကို စတင်တည်ထောင်ခဲ့သည့် အချိန်ဖြစ် - မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၃၁၀ ခုနှစ်၊ ဝါခေါင်လပြည့်နေ့ နံနက် (၀၆:၃၀)အချိန်အား " မွန်တော် လှန်ရေးနေ့" အဖြစ် ဂုဏ်ပြုသတ်မှတ်ခဲ့ကြပါသည်။
၃။လွတ်လပ်ရေးအပြီး ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ဗိုလ်ကျအုပ်ချုပ်ခဲ့ကြသူများအား ခေါင်းငုံ့မခံ ဘဲ ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး၊ တန်းတူညီမျှရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်ရရှိရေးတို့အတွက် မျိုးဆက် အဆက်ဆက် မဆုတ်မနစ် တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် မွန်လူမျိုးတို့၏ သမိုင်းမှာ ဂုဏ်ယူ ဖွယ်ကောင်းလှပါသည်။
၄။ ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် ဖြစ်ပေါ်ခဲ့သော မင်းအောင်လှိုင် ဦးဆောင် သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က အာဏာလုယူယူရန်ကြိုးစားမှုသည် မွန်လူမျိုးများအပါအဝင်တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံး၏ ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု ပေါ်ပေါက် ရေးကို ပေါ်ပေါ်ထင်ထင် နှောင့်ယှက်ဖျက်ဆီးလိုက်ခြင်းပင် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဤမတရားမှုကြီး အား လက်သင့်မခံဘဲ စစ်အာဏာရှင်ပြုတ်ကျရေးအတွက် နိုင်ငံအနှံ့ လှည်းနေလှေအောင်း မြင်းဇောင်းမကျန် တော်လှန်နေကြသည့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကြီးတွင် မွန်လူမျိုးများအနေဖြင့် တစ်ထောင့်တစ်နေရာမှ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်နေကြသည်ကို လေးစားဖွယ် တွေ့မြင်ရပါသည်။
၅။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော (၇၆)ကြိမ်မြောက် မွန်တော်လှန်ရေးနေ့တွင် ကျဆုံး လေပြီးသော မွန်အာဇာနည်ခေါင်းဆောင်များအပါအဝင် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအတွင်း အသက် ပေးလှူသွားကြသော တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးအားလုံးတို့၏ တော်လှန်သစ္စာကို အောက်မေ့သတိ ရရင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင် အမြန်ဆုံးပြုတ်ကျစေရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံ တော်သစ် ပေါ်ထွန်းလာစေရေးအတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် မွန်အမျိုး သားများအပါအဝင် တိုင်းရင်းသားအားလုံးနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းကာ တော်လှန်ရေးရည်မှန်းချက်များ အမြန်ဆုံးပြည့်ဝအောင်မြင်အောင် လက်တွဲဖော်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း လေးနက်စွာ ဆန္ဒပြုရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-08-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Mon history
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
250.63 KB
more
Sub-title:
Kim Aris says in an interview with RFA that the junta hasn’t responded to his requests to contact his mother.
Description:
"Radio Free Asia’s Soe San Aung spoke with Kim Aris, the son of former State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, last week.
Suu Kyi served as Myanmar’s de facto leader following national elections in 2015, which her National League of Democracy won by a landslide. The party also won the 2020 national elections, but the military seized power from the democratically elected government on Feb. 1, 2021.
The army immediately arrested civilian leaders, including Suu Kyi, who were in Naypyidaw for the convening of the newly elected lower house of parliament. She was held at Naypyidaw Prison until last month, when a source told RFA that she was relocated to “a more comfortable state-owned residence.”
Aris is living in the United Kingdom and has been unable to contact his mother since the military coup.
RFA: You’ve been involved in supporting the Burmese community in London and you’ve been finding funds to support back home. First, tell me what you’ve been doing to support the spring revolution, the nationwide wave of popular resistance to the Myanmar military following the 2021 coup.
Kim Aris: But I never really wish to be a public figure. I kind of already stand by and see what others do and what is needed. And as my mother’s son, I have a unique position whereby I can speak out to the world. Outside of the Burmese community, people aren’t very aware of what’s happening. So I’m doing what I can to raise funds and awareness for the cause.
RFA: As we know, your mother, Aung San Suu Kyi, was once given the chance to leave Burma, but chose to stay with the Burmese people over her family. How would you describe your mother?
Kim Aris: It always saddens and angers me that my mother has sometimes been portrayed as cold hearted because she was unable to be by my father’s side while he was dying. I was nursing him at that time, and I can say that he did not wish for her to return to England.
We wanted to be by her side in Burma. Unfortunately, the military couldn’t find it in their heart to allow him his dying wish. And from my point of view, I’ve never felt like she left me. I was with her when she was first put under house arrest in Burma. And it never felt like she abandoned me in any way.
Also in Burma, everybody’s now lost their parents to the military. It’s not as though I’ve actually lost my mother. People in Burma are going through far worse than what I have been through. It’s lucky for me that my mother left me here in England, where it’s safe. I feel privileged. Compared to what’s happening to the people in Burma, I have a very easy life.
RFA: Now your mother, Aung San Suu Kyi, is under house arrest again. Have you had any contact with her?
Kim Aris: As far as I’m aware, she’s not actually under house arrest. She’s in prison somewhere. The military has said that she’s been moved into house arrest, but there’s been no evidence that that’s actually the case.
I have had no contact with her. And the military hasn’t responded to any requests I have made for contact or to inform me of her whereabouts. In the past, I have had some contact when she was under house arrest in Yangon, but now I don’t know what condition she’s being kept under or where she is.
RFA: We are aware that you went to the Burmese embassy to give a birthday gift to your mother, but they didn’t let you in and they didn’t even say anything to you. How many times have you sent a request to the junta to get in contact with her?
Kim Aris: There’s actually very little point to corresponding with these people because I haven’t received any response ever. So I’ve tried various other avenues, such as through the British Foreign Office and via the International Red Cross, but they’ve had the same result, which is no response.
RFA: I’m sorry to hear that. But in the last amnesty, they commuted some of your mother’s sentence. What was your reaction?
Kim Aris: It’s a military gesture. The military has used these tactics in the past to try and appease the international community whilst they still continue to perpetrate all sorts of atrocities against their own people every day. And even with the reduced sentence, my mother would still be over 100 when she’s released.
RFA: So you’ve been back to Burma, like when your mother was released in 2010. What was your perception about the country?
Kim Aris: Well, obviously the situation there was incredibly sad, especially since the country was going through a period of development. There was a great deal to look forward to. Now, all of that has been taken away. The country has gone backwards since the coup. So it seems like it is worse now than it was back in 1988.
RFA: Yeah, it’s like the country is in chaos right now. You know, young people are fighting back for their freedom. What's your point of view about today’s crisis?
Kim Aris: Well, from what I can gather, the situation is not sustainable for anybody. The military aren’t as strong as people think they may be. They have lots of high tech weaponry, but they do not have the manpower that the people have. And I hope that this war cannot go on for too much longer. No more bloodshed.
But obviously, that’s not going to happen any time soon. Hopefully things will play out before two years’ time. The military will collapse, but we’ll see.
RFA: What if you had a chance to talk directly with Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the chairman of the junta’s governing body?
Kim Aris: I would ask him to stop waging this war against his own people. The resolve and fortitude of the Burmese people is absolute. They will never accept the military rule, and the youth of Burma will never accept having their freedom taken away. Now, for the first time in a long time, all the different ethnicities are starting to work together, and that shows that the army will never win this war.
RFA: What hope do you have for Burma?
Kim Aris: I hope that Burma will achieve the freedom that it’s been looking for so many years now. And that people can start to rebuild their lives. In the future, hopefully people will be united and be able to work together in a more inclusive manner.
RFA: Burmese people asking for international help. As Aung San Suu Kyi’s son, what is your message to the international community?
Kim Aris: I would ask the international community not to stand by and let the military junta brazenly commit crimes against humanity. I would ask them to increase humanitarian assistance and support organizations that are actually able to get aid to the areas which are in need. Also, to impose more targeted and effective sanctions against the junta. Also to recognize a meaningful dialogue with the shadow National Unity Government.
As stated in a recent UN report, war crimes committed by Burma’s military, including the vengeance bombings, is becoming increasingly frequent. 1.7 million civilians have been displaced, over 15,000 arrested and 6,000 killed. The military are conducting a war on their own people, regardless of race, ethnicity or religion. 17.6 million civilians are now in urgent need of lifesaving aid, protection and support.
Recent floods triggered by heavy monsoon rains have added to this crisis, with a further 50,000 people displaced. A regime that uses airstrikes against civilian villages, then returns to kill mothers and children while they are collecting the dead for burial. It’s a situation that needs to be addressed by the international community, who seem to be happy to stand aside and let this happen.
RFA: We have learned that your mother doesn’t want you to get involved in politics. Is that true? Did she ever say anything to you?
Kim Aris: Yeah, she’s never wanted me to be involved in politics. I’ve never wanted to be involved in politics. As I said, I would much rather not be any sort of a public figure. But since the military are not allowing me any access to my mother at all, I feel like I need to do something to try my best to help the situation in Burma.
After all, my mother cannot tell me what she thinks. So I have to think what she would want me to be doing. And I know she would want me to be helping where I can.
RFA: Do you hold out hope that she would be set free again?
Kim Aris: Absolutely. I cannot see the situation in Burma continuing as it is. I hope she will be free – along with all the other political prisoners in the country – and can find peace again.
RFA: What is your message to the people who are fighting for democracy in Burma, especially young people?
Kim Aris: I would say never give up. And this fight is one that cannot be lost. The military will never win. And the rest of the world is thinking about what is happening today, even though it doesn’t seem like it. Sometimes people around the world are trying to help.
RFA: By the way, I have seen the pictures with your mother and Taichito (Aung San Suu Kyi’s dog). We know you left Taichito with your mother in Burma. What is his situation now?
Kim Aris: I believe he is in Yangon. I’m not sure where exactly. He’s getting old. His eyesight isn’t as good as it was, and I’m sure he'll be missing May May (Burmese word for Mommy)..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-08-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights Defenders
Language:
more
Description:
"Despite being on the backfoot as the country’s civil war intensifies, the military regime is showing no interest in a democratic transition that may be the country’s only hope. India must explore various options for a peaceful resolution to the crisis and provide humanitarian assistance to displaced people.
Myanmar’s military regime has once again chosen to extend the state of emergency imposed two and a half years ago, marking the fourth extension since seizing power from the elected government in 2021. This latest decision prolongs the state of emergency for another six months, further delaying the promised elections that were supposed to occur under the military’s rule this month.
The ostensible justification for the extension is the need for additional time to prepare for elections. The move, however, is not surprising since the military that effectively controls the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) is facing considerable challenges in organising the polls owing to widespread opposition to their rule.
Junta’s Grip Slipping
Inside Myanmar, the situation has grown increasingly precarious, with multiple insurgencies and conflicts involving various ethnic armed groups becoming more prominent. The Rohingya crisis in Rakhine State remains unresolved, and clashes between the military and ethnic rebels have intensified in different regions, necessitating the imposition of martial law in almost 50 townships across Yangon, Mandalay, Sagaing, and Magwe regions, as well as Chin and Kayah states.
The military’s continued use of force against these groups has exacerbated the situation, leading to a spiralling cycle of violence and displacement. According to various estimates, security forces have been responsible for the deaths of 3,868 people and the arrests of 24,137 individuals, with 19,687 still detained or sentenced. As of March 2023, the number of internally displaced people has reached 1,704,000, further intensifying the humanitarian crisis.
The military’s continued use of force against these groups has exacerbated the situation, leading to a spiralling cycle of violence and displacement.
In the face of mounting challenges, the junta’s grip on power appears to be slipping. Armed resistance groups have grown more assertive, resorting to guerrilla warfare tactics and strategic offensives even with financial constraints. The ongoing internal war severely threatens the nation, aggravating chaos and suffering.
Democracy Not On Agenda
Moreover, economic hardships, soaring inflation, and humanitarian crises have added to the people’s discontent and disillusionment with the military rule. Despite having a significant advantage in resources and weaponry, the army has struggled to quell resistance and maintain control.
The military regime’s persistent postponement of the democratic transition reflects a lack of genuine commitment to democratic governance. It has shown little inclination to relinquish control and allow for a truly representative and inclusive political process, leading to growing scepticism among the domestic population, its immediate neighbours, and the international community about the junta’s intentions.
The recent reduction of Aung San Suu Kyi’s prison term from a 33-year combined sentence to merely six years along with her relocation to a state-managed residence, is unlikely to alter these perceptions.
How India Can Help
For India, this situation poses a number of challenges. Myanmar’s ongoing crisis is significantly impacting India’s northeastern border regions. Over 54,100 Myanmar nationals have sought refuge in the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland, straining resources and posing security challenges for India. The influx of displaced people and potential for cross-border insurgent activities demand India’s careful and proactive approach, especially as China remains keen to exploit the extant situation to its advantage.
As a democratic nation with deep historical and political ties to Myanmar, India has followed a constructive approach while dealing with its Southeast Asian neighbour keeping its own strategic interests in mind. However, India must not hesitate to convey a firm message to the junta, expressing its concerns about escalating instability in Myanmar and exerting pressure on the military government to take more decisive actions toward achieving a peaceful resolution to the crisis.
As a democratic nation with deep historical and political ties to Myanmar, India has followed a constructive approach while dealing with its Southeast Asian neighbour keeping its own strategic interests in mind.
India’s approach should prioritise humanitarian assistance and support for displaced people as well as showcasing its commitment to regional stability. Providing aid and service to those affected by the crisis will alleviate suffering and demonstrate India’s solidarity with the people of Myanmar.
Role At Talks Table
Moreover, India should use its influence to open channels of dialogue with and between the junta and the opposition, including armed ethnic groups. The shifting of Aung San Suu Kyi to house arrest opens up new possibilities and could prove valuable to all parties involved in any such dialogue. Despite the waning influence she holds over the growing and increasingly militant resistance movement, Aung San Suu Kyi remains a prominent symbol in the nation.
In addition to its bilateral efforts, New Delhi should collaborate closely with the ASEAN nations to assess whether their proposed peace plan requires reformulation or revisions. Working in coordination with regional partners can enhance the effectiveness of initiatives to bring stability and peace to Myanmar. India’s active involvement in regional forums will strengthen collective efforts to address the crisis and find viable solutions.
With the ground situation in Myanmar evolving rapidly, India’s efforts hold immense significance in fostering regional peace and cooperation as well as preserving Indian interests in a country which is critical for India’s own internal security in the northeast..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of publication:
2023-08-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
more
Description:
"Insight Email No. 19
This Insight Email is published on August 9, 2023, as a translation of the original Burmese language version that ISP-Myanmar sent out to the ISP Gabyin members on August 4, 2023.
This week’s ISP Insight Email No. 20 focuses on the State Administration Council’s (SAC) extension of its own term in office creating a complex Catch-22 situation with the SAC’s aspiration for fresh elections. Prison terms for President Win Myint and Aung San Suu Kyi were partially pardoned, yet the extent of the goodwill derived from this move remains minimal. This ISP Insight Email also discusses the development of the ‘ASEAN Minus’ strategy in dealing with the Myanmar junta. The bulletin also discusses the possible emerging trend of new military offensives expected after the extension of the junta’s term and also briefly introduces Andrew Ong’s new book on Wa, ‘Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border.’
∎ Key takeaways
1.Prolonged SAC’s rule
The SAC held a National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) meeting on July 31 during which it extended its term in government by an additional six months citing the ‘unusual circumstances of the country’ as justification. The SAC‘s rationale behind this extension of the state of the emergency period was grounded in Section 42(b) and 425 of the constitution. Both sections pertain to the formal submission to extend the state of emergency, where Section 42(b) stipulates ‘reasons why (the Commander-in-Chief) has not yet been able to accomplish the duties assigned to him’ and where Section 425 stipulates the reasons why the ‘Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services submits the extension.’ However ordinarily both the sections permit only two extensions of the prescribed duration of the state of emergency for a term of six months for each extension. The SAC has now extended its terms in government under the state of emergency for four times.
The SAC selectively targeted the ‘conditional clause’ of ‘unusual circumstances of the country’ and has creatively interpreted it to suit its extension needs. The SAC also claims that the constitutional court has endorsed this interpretation.
Even as the SAC extends its authority, it continues to uphold the promise of an eventual election. The SAC chairman in 2021 stated that the election process would be ready by August 2023. But this timeline has clearly not been met. In the present context, the chairman of the SAC has outlined two prerequisites for holding elections. The first condition involves conducting the election process outside conflict zones, while the second is that everyone in the nation has access to participate in the nationwide election. Both situations demand a ‘peaceful and stable situation with full law’ and ‘correct voters lists.’ Achieving correct voter lists though hinges on the successful completion of the national census, yet this process has again been delayed by incidents of physical violence and intimidation. The combination of the post-coup legitimacy crisis, a lack of widespread popular support, and the stated goal to hold fresh elections is seemingly a Catch-22 situation for the SAC. The SAC has also stated that the election will be held without delay, meanwhile it has also said ‘the election must not be rushed and should be prepared systematically.’ The SAC has still failed to state the exact date for fresh elections. Given this situation, the people of Myanmar can only realistically expect further extensions of SAC State of Emergency rule under the pretense of ‘unusual circumstances of the country.’
2.Pardoned without freedom
Speculation had been circulating that after the consecration of the Maravijaya Buddha stupa, the SAC might provide amnesty to political prisoners, even extending to the possibility of Aung San Suu Kyi’s full release or move to house arrest. There was also speculation on the formation of an interim government in order to conduct an election. This speculation intensified particularly in light of the unexpected meeting between Thailand’s Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai and Aung San Suu Kyi.
