URGENT NEWS - Rakhines Slain By Ind

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Rakhines Slain By India Army


BLOOD AND SAND

SANDAY (India)

31 May-6 June 1998

By Soumen Datta/ Port Blair and Ne Delhi with Anish Gupta, and Sourabh
Sen
Calcutta

'The Army Is Trying To Scupper a CBI Investigation Into "Operation Leeh"
In
The Andamans.' What Are They Try To Hide? SUNDAY Investigate The Real
Story

        It was Quiet. It was precise. It was brutal. It was hell in the
 archipelago
that will go down as the most astounding encounter staged by India's war
machine. As a counterinsurgency operation, its build-up, maneuvers and
subtle
subterfuge had all the qualities of small-scale military offensive. Yet,
in
the end, not many of those who took part in this exercise-code-named
"Operation Leech"-would perhaps like to cherish its memory, tainted as
it may
be by the blood of friends and the guilt that goes with betrayal.
        On 12 February, Maj. Gen. S.C. Chopra, additional
direct-general,
 military
operations, ministry of defense, told the press in New Delhi that India
security forces had intercepted, on 11 February, a major gang of
international
gunrunners supplying weapons to different secessionist groups in the
north-
east. The story unfurled further in follow-ups that claimed that a joint
operation mounted by the army, navy, air force and Coast Guards had
successfully aborted a clandestine shipment of lethal weapons valued at
around
US$ 1 million.
        In the skirmish that ensued, six gunrunners were said to be have
 killed in an
encounter-their bodies lost to the heaving sea-73 other arrested, four
vessels
impounded and huge cache of arms and ammunition recovered. The operation
was
apparently mounted following receipt of impeccable military intelligence
about
the movement of the smugglers. It was touted as the biggest seizure of
the
sophisticated weapons being landed on India territory since the Purulia
Arms
Drop in December 1995. For India's security personnel, it was yet
another
feather in their already-crowed cap.
        But is this the real story?
        When SUNDAY reached Port Blair on 7 March, the authorities,
including
 the
army, navy, and the Coast Guard, were surprisingly tight-lipped about an
incident that should normally have been trumpeted as a major success
story.
The officialdom was extremely secretive, withholding information on the
plea
of safeguarding "national security interests".
        The A&N headquarters was teeming with sleuths of every hue.
Among the
agencies that had flown in their topnotch officers were CBI, the
Intelligence
Bureau (IB), RAW, the Subsidiary Intelligence Branch (SIB), the Military
Intelligence Unit (MIU) and SIT, each trying to prise out information.
And
SUNDAY sources within some of these agencies were hinting at a cover-up
and
rising unsavory questions.
        Were the arrested men, and those who were killed, professional
 gunrunners
carrying arms for the north-east., or were they member of Arakan Army
(AA),
the military wing of National United Party of Arakan (NUPA), which is
fighting
the repressive Myanmarnese junta for separate Arakan state? Could they
have
been lured into a trap and stabbed in the back by the India authorities,
who
after propping them up to placate Myanmar's dictators in council?

