HRW statement (2)

[UBeyda@xxxxxxx]

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BURMA: AN ANALYSIS 

By: Tun Kyaw Nyein, Ph. D. 
Date: Oct (?) 1995

There is a lull in the political situation today. Since the release of Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest last July, nothing seems to have changed
much. In fact, the arrest of politicians, forced labor and other human rights
abuses continue without let up.   Daw Suu's calls for negotiations remain
unheeded, and the threat of US sanctions have receded. By all accounts things
seem to be business-as- usual for the SLORC these days. Despite this studied
nonchalance on their part, things aren't really all that hunkydory for the
SLORC. Their legitimacy is doubtful at best, foreign government and
international organizations regard them with opprobrium, investment and
foreign aid are not as forthcoming as they would like to see, and above all,
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's popularity ratings remain as high as ever both inside
and outside the country. Beyond that, there is an ever deepening  economic
polarization within a society rife with discontent and resentment against the
generals. 
Given this context, it is conceivable that the SLORC will make a move toward
negotiation with Daw Suu albeit, with an unacceptable proposal as a political
ploy to enhance their power position rather than as a genuine move toward
reconciliation and democratization.
 The following is an attempt to conceptualize a  pro-active strategy for such
an eventuality.       
   
Conceptually, democratic transition can  occur along two pathways: 
1) elite-centered transition or top down model ; 
2) grassroots level change or bottom- up transition model .

Presently, the democratic forces led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi are engaged in a
strategic interaction with  the SLORC preponderantly along the first model. In
strategic terms, it implies power transfer or power sharing  To date, this
strategy has served more to the advantage of the SLORC than to that of the
opposition .

Back in 1988, the popular uprising  for democracy suffered from lack of a
well-defined  leadership to see it through to ultimate victory. Today,  an
organized elite of the democratic forces have evolved and rallied behind the
internationally renowned leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. At the same time,
the struggle itself has gravitated toward an elite- centered transition
strategy. This  narrows down the focus of  the struggle to  a single variable
- Daw Aung San Suu Kyi- allowing the SLORC  the luxury of having to manipulate
and deal with only one variable (Daw Suu ) in their political calculus.  They
released Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest without any accompanying
movement toward democratization. Yet, they managed to placate some potential
donor governments with this move and reap  political and financial benefits.
It is  likely that they will repeat this maneuver with regard to calls for
negotiations with the opposition led by Daw Suu.  Conceivably, they can come
to the negotiation table  with a deal that is anything but acceptable, and
subsequent to it's rejection by the opposition, heap the blame on  Daw Suu's
intransigence and hunger for power etc and then  reap more political and other
benefits such as aid and acquiescence from potential donor nations.   

Potentially, an effective strategy to promote human rights and democracy at
this juncture,  would be to engage the SLORC concurrently along both models of
democratic transition -a dual tract approach.. This strategy would stipulate
two components, each with a corresponding primary objective: 1) (elite-
centered )  to effect a  sharing of or  transfer of power , and,  2)
(grassroots level) to effect grassroots level democratization /establishment
of a  civil society. 
    
With regard to the  elite-centered component, the theme is "reconciliation"
but the real issue is integration of Daw Suu and civilian democratic elements
into the polity i.e will they or will they not share or more improbably
transfer power to the opposition elite who in turn will initiate
democratization.. Under existing circumstances,  prospects for success along
this road look very bleak. What is reasonable to anticipate is an unacceptable
deal from the SLORC and to formulate a strategy to counter this likely
political ploy.  The push for bottom up/grassroots level  democratization
strategy should serve to that end.  

Grassroots-centered democratization in general, implies establishment of a
civil society. In real terms, it means convincing or pushing for the SLORC  to
allow  state- independent organizations/associations to function. Challenging
as it is, adoption of this second strategy, at the least , will open up new
fronts vis a vis the SLORC and throw additional variables into the SLORC's
political calculus.

Theoretically, it is possible to push for a common goal (democracy and civil
society) employing different means which may be issue-oriented or utility-
oriented. For example:
			
  Issue: 	   Socio-economic :    
  Utility: 	  Actual grass root democratization nidus.
  Vehicle:       Non-political, non-profit,  voluntary organizations along
American 	            Cancer  Society, American Heart Association, HIV/AIDS
			  Environmental organizations.
Rationale:  -Regardless of who is in power, environmental degradation such as
deforestation, soil depletion, species extinction exist and are
deteriorating with grave socio-economic impact. Community and
voluntary based educational approach to such problems will allow 
		the govt. to concentrate limited resources on infrastructure
		development. 
3. Issue: 	Cultural 			 					 	
    Utility:	Grass-root democratization nidus
    Vehicle:    Association to promote awareness and prevent loss of cultural
artifacts 		and antiques.
Rationale: 	In line with SLORC's cultural promotion objective. Loss of
antiques 		etc. from the country through illegal export.

 note*  	 Religious, and Moral Development  issues could also be utilized
		along same line.

 Widening the Front 
Even if the SLORC rejects establishment of any or all of these  grassroots
organization, they will still be worth striving for.

If allowed, Daw Suu could link her Foundation to the diverse socioeconomic ,
cultural and religious causes. and expand political space for herself.
This grass roots strategy would also allow  pro-democracy elements positioned
differently along the entire spectrum of political posture, to work toward the
common goal in an integrated manner.  Those who have assumed "Down with
dictatorship"  approach can emphasize  the removal of restraints on political
parties issue for example, while those in a moderate posture can advocate for
non-profit organizations with the knowledge of and mutual acknowledgment that
each in his or her own position is working toward a common goal. Hopefully, a
common overall strategy,  if it can be put in place , will foster better
cohesion and coordination between diverse elements within the democracy for
Burma movement.
International efforts may also be applied toward these broadened objectives.
It may well be that when push comes to shove, conceding on these grass root
demands 
may appear more palatable for SLORC to accommodate. If that turns out to be
the case, it still means a measure of progress for the democratic forces.