On August 1, the SAC granted partial clemency to President Win Myint and Aung San Suu Kyi. This gesture though only led to the reduction of their prison terms, falling short of ensuring their full release. For Aung San Suu Kyi, the SAC reduced her prison sentence by six years, leaving 27 years still remaining as she was originally sentenced to 33 years imprisonment. For Win Myint, the SAC reduced his 12-year sentence by four years. In contrast to the previous junta’s approach, the SAC’s leniency appears limited. In this recent amnesty, the SAC granted freedom to 7,749 prisoners, although only a handful political prisoners were included in this group.
The recent developments surrounding Aung San Suu Kyi have sparked a wave of anticipation within Myanmar’s political landscape. Her significance remains undeniable, as she continues to command people’s trust. In a previous analysis on ISP OnPoint No. 16, ISP-Myanmar discussed a forecast scenario of greater freedoms being extended to Aung San Suu Kyi. These included the prospect of Aung San Suu Kyi engaging in more interactions with international delegates, a potential return to house arrest, or even her regaining freedom in the near future. The exact trajectory remains uncertain, but there is still a sense of hope. From August 7 to 11, the Union Supreme Court is set to hear appeals, a notable event that includes six appeals submitted by Aung San Suu Kyi. This legal proceeding holds significant interest and could yet have far-reaching implications.
3.The ‘ASEAN Minus’ approach
The Five-Point Consensus was agreed upon among ASEAN countries in April 2021 in order to resolve the Myanmar conflict, but has so far encountered difficulties in implementation. Notably, U.N. special envoy to Myanmar, Mrs. Noeleen Heyzer recently finished her 18-month term, stepping down without achieving any discernible success. Acknowledging that ASEAN’s leadership and centrality are pivotal in shaping the region, Western nations have largely left resolution of the Myanmar crisis in ASEAN hands. Initial hopes were pinned on the potential of ‘ASEAN Plus’ efforts, leveraging the collaboration of regional entities including special envoys from China, Japan, and the United Nations. However, this approach has faced practical limitations and has not fully materialized. In response, certain ASEAN nations and China have leaned towards a strategy of ‘neighborhood diplomacy’ aimed at managing Myanmar’s challenges within the regional context. This new trend of ‘Asean Minus’ is thus clearly developing (See ISP Insight Email No. 17).
On July 26, 2023, as reported in AP, in a meeting with the Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim suggested that ‘Southeast Asian countries should be given some latitude to engage informally with Myanmar on an individual basis to help resolve a deepening crisis there.’ He added ‘neighboring countries should be given “some flexibility, room and space” to engage with Myanmar on an informal basis.’ This approach concretely shows the position of ‘ASEAN Minus’ gaining traction, despite the fact that the regional group’s formal policy is still for ASEAN unity and that any Southeast Asian nation’s diplomatic efforts should support the centrality of ASEAN unity, be conducted in line with the Five-Point Consensus, and in coordination with the Chair of ASEAN. The momentum behind this ‘ASEAN Minus’ trend has been particularly noticeable following the independent visit of Thailand’s Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai to Myanmar.
While the ‘ASEAN Plus’ approach has the potential to harness the collective strength of the regional bloc, the concept of ‘ASEAN Minus’ could yield divergent outcomes. Under an ‘ASEAN Minus’ approach, individual countries could be motivated by their own interests and thus could potentially exhibit less cooperative power to pressure Myanmar towards reform. ‘ASEAN Minus’ could also result in a ‘negative peace’, merely a situation absent of fighting, but lacking any substantive peace, justice, or resolution of the Myanmar conflict (See ISP Insight Email No. 16).
∎ Trends to be watched
Risk of intensifying military operations along with the extension of SAC’s term
The military junta extended its rule for another six months on July 31, 2023. One of the reasons for the extension of its rule was ostensibly in order to hold a general election. Along this pretense, SAC chairman Min Aung Hlaing stated that it is necessary to accelerate peace and stability measures, and that rule of law processes must be completed in some areas of regions and states where terror attacks still occur. When the SAC put forward its justification for the previous extension on February 1, 2023, a similar sentiment was given and at least 40 townships subsequently had martial law imposed upon them. Following the July 31 extension, it can be assumed that more townships could now have stricter rules imposed upon them.
As a result of the extension of SAC rule, ISP-Myanmar would also expect an increase in military offensives against opposition forces, orchestrated in different areas. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published a conflict updated in its Myanmar Conflict Map as ‘Junta tactics shift in Myanmar’s war-torn Dry Zone’ on July 5, 2023 where it argued that faced with the rise of newly formed armed organizations that the junta’s tactics have now shifted. The New York Times reiterated this point on July 31, 2023, in a special feature article ‘The Country That Bombs Its Own People’ working from IISS data.
Analyses conducted by both the New York Times and IISS reveal a discernible trend in the tactics employed by the junta since the onset of 2023. The junta’s actions have exhibited an increasing selectivity in target identification, accompanied by an escalated level of violence during their raids and assaults. These attacks are mainly conducted by the Myanmar military and its proxy Pyu Saw Htee forces. From December 2022 to July 2023, IISS observed a decline in building burnings, however this decline has been inversely accompanied by a noticeable rise in atrocities targeting PDF armed forces. According to IISS, on 13 July SAC Chairman Min Aung Hlaing announced a plan to intensify efforts to quell armed resistance. The New York Times also reported that ‘altogether, 2023 has had a monthly average of 30 airstrikes, the highest for any year of the conflict so far, based on data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).
Based on data compiled by ISP-Myanmar in accordance with ISP-Myanmar’s system for documenting information in armed conflicts, a comprehensive overview of events in the conflict can be discerned. Specifically, the 40 townships under martial law in the period from February to June 2023 demonstrated a declining trend in armed clashes and the torching of houses and buildings. Notably though the number of air strikes has been rising significantly. It is worth noting though that the incidence of house burnings again increased after late June. As the SAC has now extended its rule for another six months, there could be more intense fighting and military operations.
∎ What ISP is reading?
Ong, Andrew. (2023). Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border.
Cornell University Press. 276 pages.
A book recently released on the Wa ethnicity and the United Wa State Army has attracted praise from many famous contemporary authors on Myanmar including Bertil Lintner. There are still few writings on Wa, as few researchers are working on the subject. The area of Wa State is situated on the China-Myanmar border and is semi-independently ruled through its own leadership with a force of 20,000 to 30,000 well-equipped soldiers. The Wa forces have agreed ceasefires with successive Myanmar governments for more than three decades, using this long-standing truce to pursue the economic and social development of the area. However in the past, many Wa ethnic leaders have been accused of engaging in the illicit drug trade.
The author Andrew Ong’s approach to this study has some unique characteristics. Wa State is a difficult region to access for researchers and writers, but as Ong was a World Food Program (WFP) aid worker, he had a long working history in the Wa area and his anthropological approach is subsequently rather different from other authors and journalists. He studied the aspirations of ordinary Wa people, Wa leaders, and their political culture and external relations. He navigates the complexities of border politics, intersecting geopolitics and geo-economics, culminating in his book titled ‘Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border.’
In the realm of contemporary books on Wa ethnic group and its political landscape, we can find two books, namely, Magnus Fiskesjö (2021)’s ‘Stories From an Ancient Land: Perspective on Wa History and Culture’ and Bertil Lintner (2021)’s ‘The Wa of Myanmar and China’s Quest for Global Dominance’. Additionally there are some short papers produced by the USIP and a few other institutions.
“This book deliberately disappoints readers searching for details about the narcotics trade or weapons and even details about political factionalism or the who’s who of business conglomerates that investigative journalism tries to uncover,” Ong forewarns, as his approach is mixed with anthropological analysis. He presents readers with the perspective of the highlanders, showcasing how residents of the Wa State perceive the world. He also highlights the Wa’s distinctive governance concepts, which diverge from international norms. He also challenges readers to reconsider their understanding of order and stability.
Given that the Wa ethnic force holds a prominent role as a leader of the Northern Alliance (FPNCC) and serves as a significant stakeholder in Myanmar’s peace process, Ong’s book offers valuable insights into understanding both the Wa people and their leadership.
Source/publisher:
Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-08-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.09 MB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta finds itself in a conundrum. Two-and-a-half years after its coup, armed resistance to its rule has not diminished and is stronger than ever. What to do about this, from the junta’s perspective, is unclear. Its advantage in military hardware has not been decisive, its atrocity campaigns have not pacified, its diplomatic maneuverings have yielded little benefit, its ranks keep shrinking, and its financial viability gets thinner and thinner. Much of the foreign commentary about Myanmar focuses on the democratic resistance, with a good deal aimed at its weaknesses. But a big question is generally left unanswered: What is the military’s strategy to escape the hole it has dug for itself? On August 1, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing declared another state of emergency and mumbled about a future census and an election, this time in 2025. Why anybody would believe these pronouncements is baffling; they have been said over and over. Considering that, it’s worth assessing what the junta’s military status is and whether it has a viable strategy to regain the initiative, particularly on the battlefield.
It is worth stating some of the stark military realities facing the junta this year. Repeated large-scale offensives in Karenni State have been thwarted. Resistance has expanded across larger parts of Bago, Tanintharyi and Magwe regions while resistance everywhere is deeper, more experienced, better armed, increasingly coordinated, and unwavering in its intent to destroy the junta. No ethnic armed organizations have signed new ceasefires with the junta and none of the NUG’s partners has disowned it. The junta’s meetings with the remnants of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement don’t even carry ceremonial benefit anymore. The Arakan Army doesn’t need to fight to secure more and more control over Rakhine. All it must do is strengthen its administration and legal systems, support cyclone relief, train new cadres of soldiers within the state, and let the junta kill itself elsewhere. So desperate is the junta, it sends scarce reserves from Rakhine to bolster weakening units elsewhere.
RelatedPosts
The Myanmar Regime’s Hollow Gestures
Myanmar Junta Escalates War Crimes as Resistance Gains Ground in July
What’s Next for Myanmar as State of Emergency Comes to an End?
Presently, the junta cannot use highways to send supplies to large parts of the northern half of the country so it must resort to archaic flotillas easily targeted on the open spaces of rivers. It hasn’t sent significant convoys to Chin in over a year, and has stopped trying, so bad were its casualties. It has effectively lost its main arms supplier, Russia, and has not been able to bring any significant new weapons systems to the battlefield. Its new proxy militias, the Pyu Saw Hti, have never grown into significant combat forces while its old proxies, the Border Guard Forces (BGFs), only engage in hostilities to protect their commercial interests on their home turf. The junta’s troops are not massacred, but day after day they bleed casualties across the country through the steady onslaught of ambushes, roadside bombs, and drone attacks.
Worryingly for the junta, it cannot recruit new troops on any meaningful scale while its officer cadet schools scrape the barrel, desperate for admissions. It cannot maintain steady operations at key border crossings in Muse and Myawaddy, while reaching India with commercial traffic is impossible. There are increasing attacks on major highways – generals are hit with roadside bombs just outside of Naypyitaw while resistance checkpoints are increasingly the norm in Bago, Mon and Karen states. Bridges are now systematically blown up by the resistance, such as across eastern Bago and northern Mon. The coordination and strategy demonstrated in these systematic sabotage campaigns by the Karen National Union and its PDF partners will only spread.
And yes, internal cohesion is ever more problematic for the junta. It has doubts over its senior commanders, repeatedly arresting those from the northern and northwestern commands as well as the southern one in Tanintharyi. Lower-ranking field commanders have been repeatedly arrested in Karenni and Karen states for refusing orders to partake in offensive operations because they are pointless deathtraps. Overall, the junta’s units are more demoralized. Being surrounded by a population that wants you dead eventually takes a toll. Arguably the biggest military threats to the junta are consistent attrition and the subsequent erosion of the chain of command. Defections and desertions are not nearly as likely or devastating to a military as the loss of chain of command. The junta has too many small, disparate units. They won’t desert or defect en masse because that carries too many risks; they’ll just stop responding to orders and hunker down; wait for the storm to blow over until they can safely surrender. From a junta grunt’s perspective, they are now too dispersed as fighting forces, too atomized, and face too much resistance. No armored troop transport, limited and unreliable air support, little to non-existent medivac, no new weapons systems of note, limited to no communications with family, no rotations out, few if any reinforcements coming in… where does it all end for them?
Min Aung Hlaing can neither claim nor offer greater stability: no normalization, no change in public support. He knows it. Extending the state of emergency is all the junta can do, which merely reinforces the overall veracity of the preceding descriptions. The challenge for the junta is what to do about it. It never countenanced the possibility of wide-scale, sustained rebellion across massive swaths of the Bamar heartland, much less that resistance in these places would have consistent support and direct collaboration from major ethnic armed groups, enabling mass armed revolt across most of the country. Myanmar’s sprawling geography and its own decreasing manpower are crippling challenges for the junta.
Predictably, the junta’s forces will persist in what they do best, killing unarmed civilians and provoking massive population displacement through atrocity campaigns. The junta’s military strategy, if one wants to call it that, is to brutalize the population with endless atrocities hoping to break its defiance. At a much lower pace, it will conduct operations against armed resistance groups. Why this strategy would change the overall situation now is dubious given the junta’s challenges, but it will persist because that is all it knows. One shouldn’t downplay the humanitarian costs of atrocities and they do affect the armed resistance’s operations, but they are not decisive at a strategic level. Large parts of the country – think Karenni and Sagaing – have experienced systematic arson attacks and significant population displacement, but the resistance in all of them is stable if not increasing. The humanitarian crisis afflicting the Myanmar people is horrendous but their determination to win through stoic perseverance is unwavering so far.
The coordination and cohesion of resistance forces is constantly questioned and maligned by analysts domestic and foreign, but considering the back-story of decades of mistrust and indoctrination, the core block of the resistance – the National Unity Government and the consultative councils, plus the KIA, KNU, CNF and KNPP – is remarkably stable if at times frustratingly opaque. Local PDFs may bicker but that doesn’t detract from their overall achievement – building their capacities to consistently degrade the junta’s combat units. When they emerge, junta forces numbering up to several hundred men are routinely engaged in mortal combat by PDFs. This stands in contrast to a year or two ago when the junta could burn villages by the dozen with 20 men and face little to no pushback. In the remarkably honest calculation of the junta, far too much of the country requires an active military presence, i.e., what a state of emergency recognizes as necessary. In late March of this year, Min Aung Hlaing admitted in a woeful speech that the junta cannot control 130 townships. One should assume this means the junta cannot effectively control a great deal more. If the junta’s units go outside their bases, they must fight. If the junta doesn’t actively defend an area, it will be lost. The junta may “control” towns, but more and more this just means the army barracks, police station, and GAD office, which it increasingly uses to shell villages so that its battered units don’t have to emerge even to burn villages.
Considering this, what can be expected by the junta is greater emphasis on the theater of international diplomacy to obscure a worsening military position within the country. The supposed meeting by the Thai foreign minister with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, junta clemency for some of her convictions, and her movement to house arrest instead of a prison has the diplomatic and media corps abuzz. With Laos soon assuming the ASEAN chair, it can be expected that there will be more diplomatic engagement with the junta, which will attempt to use Aung San Suu Kyi as a prop to foster the false sense that it is moderating its approach. This theater of the absurd will garner endless commentary because it can be seen and written about. But it won’t change the substance of the matter, which is on the ground: a population of tens of millions that all viscerally want rid of this military. The revolution didn’t start because one party, much less one person, dictated it so. It started across the country when thousands of communities chose to take up arms. That is the reality of this time compared with 1962 and 1988, and it is inescapable. Myanmar’s war will be won or lost on the ground.
Regardless, even in the realm of diplomacy, the junta still faces massive challenges. “Support” from regional neighbors is not significant despite the hype. Nobody is going to prop up the junta with hefty amounts of armaments, help it break sanctions at a large scale, or invest in it in any way that will fundamentally change the strategic trajectory of the conflict, which it is losing. International engagement with the junta is largely transactional and the junta has less and less to offer. Allowing junta officials to join ASEAN meetings is morally pathetic but changes nothing. All that Track 1.5 talks produce is to make their participants feel better about themselves. The junta increasingly demonstrates it has little to offer its neighbors. It cannot control BGF crime hubs. It cannot prevent refugee outflows, instead causing ever more of them. The drugs trade is growing exponentially. Its economic management is woeful to even junta supporters. The latest sanctions by the US mean the junta cannot operate effectively with foreign business partners, meaning investment and even ongoing engagement is massively encumbered and never more unattractive. ASEAN has had no breakthroughs. Nobody can even remember what the 5 points of the ASEAN Consensus even were.
What the junta does next is unclear other than to manipulate the diplomatic stage and commit more atrocities. What the resistance does is much clearer – more of what it has been doing. The best thing going for the resistance is the public, which even after 2.5 years of war, still sees the junta as nothing but a loathsome ‘foreign’ occupying force. Public opinion is not shifting in the junta’s favor; too much innocent blood has been spilled. The biggest need is to send more and more humanitarian aid to displaced populations and bolster battered communities’ resilience. Maintaining public morale and support for the revolution and deepening cohesion of the core block of resistance are the other driving imperatives for the pro-democracy movement. Expanding the chain-of-command, bolstering local social services, and growing local administration are clear priorities already unfolding. Methodical relationships with the Myanmar diaspora are critical for financing. Engagement with unofficially supportive ethnic armed groups is important for bleeding the junta further.
It is easy to find faults in the resistance, to nitpick it in a thousand ways and claim these flaws lead only to defeat. Myanmar’s revolution is what it is: a sprawling bottom-up revolt initially driven by the imperatives of local self-defense that grew into a national uprising based on shared aspirations for a better future built upon federal democracy. Yes, more coordination, more messaging, more clarity about its politics, more inclusion, more and better of everything would be wonderful. But the flaws don’t detract from the bigger picture. Look around the world and there is no clearer example of a mass movement fighting for a just cause. Moreover, despite whatever its critics proclaim, the raw fact remains that Myanmar’s pro-democracy resistance is not being defeated militarily and shows no sign of wavering despite all the horrors the junta has thrown at Myanmar’s people.