        Preparation for the assault had begun several days in advance.
>From 3
February onward, the quietude of Landfall, an uninhabited island 250 km
off
Port Blair in the pristine Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) archipelago, was
shattered by unprecedented flurry of activities.
        Thee vessels-GGS Vivek. CGS Ganga Devi, CGS Lakhmibai-belonging
to the
 Cost
Guards, and two-LUC-33 and LUC-35-belonging to navy, had sailed from
Port
Blair.
        Two other naval ships-INS Santvti, INS Vindhyagiri-brought in
crack
 marine
commandos (Marcos) and hardware from Visakhapatnam, headquarters of
Eastern
Naval Command. And all seven ships, with 180 sailors and officers, took
up
position in a line between Landfall and Narcondum Islands.
        Five helicopters belonging to the air force (two MI-8s), navy
(two
 MI-8s) and
the Coast Guard (one Chetak) did sorties from Madras, Car Nicobar and
the
Brichgunj cantonment near Port Blair, ferrying in men and material.
        Aircraft based at navel base INS Utkroh in Port Blair flew
several
 sorties to
Landfall and East Islands with a few army officers. Among them was
Lt-Col.
A.J. Grewal, a military intelligence officer.  There is, however,
confusion
regarding his initials. Some say his name is P.S. Grewal, other seem to
know
him as Vijay Grewal. He is believed to have been born in Mayanmar and
was in
touch with Myanmarese military intelligence.
        Lt.Col. Grewal, say intelligence sources, was the key man in
this
 operation.
They say he speaks Burmese fluently, and had apparently visited Myanmar
and
Thailand in January this year. That he did go to Bangkok has also been
confirmed by SUNDAY's sources in NUPA from Arakan.
        By the time the sun went down on 9 February, everything was in
place.
 The net
had been perfectly laid to trap an approaching flotilla of four
vessels-two
speedboats and two fishing trawlers-that had already reached the
vicinity of
Narcondam Island, about 140 nautical miles from Landfall. And as night
fell,
the India armada waited.
        One vision of what happened in the next 36 hours can be had from
the
 FIR
filed on 18 April-seven days after the incident by R.S. Dhankar,
Lieutenant
Commander, Deputy Naval Provost Marshal, for Fortress Commander,
Commander
A.S. Rai, A&N, with the station house officer, central crime section of
the
A&N Police.
              It says: "Hard intelligence was received that a
consignment of
arms, ammunition and equipment was being brought by some foreign
nationals to
Landfall Island in trawlers/speed boats. They were reported to be of
South
East Asia n region. Intelligence sources intimated that the purpose of
bringing the arms, ammunition, stores and equipment to Landfall Island
was to
subsequently trans-ship them illegally to terrorists/militant outfits in
north
eastern states of India via Cox Bazar in Bangladeshà
        "A joint tri-services operation was lunched on 09 Feb 98 to
apprehend
 the
foreigners along with their arms, ammunition and equipment. Coast Guard
ships
and Police were also used in the operation. The operation progressed
successfully and resulted in the capture of 73 foreign nationalsàsix
foreign
national tried to escape into the adjoining area while operating fire
with
their weapons on our troops. Our troops immediately responded in self
defense
and fatally injured six of them whilst in the water. They were seen
disappearing in the sea and presumed dead. After a search none of the
six
bodies could be recovered."
        Dhankar also stated that the 73 arrests men were to be handed to
over
 (to the
civil authority) at Camp Bell Bay, but requested that the "arms,
ammunition
and equipment" be allowed to be retained by the army/navy for further
investigation. "The same," he declared, "will be produced as and when
desired
by the court."

 Within days of the FIR, the Government of India (GOI) ordered a CBI
probe.
        It was an open-and-shut case as far as the defense establishment
was
concerned. Some foreign nationals, abating terrorism in the north-east
has
been killed in an encounter, their accomplices arrested, and arms
seized. The
services had jointly acted on the basic of tip-offs given by military
sources
and had succeeded. And there, on that victorious note, the matter should
have
rested. Such encounter, in the interest of national security, are not
unusual
in Kashmir and even in the north-east. The CBI is rarely, if at all,
asked to
meddle in such cases.
        But here, the OGI's decision to put the CBI on the trail seemed
to
 suggest
there was more to it than meet the eye.
        CBI sources say the Union home ministry asked them to
investigate
 after the
army's hush-hush attitude had fuelled speculation in the local press and
had
sent the A&N administration into a tizzy.
        On 12 February, newspapers in Port Blair carried reported of a
joint
 anti-
smuggling operation by the navy and the army the day before, but the A&N
administration had been kept in the dark. And even though days passed,
the
civic administration wasn't informed, nor was any FIR field. Besides,
the
arrested men had neither been headed over to the police nor produced in
court
even three days after their arrest, when, by law, is mandatory to do so
within
24 h ours.
        Sources in Port Blair told SUNDAY that in order to cover its own
back,
 the
A&N administer pressured the fortress commander to file a case. A&N
inspector
 -
general of police Y.R. Dhuriya took a personal initiative to make the
defense
establishment conform to law.
        The services complied on 18 February by formally filing an FIR
and
 handing
over the detained foreigners. But the arms, ammunition, and other
hardware
seized in the operation-which form vital part the body of evidence-were
withheld. Only a list of materials was provided.
        Since then, it has a period of unbroken silence. Even three
months
 after
taking up the case, the CBI is nowhere near filling a chare-sheet
against the
detainees. In fact, they are likely to be set free by the court because
of the
CBI's failure to frame charges within 90 days of their arrest.
        CBI sources in New Delhi told SUNDAY on condition of anonymity
that
 the
defense authorities have completely stonewalled the investigation by
refusing
to cooperate.
        More than three months after the incident, the seized weapons
have not
 been
handed over to the CBI despite several requests attempts to interrogate
defense personnel who took part in the operation have been repeatedly
blocked
and relevant log books and papers sought by the investigators are yet to
reach
them. "The defense authorities are deliberately adopting dilatory
tactics,"
complain CBI sources.
        CBI officers even say that the deadlock has been refereed to the
PMO
 but are
special about being allowed to go the whole hog given the nature of the
case.
Its sensitivity can be gauged from the bulk of information so far
gathered
from the detained foreigners. And their version of what has happened on
9
February and after is completely different from the story contained in
the
defense FIR.