The junta is losing. If things continue as they are, it will lose. The junta’s incessant brutality has lit a fire it does not know how to extinguish. That will not change. It created this raging inferno of resistance through the arrogance of staging another coup and the mass atrocities it committed afterwards. More atrocities will not shift the war in its favor. The democratic resistance is viable and ascendant because it is, and will remain, a popular national uprising of a people determined to rid themselves of juntas once and for all. If present trends continue, and it stands to reason they will, Myanmar’s current junta will not be defeated in a grand battle for Naypyitaw. By the end Naypyitaw will not even matter. The junta will simply bleed out in different parts of the country until it effectively collapses as a force and a new government is stood up. The post-conflict peace may be messy in places, at least to parts of the international community, but it will not be Syria. There is simply too much social goodwill and solidarity among the Myanmar people, the starting and end point of this revolution..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-08-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Military's political role, Political History
Language:
more
Description:
"Junta airstrikes on civilian and resistance targets in Kayah State have risen sharply over the past six months, doubling the combined total in 2021 and 2022, according to the Progressive Karenni People Force (PKPF), which monitors regime atrocities in the state.
THE PKPF’s report on Tuesday recorded a total of 572 airstrikes on civilian targets and battlegrounds in the resistance stronghold of Kayah State, as junta forces increasingly rely on aerial assaults amid heavy losses for their ground troops.
However, the first half of 2023 saw twice as many regime airstrikes than in 2021 and 2022 combined. This period accounted for 68 percent of the total number of airstrikes conducted by the junta in the two and a half years since the coup.
Meanwhile, at least 766 clashes have erupted between regime forces and allied resistance groups in Kayah State since the military takeover, the Karenni rights group said.
The death toll among junta troops in Kayah is estimated at 2,230 – seven times larger than casualties suffered by resistance forces.
Around 310 resistance fighters have been killed fighting the junta in Kayah State, according to the PKPF.
Resistance groups had also destroyed 64 junta vehicles and seized a large quantity weapons and ammunition during the battles.
Meanwhile, junta forces have killed around 516 civilians and detained 196 since the coup, the group reported on Tuesday.
Junta shelling and bombing raids targeting civilians had also destroyed at least 1,639 houses and 39 religious buildings.
On June 6, resistance forces established the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) as an interim government body, while junta administration only functions in the state capital of Loikaw, according to local sources.
Meanwhile, fighting has escalated in Hpaswang and Mese townships after the regime sent heavy reinforcements to Kayah State last month.
The United Nations estimates that at least 98,400 people were displaced in the state as of July 17. However, local aid groups on the ground report that more than 270,000 people have been displaced in Kayah State and neighbouring Pekon township of Southern Shan State.
Aid groups said around 100,000 people are in urgent need of food supplies and healthcare assistance..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-08-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Armed conflict in Burma -- offensives, Political History
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Locals say the group has been held for 5 days.
Description:
"Junta troops have detained 17 civilians from a village in Myanmar’s southernmost Tanintharyi region, locals told RFA Wednesday.
They said the 12 women, two men and three children were arrested five days ago as they returned to the village in Kyunsu township and accused of supporting a local People’s Defense Force (PDF).
RFA has been unable to confirm the names and ages of those detained because phone and internet links are unreliable in the region.
The villagers were in a motor boat, returning from market, when they were stopped by junta troops, locals told RFA on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals.
A Kyunsu resident said the 17 are being held in the township’s police station and denied access to their families.
“They were arrested on the way home after buying rice, cooking oil and salt from Bait [Myeik city], and were accused of supporting PDFs near Tha Zin village by the police,” the local said.
“It is said they were arrested because they allegedly bought the rice and cooking oil to support the PDFs.”
Another local resident told RFA that troops and police have been patrolling in speedboats near the coastal city of Myeik to check passengers in other vessels.
“They are collecting information like names, registration numbers and where people are heading from the jetty,” he said.
“Every single boat from Myeik and Kyunsu heading to villages has to report to the junta security forces.”
On July 25, a local People’s Defense Force attacked a police station in Kyunsu township and exchanged fire with the police, according to a Kyunsu township PDF statement.
The military junta has not released any statement about the situation.
RFA called the junta spokesperson for Tanintharyi region, Yin Htwe, but he said he was in a meeting and turned off the phone..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-08-02
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights Defenders
Language:
more
Description:
" ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ဥပဒေကဲ့သို့အာဏာတည်သော အမိန့် (၁/၂၀၂၃) အရ အပ်နှင်းထားသော အခွင့်အာဏာကိုကျင့်သုံး၍ အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များအား ယှဉ်တွဲ ဖော်ပြပါ တာဝန်များ အပ်နှင်းပြီး ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်၊ ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့အား ဖွဲ့စည်းလိုက်သည်။
၁။ မင်းဇေယျာဦး ဒုတိယ ဥက္ကဌ
၂။ Dr. Johnny Ahtang ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့ဝင်
၃။ ဦးအောင်ပိုင် ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့ဝင်
(ပုံ) တင်ထွန်းနိုင်
ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ
ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-07-19
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
100.26 KB
more
Sub-title:
Urgently Locate, Ensure Safety of Thuzar Maung, Family Members
Description:
"(Bangkok) – The Malaysian government should immediately prioritize a thorough and transparent investigation into the abduction of the Myanmar refugee activist Thuzar Maung and her family, Human Rights Watch said today.
On July 4, 2023, unidentified men abducted Thuzar Maung, 46; her husband, Saw Than Tin Win, 43; her daughter, Poeh Khing Maung, 16; and sons Aung Myint Maung, 21, and Thukha Maung, 17, from their residence in Ampang Jaya, Kuala Lumpur, based on reports from witnesses and CCTV footage. Thuzar Maung, also spelled Thu Zar Moung, is an outspoken supporter of Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement.
“We fear that Thuzar Maung and her family were abducted in a planned operation and are at grave risk,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The Malaysian government should urgently act to locate the family and ensure their safety.”
At about 4:30 p.m. on July 4, a car entered the gated community where the family lives. The driver told the security guards they were police. Two hours later, Thuzar Maung was on the phone with a friend, who heard her yell to her husband that unknown men were entering the house, before being disconnected. At about 7:10 p.m., the same car and the two cars owned by Thuzar Maung’s family were seen leaving the compound. Thuzar Maung’s phone and the phones of her husband and children appear to have been immediately turned off, as no calls have gone through since.
CCTV footage at the guard booth captured the license plate of the “police” car, which Malaysian police have since identified as fake. The footage also captured a black-gloved hand of the driver of one of Thuzar Maung’s cars holding out the gate card to exit the compound. Vehicle logs show that the same car had entered the gated community on June 19. Thuzar Maung’s colleagues who entered the house on July 5 said there were no signs of robbery.
Thuzar Maung is a long-time advocate for democracy in Myanmar and refugee and migrant rights in Malaysia. She serves as chair of the Myanmar Muslim Refugee Community and Myanmar Migrant Workers Committee and has worked closely with Myanmar’s opposition National Unity Government. She has over 93,000 followers on Facebook, where she posts criticism of abuses by Myanmar’s junta, which took power after a February 1, 2021 military coup. Her friends and colleagues expressed concern that she was targeted for her activism. The police in Kuala Lumpur have opened an investigation into the case.
Thuzar Maung fled Myanmar for Malaysia in 2015 to escape growing violence against Muslims. All five family members are recognized by the United Nations Refugee Agency as refugees in Malaysia.
“Foreign governments should press Malaysian authorities to quickly uncover the location of this family,” Pearson said. “Myanmar activists are apparently at risk even when they criticize the military junta from a country where they have sought asylum.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-07-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burmese refugees in Malaysia, Human Rights and international relations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
more
Description:
"The world’s largest marble Buddha, now under construction in Myanmar’s military capital of Naypyidaw, will reportedly be able to withstand 193 kilometer-per-hour winds and earthquakes measuring as high as 8.8 on the Richter scale.
The gargantuan 25-meter Buddha, weighing over 5,000 tons and etched from over 20,000 tons of marble, is nearly complete after three-plus years of building, according to state media reports.
And State Administration Council (SAC) junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is clearly excited judging by reports of his June 29 visit to the construction site.
The project has employed over 150 laborers, including from the Myanmar Engineering Society and Military Engineering Corps, and will be built entirely “without foreign experts,” Min Aung Hlaing proudly proclaimed during his site visit.
The image, carved in the Maravijaya style, is a very common Buddha pose “with 32 great characteristics and 80 small characteristics of the Lord Buddha”, according to state media reports.
In a report covering the first section of the image’s installation in October 2021, just as multiple conflicts were raging in Myanmar following the February coup that year that installed the SAC, the purpose of the statue was touted as peaceful.
“(T)he Buddha image is being built with the aim of showing the flourishing of the Theravada Buddhism in Myanmar to the world, ensuring the peace and tranquility of the country, contributing to development of the region through the visits of local and foreign travelers and improving the State development.”
Min Aung Hlaing had taken a close interest in the gigantic statue’s construction even before his disastrous and bloody coup. He has reportedly visited frequently at important stages of the statue’s assembly.
In May, for instance, he witnessed the “Unnalon Holy Hair installation.” At the auspicious time and date of 2:43 am on February 13, the fourth section of the image was conveyed and installed. The military ruler has seemingly staked his karmic fortunes on the statue’s successful completion.
Gigantic Buddha statues are not new to Myanmar or Theravada Buddhist countries across Southeast Asia.
Some of the biggest Buddhas in Myanmar are at the Maha Bodhi Tahtaung in Monywa, home to a 116-meter standing Buddha reportedly opened in 2008, the third tallest Buddha statue in the world, and a 90-meter-long reclining Buddha replete with 31 floors inside.
(The tallest Buddha statue in the world is the Statue of Unity in India, towering at 182 meters.)
There are also gigantic reclining Buddhas in the Mon State capitol of Mawlamyaing, in Bago city and the famous Chaukhtatgyi in Bahan township in Yangon – all of which underscore Myanmar’s long tradition of religious construction and support of the Buddhist clergy, or sangha.
The Maravijaya Buddha will overshadow the previous largest marble Buddha, the Lawka Chantha Abhaya Labha Muni, or Kyauk Taw Gyi Pagoda, on the outskirts of Yangon, carved in 2013 to 11.3 meters from 700 tons of marble winnowed down to 400 tons upon completion. The statue was so heavy it required specially-built barges and railways to transport.
While gigantic religious statues in Myanmar are commonplace, so too is the pursuit of celestial absolution for mass crimes by military rulers. Min Aung Hlaing is merely the latest dictator to support religious construction projects in karmic hope that building giant Buddhas will give them positive reincarnation rather than rebirth in the “hungry ghost realm” where they belong to be endlessly tormented by their many victims.
There are growing reports of SAC leaders engaging in not just the building of gigantic religious structures but also flourishes of yedaya, or Myanmar black magic, also common practiced by generations of superstitious generals.
In the mid-1990s, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the current junta regime’s obvious inspiration, toured a Buddha Tooth Relic borrowed from China around Myanmar. That abusive regime built lavish temples, reportedly with forced prison labor, to display the artifact in a bid to boost their spiritual fortunes and appease the Buddhist priesthood.
The sangha and military haven’t always seen eye to eye. There have been sometimes supportive, almost symbiotic, relations, especially with conservative or ultranationalist monks in the official Buddhist synod, the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee.
At other times, including in 1990 and 2007, the two power centers have been antagonistically opposed as activist monks staged public marches to agitate against declining living standards and the then-military regimes’ disastrous socio-economic policies.
The relationship between the military-controlled central state and Buddhist clergy was also tested during General Thein Sein’s 2011-16 administration by the rise of the Buddhist monk-led Patriotic Association of Myanmar, or Ma Ba Tha, which contributed to a rise in anti-Muslim persecution and at times open violence.
The most notorious pro-military monk is Sitagu Hsayadaw, who was widely revered in the country until his support for the Ma Ba Tha caused certain unease. But as Myanmar Now’s editor Swe Win wrote early in 2023, Sitagu expressed support for the coup soon after it was staged and continues to sidle up to Min Aung Hlaing, to the opprobrium of many in Myanmar.
In recent weeks, the influential Ottama Thara from the Thabarwa Monastery in Thanlyin township, close to the commercial capital of Yangon, reportedly urged senior National League for Democracy (NLD) officials to compel Aung San Suu Kyi to retire from politics and seek to promote peace in the country.
Many monks formerly connected to Ma Ba Tha are now reported to support SAC-raised death squads such as the Thwe Thouq (blood drinkers) and brutal militias such as the Phyu Saw Thee in the deeply religious but horrifically violent conflict areas of Sagaing and Magwe.
State media routinely claims many monks have been targeted for assassination by the anti-coup resistance despite their supposed innocence but likely due to their perceived support for the SAC. At the same time, many monks are known to be involved in the clandestine support for resistance activities while also conducting their traditional roles in health, education and humanitarianism.
The lavish funeral arrangements for the former chairperson of the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, Bhamo Hsayadaw, who died at age 94 on May 25, were another indication of the regime’s karmic compulsions, even if the respected monk dissolved the Ma Ba Tha in 2017 and reportedly called on the military not to stage a coup in January 2021.
Min Aung Hlaing, Vice Senior General Soe Win and other senior SAC officials were pallbearers at the June 6 funeral in another apparent attempt to stockpile good deeds to outweigh their widespread war crimes.
As if to deepen the macabre aspects of these religious performances, the silicon sculpture of Bhamo Hsayadaw will have state-of-the-art artificial teeth to represent his unique smile, the work of famed sculptor Aung Kyaw Tun.
But as Myanmar endures a grinding multi-sided war, extreme military violence, natural disasters and a devastated economy, Min Aung Hlaing’s gigantic Buddha statue in Naypyidaw will not be smiling down kindly upon him or his junta.
Indeed, in March, the Maravijaya image seemingly cried as stripes appeared around the marble statue’s eyes, stains that prompted officials to unceremoniously cover its face. It was hardly a propitious sign for a superstitious dictator seeking spiritual absolution for his many well-documented karmic crimes..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2023-07-03
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Political History
Language:
more
Description:
"According to numerous postings on social media, a united front consisting of ethnic resistance armies and Burman resistance groups known as People’s Defense Forces, or PDFs, is waging a successful war against the army of the junta, which seized power in Naypyitaw on Feb. 1, 2021. Some foreign analysts have even claimed that the alliance is made up of 100,000 ethnic fighters and as many as 65,000 men and women are under the command of the PDFs, and that they together control most of the country. If those grossly exaggerated figures and outlandish claims were taken at face value, the days of the so-called State Administration Council (SAC) would be numbered and Myanmar could soon become the democratic, federal union that the resistance is said to be fighting for. It may be correct to say that the SAC-appointed government in Naypyitaw is the most incompetent the country has had since independence in 1948. The civil war has also spread from the ethnic-minority inhabited areas in the frontier areas to the Myanmar heartland, and the SAC has been unable to exercise control over some previously peaceful parts of the country.
But the bitter truth is that Myanmar has a long and troubled history of failed attempts to forge pan-ethnic resistance fronts—and the main, divisive issue has always been Burman-ethnic minority relations. And it should be remembered that there are also conflicts between the various ethnic minorities. There is long-standing animosity between the Kachin and the Shan in Kachin State, and Shan, Kachin and Palaung have overlapping claims to territory in northern Shan State. The Wa, now in eastern Shan State, want their own state, which the Shan may not agree to. Rakhine State is torn apart by conflicts between Buddhists and Muslims, and Karen and Mon rebels have been fighting over territory adjacent to the Thai border. Myanmar may not have as many as 135 “national races”, a figure that has more to do with numerology (1+3+5=9, the military’s lucky number) than reality, but the country is nevertheless the home of a multitude of ethnic groups, and successive post-independence governments—as well as forces that for decades have resisted central authority—have all failed to create the shared sense of nationhood and belonging that everyone has been talking about since the Panglong Agreement was signed in 1947.
The very first resistance front was set up in 1949, so only a year after independence. It was called the People’s Democratic Front and comprised the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), the Communist Party (Red Flag), the People’s Comrade Party (PCP), the Revolutionary Burma Army (RBA), and the Arakan People’s Liberation Party (APLP). Despite the fact that all of them were leftist and had similar ideologies, it failed to achieve anything noteworthy on the battlefield. The PCP, an offshoot of Aung San’s erstwhile militia, the People’s Volunteer Organization, surrendered in 1958 and so did the APLP, which was set up in 1945 and led by U Sen Da, an Arakanese monk and nationalist leader. What remained of the RBA, pro-communist defectors from the Burma Army, merged with the CPB.
In 1956, four ethnic resistance armies, the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Mon People’s Front and a Pa-O group led by U Hla Pe forged an alliance called the Democratic Nationalities United Front, but it ceased to exist when the Mon and the Pa-O surrendered in 1958.
A broader, pro-communist alliance called the National Democratic United Front was set up in 1959 and had six members: the CPB, the Karen National United Party (KNUP; a leftist Karen faction), the KNPP, the Chin National Vanguard Party, the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and a Pa-O faction. It was dissolved in 1975 over disagreements with the CPB, for which class was more important than nationality. Splits occurred within the ethnic groups as well, as some were still more sympathetic to the CPB and others were not.
In the early 1960s, some of the ethnic resistance armies tried to unite their respective forces under the banner of the Nationalities Liberation Alliance. It consisted of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the KNPP, the Kawthoolei Revolutionary Council (KRC), and Noom Suk Harn, a Shan group. Largely dysfunctional, it was dissolved when KRC chairman Saw Hunter Thwame surrendered in 1963. Two years later, the KNU, the KNPP, the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP; a Padaung group), the Zomi National Front (ZNF; a Chin group) and the War Council of the Shan State Army (SSA) set up the United Nationalities Front, which was dissolved after only a year of existence.
An alliance called the Nationalities United Front was set up in 1967 comprising the KNUP, the KNPP, the KNLP, the NMSP, the ZNF and the Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organization (later known as the Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization, the SSNPLO, a leftist Pa-O group.) The NMSP left the Nationalities United Front in 1969, considering the alliance too leftist. The front was eventually dissolved in 1973. In that year, the more moderate Revolutionary Nationalities Alliance was formed consisting of four members: the KNU, the KNPP, the KNLP and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), the political wing of the SSA.
The KNU, now led by the legendary General Bo Mya, was instrumental in bringing several groups together in the base area the Karen rebels controlled on the Thai border. As a result of his efforts, the Revolutionary Nationalities Alliance was succeeded in 1975 by the Federal National Democratic Front, which a year later changed its name to the National Democratic Front (NDF). Over the years, the NDF became the only alliance that had regular meetings, usually at the KNU’s Manerplaw headquarters on the Thai border. It also managed to maintain at least a semblance of unity among the ethnic resistance armies. But it also experienced splits, as well as disputes within its various member organizations, mainly over the question of whether they should or should not cooperate with the CPB. The communists demanded that other groups should made declarations accepting the leadership of the CPB, a predominantly Burman-led organization. That in turn led to splits within ethnic groups such as the SSA/SSPP and even the KNU went through a sometimes bloody power struggle between leftists and rightists.
The original members of the NDF were the KNU, the KNPP, the SSPP, the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), the Lahu National United Party (LNUP), the United Pa-O Liberation Organization (UPNO), and the Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO). The UNPO resigned in 1977 and was replaced in 1980 by the Pa-O National Organization (PNO). The NMSP joined in 1982 and the KIO in 1983; the Wa National Organization (WNO) in 1983; the Lahu National Organization (LNO) in 1987 (replacing the LNUP, which had resigned from the front in 1984); the National United Front of Arakan replaced the ALP in 1988; and the Chin National Front (CNF) joined in 1989. The KNLP resigned in 1977 but rejoined in 1991. The PNO, the PSLP and the SSPP were expelled from the NDF in 1991 because they had entered into peace agreements with the government. In the early 1990s, the NMSP, the KNPP, the KNLP and the KIO also made peace with the government while the Wa on the Thai border merged with the much more numerous Wa forces of the former CPB, which had collapsed following a mutiny among the mainly hilltribe rank-and-file of its army in April 1989. In late 1989, the combined force became the United Wa State Party and Army (UWSP/UWSA).
Following the collapse of the communist insurrection, a handful of ethnic groups that had been allied with the CPB formed the All Nationalities People’s Democratic Front: the SSNPLO, the KNLP and the Karenni State Nationalities People’s Liberation Force. A smaller Burman group called the Democratic Patriotic Army (DPA), which the CPB had set up after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, also joined the front. But by 1994, the DPA was gone from the scene and the other groups entered into ceasefire agreements with the government.
The ceasefire agreements of the early 1990s led to the demise of the NDF as well, and it was not until 2011 that an attempt was made to form a new alliance of ethnic resistance armies. It became known as the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) and, initially, brought together 11 groups, the most powerful being the KIA, the KNU and the SSA/SSPP, and it even had a unified, armed wing called the Federal Union Army (FUA). But, before long, six of the groups made their own, separate peace agreements with the government. Like all peace agreements before those, they were based on the same principle: the ceasefire groups were allowed to retain their respective armies—and to engage in any kind of business. Fundamental political issues were never on the table, and it was, in effect, nothing more than a divide-and-rule policy from the side of the military. The FUA never became a properly organized armed force, and by 2017 the UNFC had ceased to exist.
In 2016, representatives of the KIA, the Arakan Army (AA), the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) set up the Northern Alliance, which actually proved to be quite successful on the battlefields of Kachin State and northern Shan State. The AA, whose home base was in Rakhine State in western Myanmar, was included because it had been trained by the KIA and fought alongside the MNDAA in the Kokang region.
That front was enlarged in 2017 as seven groups formed an alliance called the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC): the KIA, the TNLA, the MNDAA, the AA—and the SSA/SSPP, the UWSA and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA; based in Mong La in eastern Shan State, the NDAA was one of four local armies that emerged from the CPB after it collapsed in 1989). The FPNCC was set up at the UWSA’s Pangkham (Panghsang) headquarters, and it has appealed to China to help find a solution to Myanmar’s civil wars. Parallel to the FPNCC, the TNLA, the MNDAA and the AA—and, off-and-on, the KIA—fight under the banner of the Brotherhood Alliance, sometimes referred to as the Northern Brotherhood Alliance. But the peace agreements of the 1990s and the so-called “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement”, which the Myanmar military initiated in 2015, have made it impossible for the ethnic armed organizations to establish any united front that could take part in meaningful peace talks. Massive foreign aid to dubious “peace projects” during the period 2011-2021 has also divided the groups, rather than help them unite behind common political demands.
But long before the peace agreements of the early 1990s, which led to the demise of the NDF, and more recent events, splits had also occurred between the ethnic groups and what should have been their Burman allies. In 1969, a number of prominent Burman politicians formed what was called the Parliamentary Democracy Party (PDP), whose aim was to resist General Ne Win’s military dictatorship. Led by former and ousted prime minister U Nu, it included several of the legendary Thirty Comrades who had gone to Japan with Aung San during World War II and later went back to drive out the British. The PDP’s Patriotic Liberation Army (PLA) was led by one of them, Bo Let Ya. They set up bases on the Thai border where they in 1970 signed a pact with the KNU and the NMSP called the National United Front. The SSA was invited to join as well, but declined when U Nu made no firm commitment to federalism. The movement began to dwindle when U Nu left Bangkok for India in 1973, and those who remained became the People’s Patriotic Party (PPP), led by Bo Let Ya. But they soon fell out with the KNU, also over issues related to federalism, and Bo Let Ya was killed by the Karen in 1978. Nearly all remaining members of the PPP surrendered during a general amnesty in 1980.
After the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, about a dozen Burman and ethnic groups set up the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), but it became defunct when the KIA began to negotiate a separate peace deal with the government in 1993, which was finalized in 1994. Members of the National League for Democracy, who had been elected in 1990 but prevented from taking up their posts, also fled to the Thai border area, where they formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) and an expanded front called the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) with KNU leader Bo Mya as the official president. But the Burmans and the ethnic groups never agreed on any political issues and the DAB, the NGCUB and the NCUB soon faded into oblivion.
Those who have had the patience to read this far must find the clutter of acronyms of major, middle-sized and small and insignificant groups, shifting alliances, splits and surrenders truly bewildering, and it all seems like an absolute mess only very few outsiders would even want to try to make sense of. But it reflects the complexities of Myanmar’s ethnic resistance and its complex relationships with Burman groups, whether leftist or rightist. Even so, it has not prevented foreign peacemakers from coming up with easy solutions based on suggestions of “dialogs” and talks about “reconciliation”.
In this regard, the Swiss and the Norwegians have been especially destructive, dealing only with people they know and pouring vast amounts of money into what they call “the peace process”, which isn’t and never was a genuine effort to solve Myanmar’s decades-long civil wars. Nor do we need those more recent, extravagant accounts of the situation on the battlefield today, but sober assessment of the strength and policies of the various groups, realizing that there is no nationwide entity comprising Burman outfits as well as ethnic armed organizations. Three of the main ethnic armies, the UWSA, the NDAA and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), have substantial investments in commercial enterprises in SAC-controlled areas and are not even involved in any fighting with the Myanmar army. Instead, the RCSS has fought fierce battles with the TNLA and the SSA/SSPP. And the PDFs are local forces that are not under any effective, common command.
This is a war that neither side can win. The anti-SAC forces are not well-equipped enough to defeat the much more heavily armed Myanmar army, which, in turn, is stretched out on too many fronts to be able to crush the resistance. Besides, the Myanmar army has tried to do precisely that for more than 70 years, and not succeeded. What has been lacking is a genuine analysis of what has caused the never-ending civil wars, and how the ethnic issue that is at the heart of the problem should be addressed. But that can be done only by the peoples of Myanmar themselves and, if outsiders want to play a role, they should refrain from giving bad advice based on poor insights into the history of Myanmar’s civil wars, failed alliances and misguided peace efforts as well as insufficient understandings of the intricacies of the country’s ethnic politics. Westerners especially must rid themselves of their “White-Messiah Complex” and start listening to people who matter instead of patronizing them. Only then can we, to paraphrase what Winston Churchill said during World War II, see not the end and not even the beginning of the end—but, perhaps, the end of the beginning of a process that could lead to peace..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-06-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History
Language:
more
Title: National Unity Government: Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - Announcement 1/2023
Sub-title:
Announcement regarding illegal issuance, sale and distribution of government securities
Description:
"1. It has come to the attention of the Ministry that the illegal military council, a designated terrorist organisation, through its subordinate institutions, have been raising desperately needed funds in the form of public debt through quarterly sale of government securities in the domestic market in order to perpetuate their illegal and tenuous hold on power and to prosecute their murderous reign of terror against the people; and that the auction calendar for the second quarter of the fiscal year 2023/2024 is as follows:
2. Pursuant to the Law Amending the Public Debt Management Law (Third Amendment), the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No 4, 2021), all activities pertaining to the issuance, sale and distribution of government securities shall be conducted only with the express approval of the National Unity of Government. Any auctions of debt conducted without the approval of the National Unity Government shall result in no lawful liability on the State or the Government, and shall give rise to no valid claim against the State or the Government, as delineated under the following sections of the Law:
Section 46: Any borrowing, debt or liability incurred by, or on behalf of, a Restricted Entity on or after 1 February 2021 shall not constitute a Government Debt, or Public Debt or Publicly Guaranteed Debt. All agreements, instruments or guarantees entered into by, or on behalf of, a Restricted Entity in connection with such borrowing, debt or liability shall have no binding legal effect on the State of the Government.
Section 47: No claims shall be made against the State of the Government or any successor body in connection with any borrowing, debt, liabilities or debt servicing of a Restricted Entity.
3. It is hereby further reiterated that no legal claim shall be levied against the State or the Government in association with the debts accrued through government securities, raised by the illegal military council and its subordinate institutions, from or after 1 February 2021..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Economic History - general
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
46.85 KB
more
Sub-title:
အစိုးရငွေချေးသက်သေခံလက်မှတ်များ တရားမဝင်ထုတ်ဝေရောင်းချ၍ ငွေချေးယူနေခြင်းနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းသည့်ကြေညာချက်
Description:
"၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာထားပြီးဖြစ်သည့် တရားမဝင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ယင်း၏ လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် ၎င်းတို့သက်ဆိုးရှည် စေရန်နှင့်ပြည်သူလူထုအား အကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်နိုင်ရန် အရေးပေါ်လိုအပ်နေသော ဘတ်ဂျက်လိုငွေ ဖြည့်ဆည်းနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အစိုးရငွေချေးသက်သေခံလက်မှတ်များကို ၃ လပတ်အလိုက် အချိန် ဇယား ရေးဆွဲပြီး ပြည်တွင်း၌ ထုတ်ဝေရောင်းချ၍ ငွေချေးယူလျက်ရှိကြောင်းနှင့် ၂၀၂၃-၂၀၂၄ ခု၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှစ် ဒုတိယသုံးလပတ်အတွက် အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ထုတ်ဝေရောင်းချ၍ ငွေချေးယူရန် စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်-
၂။ ပြည်သူ့ကြွေးမြီ စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုဥပဒေကို တတိယအကြိမ်ပြင်ဆင်သည့်ဥပဒေ (၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ဥပဒေအမှတ် ၄) အရ အစိုးရငွေချေးသက်သေခံလက်မှတ်များ ထုတ်ဝေ ရောင်းချ၍ ငွေချေးယူခြင်းကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ သဘောတူခွင့်ပြုချက်ဖြင့်သာ ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ခွင့်ပြုချက်မရှိဘဲ ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းသည် နိုင်ငံတော် (သို့မဟုတ်) အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အပေါ် ဥပဒေအရ သက်ရောက်မှုရှိမည် မဟုတ်ကြောင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံတော် (သို့မဟုတ်) အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အပေါ် တောင်းဆိုပိုင်ခွင့်ရှိမည် မဟုတ်ကြောင်းကို အောက်ပါ အတိုင်း အတိအလင်း ပြဋ္ဌာန်းပြီးဖြစ်သည်-
ပုဒ်မ ၄၆။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ ကန့်သတ်ထားသော အဖွဲ့အစည်း တစ်ရပ်ရပ်၏ ငွေချေးယူခြင်း၊ ကြွေးမြီတင်ရှိခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် ပေးရန်တာဝန်ရှိခြင်းသည် အစိုးရကြွေးမြီ သို့မဟုတ် ပြည်သူ့ကြွေးမြီ သို့မဟုတ် နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အာမခံချက်ရှိသည့် ကြွေးမြီဟု မှတ်ယူခြင်းမပြုရ။ ထိုကဲ့သို့သော ငွေချေးခြင်း၊ ကြွေးမြီ သို့မဟုတ် ပေးရန်တာဝန် ရှိမှုတို့နှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ ကန့်သတ်ထားသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းတစ်ရပ်ရပ်မှ ချုပ်ဆိုထားသော သဘောတူညီချက်များ၊ စာချုပ်စာတမ်းများ သို့မဟုတ် အာမခံချက်များအားလုံးသည် နိုင်ငံတော် သို့မဟုတ် အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အပေါ်တွင် ဥပဒေအရသက်ရောက်မှုမရှိစေရ။
ပုဒ်မ ၄၇။ ကန့်သတ်ထားသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းတစ်ခု၏ ချေးငွေ၊ ကြွေးမြီ၊ တာဝန်ဝတ္တရား များ သို့မဟုတ် ကြွေးမြီဝန်ဆောင်မှုနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ နိုင်ငံတော် သို့မဟုတ် အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အပေါ် တွင် တောင်းဆိုပိုင်ခွင့်မရှိစေရ။
၃။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ တရားမဝင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်း၏လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်း များက ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ ထုတ်ဝေရောင်းချပြီး ငွေချေးယူနေသည့် အစိုးရ ငွေချေးသက်သေခံလက်မှတ်များအားလုံးသည် အစိုးရကြွေးမြီ (သို့မဟုတ်) ပြည်သူ့ကြွေးမြီ (သို့မဟုတ်)နိုင်ငံတော်၏အာမခံချက်ရှိသည့်ကြွေးမြီများ မဟုတ်သည့်အတွက် နိုင်ငံတော် (သို့မဟုတ်) အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အပေါ် တောင်းဆိုပိုင်ခွင့်မရှိကြောင်း အသိပေးကြေညာလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - NUG
Date of publication:
2023-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Economic History - general
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
303.34 KB
more
Sub-title:
အခြေခံအလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်နေမှုများ၊ အလုပ်သမားခေါင်းဆောင်များအား မတရားဖမ်းဆီးနှိပ်စက်နေမှုများနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်
Description:
"၁။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လအတွင်း ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းဒေသကြီးရှိ စက်မှုဇုန်များမှ လုပ်ငန်းရှင်အချို့သည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း၍ အခြေခံအလုပ်သမား အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများအပြင် အလုပ်သမားခေါင်းဆောင်များအား မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်း၊ အလုပ်မှထုတ်ပစ်ခြင်း တို့ကို အောက်ပါ အတိုင်း ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်း ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရသည်-
(က) ၃-၆-၂၀၂၃ ရက်နေ့တွင် ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ လှိုင်သာယာမြို့နယ်၊ စက်မှုဇုန် (၅)၊ မလိခလမ်းရှိ ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံသားပိုင် JAKO ကုန်အမှတ်တံဆိပ်ချုပ်လုပ်သည့် Sun Apparel Myanmar အထည်ချုပ်စက်ရုံမှ အလုပ်သမား ၄၀၀ ဦးတို့သည် လုပ်ခ လစာတိုးမြှင့်ပေးရေး၊ အလုပ်ပိတ်ရက် အကျိုးခံစားခွင့်များ ရရှိရေး၊ သန့်ရှင်းသော သောက်ရေနှင့် ထမင်းစာဆောင် သီးသန့်စီစဉ်ပေးရေး စသည်တို့ကို ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ စုဝေးတောင်းဆိုခဲ့ရာ လုပ်သမားခေါင်းဆောင် (၂)ဦး ကို စစ်ကောင်စီမှ လုပ်ငန်းခွင် တွင်း ဝင်ရောက်ဖမ်းဆီး၍ စစ်ကြောရေးသို့ ပို့ဆောင်ခြင်း၊
( ခ) ၁၀-၆-၂၀၂၃ ရက်နေ့တွင် ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ ရွှေပြည်သာမြို့နယ်၊ သာဓုကန် စက်မှုဇုန်ရှိ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသားပိုင် ZARA နှင့် Inditex ကုန်အမှတ်တံဆိပ်များ ထုတ်လုပ်လျက် ရှိသည့် Hosheng Myanmar စက်ရုံ၌ စားဝတ်နေရေး ကျပ်တည်းမှုနှင့် ကုန်ဈေးနှုန်း ကြီးမြင့်မှုကြောင့် တစ်နေ့လုပ်အားခ (၅၆၀၀)ကျပ် တိုးမြှင့်သတ်မှတ်ပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုခဲ့သည့် အလုပ်သမားခေါင်းဆောင်(၇)ဦးအား အလုပ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ်ခြင်း၊ အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေးများရရှိရေး ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ စုဝေး တောင်းဆိုခဲ့သည့် စက်ရုံမှ အလုပ်သမား ၆၀၀ ကျော်အား စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း ၍ စက်ရုံသို့ လာရောက်ပြီး ခြိမ်းခြောက်ပြောဆိုခြင်း၊ ညှိနှိုင်းဖြေရှင်းရန် မြို့နယ် အထွေထွေအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူးရုံးသို့ လာရောက်ခဲ့သည့် အလုပ်ထုတ်ခံထားရသော အလုပ်သမားသမဂ္ဂ အတွင်းရေးမှူးနှင့် အခြားခေါင်းဆောင်တစ်ဦးအား စစ်ကောင်စီ မှ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်း၊
( ဂ) ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ လှိုင်သာယာမြို့နယ်၊ စက်မှုဇုန် (၃)၊ ကျန်စစ်သားလမ်းရှိ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသားပိုင် ZARA, Only, DIVIDED (H & M) ကုန်အမှတ်တံဆိတ်များ ထုတ်လုပ်နေသည့် Myanmar York အထည်ချုပ်စက်ရုံတွင် သတ်မှတ်အလုပ်ချိန် ထက် ကျော်လွန်ခိုင်းစေခြင်း၊ အလုပ်သမားများ၏ ဆန္ဒမပါဘဲ အချိန်ပို လုပ်ကိုင်ရ ခြင်း၊ အချိန်ပိုလုပ်ကိုင်သူများအတွက် လိုအပ်သည့် သက်သာချောင်ချိရေး အစီအမံ များ စီစဉ်မပေးခြင်း၊ ခွင့်ရက်များ အပြည့်အဝ ခံစားခွင့် မရခြင်း၊ အလုပ်သမားများ လုပ်နိုင်စွမ်းရှိသည့် ကုန်ထုတ်စံနှုန်းထက် ပိုမိုထွက်ရှိရေး ဖိအားပေးခိုင်းစေခြင်း၊ တစ်ခါတရံ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်သူများက ကိုယ်ထိလက်ရောက် ကျူးလွန်ခြင်း စသည့် အခွင့်အရေးများ ချိုးဖောက်ခံနေရခြင်း။
၂။ စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်း၏ သြဇာခံ အလုပ်ရှင်များသည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှ စ၍ အလုပ်သမားသမဂ္ဂ ခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် အဖွဲ့ဝင်များကို အလုပ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ်ခြင်း၊ ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်း၊ ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ လွတ်လပ်စွာသင်းပင်းဖွဲ့စည်းခွင့်၊ စုပေါင်းအရေးဆိုခွင့်နှင့် စည်းရုံးခွင့်ကို ပိတ်ပင် တားမြစ်ခြင်း၊ လခစားအလုပ်သမားများကို နေ့စားအလုပ်သမားအဖြစ် ပြောင်းပစ်ခြင်းနှင့် ဖိအားပေး ခိုင်းစေခြင်း၊ လုပ်အားခေါင်းပုံဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ အလုပ်သမားများ ရသင့်ရထိုက်သည့် လုပ်ငန်းခွင်ဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံအခွင့်အရေးများကို အပြည့်အဝ မပေးခြင်းစသည့် အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှု များကို ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာနက ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဩဂုတ်လ ၂၇ ရက် နေ့တွင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သော အလုပ်သမားများနှင့် အလုပ်ခန့်ထားမှုအပေါ် ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုများ၊ အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်နေမှုများနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၁၁/၂၀၂၂) နှင့် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၂၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သော အလုပ်သမားသမဂ္ဂများ လွတ်လပ် စွာ ဖွဲ့စည်းခွင့်နှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် မည်သို့သော ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုကိုမျှ လုံးဝမပြု လုပ်ရေးနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် ကြေငြာချက်အမှတ် (၁၃/၂၀၂၂)တို့ဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ရာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများတွင် အားပေးကူညီသူများ မဖြစ်စေရေး အလုပ်သမားအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ သမဂ္ဂများ၊ အလုပ်သမားအဖွဲ့ချုပ်များအနေဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်အတိုင်း လိုက်နာရန် အထူးလိုအပ်ပါသည်။
၄။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း အခြေခံအလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများ ပြုလုပ်နေသည့် အလုပ်ရှင်များ၊ Brand/ buyers များအား နိုင်ငံတကာပြဋ္ဌာန်းချက်များနှင့်အညီ ထိရောက်စွာ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် ILO နှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပြီး အလုပ်သမားအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့်လည်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေးနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှုများကို အမြန်ဆုံးရပ်တန့်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် ကျူးလွန်သူများအား ထိရောက်စွာ အရေးယူ နိုင်ရေး တက်ကြွစွာ ဝိုင်းဝန်းပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးကြပါရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။
၅။ ပြည်တွင်းတွင် ရပ်တည်လုပ်ကိုင်နေသည့် လုပ်ငန်းရှင်များအနေဖြင့်လည်း အလုပ်သမား အခွင့်အရေးများ၊ စံတန်ဖိုးများအား လေးစားလိုက်နာကြရန် အထူးလိုအပ်ပါသည်။ လူမျိုးတုန်း သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာတွင် တရားစွဲခံ ထားရသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းပြီး အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်ခြင်း များသည် သာမန် အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုမျှသာမဟုတ်ဘဲ ရာဇဝတ်မှုမြောက်သော ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများဖြစ်သောကြောင့် လုပ်ငန်းရှင်များအနေဖြင့်လည်း အထူးရှောင်ရှားရန် နှင့် ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်နေပါက ထိရောက်သော ဟန့်တားအရေးယူမှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်မည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Labour - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Labour issues in Burma
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
496.23 KB
more
Description:
"The leader of Move Forward, Pita Limjaroenrat, who won the recent Thai general election, says he is committed to ASEAN-led solutions for Myanmar and distanced himself from the outgoing government’s talks with Myanmar’s junta this week.