THERE was no encounter, the detainees have told the Andaman police in
Port
Blair. If anything, it was cold-blooded manslaughter.
        Their story began on the night of 8 February. They were members
of the
 AA,
which fighting Burmese ethnic domination and the State Peace and
Development
Council (SPDC), Myanmar's repressive military junta. The contingent also
had a
few members of AA the Karen National Army (KNA), an ally of the AA in
its
anti-junta fight. "I along with my leader told me, in Landfall Island,
we have
no problem. India government allow us all times," recounted one the
detainees.
        There were 43 of them when they sailed out of the Thai waters in
two
speedboats laden with sophisticated arms. They were to briefly halt at
Landfall and then proceed to be sent to their comrades in the Arakan
hills.
        On their way to Landfall, they accosted and captured two Thai
trawlers
 with
36 fishermen for refusing to pay a "routine tax" to the AA. Now, four
boats,
with 79 men in all, sailed again, reaching Narcondum Island at 7 pm on 9
February.
        They were already aware of India ships stationed off Landfall
Island.
Ordinary poachers or smuggles would have fled immediately. But these
boats
waited, confidently.
        Khing Raza, a NUPA politburo member and commander-in-chief of
the
 Arakan Army
and leader of the mission, had once spoken to Saw tun, his number two,
over
the wireless before the boats reached Narcondum. In accordance with
their
plan, explain, explained the detainees, Saw Tun had already arrived at
Landfall with India Army officers, who were there to receive the
Arakanese
boats. And now, from Narcondum, Khing Raza contacted Saw Tun again over
the
VHF, informing his deputy about his arrival. Nothing happened after
that.
"That night we slept near Narcondum Island," said one detainee.
        The next morning at 10 am the wireless crackled again. On the
other
 end was
Saw Tun calling from Landfall. He told Khin Raza that it was times to
start
for Landfall, and response to that beckoning call the flotilla weighed
anchor.
The smaller speedboat, said to be fitted with Volvo engines capable of
doing
35 knots per hour, surged ahead of the rest. It carried on doing board
Khing
Raza, and his close comrades Pado Mulway (in-charge of AA marine
operation),
Captain Myint Shwe (of Karen National Army) and Pho Cho, the vessel's
pilot.
        When the speedboats, with trawlers in tow, boldly passed the
through
 the
cordon of naval ships and reached Landfall towards the evening the
evening,
they were warmly welcomed by a reception party that included among
others Lt-
Col. Grewal. Apparently, there was much handshaking and embracing. Five
bottles of rum were produced and toasted raised a small camp site was
cleared
food was arranged and there was merrymaking around the campfire that
night.
That very evening, they were asked to display their weapons. The request
did
not strike them as ominous or even fishy. The arms were unloaded from
the
speedboats and laid on the shore in full vies of the Indian armymen.
        At 8am on 11 February, an India naval ship was seen taking up
 position
close to Landfall Island. The unsuspecting Arakanese solders were told
in
Myanmarese that an Indian leader would soon arrive by helicopter and
breakfast
would be "taken together" once he arrived. Moments later, six top
members of
the AA were led away by two Indian officers inside a patch of forest "to
greet
the leader at the helicopter landing point." Among them were Khing Raza,
Saw
Tun, and Padu Mulway.
        And as soon as the six disappeared into the wood, Indian 
securitymen
brandished their carbines and ordered the rest to threw up their hands.
They
did. They had no choice. And as they stood with their hands raised they
were
blindfolded and their hands tiled bu Indiam soldiers. Minutes past as
they
stood helplessly on the sands. Then they heard what they thought was the
whirr
of a sescending chiioer. And the unmistakable sound of gun shots.
        They then never saw the six men again.