Thailand’s military government hosted informal talks with Myanmar’s regime on Monday, dividing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Myanmar’s regime has been excluded from high-level ASEAN meetings since late 2021 after the junta failed to follow the bloc’s five-point peace plan.
Thailand invited all 10 ASEAN members to the closed meeting of foreign ministers but the current chair Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore shunned the event.
Myanmar’s junta-appointed foreign minister, Than Swe, and representatives from Laos, Cambodia, India, China, Brunei and Vietnam attended Monday’s meeting.
Following the meeting, Pita said in a statement that Move Forward is closely monitoring developments in Myanmar and prioritized the issue as a top concern.
He referred to divisions caused by the talks within ASEAN and reaffirmed Move Forward’s commitment to the bloc’s five-point peace plan.
“As one of the founding members of ASEAN, we attach high importance to unity among ASEAN members and to upholding principles of democracy and human rights as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter,” Pita stated.
He said engagement must be inclusive, multi-layered and appropriate to help Myanmar stabilize.
Pita said Move Forward’s coalition government plans to create a Myanmar Inter-Agency Task Force controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office which will coordinate efforts and seek solutions to Myanmar’s challenges..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-06-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from June 8 to 14, 2023
Military Junta troops arrested over 100 local civilians from Thayetchaung Township, Tanintharyi Region, Mabein Township, Shan State and Sataung from Sagaing Region and used them as human shields from June 8th to 14th. Junta soldiers raped and killed 2 women from Mobye Township, Shan State and one woman from Ledo, Kayin State. The Military’s Head of the Prison tortured and investigated over 80 political prisoners from Myingyan Prison, Mandalay Region, moreover did not allow the permission of medical treatment and blocked the family visit for 3 months.
Military Junta troops occupied 5 civilian houses and a rice mill within a week. Military Junta threatened in the announcement on June 12th that if the PDFs are arrested they will seal the house where the PDF rented. Military Junta soldiers are also raiding civilian places and still committing that they are burning civilian buildings, arresting, torturing and killing..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication:
2023-06-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"At least 139 attacks on Myanmar's health care system have been documented by Insecurity Insight between 01 January-16 May 2023. Explore this interactive map to see where incidents were reported, who the perpetrators were and the weapons used. The map does not yet include incidents reported in this News Brief.
Past incident reports: 03-16 May; 19 April-02 May; 05-18 April; 22 March-04 April; 08-21 March; All.
Past analysis reports: April and September 2022; 1 February 2021 to 10 January 2022; 1 January to 31 March 2022.
Join our Myanmar mailing list for regular updates. Visit our website. Follow us on Twitter. If you have additional information on an incident documented here, or a new incident, please get in touch. Help support the protection of health care by sharing this resource. Please copy and paste this link: bit.ly/17-30May2023MMRHealth
Documented incidents
17 May 2023: In Saw Lon village and village tract, Bawlakhe township and district, Kayah state, a sub-rural health centre was damaged in Myanmar military airstrikes. Staff house buildings of the health centre, six civilian houses, a monastery, a community seed bank building, and public drinking water pond were damaged, a female civilian killed and four male civilians injured.
Sources: Facebook, Kantarawaddy Times and Myanmar Now
17 May 2023: In Pan Nyo village and village tract, Myaung township, Sagaing district and region, the Myanmar military attacked a sub-rural health centre using armed drones. Source: Facebook 18 May 2023: In Saw Lon village, Bawlake township and district, Kayah state, an SAC aerial attack destroyed two rural medical facilities, a monastery, and six private homes. Source: Radio Free Asia
20 May 2022: In Demoso township and district, Kayah state, Myanmar military airstrikes damaged a clinic building and four civilian houses. Source: Twitter As reported on 21 May 2023: In Rakhine state, the restrictions on medicine transport and purchase are still present after the Cyclone Mocha had hit this area. The restrictions were in place from July 2022 due to the armed clashes between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army.
Source: Myanmar Pressphoto Agency
21 May 2023: In Sar Taung village and village tract, Sagaing township, district, and region, the local resistance forces used a hospital building as a bunker in their attack on a police station on the opposite side of the road. Sources: Facebook, Mandalay Free Press and Myanmar Now
21 May 2023: In Hakha town, township, and district, Chin state, the Myanmar military raided Agape Hospital and arrested a female doctor and four female nurses and detained them at the local police station. The reason for arrest is unknown, however it is suspected that it could be for prisoner exchange. Sources: Ayeyarwaddy Times, Global Security, Khonumthung Burmese,
Radio Free Asia and Radio Free Asia
As reported on 21 May 2023: In Yangon town, township and region, a male doctor was among 28 people returning from the United States and arrested at the airport by the Myanmar military and sent to an interrogation centre. Eight of them, including the doctor, were later released. Source:
Facebook
22 May 2023: In Khin-U township, Shwebo district, Sagaing region, a medical student was killed in armed clashes. Sources: Facebook and Facebook II
22 May 2023: Near Hniarlawn village and village tract, Hakha township and district, Chin state, the body of a male medical technician was found burnt along with another female civilian. The medical technician served at Hakha Hospital before being affiliated with the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Their burnt bodies were found near the former temporary base camp of the Myanmar military, and their families accused the Myanmar military for the killing. The two victims went missing on 02 May 2023 while travelling from Tedim town to Hakha town. Sources:
Khonumthung Burmese and Mizzima
23 May 2023: On the highway connecting Pauk town and Pakokku town, Magway region, an armed group seized an LNGO ambulance en route from Mandalay town to Pauk town. The ambulance operators, patient, and patient attendants were not harmed. The junta authorities accused the local resistance forces of this attack. Source: Telegram
24 May 2023: In Thea Inn village and village tract, Singu township, Thabeikkyin district, Mandalay region, a station hospital was damaged due to the artillery fires by the Myanmar military during armed clashes between the Myanmar military and local resistance forces. Source: Democratic Voice of Burma
25 May 2023: In Sanchaung town and township, Yangon (West) district, Yangon region, two male doctors were among 16 youths arrested by the Myanmar military. Sources: Mizzima and Myanmar Pressphoto Agency
As reported on 25 May 2023: In Thandaung town and station, Thandaunggyi township and district, Kayin state, and Kyaukkyi township, Nyaunglebin district, Bago region, the junta authorities restricted the transport of medicines and food items. Source: Myanmar Now
25 May 2023: In Tha Bawt Seik village, Kyauk Sin village tract, Launglon township, Dawei district,
Tanintharyi region, a private pharmacy was among the civilians’ properties ransacked by the Myanmar military. Source: Dawei Watch
26 May 2023: In Namtu town and township, Kyaukme district, Shan state (North), the junta authorities inspected the houses of six CDM-affiliated health workers and warned them to stop providing health care. One of them, a female nurse, was asked whether she had a valid nursing licence, and was told to sign a statement that she would no longer provide health care. Source:
Shwe Phee Myay News Agency
As reported on 26 May 2023: In Pakokku town, township, and district, Magway region, some LNGOs were made to obtain travel authorisation (TA) for each ambulance trip. The TA request form requires the details of the LNGOs and patients. This local by-law has to be abided by the ambulances entering or leaving Pakokku town. Source: Democratic Voice of Burma
26 May 2023: In Nwe Ni village and village tract, Yesagyo township, Pakokku district, Magway region, the Myanmar military torched a health centre and 27 civilian houses during a four-day raid of 25 villages in the area. Sources: Facebook, Facebook II and Khit Thit Media
27 May 2023: In Kayah state, two female medics and two male members of the Demoso Medic Unit of the ethnic armed organisation Karenni Revolution Union were killed in armed clashes while providing treatment to the injured. Sources: Democratic Voice of Burma, Facebook and Radio Free Asia
27 May 2023: In Kyaikdon town, Kyain Seikgyi township and district, Kayin state, a rural health centre was damaged due in an armed drone attack. The junta authorities accused the local resistance forces of this attack. Source: Eleven Media Group
As reported on 27 May 2023: In Monywa town, township and district, Sagaing region, the junta authorities inspected private clinics. Source: Mizzima
28 to 30 May 2023: In Monywa town, township and district, Sagaing region, the junta authorities arrested three male civilians from a private clinic of a female obstetrician on 28 May. A private ophthalmologist clinic was made to pay so-called tax for two years on 30 May. The military raided a private laboratory and specialist clinic Ka Ra Mat on 30 May. The pro-military media claimed that the local authorities conducted routine inspections of five private clinics and laboratories including Ka Ra Mat on 30 May. Sources: Facebook, Facebook II, Facebook III and Facebook IV
29 May 2023: In Hlut Taik village and village tract, Kyunhla township, Kanbalu district, Sagaing region, the Myanmar military and militia torched a health centre and seven civilian houses during a two-day raid of four villages in this area. Sources: Khit Thit Media and Myaelattathan
29 May 2023: In Ngwe Taung Ka Lay village, Kywe Hpyu Taung village tract, Thandaunggyi township and district, Kayin state, a local clinic was hit by Myanmar military artillery fire. The clinic was functioning at the time of the attack. There were no casualties since the attack occurred during after-hours. Sources: Facebook, KIC News and Mizzima
29 May 2023: In Nyaung Pin village, War Boe village tract, Yesagyo township, Pakokku district,
Magway region, the Myanmar military torched a health centre and 29 civilian houses during a four-day raid of 25 villages and the burning down 656 civilian houses. Sources: Facebook
As reported on 29 May 2023: In Hpa-An town, township and district, Kayin state, access to health care is limited for civilians due to hospital beds dedicated for junta soldiers, increased security at hospitals, forced discharge of chronic in-patients and shortage of health workers at public hospitals. Civilians have to access health care in the private sector rather than the public sector. At the station hospital in Kyondoe town, Kawkareik township and district, Kayin state, patients and their patients were interrogated about local resistance forces by the Myanmar military. The Myanmar military assigned their troops at public hospitals in Myawaddy, Kawkareik, and Hlaingbwe towns in Kayin state for security reasons. LNGOs were forced to find blood donors for injured Myanmar military soldiers. Source: KIC News..."
Source/publisher:
Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of publication:
2023-06-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Public Health, Human Rights and international relations, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
486.21 KB
more
Description:
"An application for a criminal investigation into the activities of the Israeli arms manufacturer CAA Industries and officials from the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been filed with Israel’s Attorney General, over the suspected aiding and abetting of the Myanmar military’s war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The application is based on leaked shipment records showing that in July 2019, CAA Industries dispatched injection moulds and tooling used for the upgrading of the Myanmar military’s small arms, via known arms broker Star Sapphire Trading.
Star Sapphire Trading is a company ultimately controlled by Dr Tun Min Latt, a Myanmar arms broker who has been indicted on money laundering, transnational organised crime and drug trafficking charges in Thailand.
The application:
argues that CAA Industries and officials in Israel’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs aided and abetted war crimes and crimes against humanity by supplying the Myanmar military with machinery to manufacture accessories for the Myanmar military’s domestic small arms production lines, knowing that the military was committing atrocity crimes;
calls for concerned individuals to be prosecuted under Israel’s Penal Code;
calls on Israeli authorities to immediately seize relevant documents from the offices of CAA Industries, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to avoid the concealment of evidence and potential disruption to the investigation.
The application was filed with Israel’s Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara on June 6 by the advocate Eitay Mack on behalf of more than 60 Israeli citizens, among them the former speaker of the Knesset Avraham ("Avrum") Burg, prominent academics including Prof. Daphna Golan-Agnon and Prof. Ruth HaCohen Pinczower, and human rights activists.
In addition to the complaint for a criminal investigation, a letter has been sent to Israel’s Defense Exports Controls Agency (DECA) of the Ministry of Defense demanding it immediately cancel export and marketing licences granted to CAA Industries for sales to Myanmar.
The application for a criminal investigation follows a similar 2018 submission by Eitay Mack into the aiding and abetting of atrocity crimes by Israelis who exported arms to Myanmar; a 2022 application requesting a criminal investigation into corruption over Israeli arms companies’ dealings with the Myanmar broker Dr Tun Min Latt and his conglomerate, Star Sapphire Group; and a 2023 application into the aiding and abetting of atrocity crimes by Cognyte for its sale of spyware to Myanmar.
Justice For Myanmar is concerned that the 2018 complaint has not yet led to a criminal investigation and calls for an investigation to be expedited.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “CAA Industries’ support for the Myanmar military’s arms industry is unconscionable, and amounts to aiding and abetting the military’s war crimes and crimes against humanity, which are continuing on a daily basis.
“The fact that this transfer took place after the Israeli government claimed to have stopped selling arms to Myanmar raises serious questions that should be urgently addressed through a criminal investigation of both CAA Industries and officials from the ministries of defence and foreign affairs for their role in the 2019 shipment of equipment to Myanmar.
“By providing moulds and tooling, CAA Industries has helped boost the military’s in-country arms production capabilities, which has lasting consequences for the people of Myanmar who are subject to daily acts of terror at the hands of the illegal junta, which is committing mass murder, indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, torture, property destruction and forced displacement.
“Israeli officials and those in CAA Industries who have enabled the supply of arms and dual use goods and technology to the Myanmar military, aiding and abetting international crimes, must be held accountable.”
Eitay Mack, Advocate, says: “Thanks to Justice For Myanmar's investigations, we repeatedly discover that Israeli military exports to the country did not stop, but continued in more sophisticated ways.
“This is illegal, immoral and shameful conduct by the Israeli government that approves licenses to Israeli military companies to continue doing business as usual with the murderous military in Myanmar.
“This time it is not a one-time export of weapons but equipment that enables the production of weapon parts and therefore requires ongoing licenses for export and the provision of services to the junta.
“Therefore, in addition to demanding a criminal investigation against the CAA company and the Israeli officials involved in the scandal, we also demand that the ongoing licenses granted to the CAA company be revoked.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-06-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arms (Military Expenditure, Arms Transfers, Arms Production Etc), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
146.33 KB 126.88 KB
more
Description:
"It was hard not to feel a sense of déjà vu when the military stepped in to assume absolute power in February two years ago. It was like 1988 all over again. Demonstrators staged initially peaceful protests in the streets of cities and towns all over the country and were met with bullets from the military. Many were killed, and activists of various kinds fled to the border areas where they linked up with the ethnic rebel armies, which have been resisting central government control for decades. A government truly representing the people was set up and became active mostly in exile. A broader front including some of the ethnic armed groups was formed. And the struggle to topple an immensely unpopular military regime continued without anyone seeming to win the war. Those are the most common superficial observations—because there are fundamental differences between what happened after 1988 and now. As a journalist who has covered Myanmar affairs for more than 40 years—including the 1988 uprising and its aftermath—I have been approached by some close friends who have asked me to explain why the current uprising is not just a repeat of what happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
First of all, mobile phones and the internet, with their associated digital media and email, did not exist in the 1980s. I was banned from visiting the country at that time, but managed with extreme difficulty to get news through a confidential network of raspy telephone lines and occasional letters, which were hand-delivered to me in Bangkok by trusted contacts. I would not have been able to write my articles for the now defunct Far Eastern Economic Review without the help of those contacts inside the country, and I am forever grateful to them for providing me with up-to-date information, often at great risk to themselves. Photos had to be taken by cumbersome cameras with film, and the rolls smuggled out of the country and developed in Thailand or elsewhere. Some grainy video recordings also made it to safety outside Myanmar, as did printed material ranging from flyers and posters to independently produced newspapers and journals. What has been preserved constitutes important historical material, but it is limited and cannot be compared with what is available online today. Now, nothing happens inside Myanmar—a protest, a gun battle, an assassination or an atrocity—without the outside world getting to know about it within a day or two, or even hours. Young people in Myanmar are very cyber savvy and continue to outsmart the military, which is much less adept at using online technology.
At the same time, it is important to remember that the brutality the military unleashed on the protests in the cities and towns in 1988 was far worse than what was witnessed after the 2021 coup. When people took to the streets on Aug. 8, soldiers sprayed automatic rifle fire into crowds of unarmed people not only in Yangon, where even armored vehicles equipped with Bren machine guns were used to crush the demonstrations, but also in Bago, Sagaing, Taunggyi and many other places. An especially bloody and virtually unpublicized event took place in Sagaing on Aug. 11 when troops and policemen commanded by Kyaw Zwa, an army veteran and the local head of the ruling Burma Socialist Program Party as well as chairman of the Sagaing Division’s People’s Council, gunned down at least 100 demonstrators, among them many Buddhist monks. According to estimates by local medical personnel, thousands of civilians—not hundreds as often mentioned in later writings about the uprising—were gunned down by the military in 1988. It would have been 3,000 countrywide in August, and another 1,000 when the military stepped in to reassert their grip on power on Sept. 18, which was also when a new junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), was formed.
The carnage prompted about 10,000 mostly young, urban activists to leave their homes and trek through the jungle and over the mountains to remote border areas controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Karenni Army, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Only a handful made it to areas in northeastern Shan State where the Communist Party of Burma had its strongholds, and no one went to the area on the Thai border controlled by the drug lord Khun Sa because they knew that he had a tacit business arrangement with the Myanmar military. In January 1996, Khun Sa also surrendered, dissolved his army and moved with his closest business associates to Yangon.
The flight to the border led to the formation of a number of alliances and fronts. On Nov. 5, 1988, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) was set up at a meeting in Kawmorrah, a KNU camp on the Thai border (which now, incidentally, is called Shwe Kokko, a new town under the control of a junta-allied Border Guard Force—and where many of the newly built casinos are located). Two weeks later, the ethnic Burman resistance and several ethnic armed groups formed the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB). Then came the May 18, 1990 election, which resulted in a resounding victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD). But the assembly that was elected was never convened. Instead, the SLORC began arresting elected MPs—and more pro-democracy activists fled to the border. On Dec. 18 that year, they formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), which in turn led to the formation of a broader front including NLD exiles, members of the NCGUB and the ethnic armed groups called the National Council of the Union of Burma, or NCUB. After the NCGUB was formed, I wrote a then-much-criticized article for the Far Eastern Economic Review titled “Cry of Desperation”. I stressed that no foreign country was likely to recognize the border-based “cabinet” and it was unlikely that it would have any impact on the situation inside Myanmar. The resistance was holed up in camps along Myanmar’s borders and the plethora of groups and acronyms also made sympathizers outside the country confused; who should they listen to and cooperate with? Who was who in the alphabet soup of armies and fronts?
I visited the resistance camps on the Myanmar side of the border with Thailand several times and also went to Mangshi and Ruili in Yunnan, China, where I met activists based in Kachin State. It was, to be absolutely frank, not an encouraging sight. I had no reason to doubt the sincerity of the young ABSDF activists who had given up everything to fight for what they believed in. But the way in which they bore uniforms adorned with flashes and insignia, and had their organization structured into numbered military units, made them no different from other armed groups fighting in the jungle-clad frontier areas. And it did not last long. The ABSDF soon split into competing factions and, for a while, there were even two ABSDFs. The activists in Kachin State even turned against each other; one group accused another of being government agents and killed them in a grisly massacre. The DAB collapsed when several of the ethnic armed groups entered into ceasefire agreements with the military. The NCGUB never became more than an acronym.
In the mid-1990s, I visited Dr. Cynthia Maung, an ethnic Karen doctor who ran—and still runs—a clinic in the Thai border town of Mae Sot. I asked her what kind of patients from the ABSDF she had received over the years, and she summed it up succinctly: “Well, the first year, it was mostly malaria cases. Then came those with gunshot wounds. Now it’s mostly deliveries.” The activists were young people from urban areas who were not used to the hard life in the jungle, and became sick from malaria and other diseases. Those who were determined to fight and still had some strength left ventured out onto the battlefield, and were often wounded. In the end, many settled down in Mae Sot and other border towns, had children and raised families. Many former activists also ended up in exile, primarily in Europe, Australia, Canada and the United States.
What remained of the ABSDF finally gave up the armed struggle and decided to focus on disseminating information about the dictatorship and networking with international NGOs. But that, curiously, did not prevent the ABSDF from being one of eight “armed groups” which signed a so-called “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” (NCA) with the military in October 2015. Needless to say, of the signatories, only two—the KNU and the Restoration Council of Shan State—had armies worth the name. On Feb. 18, 2018, the government proudly announced that two more groups, the Lahu Democratic Union and the NMSP, had signed the NCA. But the Lahu outfit is little more than an NGO based in Thailand, and today’s Mon army is tiny compared to what it once was. The NMSP had, in any event, entered into a ceasefire agreement with the military in June 1995, so it was unclear what difference it would make. Although the NCA is a signed agreement and those struck in the late 1980s and 1990s were not (the sole exception being the ceasefire with the KIA, which insisted on having it formalized in writing), there is no reason—and there never was one—to believe that the military would be seriously interested in finding a peaceful, political solution to Myanmar’s civil wars. The KIA came under attack in June 2011 and fighting broke out between the military and the KNU as well as the Chin National Front, another NCA signatory, shortly after the February 2021 coup.
It is true that there are some striking similarities between the situation after the 1988 uprising and today. The National Unity Government (NUG), set up by elected MPs and others in April 2021, seems to mirror the NCGUB, and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), which combines Burman and ethnic armies, looks like a contemporary version of the NCUB. But a closer look at today’s resistance reveals that the most obvious difference between then and now, access to the internet, is not the only one.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the activists actually believed that some foreign “uncles” would come and support them. After all, the US Congress had issued statements condemning the dictatorship, and so had the European Union, Australia, and other democracies around the world. Today’s fighters for democracy seem to have no such illusions. They know that Myanmar is not Ukraine and no weapons or other material support will come from abroad. Relying on their own resources, they are fighting with home-made guns and weapons captured from the military and the police, and they have also brought the war to the Myanmar heartland. Although many of the resistance fighters were trained by the Karen or Kachin armies and did get some weapons from them as well, it’s no longer a jungle-based insurgency. Financial support for the struggle comes from the many Myanmar nationals living in exile, including through some imaginative methods like a popular online video game, which also serves as a propaganda tool. It’s now or never.
The resistance in the heartland is often lumped together as the “People’s Defense Forces”, or PDFs, but that doesn’t mean that they are under any effective central command. Nor do they necessarily take orders from the NUG. But that also makes them harder to crush, because the military can’t find out who the leaders are, and how and where they operate. There are dozens of local resistance armies that depend on popular support in their respective areas and given the nationwide, deep-rooted hatred of the military, it is not difficult for the activists to mingle with crowds anywhere. It is obvious that the generals messed with the wrong generation when they staged their ill-fated coup.
Another important difference is that the economy was in a shambles after the 1988 uprising but, to the surprise of many, the SLORC (renamed the State Peace and Development Council in 1997) managed to not only rebuild but, by attracting foreign investment, also create a fledgling capitalist system to replace the old “socialism” that had prevailed from 1962 to 1988. The economic fallout of the 2021 coup is a severe crisis. Foreign investors are leaving and those who remain are reeling under the effects of boycotts and sanctions. In this area, digital media have made a decisive impact. The true extent of the 1988 massacres was little known outside the country, and although some sanctions were imposed even then, they were limited and had little or no effect. Today, the viciousness of the military is well documented, and anyone doing business with them is named and shamed on the internet.
The adversary the pro-democracy forces are facing is also not the same as before. Junta leader and self-appointed prime minister Senior General Min Aung Hlaing lacks the capabilities and military skills of his predecessors. Moreover, he is uncharismatic and every time he appears in public or on the TV, he appears nervous and unsure of himself. But if he is replaced, it would most likely be by someone who is more hardline than he is, such as Vice Senior General Soe Win, who often oversees operations, including devastating air strikes, against any identifiable resistance stronghold; more often than not, these turn out to be villages and entire towns. The military may be more isolated from the public at large than ever before and it has become the country’s most hated institution. There is also little doubt that the various resistance forces continue to enjoy popular support, and two years after the coup they have not given up. Rather, fighting across the country is intensifying.
But there is a huge problem facing the resistance forces: They do not today have the weaponry that is needed to defeat the well-armed military with all the firepower it has at its disposal, the most devastating being air power. The military may not win the war, but they also cannot lose. And mediation efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have failed and even backfired on the bloc as it has exposed its weaknesses. Guided by two cardinal principles, noninterference and consensus, there is actually nothing it can do when there is a crisis in a member country. International peacemakers and conflict-resolutionists have time and again shown that their efforts have been a waste of time and money; the generals simply won’t listen and, even if they pretend to, they won’t take any advice from such outsiders. That brings us to the sad reality: the military has been in power under different guises since General Ne Win’s coup in 1962, and nothing is likely to change unless and until there is a split at the top or a mutiny within the ranks. That was true in the late 1980s and remains so today. But such a development could also lead to an even bloodier civil war, a potentially devastating scenario for which the outside world and all those involved in Myanmar must be prepared. Nevertheless, if the military remains united, the decades-long civil wars will continue to bleed the country for years to come—and the main victims will be the people of Myanmar, who are suffering under the brutal rule of a power-obsessed clique of men in green..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-05-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-05-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Political History
Language:
more
Description:
"Labour Day, also known as International Workers' Day, is an important occasion to celebrate and recognize the contributions of workers around the world. In Myanmar, Labour Day is celebrated on May 1st each year, and it holds great significance for the country's workforce.
The first May Day celebration in Myanmar started in 1938, when workers went on strike against the British-owned Burmah Oil Company (BOC) in Yenanchaung, in the central region of Myanmar, before the country's independence. The strikes were part of a larger movement known as the "Revolution of 1300", named after the year in the Myanmar Calendar. After Myanmar gained independence, Labour Day was designated a "national holiday".
Before the military coup in 2021, Labour Day was celebrated with the labour ministry, business leaders, and representatives from international organizations attending ceremonies. Workers from various industries would rally in the industrial zones and march to demand their rights. Since the coup, these celebrations have not been possible. But workers have continued to organize and resist: garment workers went on strike despite police and military intervention, and delivery riders organized themselves for collective action.
We also want to take this opportunity to thank those workers who participated in Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and stood firm against the genocidal military and refused to work under the terrorist dictatorship. In fact, peaceful acts of protest such as the CDM are much more powerful than the genocidal military's acts of terrorism against the civilian’s population of Myanmar. Because of these heroes, the brave and courageous workers who participate in the CDM, our revolution has gained momentum and we are headed down the path of success. They are no more and no less than the heroes of peace and the vanguard of our freedoms and federal democracy for ALL the people of Myanmar.
Labour Day is an important occasion to acknowledge the hard work and dedication of Myanmar's workers and to renew our commitment to fighting for better working conditions and workers' rights. It is a day to celebrate the achievements of workers and to recommit to the ongoing struggle for labour rights, even in the face of challenges and obstacles..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-05-01
Date of entry/update:
2023-05-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
31.63 KB
more
Description:
"၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ(၂၃)ရက်နေ့၊ ညနေ(၄)နာရီခန့်တွင် မကွေးတိုင်း၊ ဆောမြို့နယ်၊ ကျောက်ထုဒေသ၊ ကျောက်ထု အမြှောက်တပ် (၃၆၈)မှ ထွက်လာသော ရန်သူ့အင်အား (၁၃၀) ဦးခန့်ကို ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်(PDF) ဂန့်ဂေါခရိုင် တပ်ရင်းအမှတ် (၁၃) နှင့် CDF မင်းတပ် တို့ပူးပေါင်း တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ရာ ရန်သူ့ဘက်မှ ထိခိုက်ကျဆုံးမှု ရှိခဲ့ပြီး ရန်သူ့ဘက်မှ လက်နက်ကြီးများဖြင့် ရမ်းသမ်းပစ်ခတ်သဖြင့် CDF မင်းတပ်မှ ရဲဘော်တစ်ဦး ဒဏ်ရာ အနည်းငယ်ရရှိခဲ့သည်။ည(၈:၀၆)နာရီတွင် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်(PDF) ဂန့်ဂေါခရိုင် တပ်ရင်း အမှတ်(၈)က ကျောက်ထု အမြှောက်တပ်(၃၆၈)နှင့်ကျောက်ထုလေတပ်ကို Rocket များဖြင့် ထပ်မံပစ်ခတ် တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ပြီး အထိအခိုက်မရှိ ပြန်လည်ဆုတ်ခွာနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ဧပြီလ(၂၄)ရက်နေ့၊နေ့လည်(၁၂:၁၅)နာရီခန့်တွင် မကွေးတိုင်း၊ ပေါက်မြို့နယ်၊ ပင်တောင်ကျေးရွာ (ပျူစောထီးရွာ)မှ နယ်မြေခံ ပျူစောထီးများက လုံခြုံရေး ကင်းယူလျက် ယောချောင်းအတွင်း ငါးဖမ်းနေစဥ် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်(PDF) ပခုက္ကူခရိုင်တပ်ရင်းအမှတ် (၁၈) - တပ်ခွဲ (၃) - နဂါးမျိုးအဖွဲ့၊ ပေါက် မြို့နယ် အခြေပြု ဗိုလ်တစ္ဆေအဖွဲ့၊ ပေါက်ကျေးရွာကာကွယ်ရေး အဖွဲ့များ နှင့် မြိုင်မြို့နယ် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေး တပ်ဖွဲ့ - မြိုင် ပကဖ တပ်ရင်း (၁) - တပ်ခွဲ(၅) - တပ်စိတ် (၂၊ ၄) တို့က ပြောက်ကျားစနစ်ဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ် တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ခြင်းကြောင့် ရန်သူ့တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင် (၄) ဦး နေရာ၌ပင် သေဆုံးခဲ့ပြီး (၁) ဦး ပြင်းထန်ဒဏ်ရာဖြင့် ထွက်ပြေး လွတ်မြောက်သွားခဲ့သည်။ ဧပြီလ(၂၄)ရက်နေ့၊နေ့လည်(၁:၃၅)နာရီခန့်တွင် သေဆုံးသွားသော ရန်သူ့တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင် ရုပ်အလောင်းများကို ရန်သူ့တပ်နှင့်ပင်တောင်ကျေးရွာ၊ သစ်ချိုကုန်းကျေးရွာ နှင့် ဝန်ခြုံးကျေးရွာများ မှ နယ်မြေခံ ပျူစောထီးများက လာရောက်သယ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ကြပြီး သပြေအေးကျေးရွာသို့ ဝင်ရောက်ကာ ပြည်သူပိုင် နေအိမ် များကို အကြမ်းဖက် မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့သောကြောင့် ပြည်သူပိုင်နေအိမ်များ မီးလောင်ပြာကျခဲ့သည်။ ရန်သူ့တပ်နှင့် ပျုစောထီးများက ဒေသခံ ပြည်သူများ၏ စားနပ်ရိက္ခာများကို အကြမ်းဖက်ခိုးယူသယ်ဆောင် သွားခဲ့သည်။ ..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-04-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
309.12 KB
more
Description:
"Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။
https://t.me/modnugmyanmar
ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-04-27
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
442.61 KB
more
Sub-title:
အမည်ပျက်စာရင်း ကြေညာခြင်း
Description:
"၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း များအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်တာဝန် မထမ်းဆောင်ဘဲ ဓမ္မဘက်မှရပ်တည်၍ ပြည်သူနှင့်တသားတည်း ဖြစ်စေရန်နှင့် အမိန့်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင်ပါဝင်ကြစေရန် အကြိမ်ကြိမ်ဖိတ်ခေါ် ကမ်းလှမ်းခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အမိန့်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင်ပါဝင် ခဲ့ကြသည့် ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအသီးသီးမှ နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းသူရဲကောင်းများ၏ လူမှုဖူလုံရေး၊ လုံခြုံဘေးကင်းရေး နှင့် ဖိအားကင်းစင်ရေး တို့အတွက် အလေးထားဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။
၃။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ တရားမဝင်အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လက်အောက်တွင် ဆက်လက်တာဝန် ထမ်းဆောင်နေပြီး CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများအား ဖိအားပေးခြင်း၊ ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ ရာထူးမှထုတ်ပယ်ခြင်း၊ ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ်ခြင်း၊ တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းနှင့် ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီပြန်ဆပ်ရန်မလိုတော့သည့် လစာ ချေးငွေများအား အတင်းအဓမ္မ ပြန်လည်ပေးဆပ်ခိုင်းခြင်းများစသည့် အမျိုးမျိုးသော ဖိနှိပ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်နေသော ပို့ဆောင်ရေးနှင့် ဆက်သွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ မြန်မာ့မီးရထားမှ အောက်ဖေါ်ပြပါ ဝန်ထမ်းများအား အမည်ပျက်စာရင်းသွင်း လိုက်ပြီး ဝန်ထမ်းအဖြစ်မှ ထုတ်ပယ် (Dismiss) လိုက်သည်။
မှတ်ချက် - အငြိမ်းစား ယူသွားပြီးဖြစ်သော ဝန်ထမ်းများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ CDM - နိုင်ငံ့ ဝန်ထမ်း ဆိုင်ရာ မူဝါဒ အရ ဆက်လက် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Labour - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-04-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Anti-coup protesters
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.16 MB
more
Description:
"Every dictatorship believes it needs a secret police force in order to survive in power, and the more brutal, the more effective. Nazi Germany had its Gestapo, or Geheime Staatspolizei: “The Secret State Police.” The Shah of Iran depended on Savak, the country’s domestic security and intelligence service, and Romania’s dictator Nicolae Ceausescu had his dreaded Securitate, “Department of State Security.” And Myanmar’s generals have their military intelligence service, which over the years has changed its name but always remained a main pillar of state power.