WHY are the defense forces stonewalling the CBI investigation? Are these
men
mere gunrunners "waging war" against India as claimed by the fortress
commander in his FIR, or are they indeed members of the Arakan Army who
have
had closed links with India defense establishment? Did India decide to
double
cross and liquidate the cream of the Arakanese rebel force to please the
Maynamrese junta?
        Home secretary B.P Sight has gone on record saying that the
India Army
 had
been tipped off about the arms shipments by the Myanmarese authorities.
The
defense force had, according to him, acted on the basis of that
information.
        But this appears to be a piece of disinformation in the light of
the
 claims
made by NUPA in a letter, dated 25 April to India defense minister.
        The letter written by Khin Maung in-charge of foreign affair,
NUPA,
 stated
following:
À "Those who have been caputed min the incident of Operation Leech on
the
Andaman Islands on February 11 this year are the members of our
organization,
NUPA and AA. They are neither armed smugglers nor gunrunners to
anti-India N-E
rebels.
À "They are our men carrying our own belongings for our Arakan
independence
war against the Burmese colonists."
Next, the NUPA goes on to add what it calls three "extraordinary points"
that
show the India Army's close ties with the AA and expose the India
defense
establishment's complicity in this so-called gunrunning expedition that
was
frustrated by Operation Leech.
À  The India military intelligence officer Col. Grewal had been fully
briefed
about the 8 February AA expedition on 8 January. Detailed photos of
combat and
non-combat materials and the list of men who were to be on the broad had
also
been given to him.
À To have army-to-army relationship, Saw Tun, the CEC of NUPA and member
of
the military committee of AA was assigned as an equivalent of military
attachÚ
to deal with the India defense service through Col. Grewal.

SUNDAY is in possession of a copy of this NUPA letter along with lists
of AA
fighters and the arms involved. There is also the copy of a letter by
Khin
Raza dated 13 February 1997, authorizing Saw Tun to deal with the India
defense authorities.
        SUNDAY also spoke to Khin Maung, NUPA's foreign affair in-charge
and
 the
writer of the letter. How could he be sure that  Lt-Col  Grewal had been
informed about the AA expedition in Thailand in January? " Because I was
there,"  said Maung.  "Crewal was in Bangkok between  8a nd 10 January,
staying  in a hotel with Saw Tun , discussing the plan ."
         So, what was Grewal doing with Saw Tun, a senior member of AA's
military committee in Bangkok? And for that matter, what was he doing
with Saw
Tun in Delhi  on 5th  February ,six days before the Arakanese rebel
leader was
to be slain on Landfall ?
                SUNDAY sources in Delhi  say Saw was in the capital that
day
and had met the army officer.    Saw Tun disclose the sources, had left
Delhi
on the morning of 6th February by an Indian Air Force plane.
                They are unable to say Where Saw Tun went directly from
Delhi,
but insist that he was to be present at Landfall Inland along with
Indian
defense personal to receive the Arakanese mission being led by Khaing
Raza.
Significantly, the accounts of the detainees do seem to corroborate this
piece
of information.
        What's more the seizer list accompanying the FIR lodged by the
 fortress
commander is a major giveaway. Among the many things included in the
"list of
other items" under "Exhibit D" are 50 pieced of Arakan Army vests and 12
pairs
of Arakan Army uniform (pant and shirt). Also seizers were "Burma
Map/Charts."
These materials do seem to suggest very strongly that the men involved
were
indeed member of the AA.
        So what had really happened at Landfall? The vision of A&N
Fortress
 Commodore
A.S. Rai and those of the captives vary wildly. Were some of the slain
men
indeed liaising with India Army for nearly a year as claimed by NUPA?
Were six
actually killed in encounter as claimed in the FIR or were they shot, as
the
captives say, after being received and feted as friends? Was Operation
Leech
convincing victory against international gunrunners or did it amount to
human
rights violation of the most despicable kind? And why, may we ask, are
the
defense authorities frustrating the CBI's efforts to investigate?
        Three months have already passed since the incident and the
detainees
 have
been given bail, as the CBI failed to produce a charge-sheet within the
mandatory 90 days. The captured men have, however, been reasserted on
charged
of unlawful entry.
        Perhaps it is time for the Center to intervene. The country
surely
 deserves
to know the truth. The whole truth.

                                         ***************

 Note by The Rangoon Post Working Group: Col. Gerwal, according to a U.S
intelligence source in condition of anonymity, was born in Shwe Bo,
Madalay
Division. His name in Burmese is Khin Maung Myint. He earned a science
degree
from Rangoon University. His age now is about 47. Col. Gerwal handed
four
defectors from Burmese Army to the SLORC in 1996-97. He as well handed a
student to the Burmese regime in 1996.