But because of its secretive nature, Myanmar’s military intelligence has also on at least two occasions morphed into a state within the state, which became a threat to the established order and, therefore, was purged with some of its leaders receiving lengthy prison sentences. The question of maintaining that blind loyalty is the reason why Myanmar’s current dictator, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is keeping his top intelligence operatives closer to him than his predecessors did. Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo, head of what since 2020 has been called the Office of Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA), accompanies Min Aung Hlaing at all meetings with the junta-appointed cabinet, to meetings with foreign diplomats, and during trips abroad.
Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo went to Russia with Min Aung Hlaing in June 2021 to attend the 9th Moscow Conference on International Security, and again in July 2022 to meet state-owned nuclear energy and weapons companies. During the second trip, Ye Win Oo’s wife Nilar and other spouses of the generals also went along, but more for shopping in Moscow than to participate in any important meetings. Since the 2021 coup, Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo has been responsible for tracking down opponents to the junta and he also runs the military’s interrogation centers where detainees are subjected to torture, which usually includes electric chocks, burning of genitalia, pouring boiling liquid or chemical solutions down the mouths of victims, and rape if those arrested are women. The Internet and social media have made it possible to disseminate such information to the outside world, but the methods are as old as Myanmar’s military intelligence itself.
It dates back to General Ne Win, who seized power in 1962 and built up one of Asia’s most ruthless as well as efficient secret police forces. Originally called the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), it was known down to the lowliest non-English speaking peasant as em-eye and everybody feared it. Informants could be everywhere, sometimes even within dissident families. Ne Win was originally trained by the Japanese, in Tokyo in 1940-41 and when they occupied the then Burma 1942-45.
US Lieutenant Colonel James Mc Andrew states in his 2007 study of Myanmar’s military intelligence apparatus: “Chosen for both ‘guerilla tactics and clandestine activities’ and ‘special’ leadership training was the future dictator and longtime strongman, Ne Win. Significantly, this curriculum included intelligence training provided by the Kempeitai, the brutal Japanese Military Police and counterintelligence organization. Being selected for Kempeitai is more than noteworthy in hindsight, and it must be viewed as an important early demonstration to Ne Win that maintaining coercive intelligence and counterintelligence organizations were essential to maintaining authoritarian rule.”
Ne Win’s trusted intelligence chief for many years was his subordinate Brigadier General Tin Oo — not to be confused with the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Tin Oo, or Tin U, a retired general and former army chief. ‘MI Tin Oo’, as he became known, was trained by the US’s Central Intelligence Agency on the US-held Pacific island of Saipan in 1957, and so was Lay Maung, who rose to become a top jurist for the military and Myanmar’s foreign minister 1980-1981.
In those days, US support for Myanmar’s military was motivated by the fact that it fought against the insurgent Communist Party of Burma, but that cooperation came to an abrupt end in 1961 when the military and the People’s Liberation Army of China began joint operations against remnants of US-supported, nationalist Chinese Kuomintang forces who had been ensconced in eastern Shan State since their defeat in China’s civil war.
Even if judicial executions of political opponents were the exception rather than the rule, anyone suspected of having contacts with the political or ethnic opponents of Ne Win’s regime was likely to be arrested and tortured while in jail. The MIS also had its own prison and torture center, the infamous Yay Kyi Aing, or “Clearwater Pond”. Many political prisoners were tortured to death there and in other, smaller MIS-run jails all over the country. The MIS kept a watchful eye not only on ordinary citizens, but especially army officers with perceived liberal ideas, which apart from constant rotations, corruption and institutional brutality contributed to the remarkable cohesiveness of Myanmar’s armed forces.
MIS agents also watched politicized exiles living in Britain, West Germany, Thailand, Australia and the USA. For many years, mutual suspicion neutralized them as a political force because no one was ever sure who was an informant or not.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the MIS was becoming increasingly powerful, and, at the time, Rodney Tasker characterized MI Tin Oo in the Far Eastern Economic Review: “He and his MIS colleagues were men of the world compared with the other short-sighted, dogmatic figures in the Burmese leadership. They were able to travel abroad, talk freely to foreigners and generally look beyond the rigid confines of the corrupt regime….although ruthless, he built up a reputation as a gregarious, open-minded, charismatic figure — a direct contrast to some of his mole-like colleagues in the leadership.”
But in May 1983, Ne Win’s regime suddenly and unexpectedly announced that Tin Oo had been “permitted to resign” along with his former aide, Colonel Bo Ni. They had been purged ostensibly because their wives were corrupt — a charge that could be brought against any army officer in the country. Tin Oo and Bo Ni were subsequently jailed — and the entire MIS apparatus purged as well. The reason behind the move, however, remained a matter for conjecture. It was suggested at the time that the urbane MIS people had become too powerful for comfort and had almost managed to establish another state-within-a-state, which threatened Ne Win’s inner circle of hand-picked, less-than-intelligent yes men.
Whatever the reason behind the purge, it had immediate effects on the security situation in the country. On October 9, 1983, 21 people, including four visiting South Korean cabinet ministers, were killed in a powerful explosion in Yangon. Three North Korean military officers were behind the atrocity. One of them was killed in a shoot-out with Burmese security forces, while the other two were captured alive. One of the bombers was executed in 1985, the other remained in Yangon’s Insein Prison until he died of natural causes in 2008. Observers at the time believe that the incident would never have taken place if MI Tin Oo had still been in charge; it clearly indicated that the military intelligence apparatus was no longer what is used to be. A new intelligence chief, General Khin Nyunt, was appointed in 1984. His Directorate of the Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI) soon became almost as efficient as the old outfit, and Khin Nyunt in many ways also resembled Tin Oo; he was fairly young and reasonably bright, but could be exceedingly ruthless whenever this was considered expedient by the old dictator, Ne Win.
Less than four years after Khin Nyunt began rebuilding Myanmar’s shattered military intelligence apparatus, the country faced the largest civil unrest in its history. Millions of people nationwide marched against Ne Win’s regime and for a return to the democracy that the country had enjoyed before the 1962 coup. Any regime anywhere would have collapsed under the pressure of an entire population rising up against tyranny. That was not the case with Myanmar’s military-dominated regime, however. Thousands of people were gunned down in the streets of Yangon and elsewhere as the military stepped in, not to overthrow the government but to shore up a regime overwhelmed with popular protest. After the military had crushed the uprising, the DDSI was expanded. By 1991, nine new units were established and the DDSI also operated 19 detention centers, seven of them of Yangon, of which Yay Kyi Aing was still the most notorious. Undercover DDSI agents covered every movement of the NLD’s leaders and other opponents of the regime.
However in 2004 Khin Nyunt, who had become prime minister, was ousted and arrested along with up to 3,500 intelligence personnel countrywide, including some 300 senior officers. Khin Nyunt’s fall from grace followed the death of his mentor Ne Win in December 2002. The old general had been placed under house arrest earlier that year, allegedly because of the corrupt behavior of his daughter, Sanda Win, her husband Aye Zaw Win — and the couple’s three unruly grandsons, who had terrorized private businessmen in Yangon with demands for bribes and “protection money.” But few doubted that the move against Ne Win and his family came as preparation for the post-Ne Win era; to make sure that Khin Nyunt’s influence would be limited. The dictator, who had ruled with an iron fist for several decades, was cremated near his home in Yangon. The funeral was attended by a handful of family members and about 20 plainclothes military officers, none especially high-ranking.
Khin Nyunt’s ouster was not, as some reports in the foreign media at the time suggested, a power struggle between the “pragmatic” intelligence chief and “hardliners” within the military regime. A more plausible explanation for the purge was that Khin Nyunt and his DDSI had accumulated significant wealth through involvement in a wide range of commercial enterprises. They were building up a state within a state — like the old MI Tin Oo had done in the 1970s — and not sharing their riches with the rest of the military elite. Like Ne Win, the new dictator, Senior General Than Shwe, did not want to have any potential rivals around him, and Khin Nyunt clearly had political ambitions. He was a man not to be trusted.
Immediately following the ousting of Khin Nyunt, the latest intelligence outfit, the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence [the expanded DDSI], was dissolved and an entirely new organization established: the OCMSA, which was placed under more direct military control. It is highly unlikely that Lt- Gen Ye Win Oo will repeat the mistakes which MI Tin Oo and Khin Nyunt committed, and Min Aung Hlaing may, at least for the foreseeable future, be secure.
OCMSA remained active throughout the decade of openness from 2011 to 2021, carefully watching the activities of politicians, activists and journalists. But Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo and his men unleashed the full force of the organization’s most brutal operatives after the 2021 coup. According to the rights group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 3,194 people have been killed since then, while 17,075 people have been detained and 5,274 of them have been sentenced by a court. A total of 108 prisoners received the death penalty, 121 of them are in absentia. 150 are currently on death row awaiting execution. So far, according to AAPP’s data, 3,874 have been released from prison.
Until the 1988 uprising, Myanmar’s military intelligence conducted only limited operations overseas, mainly collecting information and giving the exiled community a scare. But after the dramatic events of the late 1980s and the subsequent flight of thousands of pro-democracy activists, especially to Thailand, its agents became more operational outside the country. Khin Nyunt’s right-hand man, Colonel Thein Swe sent thugs to beat up activists and, allegedly, ordered murders when he was defense attaché in Bangkok. In the early 1990s, the colonel built up an extensive network among diplomats, spies, informants and some media in Thailand. He was rewarded by being made the top-ranking intelligence officer under Khin Nyunt after he returned to Myanmar.
There is now every indication that the OCMSA is even more active in foreign countries. To the surprise of many, not only are regular operatives involved in keeping a watchful eye on activists, journalist and others in Thai cities like Chiang Mai and Mae Sot, but people who once played roles in the pro-democracy movement and the so-called “peace process” during the 2011-2016 U Thein Sein presidency have become informants.
At home in Myanmar, as The Irrawaddy has reported, old loyalties to military supremacy remain: even military intelligence operatives who were purged or sidelined in 2004 have been used as advisers. Among them are Colonel Ngwe Tun who was at the Defense Services Academy in Pyin Oo Lwin at the same time as Min Aung Hlaing, Lieutenant Colonel Nyan Linn, who in 1988 was responsible for distributing leaflets condemning democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Sai Aung Thein who used to serve in Kengtung in Shan State, Myint Htay, an operative who liaised with Pa-O militia leader Aung Kham Hti, Lin Mingxian, another militia leader at Mong La on the Myanmar-China border, and Thein Swe, the horror man of Bangkok who has become a Brigadier General. As Ne Win once put it, lukaun lutaw, which refers to his preference for promoting loyal cronies rather than talented persons. Significantly, Major General Kyaw Win, an intellectual who Than Shwe in 1993 appointed deputy head of DDSI to counterbalance the rising power of Khin Nyunt, has not been seen since the coup.
The future of the pro-democracy movement depends on its ability to understand the inner workings of Myanmar’s past and present military intelligence services [which to all intents and purposes have been a secret police], to map the current OCMSA’s activities, and counter them with increased vigilance in the streets — as well as in cyberspace. New, sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment, not available before, has been obtained from firms in Singapore and Israel. And with the military and its most repressive organ of power operating more closely than in the past, domestically as well as in foreign countries, the dangers are real..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-04-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Political History, Military History
Language:
more
Description:
"၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ဘဏ္ဍာငွေ ရှာဖွေရေး အစီအစဉ်တစ်ခု ဖြစ်သည့် PRF - ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး ထောက်ပို့ မိသားစု အစီအစဉ် စတင်ခဲ့သည့်အချိန်ကပင် ယနေ့ထက်တိုင် လစဉ်မပျက် ထည့်ဝင်ပေးခဲ့ကြသော ထောက်ပို့ မိသားစု ရဲဘော်များ ၊ Fundraiser များ နှင့် OFP အဖွဲ့ဝင်များအားလုံးကို ကျေးဇူး အထူး တင်ရှိပါကြောင်းနှင့် ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ဂုဏ်ပြုမှတ်တမ်းတင်အပ်ပါသည်။
၂။ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး ထောက်ပို့ မိသားစု အစီအစဉ်မှ တဆင့် (၁၅) လ တာ ကာလအတွင်း ဘဏ္ဍာငွေ ခန့်မှန်းအမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၉.၄၂) သန်း ရရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါ ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများကို ပြည်သူ့ ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်၊ တပ်ရင်း၊ တပ်ဖွဲ့များ၏ ရိက္ခာထောက်ပံ့ငွေအဖြစ် သုံးစွဲခဲ့ပြီး စုစုပေါင်း ရိက္ခာ ထောက်ပံ့ငွေ ၏ ၇၅ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းခန့်ကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးနိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
၃။ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေး ထောက်ပို့ မိသားစု အစီအစဉ်မှ ရရှိသည့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေ များကို စနစ်တကျလက်ခံ၍ တပ်ရင်းများ၏ ရိက္ခာဖူလုံရေးကိစ္စရပ်များတွင် အဓိက အသုံးပြုနေပြီး လစဉ် အသုံးပြုနေ မှုများကို သင့်တော်သလို သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း အသိပေးအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
194.21 KB
more
Description:
"The Burmese military announced on 28th March 2023 that it has banned 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), which has won every election it has been able to contest.
The ban follows the military demanding that the political parties reregister with the military-appointed Union Election Commission, something the parties refused to do as the military has no legitimacy or legal power to set election rules.
The Burmese military have arrested, killed, jailed and tortured NLD members, and closed their offices, but have never gone so far as to impose a complete ban. The ban is a sign of how desperate and insecure the Burmese military are as they face unprecedented resistance after their attempted coup began two years ago.
“The Burmese military banning 40 political parties should be a wake-up call to those in the international community who still think there can be genuine dialogue and compromise with the military,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “For decades the Burmese military has held the country back from building democracy, human rights, and economic development. The people of Burma want a future without the Burmese military and the international community should be supporting them in achieving that goal. At the present time, the Burmese military receives far more international support than Burma’s democracy movement, with even the USA and UK still dithering over whether to sanction gas revenues.”
There are no soft-liners or genuine reformers in the military waiting in the wings. The Burmese military is not an institution which can be reformed. Each leader is more hardline and brutal than the last. Even the so-called reform period during the 2010s saw a significant escalation of violence and human rights violations perpetrated against ethnic people in Burma, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The plodding pace of the implementation of sanctions enables the Burmese military to continue to receive revenue, arms and equipment, including aviation fuel, which it is using to commit violations of international law against the population of Burma.
“Faced with increased repression, airstrikes, artillery bombardments and a humanitarian crisis, the people of Burma need swift and decisive action to cut off revenue and arms to the Burmese military, including gas revenue and aviation fuel. The pace of sanctions implementation is simply too slow, and people are dying as a result,” said Mark Farmaner.
The 40 political parties listed in Burmese military-controlled state media are:
Lahu National Development Party
Democratic Party (Myanmar)
Kayen National Party
Ta’ang (Palaung) National Party
Party for Democracy and Peace
Shan Nationalities Democratic Party
Wunthanu Democratic Party
National Democratic Party for Development
Ethnic National Development Party (ENDP)
Kaman National Development Party
Bamar People’s Party
National League for Democracy
Democratic Party for a New Society
Myanmar National Congress Party
Asho Chin National Party
Shan National League for Democracy
United National Congress Party
National Prosperity Party
Dawei Nationalities Party
Federal Union Party
Union Pa-O National Organization
Khumi (Khami) National Party
Democratic Party for a New Society
Karen National Party
Mro National Democracy Party
Guiding Star Party
88 Generation Democracy Party
Lhaovo National Unity and Development Party
New Era Union Party
Zo National Region Development Party
National Development Party
Daingnet National Development Party
Arakan League for Democracy Party
Kayah State Democratic Party
National United Democratic Party (NUDP)
The Yeomanry Development Party (YDP)
Chin National League for Democracy Party
Chin National Party (CNP)
Kachin National Party
Alliance of Myanmar’s Worker and Farmer Party (AMWFP)..."
Source/publisher:
"Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of publication:
2023-03-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
more
Description:
"In this second installment of an interview, human rights campaigner Igor Blazevic asks security analyst Anthony Davis what changes we can expect to see this year in the Myanmar resistance’s armed campaign against the junta, as well as likely developments on the international front.
Blazevic: How effective are the resistance attacks on the stockpiles of arms and fuel? Can that be an effective tactic for the resistance?
Davis: Obviously ammunition supplies and aviation fuel are the lifeblood of the military. Without them a war cannot be sustained. The military understands that, and ammunition and fuel dumps will be extremely well protected, not only on the ground but also from drone attack. So, are they worthwhile targets? Absolutely, and I would hope that various ethnic resistance organizations and the Defense Ministry of the NUG are mapping very carefully where these dumps are and how effective security precautions are. There will always be weak spots. Identifying them may take weeks of covert surveillance but taking out a major fuel or ammo dump is a huge coup, materially and psychologically.
At this stage in the war, I’d be surprised to see this type of operation but it’s not impossible, and certainly a worthwhile objective.
Let me add one more aspect. Between fuel and ammunition dumps and various fronts, there are lines of supply along highways and rivers and that is really where the resistance can and must become more effective. That’s where the real vulnerability lies. But to hit supply convoys—and I know this from personal observation—you need well organized units of 20 or 30 men equipped with RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] and machine guns in addition to IEDs and assault rifles. Plus a level of resistance which is confident about operating along those lines of supply. If you look at the main roads between Yangon and Naypyitaw or Mandalay and Myitkyina, the resistance is probing those areas, but it doesn’t yet have either the confidence and/or probably the logistic support that would allow it to operate in strength. This probably comes further into the war.
Blazevic: What is the role of pro-junta militia? How important are they for the army and can they successfully add manpower to the military?
Davis: The military is putting a lot of stress on recruitment of these militia forces, so clearly they are regarded as important. Why? Because in the countryside, particularly in Sagaing and Magwe, they provide the military with eyes and ears. Many battalions have little or no familiarity with the township in which they operate. So, in terms of local intelligence, the Pyu Saw Htee militia and the villages they operate from are seen as adding to overall capability. How effective they are in purely military terms is another matter. They’re mostly untrained and poorly armed so in some areas may even be more of a liability than an asset if they require army troops to help them out.
Blazevic: How do you evaluate the NUG and resistance chain of command and coordination capacity between the PDFs and ethnic revolutionary organizations? Do you notice any improvement? Is command and coordination getting better or is the resistance still not achieving a sufficient level of coordination?
Davis: That’s an extremely important question and sitting in Bangkok I don’t have as clear an answer as I would like. But I would say that compared to this time last year, there has been significant improvement. We can see that particularly in Karen and Karenni [Kayah] states and also in southern townships of Kachin where they abut northeastern Sagaing. Is this sufficient to produce a strategic impact at this stage in the war? Not yet. One must hope that incremental, gradual success will accelerate matters. There is an old saying in English, “success breeds success,” and it’s very true.
It is obviously critically important that the NUG and its Defense Ministry is liaising regularly with allied ethnic military organizations—Kachin, Karen, Karenni and Chin—and maybe with others that are not direct allies. I believe that is the case already, but that liaison and confidence building must move forward.
At this stage in the war, this cannot and should not be about attempting to organize grand coordinated offensives involving different parts of the country which end up in disappointment and mistrust. It’s ideally about confidence building and sharing experience and best practices. Where improving battlefield coordination is really important is at the township and district levels. Achieving results there will involve ethnic forces with better weaponry and long experience extending operational and tactical command-and-control over new and inexperienced PDFs. This is a lot easier said than done, but it is still worth saying.
Blazevic: What could be the turning point in Myanmar?
Davis: An impossible question to answer, I don’t have a crystal ball. No one knows. Talking about the coming year is more useful and in that time frame personally I don’t foresee any dramatic turning points, more of a long, hard slog, a progression in which the resistance becomes more effective and hopefully better connected while the military finds it increasingly difficult to solve growing problems—military, economic and political. That would be my prediction for this coming year.
That process might be accelerated if there were policy shifts by external players. I’m thinking the United States, India and possibly Thailand, after the May elections. These are key players and it is not inconceivable that ongoing erosion of the military’s capabilities on the battlefield will encourage a corresponding shift in the policies of external actors towards the NUG and the resistance more generally—not overnight changes but slow shifts. To a degree this is something which is already happening on the diplomatic and aid fronts: no dramatic turning points but definitely shifting dynamics.
Blazevic: On several occasions Myanmar people have called for a no-fly zone. Is that something that can happen?
Davis: No, a no-fly zone is not going to happen. Period. Even if the Myanmar Air Force were to conduct major strikes against urban areas captured by resistance forces resulting in the deaths of hundreds, even thousands of civilians—something entirely in their playbook—a no fly zone will still not happen. Why? Because only the United States could enforce one and that would necessitate moving an entire carrier battle group into the Bay of Bengal at a time where the US Navy has its hands more than full in the Asian theater. Even more importantly, it would provoke a very severe reaction from China, diplomatic consternation in ASEAN, and imply US responsibility for the future of a post-Tatmadaw Myanmar at a time when Myanmar is nowhere near the top of US government priorities. Bottom line: this is not the post-Cold War era of the 1990s. We can forget it.
Igor: Let us look at other outside factors. What impact can Western sanctions have? Can the positions of Thailand and India be shifted? It doesn’t look promising so far.
Davis: Sanctions are important politically and symbolically. They reflect the interest of any given state or in the case of the EU, a group of states, to make clear that they are opposed to the military’s attempt to take over Myanmar. Sanctions play a symbolic role but it would be a big mistake to think that sanctions are going to have any real impact on the battlefield in Myanmar in the coming year or two.
Regarding Thailand and India, you said that things don’t look very hopeful. I don’t think that’s necessarily the case if the resistance, PDFs plus ethnic armed organizations can achieve a degree of military momentum. This year is going to be an important, even decisive year in terms of defining trajectories—who’s going up, who’s going down. It won’t be about final victory, but if the resistance can demonstrate military momentum in the right direction that will necessarily impact the policies of important neighbors like India and Thailand. There are unlikely to be official statements, but things will likely shift on the borders in a way that reflects the changing dynamics inside Myanmar. So the military dynamic inside Myanmar is key: that’s what will influence what foreigners think and do, not the other way around.
Blazevic: Can the Myanmar resistance get some military support from outside? Is the US slowly shifting in that direction or is that an unrealistic expectation for the time being?
Davis: It is important to define the terms here. If you’re talking about an arms pipeline, a process of resupply over a period of time with a military objective in mind, I don’t believe there is any possibility of any external player looking to institute such a pipeline.
However, what I am suggesting is that as the military dynamic in Myanmar shifts, you may see states on Myanmar’s borders—Thailand and India most importantly—becoming more inclined to “look the other way” to what weapons are crossing the border courtesy of the “private market”. I’m not suggesting either of those states would agree to join with the West in moving truckloads of weapons to the resistance—even assuming the West were interested in providing weapons. But as they realize the Myanmar military is slowly sinking in this quagmire, they may gradually look to hedge their bets and ask themselves whether the internal conflict dynamics are changing the map? How does that impact our border security? Who do we need to be talking to and dealing with?
Blazevic: Could that include MANPADS—man-portable air defense systems?
Davis: It’s difficult to see that happening. MANPADS are extremely problematic at a range of levels—political, logistical, and in broader security terms. And the resistance as a potential beneficiary is itself far too fragmented. Even assuming an external actor were interested to supply them, to make a difference on the battlefield the resistance would need a supply chain: one or two would achieve nothing. And then you have the problem of where they end up. If you can shoot down an air force jet with a surface-to-air missile, you might also possibly sell it to somebody who wants to shoot down a civilian airliner taking off from Don Mueang airport outside Bangkok. So, risks at every turn. What has happened in Ukraine—and there is no shortage of risk there—is almost certainly not going to happen in Myanmar.
Blazevic: Can Russia be the game changer in Myanmar? Or is Russia simply too weak because of the war in Ukraine to play a game-changing role as it has done in Syria.
Davis: Even without the Ukraine war, Russia was never going to be a game-changer in Myanmar. It would be near impossible to imagine Russia intervening militarily in support of the Naypyitaw regime as it did in Syria, where it had real strategic concerns. But beyond that it’s a solid marriage of convenience in which both parties need the other. We understand the diplomatic and geopolitical implications of Russia’s problems. For its part, the Myanmar military already relies heavily on a range of Russian equipment and is diplomatically thrilled to have at least one admirer.
Practically though what more can this marriage produce? The Myanmar Air Force might benefit from spare parts and perhaps Russian advice in niche areas like air mobile operations, where their record has been unimpressive. But beyond that, actual Russian systems they might need more of—such as attack helicopters or additional Mi-17 transport helicopters or even basic Kamaz trucks—the Russians clearly need themselves. When it comes to fixed-wing aircraft, the Myanmar Air Force can certainly make do with what it has.
At the end of the day, the military is struggling to prosecute a scorched-earth counterinsurgency campaign against their own population, not a high-intensity conventional war. And as we already discussed, their problem is fundamentally about manpower and potentially logistics, not a lack of big-ticket equipment be it from Russia or anywhere else.
There’s also a lot of talk about economic and nuclear cooperation, and even tourism, which unless you’re a Russian male looking to avoid a one-way ride to the front in Ukraine, is something of a joke. But all this talk presupposes that the Myanmar military can reestablish a credible degree of security in the country, which in the coming years is unlikely. So, everything in the non-military sphere is probably more talk than substance.
Anthony Davis is a Bangkok-based security consultant and analyst with extensive field experience on a range of armed conflicts across Asia. He writes primarily for Janes, a security and defense publishing house..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"It was a fraught, reluctant, but urgent and necessary operation. We could rightly call it an “escape mission”.
It was not the first time I had been forced to flee my home country to avoid political persecution—that occurred in 2000, a year after I was freed from the previous military regime’s gulag. Twenty-two years later, I found myself with no choice but to make my escape once again, for the same reason.
It was this month last year—Feb. 23, 2022 to be precise—exactly one year and 23 days after the military seized power, overthrowing an elected government and launching its reign of terror over a population that now lives in fear of arrest, torture and death at the hands of the regime. Its endless violent crackdown on dissent has forced countless anti-coup protesters, students, politicians, artists and members of various professions, including journalists, to flee the country.
A few hours before sunrise on that day in Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city, a colleague and I headed for a previously arranged location where an unknown driver would be waiting for us. Minutes later, two more colleagues joined us, and the young but calm driver wordlessly drove his old van into the darkness. His assignment was to take us to a remote border town; our mission was to flee our country.
It was something we hated to do.
In the van, it was still too dark to see each other, and we traveled in silence. But I could feel that all of the passengers were overwhelmed with worry and sorrow. For them, it must have been an unfamiliar feeling, as it was the first time they had undertaken such a journey. As for the driver, he must have had concerns of his own: Though he didn’t know we were journalists, he knew he was transporting “fugitives” fleeing the junta’s arbitrary persecution.
Fear of being detained by junta security forces before reaching our destination mingled with the sorrow of leaving our homes and loved ones behind, along with everything that we held dear, or that was simply familiar: a cracked or stained coffee mug; an old dining table around which family members would sit to eat every meal; a stained wall, empty, or perhaps with a tilted painting or yellowing, framed family photograph hung on it; the smell of one’s bed; the stuffy air in one’s rooms or the way sunlight shines through a particular window; a beloved pet; even the everyday noises of the neighborhood—and too many more to name. Nothing can replace such things, nothing feels more valuable or beautiful once taken away. Together, such things, I believe, add up to what we think of as “home”. Without them, there is no home, just a building. Their absence creates a powerful nostalgia for home.
Yes, leaving home was something we all hated to do. But we had to do it to survive.
Three days earlier, junta troops had arrested one of our admin staff who knew the home addresses of all of The Irrawaddy’s employees, including the editors and reporters. He was forced to show the authorities where we lived, making it necessary for us to leave our homes immediately. The group of us in the van were one of the last groups from our publication to leave the country.
After the junta’s ruthless and bloody crackdown on nationwide peaceful anti-coup protests in the early months of 2021, following the coup on Feb. 1, tens of thousands of people fled their homes and many of them left the country. Among them were many dozens of journalists.
As it confronts the sheer scale of the anti-regime movement, the military regime has identified as one of its main enemies the news media, in particular the journalists whose work daily exposes the true colors of the coup leaders—their cruel, inhumane and immoral acts against the entire population. Their work has made the media an enemy of the regime. Myanmar was the world’s third-worst jailer of journalists, with at least 42 journalists behind bars, at the time of the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Dec. 1, 2022 prison census.
In those early days I made the risky—some of my friends said daring—decision to stay inside the country to continue to work as an editor for The Irrawaddy, which by this time had been charged under various repressive laws. I thought I would be able to hide, periodically shifting locations, while continuing to work. In early March, one month after the coup, I went into hiding. This life of concealment and disguising myself in public was manageable for a year, but eventually, moving from one hiding place to another became untenable due to the junta’s oppressive laws, such as the mandatory guest and household registrations, not to mention its manhunt operations targeting us. Friends who offered to hide me at their places became concerned for their own safety, as they were helping a “fugitive journalist”.
With the security situation deteriorating, the arrest of our staff member forced me and my colleagues to make the difficult decision to flee the country. It was an unwanted outcome but the only practical one if we were to survive.
Our car had to stop at every one of the many security checkpoints we encountered throughout the trip. The driver, however, was prepared, and knew how to deal with police and military personnel: He slipped a roll of cash into the palm of the security guard at every checkpoint. He had prepared many rolls of cash ahead of time; his method worked—we were never seriously asked to identify ourselves.
We fled because it’s simply not worth getting arrested, tortured and given lengthy prison sentences, if not killed, for doing the work that is our calling—our work with the pen, with words. No citizen of my country deserves to live and work under this brutal junta and its generals, or any kind of dictatorship or authoritarianism. Our country has endured six decades of this. That should be enough, but it has yet to end. Of course, no one deserves such ruthless rulers; the Ukrainians don’t deserve Vladimir Putin’s invasion and war, either.
I endured plenty of what I didn’t deserve—to understate matters—under the previous regime. As a 19-year-old student, I was handed a 10-year prison sentence for my peaceful anti-regime activities, including publishing a pro-democracy journal, after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. I managed to survive that harsh eight-year incarceration in two notorious prisons. For what? To carry on what I started—my own revolution against authoritarianism and military dictatorship.
In 2000, one year after my release, I fled my country for the first time, vowing not to be jailed again. In the 13 years of exile that followed, I worked as a journalist, dedicating myself to exposing the real nature of Myanmar’s cruel, greedy generals and other powerful figures. I survived exile, just as I had survived prison. For what? To tell stories: Not only horrific stories of the regime’s inhumanity, but also stories of the resilience of the Myanmar people. To share them with those citizens of our world lucky enough to be spared such experiences, as well as for the future generations, for whom our stories contain valuable lessons of survival.
In the days following the coup in 2021, my friends urged me to leave the country immediately. They said it wasn’t worth it, risking another lengthy imprisonment. But I was stubborn, determined to continue my work from hiding. Why? Because I wanted to share with the world the stories of our people who were suffering and fighting against the brutal regime—I wanted to tell these stories from the ground.
Now, though, having been forced from my country for a second time, I have come to believe that the decision to leave was the correct one—that I need to survive this time, too. The reason is the same: to be able to tell the stories of our terrible, all too “interesting”, times—starting with my own experiences of life under the dictatorship.
After a 12-hour drive, we arrived at a town on the Thai border. The driver took us to a meeting point where a four-wheeled pickup waited for us. The drivers greeted each other familiarly; they seemed to have conducted many such missions since the coup. We moved straight from the van into the second vehicle, a four-wheeled pickup, which set off after a brief exchange of words between the two drivers. Our new driver was actually an officer from an ethnic rebel group. While driving through rebel-held territory he told us that, due to the heightened security situation along the border, his group had stopped smuggling people out of the country. He had made an exception in our case, however, as he had been told that our group was very important. He said: “You are VIPs. That’s why.” I am sure many “VIPs” preceded us in this journey. We thanked him.
A couple of hours later, we reached our destination. All things considered, it was a relatively quick and safe experience. Some of our colleagues weren’t so lucky. Traveling with a baby they endured a horrific, two-day-long ordeal on a different route, though they eventually made it out too.
Our mission was to escape from the hell of military rule.
Mission accomplished. We survived.
But escaping the junta’s persecution was just our first mission. As journalists, our new and greater mission is to continue to report and write about what’s going on in our country under the ruthless military regime, and to explain the larger truths beyond the headlines, both to our own citizens and the world.
The morning after our arrival, all of us did exactly what we had been doing in hiding for the past year: We turned on our laptops. This is the job we have been doing for many years. The difference is that we are no longer in our homes, or in our country. To be suddenly wrenched away from our homes, our loved ones and our cherished belongings leaves one vulnerable to nostalgia. But in nostalgia, along with the slight sadness, there is a positive side, something I remember feeling in my first exiled life: a positive, even pleasurable energy with the power to motivate someone who has been forced from their home to strive to find a way to return.
For me, it’s the beginning of my second life in exile. The first kept me from home for 13 years. For my colleagues, it’s the beginning of their first such life. The bitter truth is that nobody knows how long it will take this time, either. Well… it should no longer matter to me. I am what I am, as I chose who I am. I am sure this rings true for my dedicated colleagues, other journalists and the countless resolute citizens of our country who have been forced to leave their homes for acting in the service of their country.
At the very least, we all need to survive to see the fall of the dictatorship.
That still greater mission remains unaccomplished…"
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more